Pierce v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 11/9/10. (sat, Chambers)
Pierce v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Doc. 48
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND TINA PIERCE v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY : : : : : Civil Action No. DKC 09-1917
MEMORANDUM OPINION Three motions are pending and ready for resolution in this personal injury case: (1) a motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment (ECF No. 36) filed by Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"); (2) a motion to strike
Plaintiff's expert (ECF No. 35), also filed by WMATA; and (3) a motion for leave to file a surreply (ECF No. 46) filed by
Plaintiff Tina Pierce.
The issues are fully briefed and the For the reasons
court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6.
that follow, WMATA's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment will be granted. WMATA's motion to strike will be denied as
moot and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply will be denied.1
Plaintiff's proposed surreply protests certain deficiencies in discovery and makes additional arguments concerning the standard of care. (ECF No. 46). Neither the discovery issues nor the tardy legal arguments have any material impact on the outcome of this motion. As such, there is no need for further consideration of those arguments.
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I.
Background A. Factual Background This case stems from Road Metrorail
The following facts are undisputed. an August 27, 2007 incident at the
Addison
Station, owned and operated by WMATA, involving a mother and her minor child. Around 4:30 pm that day, Plaintiff Tina Pierce and
other family members were standing under a tree at the station, waiting for a bus. (ECF No. 36-5, Pierce Depo., at 5, 6).
Plaintiff's six-year-old daughter, T.S.S., climbed onto a nearby fence or gate at the station. When Plaintiff noticed her
daughter on the fence, she told her to get off.
(Id. at 9, 12).
T.S.S. started to climb down and, in the course of doing so, placed her hand at the top of the fence. Depo., at 6). (ECF No. 42-2, T.S.S.
The gate on the fence moved, closed, and injured (Id. at 5-6; ECF No. 36-5, Pierce Depo., at
T.S.S.'s finger. 14).2
Plaintiff did not witness her daughter's injury. No. 36-5, Pierce Depo., at 12-13).
(ECF
Instead, she only realized
something was wrong when T.S.S. ran to Plaintiff's mother and told her that her finger had been cut. (Id. at 12). (Id.). It was
then that Plaintiff saw "the blood shooting up."
Plaintiff and her family members passed through the open gate when they first arrived at Addison Road Station. (ECF No. 42-1, Pierce Depo., at 4). 2
2
No WMATA employees witnessed the incident or were in the area when T.S.S. was injured. (ECF No. 44-4, Pierce Depo., at WMATA Station Manager
34; ECF No. 44-5, Clark Depo., at 4).
Connie Clark did inspect the area around the gate after the incident, where she observed a "spec[k] of blood on the fence area." (ECF No. 36-2, Clark Depo., at 4-5).
There is some dispute over the condition of the gate at the time of the accident. Plaintiff contends that the gate was In support,
"broken" because a latch on the gate was missing.
she provides several photographs taken by an investigator at some time after the accident (but no earlier than two days after the accident). Projects (ECF Paul No. 36-6, at 2-8). that, WMATA at Manager in of the
Special
Kram
conceded
least
pictures, "[t]he latching mechanism is not present." 42-4, Kram Depo., at 6).
(ECF No.
Kram explained that the "design was So . . . it was Thus, the gate would
not to lock [the gate], [but] to latch. designed to close after use." (Id. at 4).
remain accessible and unlocked for those who wanted to open it. (ECF No. 36-3, Kram Depo., at 8, 9; ECF No. 36-2, Clark Depo., at 10). B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, asserting claims of premise (ECF
liability and negligence on behalf of her minor daughter. 3
Nos. 1, 2).
The case was removed to this court by WMATA, which (ECF No. 4). On September 9,
filed an answer on July 22, 2009.
2009, this court granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. (ECF No. 12). next In the amended of complaint, and on Plaintiff her own sues as
parent
and
friend
T.S.S.
behalf,
individually.
(ECF No. 13).
The court dismissed any claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in an October 5, 2009 order. (ECF No. 19). WMATA then filed a motion to dismiss the
remaining claims (ECF No. 36), as well as a motion to strike Plaintiff's safety expert (ECF No. 35), on May 28, 2010. II. Standard of Review WMATA has moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. A
court considers only the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Because WMATA's motion relies extensively on
matters outside the pleadings, the court will construe it as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Walker v.
