Blake v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah L. Boardman on 5/7/2024. (c/m to P on 5/8/2024 heps, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SHAIDON BLAKE,

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Petitioner,

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v.

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STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.,
Respondents.

Civ. No. DLB-24-0697
(Related Cases:
Civ. No. PWG-13-1160,1
Civ. No. PWG-20-3563)

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 7, 2024, Shaidon Blake, an inmate incarcerated at North Branch Correctional
Institution (“NBCI”), filed a document seeking injunctive relief. ECF 1. He claims that, due to
fraud and other misconduct committed by the prosecution, he was wrongfully convicted of
murdering a Bloods gang member in 2007 and has served 11½ of the past 18 years on
administrative segregation because the prison believes the nature of his conviction places him at
risk of serious injury. He asks the Court to overturn his conviction, vacate his sentence, and release
him. Id. at 6. The Court construes the filing as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 On
March 27, 2024, Blake filed a motion for appointment of counsel and to supplement his filing to

1
2

The Clerk is directed to add Civ. No. PWG-13-1160 as a related case on the docket in this case.

Blake’s initial filing, titled “Emergency Preliminary Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order,”
was filed on February 5, 2024. The Court returned that filing to him because it appeared it was
filed in a closed case. ECF 1-1; see ECF 1. Blake refiled the document with a cover letter stating
this Court “miscons[tru]ed the intent and content of this request.” ECF 1-1. He insists that he brings
a new case based on the alleged misconduct of the State of Maryland, Brian Fish, and Patricia
Jessemy, which has placed his life “in constant peril.” Id. Blake states that, “[i]f not for their
actions, [he] would not have been stabbed [in prison] and forced to be on permanent segregation.”
Id. In light of these assertions and the relief he seeks, the Court now construes the filing as a habeas
petition.

add claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 and add the Baltimore City Police Department and
Lauren Lipscomb of the State’s Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Unit as defendants. ECF 3. Blake
may amend as a matter of course, and his motion to supplement is granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A). For the following reasons, the petition and motion for appointment of counsel are
denied.
I.

Blake’s Allegations
In April 2007, Blake was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and

second-degree murder. He claims the “prosecutor Brian Fish relied on blood evidence as linkage
from the victim, found in a[n] alley, to a house [Blake] frequented,” but the State did not give the
defense a lab report showing that the blood evidence was the victim’s blood. ECF 1, at 1–2. Blake
insists this failure violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). He also claims that, when
he ultimately obtained the lab report, he learned that “the blood is non-human in origin, making
the state’s repeated misrepresentation of this vital evidence, intentional fraud, requiring immediate
overturning of the conviction and vacating of the sentence for a void judgment due to fraud on the
court.” Id. at 2. Blake claims the prosecution committed additional “fraud on the court” by
“intentionally withholding a vital DNA report” that excluded him “as a contributor to any and all
sources of DNA collected,” so that he could not “properly prepare a defense.” Id.
Blake next claims that the State presented Detective Darrell Merrick as “an expert witness
and in the State’s case-in-chief, in violation of the courts [sic] findings in Garcia v. United States,
where the courts stated witness testimony as an expert cannot serve dual capacity.” Id. at 3.
Additionally, Blake claims Merrick’s testimony violated “Crawford and the confrontation clause
of the U.S. Constitution” because he testified about his video-recorded interview of a suspect in
an unrelated crime, who stated that Blake was in Maryland to “essentially . . . act as a hitman for

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the gangs.” Id. Blake characterizes this evidence as “uncorroborated testimony of an out of court
declarant.” Id. Blake contends that the prosecutor committed fraud on the court by eliciting
Merrick’s testimony that the interviewee, known as “Bloody Eyes,” was the nephew of a gang
leader. Id. at 3–4. Blake contends that Bloody Eyes does not exist and that the prosecutor
committed fraud because he knew the testimony he elicited was untruthful. Id.
In Blake’s view, these claims challenging his conviction support his request for injunctive
relief because the Bloods in Maryland have been trying to kill him based on the State’s evidence
at trial. ECF 1, at 4. He states that his case was covered by the news, and as a result, he was
“attacked and stabbed within a week of arriving at NBCI.” Id. After that, he was housed on
administrative segregation for three years and then transferred to Kansas because it was determined
he could not be housed safely in Maryland. Id. When Blake returned to Maryland one year later
for post-conviction proceedings, he was housed at Maryland Reception Diagnostic Classification
Center and then transferred to Jessup Correctional Institution. Id. at 5. Every time Blake has been
released to general population, he has been returned to administrative segregation shortly thereafter
because of a credible threat on his life. Id. As a result, he has been housed in administrative
segregation for 11½ of the 18 years he has served. Id. He claims that “to be subjected to this many
years under the serious threat of murder is cruel and unusual punishment that was caused by the
manifest injustice created by the respondent’s gross misconduct and fraud on the court, requiring
immediate relief.” Id.
II.

