Banks v. Broadwater et al

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/26/11. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ANTONIO DEVIN BANKS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 09-0589

:
JERRY BROADWATER, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this prisoner
civil

rights

alternative,
Gaughan.

action
for

is

a

summary

motion

judgment

(ECF No. 77).

to

dismiss

filed

by

or,

Defendant

in

the

Melissa

The issues are fully briefed and the

court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being
deemed

necessary.

For

the

reasons

that

follow,

Defendant’s

motion will be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Procedural Background

On March 6, 2009, the clerk received for filing a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 submitted by Plaintiff
Antonio
(“WCI”).1

Banks,

an

inmate

at

Western

Correctional

Institution

Plaintiff alleged that correctional officers Jerry

Broadwater, Russell Gover, William Logsdon, and Robert Huff used

1

Plaintiff has since been transferred to the Correctional
Mental Health Center in Jessup, Maryland.
(ECF No. 82, at 3
n.4).

excessive force and denied him medical care in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
or,

alternatively,

denied.

The defendants responded by moving to dismiss
for

summary

judgment.

That

motion

was

Counsel was appointed for Plaintiff.

On August 18, 2010, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a verified
amended

complaint,

naming

three

additional

defendants

–

two

correctional officers, “Lieutenant Yates” and “Officer Stott,”
and “Medical Technician Phoebe,” whose proper name the parties
now agree is Melissa Gaughan (hereinafter, “Defendant”).
No. 65).2

(ECF

As to each defendant, the amended complaint alleged

violations of the Eighth Amendment and Articles 16 and 25 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The correctional officer defendants answered the amended
complaint on December 16, 2010, denying all allegations.
No. 72).

(ECF

Defendant responded, on March 7, 2011, by filing the

pending motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment.
B.

(ECF No. 77).
Factual Background

The following facts relate to the claims against Defendant
Gaughan

only.

Unless

otherwise

noted,

they

are

either

undisputed or uncontroverted.

2

The clerk will be directed to correct Ms. Gaughan’s name
on the docket.
The defendants other than Ms. Gaughan will be
referred
to,
collectively,
as
the
“correctional
officer
defendants.”
2

On December 23, 2007, at shortly after 5:00 p.m., Officer
Broadwater approached Plaintiff’s cell and directed him “to pass
[his] food tray through the feed-up slot in the cell door.”
(ECF

No.

65

¶

39).

When

Plaintiff

complied,

the

officer

“grabbed [] Plaintiff’s hands, pulled [them] towards himself,
and

with

great

force

and

violence

closed

the

slot

upwards,

catching Plaintiff’s right hand with the slot door and causing
agonizing pain[.]”

(Id. at ¶ 41).

The force of the blow

“partially severed one of [] Plaintiff’s fingernails” and caused
his finger to bleed profusely.
asked

Officer

present,

to

Broadwater
“take

(Id. at ¶¶ 43, 44).

and

[him]

Officer

to

the

Logsdon,

medical

Plaintiff

who

was

also

department”

for

treatment, but the officers “walked away from Plaintiff’s cell,
without responding.”

(Id. at ¶¶ 45, 46).

Shortly thereafter,

Lieutenant Yates approached Plaintiff’s cell.

Plaintiff “showed

[Lieutenant] Yates his bloody finger” and asked to be “taken to
the medical department for treatment.”

(Id. at ¶ 49).

Rather

than provide assistance, the lieutenant “mock[ed]” Plaintiff and
walked away.
At
arrived

(Id. at ¶ 51).

approximately
on

prisoners.”

7:30

Plaintiff’s
(Id.

at

p.m.,

tier
¶

“to

54).

Defendant
dispense

and

Officer

medications

Defendant

was

a

Stott

to

the

“Certified

Medication Aide” (ECF No. 77-2, Gaughan decl., at ¶ 1) employed
by

Correctional

Medical

Services,
3

Inc.

(“CMS”),

a

private

corporation under contract with the State of Maryland to provide
medical services to inmates.

