Crouch v City of Hyattsville, et al

Filing 117

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/5/12. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MATTHEW J. CROUCH
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 09-2544

:
CITY OF HYATTSVILLE, MARYLAND,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this civil rights
case is the motion for leave to file second amended complaint
filed by Plaintiff Matthew J. Crouch.

(ECF No. 102).

The

issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
hearing deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following

reasons, the motion for leave will be denied.
I.

Background1
A.

Factual Background

According to the Amended Complaint, shortly after midnight
on the morning of September 29, 2008, Plaintiff and his friend
Anthony Heidenberg drove from College Park to the home of one of
their friends in Hyattsville by way of Queensbury Road.
parked on 41st Avenue near their friend’s house.

1

They

After finding

As two opinions in this case have come before this one,
some familiarity with the facts is assumed. See Crouch v. City
of Hyattsville, No. DKC 09-2544, 2010 WL 3653345 (D.Md. Sept.
15, 2010); Crouch v. City of Hyattsville, Md., No. DKC 09-2544,
2010 WL 4868100 (D.Md. Nov. 23, 2010).

that he was not home, they returned to their car.

At that

point, they saw a red truck fail to stop at a stop sign at the
corner of Queensbury Road and 41st Avenue, and they began to
shout and gesture to the truck to slow down.

The driver of the

truck stopped in the middle of 41st Avenue to confront them.
Heidenberg approached the truck to tell the driver to go
away when a white male — later identified as Defendant Todd O.
Prawdzik — jumped out with a handgun pointed at Heidenberg.
According

to

the

complaint,

Heidenberg repeatedly.”

Prawdzik

“began

(ECF No. 36 ¶ 19).

to

assault

Plaintiff then

approached at which point Prawdzik identified himself as an offduty

Hyattsville

Plaintiff.

police

Plaintiff

officer
raised

and

his

pointed

hands

in

his

gun

at

the

air

to

“surrender,” but Prawdzik still “physically attacked [Plaintiff]
to effect his arrest, striking him multiple times about the head
with his handgun.”

(Id.).

Plaintiff sustained severe, open-

head trauma and was rendered unconscious and bleeding profusely.
An ambulance transported Plaintiff to Washington Hospital
Center, where he was treated for lacerations, open-head trauma,
and other injuries.

He was then released to the District of

Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and taken to the Fifth
District precinct.
While at the police station, Plaintiff became ill from lack
of

insulin,

as

he

is

an

insulin-dependent
2

diabetic.

On

September 30, 2008, after his initial appearance, Plaintiff was
taken to Providence Hospital for treatment for his diabetes.
Later, he was taken back to the Fifth District to await further
proceedings.

During

consciousness.
where

he

was

those

proceedings,

Plaintiff

lost

He was admitted to Howard University Hospital,
diagnosed

blood glucose levels.

with

diabetic

ketoacidosis

from

high

Plaintiff was released from the hospital

on October 8, 2008.
Plaintiff

alleges

that,

following

his

release,

he

has

experienced “persistent attacks of post-traumatic anxiety” and
has been under the care of a neuro-psychiatrist for treatment
for his head trauma.
B.

(Id. ¶ 23).

Procedural Background

On September 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this
court asserting twelve causes of action against eleven total
defendants.
(ECF

Nos.

(ECF No. 1).
5,

7)

that

As a result of two motions to dismiss
the

court

granted

in

part,

several

Defendants were dismissed from the case, and some counts were
dismissed as to the remaining Defendants (ECF No. 35).

At the

same time, the court granted a motion filed by Plaintiff for
leave to file an amended complaint.

(Id.).

After one more

motion to dismiss by Defendants was granted (ECF No. 49), the
following

Defendants

remained

in

the

case:

(1)

City

of

Hyattsville; (2) Prawdzik; (3) Corporal Kirk Pile; (4) John Doe
3

Police Officer; and (5) Lieutenant Mark Roski.
claims remain:
1983,

false

The following

violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §
arrest,

false

imprisonment,

assault,

battery,

defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Prawdzik alone; malicious prosecution against
Prawdzik, Pile, Roski, and the John Doe Police Officer; and
state constitutional claims under Articles 24 and 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights against City of Hyattsville.2
After these and other motions were resolved, on November
23, 2010, a scheduling order was entered.

(ECF No. 50).

The

scheduling order was modified twice — once on May 27, 2011, and
once

on

September

discovery needs.

