Waker v. Owen et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 7/27/11. (cms, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOSEPH R. WAKER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
G.E. OWEN,
Defendant.
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Case No. RWT 09cv2380
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Joseph R. Waker, Jr. (“Waker”) instituted this action against Officer G.E. Owen
(“Owen”), Governor Martin O’Malley, Attorney General Douglas Gansler, and Assistant State’s
Attorney Anthony Covington, in their individual and official capacities, for “Fourth Amendment
– wrongful arrest” and “First Amendment – due process violations, and malicious prosecution.”
Compl. at 1. The Complaint was previously dismissed against all Defendants except Officer
Owen. See ECF Nos. 15, 16. Owen now moves for summary judgment on the only surviving
claims, those for malicious prosecution under state common law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 31, 2000, Waker, with the assistance of a cane, entered the Charles
County Courthouse in La Plata, Maryland. See Compl. ¶ 10. As Waker approached the metal
detector, Owen, a Deputy Sheriff, Patrol Officer II for Charles County, purportedly asked him
whether the cane he was carrying contained a concealed weapon. See id. ¶ 11. Waker alleges
Owen never handled the cane, and claims it did not pass through the metal detector. See id. ¶ 12.
Waker claims he left his driver’s license with Owen and walked to the parking lot to place the
cane in his car. See id. ¶ 11. Waker alleges he then returned to the courthouse without the cane,
passed through the metal detector, and retrieved his license from Owen. See id. ¶ 12.
Conversely, Owen provides the Court with evidence showing that he confiscated the cane
on August 31, 2000, after finding an eighteen-inch blade hidden inside it. See Def. Mot. Summ.
Judg., at Ex. 2. Later that same day, Owen applied for a Statement of Charges related to the
incident. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. Judg., Ex. 1, at ¶ 6. The District Court of Maryland for Charles
County issued a Statement of Charges, charging Waker with a violation of Md. Code Ann., Art.
27 § 36, wearing and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Id. at Ex. 5. On October 27, 2000,
the District Court issued a warrant for Waker’s arrest. Id. at 15.
Nearly nine years later, on April 1, 2009, Waker was arrested on a Fugitive from Justice
warrant in the District of Columbia related to the cane incident. See Compl. ¶ 14. He was
detained until April 6, 2009, when he was extradited to Charles County, Maryland and posted
bond. See id. During a preliminary hearing in the District Court for Charles County on April 27,
2009, Waker purportedly orally requested that the charges be dropped because (i) he had not
been served with the summons and charging document pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-212(c) and
(ii) the charging document erroneously stated that Owen picked up the cane, unscrewed it, and
discovered an eighteen-inch blade. See id. ¶¶ 15-17. Waker alleges that Defendant Assistant
State’s Attorney Anthony Covington denied Plaintiff’s request and trial was set for August 25,
2009. See id. ¶ 17. Waker allegedly renewed his objections in writing on April 28, 2009, but the
court denied his motion to dismiss. See id. ¶ 18. The court also later denied Waker’s motion to
quash the charging documents and arrest warrant. See id.
On August 25, 2009, the case against Waker was dismissed upon entry of a nolle
prosequi. See id. ¶ 19. Shortly thereafter, Waker purportedly requested via letter that the Clerk
of Charles County rescind or revoke any outstanding warrant or detainer relating to the charge,
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but the duty clerk rejected his letter. See id. ¶ 20. On September 8, 2009, Waker filed a motion
to compel revocation of any warrants. See id. ¶ 21. That motion was allegedly pending as of
April 6, 2010. See id.
Waker brought this action on September 10, 2009, against the State of Maryland and
various individuals for unlawful arrest in violation of his “federal rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [§]
1983” and “common law rights pursuant to respondeat superior,” and sought $10,000,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 3. On February 2, 2010, Defendants O’Malley,
Gansler, and Covington filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 9. Two days later,
Defendant Owen also moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 11. On February 19, 2010,
Waker filed an “Amended Complaint and Memorandum of [sic] in Opposition of Motion to
Dismiss,” as well as a one paragraph “Motion for Summary Judgment” against Defendant Owens
for “fail[ing] to answer the pleadings in a timely manner.” ECF Nos. 13, 14.
On April 6, 2010, the Court denied Waker’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted
Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to all claims except the claims of malicious prosecution
asserted against Owen. See ECF Nos. 15, 16. On April 26, 2010, Owen answered the Complaint
and asserted various affirmative defenses. ECF No. 18. On March 4, 2011, after the conclusion
of discovery, Owen moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 32. He argues that there is no
genuine dispute regarding the fact that he had probable cause to apply for a statement of charges
against Waker, and also argues that he is entitled to state personnel immunity. ECF No. 32 at 6,
11.
