Blake v. Ross
Filing
146
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 7/10/2013. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 7/11/13)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAIDON BLAKE,
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
*
v.
*
Case No. 09-cv-2367-AW
*
GARY MAYNARD, et al.,
*
*
Defendants.
*
*
******************************************************************************
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shaidon Blake filed suit against Defendant James Madigan and a host of others
alleging the excessive use of force after Plaintiff was punched multiple times by Madigan. The
suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At trial, the jury found Madigan liable and ordered that
Madigan pay Plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory damages. There are currently two pending
motions: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Doc. No. 138, and Madigan’s Motion for New
Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. Doc. No. 139. For the
following reasons, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and DENY
Madigan’s Motion for New Trial.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shaidon Blake is an inmate in the Maryland Department of Corrections. Blake
accused James Madigan, a correctional officer, of punching him in the face several times with a
“fist clenched over a key ring.” Blake pursued a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Madigan, and
1
the case proceeded to trial. At trial, while Blake did not call a medical expert, Blake himself
testified of the significant pain and suffering that he incurred as a result of Defendant’s actions.
He also offered several medical records. After hearing this evidence, the jury found Madigan
liable on Blake’s § 1983 claim, and awarded Blake $50,000 in compensatory damages.
The Parties have filed two post-verdict motions. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney
Fees, Doc. No. 138, while the Defendant has filed a Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative,
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Doc. No. 139.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 suit may receive “a
reasonable attorney’s fee.” “A court’s award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is the product of the
reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Sutton v. Smith, No. Civ.A.
AW–98–2111, 2001 WL 743201, at *1 (D. Md. June 26, 2001). This Court has considered
twelve factors in determining the reasonableness of this product:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4)
the attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the
litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the
amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal
community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in
similar cases.
Id.
2
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) places limitations on the attorney fees
that can be awarded in cases brought by prisoners. The PLRA stipulates that the fee must have
been “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights,”
and that “the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the
violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Section 1997e further provides that an award of attorney fees
may not exceed 150% of the judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). Additionally, a calculation of
attorney fees may not “be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate
established under 3006A of Title 18 for payment of court-appointed counsel.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(d)(3). The current rate of compensation in the District of Maryland is $125 per hour. See
CJA Hourly Rates, http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/publications/forms/CJARates.pdf.
Plaintiff submits evidence that Mayer Brown attorneys worked 2,187 hours on this case
at varying rates, all of which exceed the statutory maximum of $187.50 per hour. Doc. No. 1382. In accruing these hours, Plaintiff argues that his counsel had to review years of medical
evidence, take a number of depositions, consult a medical expert, and prepare for and conduct
trial. Doc. No. 138-1, at 3. Multiplying the number of hours worked by the statutory maximum,
Plaintiff submits that his attorneys would be entitled to $410,062.50 in fees were it not for the
statutory cap on attorney fees at 150% of the judgment. Consequently, Plaintiff asks for the full
$75,000, which is 150% of Plaintiff’s $50,000 judgment. Noting the substantial amount of work
performed by Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court grants Plaintiff the statutory maximum of $75,000 in
attorney fees.
3
The PLRA also provides that a Court must order that a portion of the attorney fees come
out of the plaintiff’s judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). This portion may not exceed 25% of the
judgment. Id. The Court may exercise discretion in determining the amount of the judgment that
gets directed toward attorney fees. See Sutton, 2001 WL 743201, at *2. In the past, when the
conduct of the officer has been egregious, this Court has directed $1.00 of the judgment toward
attorney fees and has required the defendant to pay the remainder. See id.
Because of the egregious conduct of the Defendant, the Court orders that $1.00 of
Plaintiff’s attorney fees be taken from Plaintiff’s judgment. At trial, the jury found that
Defendant “maliciously and sadistically” violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by punching
him several times in the face and throwing him to the ground, causing his head to hit the concrete
floor with substantial force. Such egregious behavior requires that only a nominal amount of
Plaintiff’s judgment be used to pay his attorney fees. See Sutton, 2001 WL 743201, at *2. Hence,
the Court orders attorney fees to be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $75,000, with
$1.00 to be paid from Plaintiff’s judgment, and the remainder to be paid by Defendant.
Defendant has a number of objections, all of which are meritless. First, Defendant
contends that he is destitute and therefore cannot afford to pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees. However,
he cites no legal authority that uses the means of the defendant as a measuring stick for awarding
attorney fees. Wealth, or lack thereof, of the defendant is not listed as one of the twelve factors
used to determine a reasonable attorney fee. See id. at *1. Moreover, “plaintiffs in civil rights
actions shall ordinarily receive fees and costs as long as no special circumstances render such an
award unjust. The district court has limited discretion in not awarding fees to a prevailing party.”
Clark v. Sims, 894 F. Supp. 868, 870 (D. Md. 1995) (citations omitted). Defendant has asserted
no special circumstance compelling the Court to exercise its limited discretion. For this same
4
reason, we also find no merit in Defendant’s argument that his counsel spent less time and fewer
resources preparing for trial. That his counsel was unwilling or unable to do as much as
Plaintiff’s counsel does not create a special circumstance rendering it unjust to award attorney
fees to Plaintiff.
Third, Defendant argues that most of the time used by Plaintiff’s attorneys was spent
dealing with claims against defendants other than Madigan. However, by the time Mayer Brown
was appointed, all defendants other than Madigan and Michael Ross had been dismissed from
the case. Doc. Nos. 3, 33, 38. Plaintiff points out that much of Mayer Brown’s work was related
to factual discovery, and the factual discovery performed to pursue the case against Madigan is
largely indistinguishable from the factual discovery taken to pursue the case against Ross.
