Murphy v. Washington County Circuit Court

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Julie Rebecca Rubin on 9/25/2024. (c/m) (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TERRANCE LEE MURPHY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No.: JRR-24-2306

WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-represented Plaintiff Terrance Lee Murphy’s pleading titled “Petition for Writ of
Certiorari” was received by the court for filing on August 8, 2024. (ECF No. 1; the “Complaint.”)
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, which shall be granted. (ECF No. 2.)
For the reasons that follow, by separate order, the Complaint will be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that he is “a non-corporate entity, Born alive (see) 1 U.S. Code section 8
Aboriginal indigenous to this land.” (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff explains that he was arrested on
September 8, 2023, for trespassing, burglary and resisting arrest. Id. at 2. He asserts that his right
to due process has been denied because, at the time he was arrested, he was exercising his right to
peacefully protest. Id. He claims that while his trial date has been set, his requests “for suppression
and discovery” have not been answered, nor has his request to have his case dismissed been
addressed. Id. Plaintiff avers further that he is an “aboriginal indigenous to this land, a sovereign
individual. The laws and treaties binding to the united states of America were put in place for me
before the ordinance of (1787) and the united states constitution of (1787). [Plaintiff’s] pre-

establish diversity rights of claim for the protection of all indigenous aboriginal people are
supported by article VI of the united states constitution.” Id. at 2.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that
is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). Pursuant to
Rule 201(b), the court takes note that Plaintiff is currently awaiting trial in the Circuit Court for
Washington County on charges of fourth degree burglary, trespass, and resisting/interfering with
arrest. State v. Murphy, Case No. C-21-CR-23-000748 (Wash. Cty. Cir. Ct.). 1 Plaintiff has not
yet stood trial for these charges; and proceeding with the instant action wherein Plaintiff claims
that his right to due process was violated in connection with the charges in the above-cited
Washington County case is inappropriate for the reasons set forth below.
The Younger 2 abstention doctrine “requires a federal court to abstain from interfering in
state proceedings, even if jurisdiction exists,” if there is: “(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding,
instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates important,
substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to
raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.” Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc.
v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 165 (4th Cir. 2008); accord United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d
518, 527 (4th Cir. 2013). “Younger is not merely a principle of abstention; rather, the case sets
forth a mandatory rule of equitable restraint, requiring the dismissal of a federal action.” Williams
v. Lubin, 516 F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247
(4th Cir. 2006)).

1
2

See https://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquiryByCaseNum.jis (last visited Sept. 24, 2024).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

2

Criminal prosecutions implicate vital state interests and Plaintiff has an adequate
opportunity to advance his claim that his right to due process has been violated in the context of
his criminal case. See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (“one class
of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state
criminal proceeding . . . .”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without

prejudice.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff espouses a “sovereign citizen” claim that he is exempt
from state laws, that claim is subject to dismissal on separate grounds. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the court “shall dismiss [a] case” filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis if the
court determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2002)
(extending 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening to non-prisoner pro se litigants). Although a selfrepresented party’s complaint must be construed liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), a pro se plaintiff still carries “the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized
legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
The basis of Plaintiff’s demand for relief – i.e., that he is a sovereign citizen and, therefore,
his rights have been unlawfully trodden – has been soundly rejected:
“Adherents to the ‘sovereign citizen’ theory ‘believe that the state and federal
governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to
regulate their behavior.’” Cruel-El v. South Carolina, No. 6:18-cv-1680-HMHJDA, 2018 WL 3628844, at *3 (D.S.C. July 10, 2018) (quoting United States v.
Ulloa, 511 F. App'x 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013)). Such arguments are baseless,
as numerous courts have held, and should be rejected summarily. Id. (collecting
cases).

3

Anderson v. Seat Pleasant Police Dep't, No. CV DLB-22-1542, 2023 WL 5509167, at *6 (D. Md.
Aug. 25, 2023); Coleman v. Calvert Co., No. GJH-15-0920, 2018 WL 1187561, (D. Md. 2018)
(dismissing action county sheriff department where refusal to provide valid identification was
based on sovereign citizen beliefs). “Regardless of an individual's claimed status of descent, be it
as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person
is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however
they are presented.” United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011); see United States
v. White, 480 F. App’x. 193, 194 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Neither the citizenship nor the heritage of a
defendant constitutes a key ingredient to a ... court’s jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions....”).
Accordingly, by separate order, the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
_9.25.2024___________
Date

_/S/____________________________
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge

4