True, 399 F.3d 315, 319 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005); Offen v. Brenner, 553 F.Supp.2d 565, 568 (D.Md. 2008). A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). other words, summary judgment is 4 inappropriate if there In are
factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. A party who bears the
372, 378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. 323. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
"[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will
have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. will not suffice F.3d to 307,
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Celotex "A mere scintilla of proof, however, summary Cir. judgment." 2003). Peters must v. be
prevent 314
Jenney,
327
(4th
There
"sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
"If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly 5
probative, summary judgment may be granted." (citations omitted). III. Analysis WMATA contends that Plaintiff's claims
Id. at 249-50.
are
barred
by
sovereign immunity.
(ECF No. 36-1, at 3).
Specifically, WMATA
maintains that Plaintiff's claims are "inextricably interwoven with a challenge to the design of the fence and gates which WMATA chose to use in the exercise of its discretion." 6. Such discretionary decisions are, as explained Id. at below,
shielded from suit.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, characterizes
her claims as relating "to the operation and maintenance of the fence and gate." (ECF No. 42, at 13). If that were the proper
characterization, the claims would not be barred by immunity. WMATA is a mass transit system (serving the District of Columbia and suburban areas) that enjoys a unique type of
sovereign immunity with respect to certain claims.
Created in
1966, WMATA was formed by an interstate compact ("the Compact") enacted and consented to by Congress and adopted by the state of Maryland, Virginia. the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of
Martin v. WMATA, 667 F.2d 435, 436 (4th Cir. 1981).3
The Compact provides that WMATA is an interstate agency and
Legal issues related Compact are federal questions. 206 (4th Cir. 2002). 6
3
to the interpretation of the Smith v. WMATA, 290 F.3d 201,
instrumentality
of
each
of
the
signatories
to
the
Compact.
Delon Hampton & Assocs., Ctd. v. WMATA, 943 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1991). privileges As such an agency, WMATA enjoys the same rights and as a state, including sovereign immunity. Id.
(citing Beatty v. WMATA, 860 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). WMATA's immunity is not all encompassing, as the Compact waives that immunity for some claims i.e., those that stem from the performance of a propriety, or non-governmental In
function.
Smith v. WMATA, 290 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2002).
particular, Section 80 of the Compact provides: The Authority shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts and those of its directors, officers, employees, and agents committed in the conduct of any proprietary function, in accordance with the applicable signatory (including rules of conflict of laws), but shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function. The exclusive remedy for such breach of contracts and torts for which the Authority shall be liable, as herein provided, shall be by suit against the Authority. Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 10-204(80) (2010). Determining whether something is properly labeled
"propriety" or "governmental" is not easy, Smith, 290 F.3d at 206, but the Court of by Appeals borrowing for a the Fourth Circuit approach has to
provided
guidance
two-part
identifying "governmental" acts from the Court of Appeals for
7
the D.C. Circuit.4 F.Supp.2d whether 424, WMATA 430 "is
Smith, 290 F.3d at 207; James v. WMATA, 649 (D.Md. engaged 2009). in a First, the test looks to
quintessential
governmental
function."
Smith, 290 F.3d at 207.
If it is, the activity is Id. If
within WMATA's sovereign immunity and the inquiry ends.
WMATA was not engaged in a quintessential government function, the court "must proceed to the second inquiry, [wherein] it must determine whether the challenged activity is discretionary or ministerial." immune "from Id.5 any If an activity is discretionary, WMATA is `however negligently caused.'" Id. In
claim,
(quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1953)). contrast, actions." "sovereign immunity never shields
ministerial
Monument Realty LLC v. WMATA, 535 F.Supp.2d 60, 76
(D.D.C. 2008). Here, it cannot be said that WMATA was engaged in a
quintessential government function, and "WMATA has not attempted to shoehorn itself into this narrow category of conduct." KiSKA
Constr. Corp. v. WMATA, 321 F.3d 1151, 1158 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
"[A] proper consideration in construing the Compact is the maintenance of consistency between the legal interpretations of the `two federal circuits most likely to hear cases in which [METRO] is a party,' i.e., [the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit] and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." Smith, 290 F.3d at 207 n.9 (quoting Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 134 (4th Cir. 2001)). This distinction is also found in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Smith, 290 F.3d at 207. 8
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(internal quotations omitted). a simple fence. Matters
At its root, this case concerns concerning a fence are easily
distinguishable from "quintessentially governmental" activities, such as police activity, Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997), prosecutorial decisions, Sloan v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2001), or firefighting, West v. Anne Arundel Cnty., Md., 137 F.3d 752, 758 (4th Cir. 1998). and classify Thus, the court must move on to the next step challenged activity as discretionary or
the
ministerial. At the general level, the D.C. Circuit has explained that "a duty is discretionary if it involves judgment, planning, or policy decisions. It is not discretionary [i.e., it is
ministerial] if it involves enforcement or administration of a mandatory duty at the operational level, even if professional expert evaluation is required." KiSKA Constr. Corp., 321 F.3d Two more pointed court considers
at 1159 n.9 (internal quotations omitted). questions whether dictate any the outcome. First, or the
statute,
regulation,
policy
"specifically Id.