Second or Successive Petition
The Court construes Blake’s filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 because he challenges aspects of his criminal trial and conviction. This is not
Blake’s first petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Blake v. Wolf, Civ. No. PWG-13-1160

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(D. Md. 2015) (“Blake 2015”).3 In Blake 2015, the Court considered and rejected Blake’s
challenges to his conviction, including the Brady claim and the claims regarding Merrick’s
testimony. ECF 39, at 26–29, 31, 34–36 in Blake 2015.
To file a second or successive habeas petition in this Court, Blake first must file a motion
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit asking for authorization. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3). Because Blake has not complied with this “gatekeeper” provision, his successive
application for habeas corpus relief is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).4
III.

Claims for Damages under §§ 1985 and 1986
In his supplemental pleading, Blake added claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.

Under § 1985, it is unlawful to, inter alia, conspire to interfere with court proceedings “by force,
intimidation, or threat” or “with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws” or
“for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(2), (3). Section 1986 provides a cause of action against “every person who has knowledge
of, and power to prevent, a § 1985 conspiracy, but neglects or refuses to act.” Burnett v. Grattan,
468 U.S. 42, 44 n.5 (1984). A § 1986 claim “is dependent upon the existence of a claim under §
1985,” and therefore, if the court dismisses a § 1985 claim, it also must dismiss the § 1986 claim.
Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985). If Blake did not intend to file a habeas
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See also Blake v. Fish, et al., Civ. No. PWG-18-137 (D. Md. 2018) (dismissed as successive
petition); Blake v. Zmuda, Civ. No. 21-3006-SAC, 2021 WL 1516422 (D. Kan. 2021) (dismissed
habeas as third petition).
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Blake must comply with the Fourth Circuit’s procedural requirements and deadlines for filing a
motion for an authorization order. Attached to this Order is a packet containing the Fourth Circuit’s
instructions on seeking authorization to file a successive habeas petition. Before this Court may
consider his claims, Blake first must obtain authorization from the Fourth Circuit to file a
successive petition.

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petition at all and, instead, intended to file claims for damages under § 1985 and § 1986, he has
not stated a claim under those statutes.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Blake has not paid a filing fee. Title 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1) permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in this Court without prepaying
the filing fee. To guard against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute requires dismissal of
any claim that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), 1915A(b). “[P]ro se filings are ‘h[e]ld to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 272 (4th Cir.
2022) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Accordingly, the Court must construe
pro se pleadings liberally. Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 1376 (2021). But “liberal construction does not require [the Court] to attempt to ‘discern
the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff’”; the Court need only “determine the actual meaning of the
words used in the complaint.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Thus, a pro se complaint “still
‘must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Thomas v. The
Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, at 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825
F.3d 206, 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
Blake complains about conduct that occurred before his April 2007 conviction—more than
17 years before he filed this lawsuit. He does not allege that he recently learned about any of the
alleged facts. The relevant statutes of limitations expired more than a decade before Blake filed
suit. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 1999) (“It
is well-settled that section[] . . . 1985 borrow[s] the state’s general personal injury limitations
period, which in Maryland is three years.” (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–101)); 42

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U.S.C. § 1986 (one-year statute of limitations). When, as here, the plaintiff has not paid the filing
fee, the Court may dismiss a time-barred claim sua sponte. United States v. Oliver, 878 F.3d 120,
127 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting “courts should not invoke a statute of limitations sua sponte unless
proceeding to the merits would significantly implicate the efficiency and integrity of the judicial
process,” such as when a plaintiff brings an untimely complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, that
is, without paying the filing fee). Blake’s § 1985 and § 1986 claims are dismissed.
IV.

