Brown v. Arvine Lorings, et al
Filing
79
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 11/24/2014. (c/m 11/25/14 jf2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREGORY BROWN,
*
Plaintiff,
* Civil Action No. RDB-03-00167
v.
*
ARVINE LORINGS, et. al.,
Defendants.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
*
*
*
Currently pending is Plaintiff Gregory Brown’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Seal (ECF No.
76), which seeks to seal the entire above-captioned case. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (ECF No. 76) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On January 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Arvine Lorings Lucent
Technologies and two other Defendants (collectively referred to as “Defendants”), alleging,
inter alia, that Defendants engaged in employment discrimination based on race and that they
failed to pay wages and benefits under the Maryland Fair Wages and Labor Act. The case
was referred to Magistrate Judge William Connelly (now Chief Magistrate Judge), who held a
settlement conference on November 3, 2003. The parties entered into a settlement
agreement whereby the Defendants would pay Plaintiff a specified amount of damages, and
Plaintiff would release all claims against Defendants. Later, Plaintiff was dissatisfied with
some of the terms of the settlement agreement and submitted a Motion for Reconsideration
1
(ECF No. 47) of the settlement agreement. On September 10, 2004, this Court issued an
order, enforcing the settlement agreement (ECF No. 73). Nearly ten years later, on March 5,
2014, Plaintiff filed a pro se Motion to Seal (ECF No. 76) without a certificate of service.1 To
support his motion, Plaintiff argues that employers are terminating him because they have
public access to his past employment discrimination case. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that
employers are blacklisting him, which is making it difficult for him to find employment
because he cannot make it pass the screening phase of any employer’s hiring process.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his motion has been “liberally construed” and is
“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citation omitted).
In ruling on a motion to seal, a district court must: (1) give the public notice that the
sealing of documents may be ordered; (2) provide interested parties the opportunity to
object to the motion; (3) state reasons on the record if the district court decides to seal the
case; and (4) state reasons for rejecting alternatives to closure. Rushford v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253–54 (4th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “The public notice
and opportunity to challenge requirements are met when the court allows sufficient time for
objections to be made.” Bureau of Nat’l Affairs v. Chase, Civ. No. ELH-11-1641, 2012 WL
3065352, at *2 (D. Md. July 25, 2012) (citations omitted). Here, the first and second
1
Here, Plaintiff failed to file a required certificate of service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) states “[a]ny paper after the complaint
that is required to be served--together with a certificate of service--must be filed within a reasonable time after service.”
(emphasis added). Additionally, “…all court documents other than the original complaint must bear a signed certificate
signed by counsel stating that the service required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) has been made.” Local Rule 102.1 (D. Md.
2014). Therefore, it is clear that Plaintiff’s motion must be DENIED on this ground as well because he has failed to
comport with the proper service requirements.
2
requirements have been met because the Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (ECF No. 76) has been
on the public docket for more than eight months, giving any interested parties ample time to
object.
The public and the press have a qualified right of access to judicial documents and
records filed in civil proceedings. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265 (4th Cir. 2014). The
right of access exists even if no objections to a motion to seal are made. See Bureau of Nat’l
Affairs, 2012 WL 3065352, at *2 (stating that a presumptive right to access exists after noting
that no objections to sealing had been made). This right of access derives from both the
“First Amendment and the common-law tradition that court proceedings are presumptively
open to public scrutiny.” Id. (citations omitted). The common law presumption in favor of
access can be rebutted “if countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interest in
access[.]” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Some of the factors that are
relevant in determining whether a party can overcome the presumption include: (1) whether
the records are sought for improper purposes; (2) whether release would enhance the
public’s understanding of an important historical event; and (3) whether the public has
already had access to the information contained in the records. Virginia Dep’t of State Police v.
Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004)
The First Amendment also provides substantive protection to the interests of the
press and the public in accessing records. Doe, 749 F.3d at 265. The party seeking to restrict
access bears the burden of overcoming the First Amendment right of access, and the party
must proffer specific reasons why such access should be denied. Virginia Dep’t of State Police,
386 F.3d at 575. When determining whether a First Amendment right of access is available,
3
the courts looks at “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press
and general public,” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question.” Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64
(4th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The right of public access
“may be abrogated only in unusual circumstances.” Doe, 749 F.3d at 266
This Court’s Local Rules also determine how a Motion to Seal should be evaluated.
