Williams-Johnson v. Paris Foods Corporation

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 3/10/2025. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
FLORETTA WILLIAMS-JOHNSON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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PARIS FOODS CORP.,

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Defendant.

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Civil Action No. RDB-24-1197

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Through

the

instant

employment

discrimination

case,

Plaintiff

Floretta

Williams-Johnson (“Plaintiff” or “Williams-Johnson”) alleges that her former employer,
Defendant Paris Foods Corporation (“Defendant” or “Paris Foods”), discriminated against
her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”), MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606, (Count I). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22–25.)1 She further alleges
common law defamation (Count II). (Id. ¶¶ 26–32.) Presently pending in this Court are two
motions filed by the Defendant: (1) an unopposed Motion to Vacate Order of Default and for
Leave to Respond to Complaint (ECF No. 8); and (2) a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
(ECF No. 10), which is fully briefed (ECF Nos. 11 (Plaintiff’s Response); 14 (Defendant’s
Reply)). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. Loc. R.

1 For clarity, this Memorandum Opinion cites to the ECF generated page number, rather than the page number

at the bottom of the parties’ various submissions, unless otherwise indicated. Likewise, this Memorandum
Opinion cites to the ECF generated document number, rather than the exhibit number provided by the parties’
various submissions.

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105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order
of Default and for Leave to Respond to Complaint (ECF No. 8) and Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint (ECF No. 10) are both GRANTED. With respect to the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in
a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found.
v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.)
Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Except where otherwise indicated, the following facts
are derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), and accepted as true for the purpose of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 10).
Plaintiff Floretta Williams-Johnson is a woman who worked as a production worker at
Defendant Paris Food Corporation’s facility in Trappe, Maryland. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.) Through
her Complaint, she alleges that, on August 31, 2023, while socializing with coworkers in the
breakroom, she gifted her coworker Kenyatta Peterson (“Peterson”) “a bottle of lotion, a
nightgown, and a Leap Pad game system for her son.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Williams-Johnson alleges that
Peterson thanked her before the two exited the breakroom to begin their shifts. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that, sometime around the gift exchange,2 Aquwina Carr (“Carr”)—a
friend and former coworker of Plaintiff—received a phone call from Production Supervisor

While the Complaint indicates this phone call happened on August 26, 2023 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10), the Court is
inclined to assume conversation post-dated the August 31, 2023 gift exchange.
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Angela Jones, who was Peterson and Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.) Jones
allegedly “boasted she had finally gotten ‘[Ms. Williams-Johnson’s] a** out of here’” and
indicated that “‘[Paris Foods] are getting ready to do something’” with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 10.)
On September 5, 2023, Williams-Johnson was called into a meeting with Production
Manager Kyrie Manokey and Human Resources Manager Katie Liveston (“Liveston”). (Id.
¶ 11.) Williams-Johnson alleges that during that meeting, she was informed that Peterson had
filed a sexual harassment complaint against her, which alleged that Plaintiff had gifted Peterson
a nightgown and grabbed Peterson’s hand, and that both gestures were unwelcome and
“immediately reported” to Jones.

(Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)

According to Plaintiff, Liveston

“acknowledged . . . that [Plaintiff] likely ‘didn’t mean any harm’ by her conduct,” but claimed
“Defendant had ‘no choice’ but to ‘treat her like a man’ and terminate her for violating the
company’s sexual harassment policy.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Williams-Johnson alleges she was then
escorted by security “in front of her former coworkers.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff alleges that she “encountered [] Peterson” on September 10, 2023, who
allegedly told Williams-Johnson that “the sexual harassment complaint had been orchestrated
by [] Jones.” (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) According to Plaintiff, Peterson recounted that after she showed
Jones the gifts, Jones “insisted the nightgown was ‘inappropriate’ and that [] Peterson had to
file a complaint.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further alleges that Peterson told her that Jones “had
instructed her exactly what to write in the complaint—including fabricating the claim that
[Plaintiff] had grabbed [her] hand.” (Id. ¶ 21.)
Sometime thereafter, Williams-Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 3.) The EEOC

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declined to proceed with her claim and therefore issued her a right-to-sue letter dated
April 3, 2024. (Id.; see also ECF No. 1-1.)
On April 24, 2024, Williams-Johnson initiated the instant lawsuit against her former
employing, alleging one count of discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Maryland Fair
Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”), MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606, (ECF No.
1 ¶¶ 22–25); and one count common law defamation, (id. ¶¶ 26–32).