Injunctive Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 or § 1986
To the extent that Blake seeks injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 or § 1986, he has

not demonstrated a right to such relief. He raised similar claims in Blake v. Green, Civ. No. PWG20-3563, 2021 WL 2981804 (D. Md. 2021) (“Blake 2021”). In that case, this Court analyzed his
claim challenging his long-term segregation as follows:
A liberty interest is created by the imposition of an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472, 484 (1995). Whether Blake was entitled to due process
before being assigned to long term segregation or to CBB status hinges upon
whether the conditions under which he has been confined constituted an atypical
and significant hardship. Assignment to administrative segregation alone does not
create an atypical and significant hardship. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467
(1983) (holding that administrative segregation is part of the ordinary incidents of
prison life). The Supreme Court found that conditions in a super-maximum prison
where human contact and communication between cells was forbidden and exercise
was limited to one hour a day in a small indoor room were not enough alone to
implicate liberty interest. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005). Rather
the duration of the confinement to the prison enforcing those conditions created a
liberty interest in avoiding a transfer there. Id. The Wilkinson prisoners received
only annual reviews and “even inmates with exemplary behavior rarely
progress[ed] through [the prison] in less than two years.” Austin v. Wilkinson, 189
F. Supp. 2d 719, 740 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
There is no evidence here that Blake has been subjected to conditions of
confinement that are atypical and substantially harsh. His designation on CBB
status directly relates to his chronic violation of prison rules, and he is provided a
monthly review of his long-term segregation assignment, similar to the monthly
reviews provided to inmates confined to administrative segregation in Maryland
prisons. Blake’s confinement to segregation does not approach the draconian

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conditions condemned by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson, nor does it run afoul of
the due process protections he would otherwise receive if confined in Maryland.
ECF 18, at 17–18 in Blake 2021; Blake 2021, 2021 WL 2981804, at *9. This Court then found that
Blake had not been subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement during his stay in Kansas.
Id. Injunctive relief was denied.
Injunctive relief “is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a
matter of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010). A plaintiff
seeking such relief must meet “a high bar” by “[s]atisfying . . . four factors.” SAS Institute, Inc. v.
World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 385 (4th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must show “[1] that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); The Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2009)
(discussing Winter factors).
When a prisoner seeks injunctive relief that would affect the management of a correctional
institution, the Court should grant the request only under extraordinary and compelling
circumstances “so as not to assume the role of prison administrators.” See Taylor v. Freeman, 34
F.3d 266, 269–70 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994). Additionally,
[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the
least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial
weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity
set out in [18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)] (1)(B) in tailoring any preliminary relief.
Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the date that is 90 days
after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required under [18 U.S.C.
§ 3626] (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before
the expiration of the 90-day period.

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18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (permitting court to “enter a temporary restraining order or an order for
preliminary injunctive relief” in a “civil action with respect to prison conditions”).
Blake has not shown he is entitled to injunctive relief. He has not shown a likelihood of
success on a § 1985 or § 1986 claim or that he will be irreparably harmed without an injunction.
He claims that he has been housed in segregation for almost two-thirds of his imprisonment
because false trial evidence portrayed him as a hitman for gangs, which makes general population
unsafe for him. But this Court previously noted that Blake was placed in segregation repeatedly
for rules violations, threatening officers, and using and possessing drugs and other contraband, and
ultimately, the prison “assigned him to segregated housing for ‘consistent bad behavior.’” Blake
2021, 2021 WL 2981804, at *3–6 (cataloging 11 charges that totaled 945 days of administrative
segregation). Thus, his claim that he has been on segregation for 11½ years for his own safety is
implausible. In addition, Blake has not shown the balance of equities or the public interest favors
an injunction. His request for injunctive relief is denied.
V.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel
In civil cases, a federal district court judge has the discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

to appoint counsel, but only if an indigent claimant presents exceptional circumstances. See Cook
v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir.
1982). “Courts consider ‘the type and complexity of the case,’ whether the plaintiff has a colorable
claim, and the plaintiff’s ability to prosecute the claim.” Giddings v. Montgomery Cnty., No. GJH21-959, 2021 WL 5921382, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2021) (quoting Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d
160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296,
298 (1989)), aff’d sub nom. Giddings v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, No. 22-6057, 2022 WL

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1284296 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2022). Because Blake’s claims are dismissed, his motion for
appointment of counsel is denied.
VI.

Certificate of Appealability
When a district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate

of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate “(1) ‘that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Blake’s pleading fails to demonstrate that a certificate of
appealability should issue; he may still request that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit issue such a certificate. See Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2003)
(considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability after the district court declined to issue
one).
The petition is dismissed, and a certificate of appealability shall not issue. A separate order
follows.

May 7, 2024
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Date

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Deborah L. Boardman
United States District Judge

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