She was “neither authorized nor

trained to administer any . . . medical or nursing treatment”
and “[i]f an inmate asked [her] for any treatment other than
medications,

[she]

would

ask

the

tier

officer

registered nurse on duty to evaluate the inmate.”
¶ 4).

to

call

the

(ECF No. 77-2

According to Plaintiff, both Defendant and Officer Stott

“ignored”
“refused

his
to

medication.”
Officer

request
provide

for

“medical

[him]

with

attention”

[his]

and

previously

Defendant
prescribed

(ECF No. 65 ¶¶ 55, 56).3
Logsdon

provided

Plaintiff

medication at approximately 8:00 p.m.

with

his

prescribed

(Id. at ¶ 57).4

Plaintiff

again asked Officer Logsdon “to secure medical attention for
[his] partially severed fingernail,” but the officer “laughed
and walked away.”

(Id. at ¶ 58).

Officers Yates, Gover, and

Logsdon returned about fifteen minutes later, and Officer Gover
“cleaned up the blood on the tier in front of Plaintiff’s cell.”
(Id.

at

¶

60).

Once

again,

Plaintiff

requested

medical

attention and was ignored.

3

Defendant asserts in her declaration that
recollection of these events. (ECF No. 77-2 ¶ 3).
4

she

has

no

In his opposition papers, Plaintiff does not contend that
Defendant is liable for the thirty-minute delay in receiving his
prescribed medication.
4

At 12:45 the following morning, i.e., approximately five
hours after Plaintiff asked Defendant for medical attention, a
nurse responded to his “sick-call request.”

(ECF No. 77-3,

Declaration of Dr. Isaias Tessema, at ¶ 3; ECF No. 77-4, medical
records, at 01).

Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary where the

nurse observed “a small avulsed area on the nail of [his] right
ring finger” and “slight bleeding and . . . swelling,” but also
that Plaintiff had “good range of motion” in all fingers and “no
crepitus of his fingers or hand.”

(ECF No. 77-3 ¶ 3).

The

nurse cleaned the wound, applied antibiotic ointment and a gauze
dressing, and gave Plaintiff ibuprofen for pain.
II.

(Id.).5

Standard of Review
Defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

A court considers only the

pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Where, as here,

the parties present matters outside of the pleadings and the
court considers those matters, the motion is treated as one for
summary judgment.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Gadsby by Gadsby v.

5

Although “the fingernail on Plaintiff’s right ring finger
[eventually] fell off” and Plaintiff “remained in some pain for
the next several months” (ECF No. 65 ¶¶ 64, 65), a January 30
follow-up examination by a CMS nurse noted “no redness,
swelling, or drainage” and “good range of motion in the finger”
(ECF No. 77-3 ¶ 7).
5

Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 949 (4th Cir. 1997); Paukstis v. Kenwood
Golf & Country Club, Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 551, 556 (D.Md. 2003).
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment
will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

See Fed.R.Civ.P 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297
(4th Cir. 2008).

In other words, if there clearly exist factual

issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because

they

may

reasonably

be

resolved

party,” summary judgment is inappropriate.

in

favor

of

either

Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also JKC Holding Co.
LLC v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th
Cir. 2001).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 377 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.

A party who bears the

burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support
each element of his or her claim.
at 323.

See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential

element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Id.

Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will

have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to
6

confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or
other

similar

evidence

in

order

to

show

the

existence

of

a

genuine issue for trial.

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

“A mere scintilla of proof, however,

will

not

Jenney,

suffice

327

F.3d

to

prevent

307,

314

summary

(4th

Cir.

judgment.”
2003).

Peters

There

must

v.
be

“sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.”

Id. at 249-50

(citations omitted).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that, by ignoring his request for medical
treatment related to his injured finger, Defendant violated his
rights under the United States and Maryland Constitutions to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.

There is no dispute

that, as an employee of CMS, Defendant was a state actor for
purposes

of

§

1983.

The

Eighth

Amendment

applies

to

state

actors via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F.Supp.2d 345, 353 n.25 (D.Md. 2007)
(citing

Wilson

v.

Seiter,

501

U.S.

294,

296-97

(1991)).

Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are
construed in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment, see Brooks
v. State, 104 Md.App. 203, 213 n.2 (1995) (citing Harris v.
7

State, 312 Md. 225, 237 n.5 (1988)); thus, Plaintiff’s claims
under those provisions need not be considered separately from
his federal constitutional challenge.
It is undisputed that Defendant was not, herself, qualified
to

render

medical

assistance

to

Plaintiff.

When

an

inmate

requested such assistance, her role was limited to “ask[ing] the
tier officer to call the registered nurse on duty to evaluate
the inmate.”

(ECF No. 77-2 ¶ 4).

There is also no dispute that

Plaintiff was evaluated and treated by a nurse approximately
five hours after he requested Defendant’s assistance; indeed,
Plaintiff “does not challenge the adequacy of the medical care”
provided.
claim

(ECF No. 82, at 6-7).

presented

is

that

Thus, the only substantive

Defendant’s

failure

to

report

his

request for medical assistance to “the tier officer” constitutes
cruel

and

unusual

punishment

in

violation

of

the

Eighth

“unnecessary

and

wanton

Amendment.
The

Eighth

Amendment

prohibits

infliction of pain” by virtue of its prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
(1976).

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173

To establish a claim for denial of medical care under

the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
actions of the defendant, or the defendant’s failure to act,
amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
8

Deliberate indifference claims have both an objective and
subjective component.
167 (4th Cir. 1998).

See Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164,
First, the plaintiff must prove that the

medical condition or injury at issue was objectively serious.
Id.;

see

also

Hudson

v.

McMillian,

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

503

U.S.

1,

9

(1992);

The plaintiff must also satisfy the

subjective component by showing that the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference, i.e., that she was both “aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of

serious

inference.”

harm

exists”

and

that

she,

in

fact,

“dr[e]w

the

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

Plaintiff

cannot

establish

either

component

here.

A

“‘serious medical need’ is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.’”

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir.

2008) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir.
1999)).
time

As Plaintiff’s injury had not yet been diagnosed at the

Defendant

allegedly

ignored

his

request

for

medical

attention, the relevant inquiry is whether the severity of his
injury – later diagnosed as “a small avulsed area on the nail of
[his]

right

ring

finger,”

with

some

degree

of

bleeding

swelling (ECF No. 77-3 ¶ 3) – was sufficiently obvious.

and

Courts

considering cases involving similar injuries have answered that
9

question in the negative.

See, e.g., Thomas v. Nassau Co. Corr.

Ctr., 288 F.Supp.2d 333, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“an injured hand
is not a serious enough condition to satisfy the first prong of
the test”); Sonds v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs., 151
F.Supp.2d 303, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“a cut finger, even where
skin is ripped off, . . . does not, as a matter of law, qualify
as an injury severe enough to justify civil rights relief”).
Plaintiff argues that “[e]xtreme pain may make a medical
condition sufficiently serious,” adding that “[a]nyone who has
ever

lost

a

fingernail

painful it is.”

due

to

blunt

(ECF No. 82, at 8).

force

trauma

knows

how

Be that as it may, the

“serious injury” prong is an objective inquiry, as the cases
cited by Plaintiff make clear.
F.3d

550,

553

(2nd

Cir.

See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99

1996)

(“Objectively,

the

alleged

deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a
condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration,
or

extreme

pain

exists.”)

(emphasis

added;

internal

marks

omitted); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“[a] condition is objectively serious if failure to treat [it]
could result in further significant injury or unnecessary and
wanton

infliction

omitted).

of

pain”)

(emphasis

added;

internal

marks

In other words, the degree of pain that Plaintiff

subjectively

experienced,

by

itself,

is

not

relevant

–

particularly where, as here, there is no evidence suggesting
10

that the defendant inflicted the injury or had any knowledge of
the

manner

perspective

in

which

that

is

it

was

relevant,

inflicted.
moreover,

plaintiff, but of the defendant.

