Commodore v. Calvert County Board of County Commissioners et al

Filing 71

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to James Butler and c/s to Plaintiff via Rosslyn Harris, USPO 10/13/09 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/13/09. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND ROBERT L. COMMODORE : : v. CALVERT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ET AL. : : : Civil Action No. DKC 07-0661

MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending are Plaintiff's original and supplemental motions for attorneys' fees. (Papers 67, 69). For the

following reasons, the motions will be denied. After a jury trial, Plaintiff Robert L. Commodore was

awarded one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. other claims. attorneys' fees. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . ." Courts have interpreted this Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants on all Plaintiff now seeks an award of $68,690.00 in

provision to mean that "prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions shall ordinarily receive fees and costs as long as no special circumstances render an award unjust." Clark v. Sims,

894 F.Supp. 868, 870 (D.Md. 1995) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). 1988, private Congress attorney intended to encourage Texas In enacting § to act Ass'n as v.

plaintiffs

generals.

State

Teachers

Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989)); see also Newman, 390 U.S. at 401-02. "Unlike most private tort

litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms." (1986). The award of nominal damages does render Plaintiff a City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574

prevailing party under § 1988.

"[A] plaintiff `prevails' when

actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship behavior between in a the way parties that by modifying benefits the the The for

defendant's plaintiff." prevailing damages in

directly

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). party any standard amount, is satisfied by a "judgment or

whether

compensatory

nominal."

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12; see also Mercer v. Duke University, 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005). Eligibility for a fee award,

however, is not the same as entitlement:

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[T]he district court has discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee, a determination that requires the court to consider the extent of the plaintiff's success. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 ("Once civil rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of a fee award...." (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the prevailing party has recovered only nominal damages, the Supreme Court has explained that "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 see also id. ("In some (emphasis added); circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally `prevails' under § 1988 should receive no attorney's fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing party...." (emphasis added)). Mercer, 401 F.3d at 203. Here, Plaintiff asserts that the relief sought was

"generally nonmonetary." by the record. The

That assertion is totally unsupported sought only compensatory and

complaint

exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and "such other and further relief as the court may deem appropriate." The entire tenor of On that

the litigation was a quest for a large damages award.

point, Plaintiff achieved almost none of the relief requested. The case also did not involve novel legal issues. While

excessive force claims are always serious, Plaintiff's nominal damage verdict did not serve to advance the state of the law. Furthermore, this verdict was against the officer personally and 3

not in his official capacity; thus, the suit and limited verdict did not serve a public purpose. Moreover, the file reflects

repeated discovery lapses by Plaintiff's counsel, not only in failing to respond to Defendants' legitimate requests, but also in failing to pursue discovery on behalf of Plaintiff in a

timely fashion.

In sum, the limited success evidenced by the

verdict justifies no award of attorneys' fees. A separate order will be entered.

________/s/__________________ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

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