“Any motion seeking the sealing of pleadings…or other documents…shall include (a)
proposed reasons supported by specific factual representations to justify the sealing and (b)
an explanation why alternatives to sealing would not provide sufficient protection.” Local
Rule 105.11 (D. Md. 2014).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks to seal this employment case due to concerns that employers are using
public information against him and terminating him because of their alleged knowledge of
his prior employment dispute. After considering Plaintiff’s motion under a common-law
right-of-access analysis, a First Amendment analysis, and this Court’s Local Rules, it is clear
Plaintiff has not stated sufficient reasons to overcome the presumption that the press and
public have a right to access to the judicial records in this case. Additionally, Plaintiff
provides no suitable alternative to sealing the entire case nor does this Court think that
imposing any less restrictive alternative would be appropriate.
I.
Defendant’s Motion to Seal Under Common Law
In order to determine whether Plaintiff can overcome the common law presumption
of access, the court must look at (1) whether the records are sought for improper purposes,
4
(2) whether release would enhance the public’s understanding of an important historical
event, and (3) whether the public already had access to the records. Virginia Dep’t of State
Police, 386 F.3d at 575. This Court is afforded a large amount of discretion in determining
whether to grant or restrict access to judicial records. See id.
Here, under the first factor, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that demonstrate
that the judicial records in his employment case are being accessed for improper reasons.
Although Plaintiff speculates that he is being terminated because employers have access to
the case, he does not point to any specific instances where an employer actually accessed his
records or mentioned his public employment case as a reason for terminating or refusing to
hire him. Accordingly, the first factor weighs against restricting access to the judicial
records. Although the second factor is not relevant to this case, the third factor also weighs
against restricting access. The public and press already have access to the court files in this
case, and Plaintiff states no reasons why this access should now be restricted some ten years
later. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to overcome the common law presumption in favor of
access.
II.
Defendant’s Motion to Seal Under the First Amendment
Plaintiff has the burden of proof in overcoming the First Amendment right to access,
and he must proffer specific reasons for restricting access. Virginia Dep’t of State Police, 386
F.3d at 575. In determining whether a right of access exists under the First Amendment, the
court looks to (1) whether the place and process have been historically open to the press and
public, and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question. Baltimore Sun Co., 886 F.2d at 64.
5
In this case, Plaintiff only proffers speculation about employers taking adverse action
against him rather than citing any specific reasons for restricting access to the judicial records
in his case. Additionally, the first factor of the First Amendment balancing test weighs
against restricting access because judicial records have been historically open to both the
press and the public. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (internal
footnotes omitted) (“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.”).
The second factor, which looks at whether the public access plays a positive role in the
functioning of the process in question, also weighs in favor of allowing public access because
access to judicial records plays a positive role by ensuring transparency in the court system.
See Doe, 749 F.3d at 266 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (“Public access
serves to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to
provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a
better perception of fairness.”). Because of Plaintiff’s inability to state any specific reasons
for sealing the case and the historical and significant importance of the public’s access to
judicial records, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the First Amendment right to access
in this case should be restricted.
III.
Defendant’s Motion to Seal Under this Court’s Local Rules
Under this Court’s Local Rules, “[a]ny motion seeking the sealing of pleadings…or
other documents…shall include (a) proposed reasons supported by specific factual
representations to justify the sealing and (b) an explanation why alternatives to sealing would
not provide sufficient protection.” Local Rule 105.11 (D. Md. 2014).
6
Plaintiff fails to support his reasons for sealing the case with any specific factual
representations. In lieu of any specific factual circumstances, Plaintiff summarily states that
companies have his name on a list, which is why he cannot get past the initial screening
phase of any employer’s hiring process. However, Plaintiff does not mention any instances
in which his judicial records were actually accessed nor does he allege that any employer has
cited his public employment dispute as a reason for refusing to hire him or for terminating
him. Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide an explanation of why an alternative to sealing
the entire case would not provide him with adequate protection. Additionally, this Court can
think of no suitable alternative to sealing the case. Because Plaintiff does not provide any
factual circumstances indicating that any employer has used the civil case in question as a
reason for firing him or refusing to hire him, there is no reason for this Court to partially seal
the case or redact personal identifying information. Accordingly, under this Court’s Local
Rules, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient justification for sealing the case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion to Seal (ECF No. 76) is
DENIED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated: November 24, 2014
/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?