6,

2011

—

to

accommodate

the

parties’

(ECF Nos. 63, 82).

Plaintiff filed the pending motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint on December 22, 2011.
On January 9, 2012, Defendants opposed.
January 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a reply.
II.

(ECF No. 102).

(ECF No. 105).

On

(ECF No. 108).

Analysis
The parties focus most of their attention on Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).

That rule provides that the court

2

For the reasons stated in the court’s September 15, 2010,
memorandum opinion (ECF No. 34), the common law tort claims
asserted
against
City
of
Hyattsville
may
not
proceed.
Unfortunately, the court’s accompanying order did not dismiss
those claims. (ECF No. 35). Those claims will be dismissed in
the separate order following this memorandum opinion.
4

should “freely give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.”
Fed.R.Civ.P.

15(a)(2).

important complication:

Both

parties,

however,

overlook

an

the modified scheduling order in this

case set a deadline of June 17, 2011, for the amendment of
pleadings; that deadline has long since passed.
63).

(ECF Nos. 62,

Although the scheduling order was modified once more, the

deadline for the amendment of pleadings was not altered.
ECF

No.

82).3

In

consequence,

Plaintiff

must

do

more

(See
than

satisfy Rule 15(a)’s liberal standard; he must first meet the
mandates

of

Rule

16(b)(4),

change a scheduling order.
535

F.3d

295,

298–99

(4th

which

calls

for

“good

cause”

to

See Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian,
Cir.

2008);

see

also

Wilson

v.

Appalachian Power Co., No. 3:10–0445, 2011 WL 221656, at *1
(S.D.W.Va.

Jan.

24,

2011)

(applying

two-step

test

employing

Rules 16(b) and 15(a) in analyzing untimely motion for leave to
amend); Rassoull v. Maximus, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 372, 373 (D.Md.
2002) (same).

3

Plaintiff argues that the court’s September 6, 2011, order
superseded the scheduling order rather than simply modifying it
and that this “new” order “does not give a deadline for amending
pleadings.” (ECF No. 108, at 23). This argument makes no sense
in light of the clear language of the court’s order, which
began: “PAPERLESS ORDER MODIFYING the Scheduling Order.” (ECF
No. 82) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s cited case
in support of this argument is inapposite, as that case, United
States v. Halley, 362 F.App’x 369 (4th Cir. 2010), concerned a
fully amended criminal judgment order superseding a previous
order.
5

Rule 16(b) focuses on the proposed amendment’s timeliness
and the reasons behind its tardy submission.
F.R.D. at 374.

Rassoull, 209

In particular, Rule 16(b) requires the movant to

show that he acted diligently.

Id.

The court also considers

whether the non-moving party could be prejudiced by the delay,
the length of the delay, and whether the movant acted in good
faith.

Tawwaab v. Va. Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F.Supp.2d 757,

768–69 (D.Md. 2010).

All in all, the dictates of Rule 16(b) are

not to be taken lightly.

See Potomac Electric Power Co. v.

Electric Motor Supply, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 372, 375 (D.Md. 1999)
(“[A] scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly
entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without
peril.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Here, the parties offer no discussion of “good cause,” and
a

review

of

the

record

suggests

that

it

cannot

be

found.4

According to Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff seeks only to add two
counts to the complaint:
against

City

of

one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Hyattsville

as

recognized

and

described

in

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

4

Significantly, the amended complaint has been in place
since September 15, 2010 and fact discovery closed December 16,
2011.
Permitting Plaintiff to amend his complaint at this
point in the proceedings would require not only that the
deadline for the amendment of pleadings be modified, but likely
that other deadlines be modified as well to accommodate
additional discovery concerning any new claims.
6

and

one

claim

Declaration

under

of

Articles

Rights

as

24

and

recognized

26

and

of

described

George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450 (2011).
at 13).5

the

Maryland
in

Prince

(ECF No. 102,

Plaintiff appears to contend that he learned of facts

supporting these claims for the first time during the course of
discovery.

(Id. at 1).

But, at the same time, Plaintiff states

that “the core operative facts of the [proposed] Second Amended
Complaint are the same as those of the original Complaint,”
which

contradicts

the

suggestion

that

new,

previously

unattainable information was gleaned during discovery.

(See id.

at 14).
As

Defendants

observe,

as

early

as

August

28,

2011,

Plaintiff admitted that he was aware that he could assert a
Monell claim.