The

is

not

subjective

that

of

the

See Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (the

defendant must have “actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the
inmate” and “recognize[] that [her] actions were insufficient to
mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical
needs”).
The

subjective

component

of

the

deliberate

indifference

analysis “sets a particularly high bar to recovery,” id. (citing
Grayson

v.

Peed,

195

F.3d

692,

695

Plaintiff has failed to meet that bar.

(4th

Cir.

1999)),

and

Even assuming that his

injury was objectively serious and that Defendant ignored his
request for medical attention, there is nothing in the record
suggesting that Defendant had specific knowledge of a risk of
harm to Plaintiff.

It may be reasonably inferred that there was

some amount of blood on the floor in front of Plaintiff’s cell
at

the

time

Defendant

passed

by,

but

it

is

not

enough

for

Plaintiff to show that Defendant should have noticed the blood
and inferred that Plaintiff’s injury called for prompt medical
attention.

See Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (“actual knowledge of the

risk of harm to the inmate is required”) (citing, inter alia,
Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir.
2004)

(“It

is

not

enough

that
11

the

officers

should

have

recognized [a substantial risk of harm]; they actually must have
perceived

the

risk.”)

(emphasis

in

original)).

Unlike

his

request for treatment from Lieutenant Yates, to whom he “showed
. . . [the] bloody finger” (id. at ¶ 49), Plaintiff does not
suggest that Defendant ever saw his finger or that he told her
the nature of his injury.

In fact, his claim that Defendant

“ignored” his request for “medical attention” (ECF No. 65 ¶ 55)
is not inconsistent with Defendant’s assertion that she does
“not

recall

[Plaintiff]

bleeding fingernail.”
The

record

ever

complaining

of

a

broken

and

Defendant

had

(ECF No. 77-2 ¶ 3).

further

reflects

that

even

if

recognized that Plaintiff had a serious injury, she could only
have “ask[ed] the tier officer to call the registered nurse on
duty to evaluate the inmate.”

(Id. at ¶ 4).

It is unknown who

“the tier officer” was on the night in question, but Plaintiff
asserts that five correctional officers on the tier were already
aware of his request for medical attention – including Officer
Stott, who came on the tier at the same time as Defendant.
Thus, it appears doubtful that Defendant’s report to “the tier
officer” would have done anything to mitigate a risk of harm to
Plaintiff.
The

Fourth

Circuit

has

recognized

that

deliberate

indifference can be shown where medical treatment is delayed for
non-medical reasons, see Hunt v. Sandhir, M.D., 295 Fed.Appx.
12

584, 586 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Monmouth County
Corr. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.3d 326, 346-47 (3rd Cir. 1987)), but
Plaintiff has not even suggested a non-medical reason Defendant
had for allegedly delaying his treatment.
failure

to

report

approximately

the

five

injury

hours.

At most, Defendant’s

resulted

Considering

the

in

a

delay

relatively

of

minor

nature of Plaintiff’s injury, that time period is too brief to
support an Eighth Amendment claim.

Cf. Hunt, 295 Fed.Appx. at

586 (finding nine-day delay in treating a fractured elbow, based
on

non-medical

reasons,

sufficient

to

support

a

deliberate

indifference claim) (citing Hunt v. Dental Dep’t., 865 F.2d 198,
201 (9th Cir. 1989) (failure to treat dental problems for three
months); H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086-87
(11th

Cir.

1986)

(three-day

delay

in

medical

treatment

for

shoulder injury); Fields v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir.
1984) (failure to treat an infected tooth causing severe pain
for twelve days)).

Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s

“sick-call request” was submitted at some point and that a nurse
responded

and

provided

Plaintiff preferred.

adequate

treatment,

albeit

later

than

His complaint that he was not treated more

promptly sounds in the nature of a disagreement with the prison
staff’s assessment of the severity of his injury.

It is well-

settled that such a disagreement does not constitute an Eighth
Amendment claim.

See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th
13

Cir. 1985) (“Disagreements between an inmate and a physician
over the inmate’s proper medical care do not state a § 1983
claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged.”).
In sum, Plaintiff cannot establish, on this record, that
Defendant
need.
IV.

was

deliberately

indifferent

to

a

serious

medical

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

14