In Count I,

Williams-Johnson alleges that Defendant disciplined her “more harshly for conduct far less
severe than that of a male employee,” citing an incident where a male employee accused of
sexual harassment was not terminated after he allegedly “urinated in front of a female
employee and then assaulted a second female employee when she confronted him.” (Id.
¶¶ 16–17, 22–25.)

In Count II, Williams-Johnson alleges that because she “has been

approached by members of the community not associated with [Defendant], who nonetheless
know she was terminated for ‘sexual harassment,’” that Defendant “clearly published these
false and defamatory statements to third parties.” (Id. ¶¶ 26–32.)
On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service swearing service was effectuated
on a “Registered Agent for the Defendant” on May 1, 2024. (ECF No. 3.) Attached thereto
was U.S. Postal Service Tracking information and a Certified Mail Receipt (i.e., PS Form 3800),
which indicated that the delivery was “[l]eft with individual” at the delivery address. (ECF No.
3-1.) Although certified mail is an authorized method of service under Maryland Rule 2-121

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(a)(3),3 the rule requires this method to include restricted delivery to the individual named, in this
case the registered agent, which Plaintiff did not request. (See ECF No. 3-1.) Further, while a
return receipt was requested on the submitted PS Form 3800, a signed return receipt (i.e., PS
Form 3811) was not included with Plaintiff’s submission, (id.), as is required by Maryland Rule
2-126(a)(3).
Nevertheless, on July 9, 2024, Plaintiff moved for a Clerk’s entry of default against
Defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). (ECF No. 6.) On July 25, 2024, the Clerk of
Court entered an Order of Default and issued a Notice of Default to Paris Foods. (ECF Nos.
6, 7.)
On August 2, 2024, Paris Foods filed a Motion to Vacate Order of Default and for
Leave to Respond to Complaint (ECF No. 8), which is unopposed and remains pending on
this Court’s docket. Therein, Paris Foods emphasizes that Plaintiff’s use of certified without
restricted delivery did not constitute proper service and further highlighting Plaintiff’s failure
to include a signed return receipt in her filing. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2–3.) Defendant further
argues that, even if service was proper, the motion should be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(c),4 contending Paris Foods has a meritorious defense and acted with reasonable

Maryland allows service of process to be effected “by mailing to the person to be served a copy of the
summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it by certified mail requesting: []Restricted Delivery—show
to whom, date, address of delivery[,]” with service by certified mail “completed upon delivery.” MD. R.
2-121(a)(3).
4 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may “set aside an entry of default for good cause.”
The Fourth Circuit has announced a “strong policy that cases be decided on their merits.” United States v. Shaffer
Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993). Therefore, a motion to vacate default must be “liberally construed
in order to provide relief from the onerous consequences of defaults and default judgments.” Tolson v. Hodge,
411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969). “Any doubts about whether relief should be granted should be resolved in
favor of setting aside the default so that the case may be heard on the merits.” Id. When considering whether
to set aside an entry of default, the Court weighs six factors: (1) whether the movant has a meritorious defense,
(2) whether the movant acted with reasonable promptness, (3) whether the movant bears personal responsibility
for the entry of default, (4) any prejudice to the non-moving party, (5) any history of dilatory action, and (6) the
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promptness, and there is no prejudice to Williams-Johnson and no history of dilatory action
by Defendant. (Id. at 4–7.) As discussed supra, Plaintiff failed to properly effectuate service
on Paris Foods, as her submission to the Court fails to conform with Maryland Rules
2-121(a)(3) and 2-126(a)(3). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order of Default and
for Leave to Respond to Complaint (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED.
On August 16, 2024, Paris Foods filed the pending Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
(ECF No. 10), which seeks to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff
responded in opposition (ECF No. 11), and Paris Foods replied (ECF No. 14). This motion
is ripe for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.
R. CIV. P 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and
not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations
omitted).
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility standard,
a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the

availability of lesser sanctions short of default judgment. See Colleton v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417
(4th Cir. 2010). As the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to properly effectuate service on Paris Foods, it need
not address these six factors.