Moreover, because Ross was dismissed from the case prior to trial, all of Mayer Brown’s trial
preparation was focused solely on the case against Madigan. However, as the Fourth Circuit has
explained,
It is often quite difficult . . . to separate the hours worked “on a claim-by-claim
basis” when “plaintiff’s claims for relief . . . involve a common core of facts or . .
. [are] based on related legal theories.” When this is the case, the chief
consideration becomes “the significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” When the
results have been “excellent,” the award should encompass “all hours reasonably
expended on the litigation.”
Knussman v. Maryland, 73 F. App’x 608, 614 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 435–36 (1983)). There is no dispute that Plaintiff received excellent results, and
Defendant has put forward no evidence or argument that Plaintiff’s counsel acted unreasonably.
Hence, the Court declines to lower its award of attorney fees to Plaintiff.
Fourth, Defendant asserts that Madigan’s cooperation made it easy for Plaintiff to prevail
and helped the trial run smoothly. That the costs of the litigation would have been even higher
5
had Defendant not cooperated does not give the Court a reason to deny Plaintiff attorney fees for
the costs that were actually incurred. Moreover, even if the Court accepted Defendant’s
arguments as factually true, they would not justify a reduction in the attorney fees owed to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s attorney fees, using the maximum statutory rate, were over $400,000;
Plaintiff is seeking to recover only a fraction of that amount. Even accounting for Defendant’s
financial circumstances and cooperation, and the possibility that time was spent pursuing
litigation against other defendants, the Court would not reduce Plaintiff’s attorney fees below the
$75,000 threshold.
2. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment
Defendant has filed a motion asking the Court to amend the judgment and impose a
verdict of nominal damages to the Plaintiff or, in the alternative, to grant a new trial. Doc. No.
139. The motion focuses entirely on the fact that the Plaintiff did not call a medical expert to
demonstrate that the Defendant’s conduct caused Plaintiff’s injury. For the sake of clarity and
exhaustion, the Court will presume that Defendant is moving both for a new trial under Rule 59
and, in the alternative, for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50.
Defendant’s motion fails on the merits.1 Under Rule 50, the Court must enter judgment
for Defendant if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
for” Plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). “In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
the trial court should consider the record as a whole viewing the evidence presented in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.” Bostron v. Apfel, 104 F. Supp. 2d
548, 551 (D. Md. 2000). “The court must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s
1
Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not properly preserve this motion. The Court, absent a full trial transcript, is not
in a position to evaluate this argument. Nonetheless, the Court need not evaluate Defendant’s preservation of the
motion as the motion fails on the merits.
6
favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness’ credibility.” Pathways
Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, Md, 223 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706 (D. Md. 2002).
On the other hand, under Rule 59,
a district court must[] set aside the verdict and grant a new trial if . . . (1) the
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence
which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may
be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.
Id. In applying this standard, “[c]ourts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that
prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done.” Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In general reconsideration of a
judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Pac. Ins.
Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Defendant’s Motion fails under both Rule 50’s “legally sufficient evidentiary basis”
standard and Rule 59’s “clear weight of the evidence” standard. The jury had more than
sufficient evidence to conclude that Plaintiff was entitled to $50,000 in damages. “Compensatory
damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such
injuries as impairment of reputation . . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff provided testimony of his suffering, explaining
that his “face was swollen up from being hit with a metal key chain like with the effect of brass
knuckles.” Doc. No. 142, at 74:6-10. He also explained that he suffered from headaches after the
beating. Id. Further, Plaintiff testified that he was constantly in pain for two weeks after the
incident and that he still has headaches and pain to this day. Id. at 78:8-11, 81:3-6. Moreover, he
7
explained that he has complained of headaches at every correctional facility he has been to, and
that he was prescribed Neurontin to counteract the headaches. Id. at 131:25-135:22. While he
had been prescribed Neurontin before, he testified that he was prescribed much higher doses
after Madigan’s attack. Id. Plaintiff testified that he is currently taking the highest dosage of
Neurontin that he has ever received. Id. Finally, Plaintiff submitted several exhibits of medical
records detailing the pain he experienced after Madigan’s attack. See Doc. No. 128, Plaintiff’s
Exhibit List.
Defendant argues that this evidence is insufficient as a matter of law because Plaintiff did
not call a medical expert to explain that his injuries were linked to Defendant’s actions.
However, no such expert was required:
There are many occasions where the causal connection between a defendant’s
negligence and a disability claimed by a plaintiff does not need to be established
by expert testimony. This is particularly true when the disability develops
coincidentally with, or within a reasonable time after, the negligent act, or where
the causal connection is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the
circumstances surrounding it, or where the cause of the injury relates to matters of
common experience, knowledge or observation.
Osunde v. Lewis, 281 F.R.D. 250, 261 (D. Md. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that he suffered from pain and headaches after he was
repeatedly struck on the head by Defendant. It is plain to this Court that the “causal connection is
clearly apparent” from Plaintiff’s injury. Moreover, suffering from significant pain and
headaches after being repeatedly struck in the head is so obvious that it can be considered a
matter of common experience, knowledge, or observation. Hence, no medical testimony was
necessary to establish the causal link between Defendant’s acts and Plaintiff’s injury.
The lack of medical testimony offered by Plaintiff is the sole basis for Defendant’s
motion. Because this argument is meritless, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion. The Court
8
is satisfied that Plaintiff’s testimony and medical records demonstrate that the verdict was not
against the weight of the evidence under Rule 59, and that they provided a legally sufficient basis
for the verdict under Rule 50.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees will be GRANTED, and
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment will be DENIED. A separate Order follows.
July 10, 2013
Date
/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?