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow." at 1159.
If the course is prescribed, the activity is not Second, the court must determine whether the is grounded in "social, economic, or
discretionary. exercise of
discretion Id.
political goals."
If it is, sovereign immunity applies. 9
There is no suggestion that any statute, regulation, or policy mandated WMATA to take any actions concerning the gate or fence. Thus, the court must look to whether the challenged To the
action relates to social, economic, or political goals.
extent that Plaintiff challenges the design of the fence or gate, courts "regularly invoke governmental function immunity to reject . . . negligent design claims against WMATA." Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Transp., 530 F.Supp.2d to Plater v. 101, of 104 bus
(D.D.C.
2008)
(applying Indeed,
sovereign
immunity have
design
shelters).
various
cases
applied
sovereign
immunity to the design of seemingly every aspect of the WMATA system. See also, e.g., Abdulwali v. WMATA, 315 F.3d 302, 305
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (design and adequacy of warning signs); Souders v. WMATA, 48 F.3d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (design of noise level guidelines for Metrorail); Dant v. Dist. of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C. v. Cir. 1987) 880 (design F.Supp. of 14, automated 19 farecard 1995)
system);
Warren
WMATA,
(D.D.C.
(choice of glass in bus windows); Jones v. WMATA, 742 F.Supp. 24, 25 (D.D.C. 1990) (design of escalators); Simpson v. WMATA, 688 F.Supp. 765, 767 (D.D.C. 1988) (design of gap between train and platform); Nathan v. WMATA, 653 F.Supp. 247, 248-49 (D.D.C. 1986) (design of stairs). In fact, an unreported decision of
the Fourth Circuit has specifically held that WMATA's decisions concerning the design of a fence are shielded from immunity. 10
Szadkowski v. WMATA, No. 96-2353, 1998 WL 116177, at *2 (4th Cir. 1998) ("WMATA's decision whether to post . . . a fence is a
design decision for which it is immune from suit."); cf. Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 722 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding design and construction of guardrails immune from suit under FTCA). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff's case constitutes a challenge to the fence design, sovereign immunity would bar it. Plaintiff protests that the claims in this case "have nothing whatsoever to do with the actual design of the fence and/or gateway at issue." submitted suggests (ECF No. 42, at 13). otherwise. The The evidence she has from Plaintiff's
report
expert, for instance, reads as a direct attack on the design aspects of the fence. · For instance:
The expert examined photographs "to evaluate the design and construction of the railing and gate assembly" (ECF No. 42-7, at 4); He concludes that "[t]he design and construction of the gate and railing assembly presented a hazardous condition," namely a pinch point (id. at 5, 7); and He counsels a design change, gate's hinges (id. at 5). i.e., relocation of the
·
·
Thus, at least to some extent, Plaintiff's claims appear to challenge the design of the fence and gate. In addition,
Plaintiff's expert contends that WMATA should have locked the gate "in the fully opened or fully closed position." 7). (Id. at 6,
This too is an attack on an element of the design of the 11
station property, and challenges a discretionary decision made by WMATA to allow the free flow of individuals through the
fenced-off area while maintaining the architectural line of the fence. (ECF No. 36-3, Kram Depo., at 6). Even if one assumes
that the gate was used only to allow landscaping crews to access the grassy area behind the fence (ECF No. 42, at 9), the
decision to allow employee access through an unlocked gate was discretionary.6 Thus, these challenges to WMATA's design
decisions are barred by sovereign immunity. But it is not the case that all of Plaintiff's claims
challenge the design.
