Jarvis v. Enterprise Fleet Services and Leasing Company
Filing
212
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 5/11/10 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/11/10. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND DEREK JARVIS v. ENTERPRISE FLEET SERVICES AND LEASING COMPANY : : : : : Civil Action No. DKC 07-3385
MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before the court are motions filed by Plaintiff Derek Jarvis for reconsideration (paper 204), for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis (paper 209), and for transcripts to be provided at government expense (paper 208). The issues have
been briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. follow, Plaintiff's motions will be denied. I. Background On March 17, 2010, this court separately issued a For the reasons that
memorandum opinion and order denying numerous motions filed by Plaintiff, Enterprise granting Fleet summary judgment Leasing in favor of and Defendant entering
Services
and
Company,
judgment for Defendant in the amount of $2,112.89, representing an award of attorneys' fees incurred by Defendant in litigating a prior motion. (Paper 203). On March 22, 2010, Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration of the court's order granting summary
judgment and entering a monetary judgment in favor of Defendant, citing "manifest errors of law or fact" and "the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent a manifest injustice." 204, at 2). (Paper
On April 8, 2010, Plaintiff concomitantly filed a
motion for trial transcripts at government expense (paper 208), a motion and supporting affidavit for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (paper 209), and a notice of appeal (paper 210). II. Motion for Reconsideration A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Courts have recognized three limited
grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e): (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See United States ex rel.
Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1012 (2003). "A motion to reconsider is not a license to argue the RGI, Inc. v. Unified Indus., To the contrary, it is be used sparingly,"
merits or present new evidence."
Inc., 963 F.2d 658, 662 (4th Cir. 1992). "an extraordinary remedy which should
Pacific Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403. 2
B.
Analysis
In considering Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court prefaced its analysis by noting that there was
"considerable disparity in the quality of the evidence submitted by the parties." (Paper 202, at 39). The court observed that
"[w]hile Enterprise has presented voluminous records, deposition excepts, and a number of declarations of relevant witnesses in support of its claims, Plaintiff relies principally upon his own `affidavits,'" (Id.). which were "problematic in several respects."
"Initially," the court noted, Plaintiff's self-described
affidavits "are unsworn and do not include the language required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746 for unsworn declarations." court then continued, with observing several other such as (Id.). The
evidentiary that his
"problems" "purported conclusory evidence," [personnel
Plaintiff's
submission, if not
affidavits allegations that he
largely, that are
exclusively, by any
assert other labeled as the to
unsupported and
"grouped for these
together
improperly employees] he
records of
various
Enterprise and
`declarations'
employees,"
that
"failed
explain the relevance of many of [these] exhibits and, in many cases, it is unclear how they support the proposition for which they appear to be cited." (Id. at 40, n. 9).
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In moving for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the court "appears to [have based] its entire Order/Opinion" on its finding that his "affidavits" were defective, contending that they "absolutely constitute[] . . . `sworn statement[s],'" and requests that it "immediately vacate its erroneous and flawed opinion/order" to the contrary. (Paper 204, at 1). While
Plaintiff fails to cite any legal support for his argument, he asserts that the language he used to certify his affidavits was "consistent with the language used in an affidavit . . . `under penalty of perjury.'" (Id. at 13).
Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive in several respects. First, as the court explained in its memorandum opinion, the documents that Plaintiff purported to be "affidavits" clearly were not. "An affidavit is a statement reduced to writing and
the truth of which is sworn to before someone who is authorized to administer an oath." Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Hammer, 83 F.Supp. 383, 386 (D.W.D.), rev'd on other grounds, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949). The documents submitted by
Plaintiff did not purport to "sworn to before someone who is authorized to administer an oath"; thus, they were not true affidavits. Secondly, Plaintiff's submissions did not contain
the requisite language to qualify as "unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. That statute
provides that where a party declares "under penalty of perjury 4
that the foregoing is true and correct," or the substantial equivalent, affidavit. following its statements two may be submitted in lieu of an the
Plaintiff's language: "I
"affidavits" Certify
concluded that the
with
Hereby
foregoing
statements made by me are True and Correct, I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to perjury." Paper 195, Ex. 1, at 15). the contrary, set this forth is in (Paper 192, Ex. 2, at 23; see also Despite Plaintiff's apparent claim to not 28 the equivalent § 1746; of the suggested
language
U.S.C.
thus,
Plaintiff's Were
"affidavits" could not qualify as unsworn declarations.1 this technical the issue court the only not problem have with
Plaintiff's to permit
"affidavits,"
would
hesitated
Plaintiff to amend his affidavits.
As the court observed in its
memorandum opinion, however, this was only the initial problem. Plaintiff's allegations "affidavits" unsupported by also any consisted other largely of bald those
evidence.
Under
circumstances, permitting Plaintiff to amend his "affidavits" would have served no legitimate purpose.
While Plaintiff complains that the court did not find similar fault with Defendant's unsworn declarations, each of Defendant's declarations were properly prefaced with language establishing that the declarant "declare[s] under the penalties of perjury that the following is true and correct." (See, e.g., Paper 190, Ex. 1). This language largely mirrored the example set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 5
1
While Plaintiff presents a number of additional arguments in support of his position that the court must "correct manifest errors of law or fact" (paper 204, at 2) with respect to its prior decision, these arguments essentially seek "to have the court change its mind, which is not the function of a Rule 59(e) motion," Frall Developers, Inc. v. Board of County Com'rs for Frederick County, Civ. No. CCB-07-2731, 2010 WL 672847, at *1 (D.Md. Feb. 22, 2010). motion is To the extent that Plaintiff's rambling he law, has failed to identify evidence, any or
comprehensible, change in the
intervening
newly
developed
clear error of law or manifest injustice that would cause this court to alter its prior opinion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration will be denied. III. Motions for Trial Transcripts at Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis Government Expense and
As the court stated previously (paper 168), it has already granted Plaintiff's prior motions for in forma pauperis status (papers 100, 119), and need not do so again. Thus, Plaintiff's
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (paper 209) will be denied as unnecessary. Plaintiff additionally requests, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), that the government be charged the cost of reproducing copies of a hearing before Judge Day for purposes of his appeal. (Paper 208). "An appellant proceeding on appeal in forma
6
pauperis is entitled to transcripts at government expense only if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous but presents a substantial question." Cheris
v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 351 Fed.Appx. 792, 793 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). For the reasons stated
in the memorandum opinion, this court cannot make the requisite certification here.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for free
transcripts will be denied. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motions for
reconsideration, for trial transcripts at government expense, and to appeal in forma pauperis will be denied. order will follow. A separate
________/s/_________________ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge
Notably, Plaintiff apparently seeks this transcript in connection with this court's denial of his "motion for reconsideration" of a prior order issued by Judge Day. Plaintiff, however, has already appealed the underlying order (paper 178), and that appeal was dismissed by the Fourth Circuit on December 23, 2009 (paper 196). 7
2
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