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elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown,
716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must, however, set
forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even
if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to
plead a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346
(4th. Cir. 2011).
ANALYSIS
Through her Complaint, Floretta Williams-Johnson asserts one claim of discrimination
on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”), MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606, (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22–25); and one count common law
defamation, (id. ¶¶ 26–32).

Through Paris Foods’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint, her former employer seeks dismissal of all counts. (ECF No. 10.)
I.

Plaintiff’s Sex Discrimination Claim Under Title VII and MFEPA
In Count I, Williams-Johnson alleges that Paris Foods discriminated against her on the

basis of sex, in violation of Title VII and MFEPA. Because Maryland courts “traditionally
seek guidance from federal cases in interpreting [MFEPA]” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 914
A.3d 735, 742 (Md. 2007), the Court discusses Count I under the Title VII framework.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes discrimination in employment on

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the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As a
precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action in court, a complainant must first
file a charge with the EEOC. Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543 (2019) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1)). After examining her claims and finding no discrimination, the EEOC
issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter dated April 3, 2024 (ECF No. 1-1), and Plaintiff
commenced this lawsuit on April 24, 2024. As such, it is undisputed that Plaintiff exhausted
administrative remedies prior to commencement of this Title VII action.
A plaintiff may establish discrimination under Title VII by showing direct or
circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff’s status in a protected class was a motivating factor
in an adverse employment action, or by relying on the burden-shifting scheme established by
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App’x. 745, 747 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Holland v. Wash.
Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213-14 (4th Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff need not commit to either of
the two approaches at the motion to dismiss stage. Chen v. Md. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene,
No. ELH-15-1796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117045, 2016 WL 4539204, at *17 (D. Md. Aug.
29, 2016).
Under the McDonnel Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318–20 (4th Cir.
2005). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of illegal discrimination or
retaliation arises, and the burden of production shifts to the employer to state a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action. Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336
(4th Cir. 2011). “If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised

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by the prima facie case is rebutted.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255
(1981). To prevail, the plaintiff must then prove, by a preponderance of evidence, “that the
[employer’s] proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision” and that
the plaintiff “has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 256.
However, the McDonnel Douglas proof scheme is “a procedural device, designed only to
establish an order of proof and production.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521
(1993). The “prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an evidentiary standard,” “not a
pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). At the motion to
dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonell
Douglas; she must instead satisfy the pleading standard established in Iqbal and Twombly. See
Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017). Thus, a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that an adverse action was motivated by
unlawful discrimination. See McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 584–86 (4th
Cir. 2015); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Coleman
v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). And reference to the elements of a prima facie
claim of discrimination “is helpful to gauge the sufficiency of the allegations[,]” even if the
pleading is not actually required to satisfy all the elements. Gaines v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 657 F.
Supp. 3d 708, 734 (D. Md. 2023).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated on the basis of her sex. To state a claim
for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) membership in a protected class;
(2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment
from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid

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Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190).
As a woman, Williams-Johnson is a member of a protected class, and her termination
is clearly an adverse employment action. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that
she had satisfactory job performance, nor does Williams-Johnson adequately allege that
similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.
To be clear, with respect to the last element, a plaintiff is “not required as a matter of
law to point to a similarly situated comparator to succeed on a discrimination claim.” Haywood
v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010), see Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d
536, 545–46 (4th Cir. 2003). But where, as here, “a plaintiff attempts to rely on comparator
evidence to establish circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,” the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the comparator is similarly situated in all relevant respects.
Swaso, 698 F. App’x at 748.
Therefore, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that she is “similar in all relevant
respects to [her] comparator.” Haywood, 387 F. App’x at 359. This includes “that the
employees ‘dealt with the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards
and . . . engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances
that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.’” Id. (quoting
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)); see Sawyers v. United Parcel Serv., 946
F. Supp. 2d 432, 442 n.10 (D. Md. 2013). While the comparison “‘will never involve precisely
the same set of work-related offenses occurring over the same period of time and under the
same set of circumstances,’” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223–24 (4th Cir.
2019) (citation omitted), “[i]f a plaintiff wishes to prove that a defendant’s legitimate, non-