Indeed, WMATA admits in its reply that
"Plaintiff's `theory' of WMATA's negligence is that a broken latch allowed the gate to swing and injure her child's finger." (ECF No. 44, at 15). Obviously, WMATA did not place a broken Thus, if Plaintiff could prove
latch on the gate by design.
that the broken latch caused T.S.S.'s injury, such a claim would not be barred by sovereign immunity. 116177, at . *2 . ("Design . [and] is WMATA See Szadkowksi, 1998 WL from operation by and
distinct is not
maintenance
shielded
sovereign
Similarly, any failure to warn is discretionary. See McKeel v. United States, 178 F.Supp.2d 493, 503-04 (D.Md. 2001) (listing cases); see also Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he decision whether to warn of potential danger is a protected discretionary function."). That is especially so where, as here, the danger was not hidden. Smith, 290 F.3d at 210. 12
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immunity for such ministerial functions as the operation and maintenance of its facilities."); see also Abduwali, 315 F.3d at 305 ("We have drawn a distinction between complaints alleging negligent design, which the Transit Authority's immunity bars, and those alleging negligent maintenance, to which the Transit Authority's immunity does not apply."). The fact that Plaintiff's maintenance claim is "interwoven" with apparent design claims does not automatically require
dismissal of the entire case.
In Beatty v. WMATA, 860 F.2d 1117
(D.C. Cir. 1988), for instance, Plaintiff sued WMATA for damages caused by vibrations from passing Metrorail trains. 1118-19. caused the Although alleged cause that of both parties agreed could Id. that not at to the Id. at
vibrations on the WMATA and
damages, the case
they
agree 1127. the
underlying contended
vibrations. was a Id.
the
challenge
design
placement of the rail line.
Beatty, on the other hand,
contended that her suit was a challenge to the implementation of the design; she argued that WMATA employees had forgotten to place certain beams on one side of the tracks. Id. The court
held that summary judgment could not be granted because a trier of fact could conclude that the "alleged injuries were caused by WMATA's exercise of a ministerial function." Id.; see also
Dant, 829 F.2d at 74 (allowing case against WMATA to proceed from motion to dismiss stage, 13 but "only insofar as [the
plaintiff] can establish that the injury alleged is directly attributable to negligent maintenance and operation"). in Beatty, the viability can she of Plaintiff's that case rests Just as on one
central
question:
establish
T.S.S.'s
injuries
resulted from the negligent maintenance of the latch, which is an unprotected ministerial function? Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict that a broken latch led to this accident. Indeed, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the latch was actually broken on the day of the accident. Although she
has produced pictures of a broken latch on the days after the accident, she did not provide any evidence that these pictures actually reflect the condition of the fence on the day of the incident.7 Moreover, even assuming that the latch was broken on the day of the incident, Plaintiff did not establish that it was the proximate cause of T.S.S.'s injury. "It is a basic principle
that negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause
Plaintiff states that "[a]t the time the minor child was injured the gateway latch was broken as admitted by Mr. Kram during [his] deposition." (ECF No. 42, at 4). Kram did not testify that the latch was broken on the day of the incident. Rather, Kram testified that the latch was broken in certain pictures taken later; Plaintiff's counsel, not Kram, indicated that those pictures reflected the condition of the latch on the day of the incident. (ECF No. 42-4, Kram Depo, at 5-6). 14
7
of the harm alleged." 244 (2009) (internal
Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, quotations and brackets omitted). One
element of proximate cause is cause-in-fact the determination that the "defendant's conduct actually produced an injury." (quotations omitted). Id.
Where only one negligent act is at issue,
cause-in-fact is found where the injury would not have occurred absent that negligent act. Id.
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence indicating that, but for the absence of the latch, the accident would not have happened. Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that "[i]f the gate
had been latched in the closed position then the minor child would not have had the opportunity to have her finger
amputated." however, any
(ECF No. 42, at 14). evidentiary makes support no
Plaintiff does not provide, for of that the contention, latch. and
Plaintiff's
expert
mention
Without
evidence, the bare assertion is not enough to survive summary judgment. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645,
649 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a `mere scintilla of evidence' in support of his case." (quoting Phillips v. CSX Transp., Inc., 190 F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1999)). IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, WMATA's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment will be granted, WMATA's motion to strike 15
will be denied as moot, and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply will be denied. A separate order will follow.
/s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge
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