On June 8, 2011, Waker opposed Owen’s Motion for Summary Judgment, but failed to
provide any evidentiary materials or affidavits in support of his opposition. ECF No. 40. On
June 13, 2011, Owen filed a reply. ECF No. 41. Owen’s Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe
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for resolution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment “should be
rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2). The Supreme Court has clarified that “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Whether a fact is material depends upon the
substantive law. See id.
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e))(internal quotations omitted).
The court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct.
1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct.
993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962)).
However, “where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. at 380 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586-587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
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could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.” Id.
ANALYSIS
“To prevail on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated or maintained a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was not supported by
probable cause; and (4) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Snider v. Seung Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 202 (4th
Cir. 2009); see also Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000). Similarly, under
Maryland common law, a plaintiff asserting a claim for malicious prosecution must allege the
following four elements:
1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant
against the plaintiff; 2) without probable cause; 3) with malice, or
with a motive other than to bring the offender to justice; and
4) termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff.
Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000).
“The burden is on the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case to show that the defendant
lacked probable cause.” Smithfield Packing Co., Inc. v. Evely, 169 Md. App. 578, 905 A.2d 845,
860 (Md. App. 2006).
Probable cause is “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing that the
accused is guilty.” Id. (quoting Gladding Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fowler, 264 Md. 499, 287 A.2d 280
(Md. 1972)). Probable cause is “determined by the facts known at the time the prosecution was
instituted.” Silvera v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (D. Md. 2002) (citing
Banks v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 212 Md. 31, 128 A.2d 600, 604-05 (Md. 1957)). If the
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material facts are undisputed with respect to probable cause, then the question of probable cause
is one for the court. Id. (citing Fowler, 287 A.2d at 284).
Thus, the Court must determine whether a reasonable person in Owen’s position would
have believed in good faith that Waker was involved in a crime at the time Owen applied for the
statement of charges. Nasim v. Tandy Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (D.Md.1989). Owen
argues that the evidence clearly shows that he had probable cause to apply for a statement of
charges against Waker.
The evidence in the record demonstrates that Owen seized the cane and discovered a
concealed weapon therein, giving him probable cause to apply for a statement of charges against
Waker. Waker claims that as he entered the courthouse, Owen asked him if his cane concealed a
weapon, and then asked him not to enter the courthouse with the cane. Compl. at ¶11. Waker
claims he complied, left his driver’s license with Owen and returned the cane to his car.
Id.
However, Owen states that he retained the cane and placed it in the Sherriff’s Office “property
hold” where it remains. Mot. Summ. Judg. at Ex. 2. Owen clearly handled the cane, unscrewed
the top, found that there was a blade inside, and confiscated it. See Mot. Summ. Judg., Ex. 1, ¶¶
4-5; Ex. 2. Therefore, Waker could not have left the cane in his car as he claims; rather, the only
plausible interpretation of the facts is that Waker brought the cane into the courthouse where it
was confiscated.
It is clear that an eighteen-inch blade is a dangerous and deadly weapon. Handy v. State,
357 Md. 685, 691-92, 745 A.2d 1107, 1110-11 (2000) (“dangerous or deadly weapons”
encompass those devices that are inherently dangerous or deadly or that may be used with
dangerous or deadly effect.) It is also undisputed that the blade was concealed in a cane that Mr.
Waker carried to the security checkpoint in the Courthouse. See In re Colby H., 362 Md. 702,
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712-14, 766 A.2d 639, 644-45 (2001) (defining “carry” as “to move while supporting; convey;
transport”). Thus, there is no dispute of material fact regarding whether Owen had probable
cause to apply for a statement of charges against Waker. He clearly did and is therefore entitled
to summary judgment. Waker does not provide any affidavit or other evidence, nor does he cite
any relevant case law in his opposition to Owen’s Motion for Summary Judgment to support his
claim that Owen lacked probable cause to apply for a Statement of Charges against him.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, no rational trier of fact could find that Owen did not have
probable cause to charge Waker with a violation of Md. Code Art. 27, § 36, wearing or carrying a
concealed dangerous and deadly weapon. Because the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue for trial. Accordingly, the
Court will grant Owen’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
A separate order follows.
Date: July 27, 2011
/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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