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discriminatory explanation is pretext by pointing to other employees who were treated
differently, ‘[t]he similarity between comparators . . . must be clearly established in order to be
meaningful.’” Swaso, 698 F. App’x at 748 (citation omitted). Thus, a complaint’s conclusory
assertions that the plaintiff and a coworker are on equal footing is insufficient to nudge a
discrimination claim across the line from conceivable to plausible. Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint refers to one male comparator in an effort to support an inference
that Defendant unlawfully discriminated her. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16–17, 23.) While Plaintiff
alleges that this male comparator was “accused of sexual harassment” and “not terminated,”
she does not allege any facts showing that she and the proffered comparator were on equal
footing. More generally, the Complaint offers no facts to support an inference that Plaintiff’s
employment was terminated on account of her sex. See Gaines, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 735 (“[T]he
adverse action must have ‘occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of
unlawful discrimination.’”(quoting Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 650 (4th Cir.
2021)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED with respect
to Count I of the Complaint.
II.

Plaintiff’s Common Law Defamation Claim
In Count II, Williams-Johnson complains that “Defendant caused [her] to be escorted

out its facility by security, in front of coworkers, as though she were a criminal” and further
alleges that because she “has been approached by members of the community not associated
with [Defendant], who nonetheless know she was terminated for ‘sexual harassment,’” that
Defendant “clearly published these false and defamatory statements to third parties.” (ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 26–32.) Under Maryland law, in order for a defamation claim to withstand a motion

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to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting four elements: “(1) the defendant made a
defamatory statement to a third person (a requirement known as publication); (2) the statement
was false; (3) the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement; and (4) the plaintiff
thereby suffered harm.” Doe v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 355, 365 (D.
Md. 2017) (citing Gohari v. Darvish, 767 A.2d 321, 327 ( Md. 2001)). “To satisfy federal pleading
standards, a plaintiff must specifically allege each defamatory statement.” Doe v. Salisbury Univ.,
123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 758 (D. Md. 2015). A plaintiff alleging defamation “need not plead
detailed allegations as to each one of the who, what, where, and when, in order to state a claim.
But, they must provide more than vague and hazy allegations as to at least some of these
questions. Their failure to do so renders their pleading deficient.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Slade Healthcare, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 3d 536, 568 (D. Md. 2019).
To satisfy the publication requirement, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege “that the
alleged defamatory words were ‘seen or heard by some person other than the plaintiff and
defendant.’” Lucas v. Moore Transp. of Tulsa, LLC, No. CV RDB-18-0888, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 144101, 2018 WL 4052194 at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2018) (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Paul, 261 A.2d 731, 734–35 (Md. 1970)). The Complaint merely complains that she was
escorted out by security in front of coworkers and further alleges that because individuals
unaffiliated with Defendant nonetheless knew she was terminated for “sexual harassment,”
Paris Food must have “published these false and defamatory statements to third parties.”
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 26–32.) However, Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no facts that demonstrate that
Defendant ever communicated the circumstances of Plaintiff’s termination to anyone other

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than to Plaintiff herself. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.) At bottom, Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly fulfill
this first element warrants dismissal of the claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) shall be
GRANTED. Plaintiff Floretta Williams-Johnson’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint to address deficiencies in an original complaint
is freely given pursuant to Rule 15(a). Indeed, there is authority that a plaintiff should be given
at least one opportunity to amend a complaint before a dismissal of a case with prejudice. See
Harvey v. CNN, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 3d 693, 725 (D. Md. 2021) (citing Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d
1045, 1048 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, there is authority that leave to amend does not need
to be granted unless requested by the plaintiff. Id. (citing Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated
Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 555–56 (5th Cir. 2007)). Nevertheless, leave to amend may be
denied if such amendment is deemed futile. Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d
619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff Floretta Williams-Johnson has alleged one claim of discrimination on the basis
of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17,
and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”), MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV’T § 20-606, (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22–25); and one claim for common law defamation, (id.
¶¶ 26–32), against her former employer, Defendant Paris Foods Corporation. Through her
Complaint, Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege both claims. Nevertheless, Plaintiff may file an
Amended Complaint within fifteen days of this Opinion, i.e., by March 25, 2025. Such an

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Amended Complaint may still be subject to dismissal by reason of repeated failure to cure
deficiencies or futility of the amendment. Harvey, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 725 (citing Abagninin v.
AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008)). Accordingly, the DISMISSAL will
initially be WITHOUT PREJUICE. If an Amended Complaint is not filed by March 25, 2025,
the Clerk of this Court is instructed to CLOSE this case with DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE.
A separate Order follows.
Date: March 10, 2025

/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge

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