(ECF No. 105, at 3-4).

On that date, Plaintiff

sent a letter to Magistrate Judge William Connelly, who was
overseeing the discovery process, regarding a dispute over the
release of certain records to Plaintiff.
support

his

contention

Plaintiff wrote:
Complaint

that

(Id. at 1).

that

the

(ECF No. 105-2).

records

were

To

discoverable,

“Plaintiff has alleged facts in the [Amended]
would

inferentially

support

a

Monell

claim.”

Plaintiff does not deny that this was the case.

5

A Longtin claim is the Maryland state constitutional
equivalent to a Monell claim, which is a creature of federal
law. See Longtin, 419 Md. at 490-98.
7

And,

in

fact,

Plaintiff

even

suggests

that

he

could

have

asserted a Monell claim at the time he moved for leave to file
the amended complaint in June 2010, if not earlier.

(See ECF

No. 108, at 7, 13).
Plaintiff’s chief rationale for not including the Monell
claim in the amended complaint appears to be that he did not yet
have adequate evidence of that claim.
(“While

Plaintiff

had

knowledge

of

(See, e.g., id. at 8
misconduct

by

Defendant

Prawdzik prior to the completion of discovery, he did not have
sufficient evidence of acquiescence in that misconduct by the
Hyattsville

Police

Department

to

municipal liability claims.”)).

bring

the

newly

asserted

Rule 8, however, does not place

such stringent conditions on a party’s right to plead a claim
for

relief.

That

rule

merely

requires

“a

short

and

plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

A plaintiff need not prove his

case in his complaint by “forecasting evidence.”

See Bass v.

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir.
2003);

see

Homes,

LLC,

complaint

also

Wachovia

750

need

not

Bank,

F.Supp.2d
plead

Nat’l

682,

688

‘specific

Ass’n

v.

(W.D.Va.

evidence

or

Preston

Lake

2010)

(“[A]

extra

facts

beyond what is needed to make the claim plausible.’” (quoting
Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 120-21 (2d Cir.
2010))); Settle v. Balt. Cnty., Md., 34 F.Supp.2d 969, 997 n.8
8

(D.Md. 1999) (noting that a plaintiff “is not required to plead
evidence”).
of

The Federal Rules actually discourage the pleading

evidence.

Sewraz

v.

Morchower,

No.

211578, at *1 (E.D.Va. Jan. 28, 2009).

3:08cv100,

2009

WL

Thus, the fact that

Plaintiff may not have had sufficient evidence to prove a Monell
claim before the deadline for the amendment of pleadings had no
bearing on his ability to plead a Monell claim in a timely
manner.

This is true especially given that he was apparently

aware of a potential Monell claim “since the inception of this
case.”

(See ECF No. 108, at 13).

There is simply no showing of

good cause here to permit Plaintiff to amend his pleadings to
add a Monell claim.
Although

Plaintiff’s

motion

addresses

only

Monell

and

Longtin claims, the attached proposed second amended complaint
encompasses

several

more

adding

Monell

and

the

wished-for
Longtin

claims.

claims,

the

In

addition

proposed

to

second

amended complaint would add § 1983, Articles 24 and 26, false
arrest,

false

imprisonment,

and

intentional

emotional distress claims against Pile and Roski.
1).

infliction

of

(ECF No. 102-

It would also add City of Hyattsville Police Department as

a defendant, reassert at least some (if not all) of the tort
claims against City of Hyattsville, expand the scope of the §

9

1983 claim against Prawdzik, and add an “inadequate supervision
claim” pursuant to § 1983 against City of Hyattsville.
Defendants

characterize

this

inconsistency

(Id.).6
between

Plaintiff’s motion and the proposed second amended complaint as
evidence of “Plaintiff’s Misrepresentations to the Court.”
No. 105, at 4-5).

(ECF

The court trusts Plaintiff’s explanation that

this discrepancy was inadvertent.

(See ECF No. 108, at 20-21).

That

absolve

fact,

however,

responsibility
amendments.

to
It

does

show
was

good
only

not
cause
after

for

Plaintiff

allowing

Defendants

his

of

his

proposed

identified

this

discrepancy in their opposition that Plaintiff presented reasons
why

some

of

these

additional

amendments

should

be

accepted.

Because Plaintiff’s arguments appear for the first time in their
reply, the court is inclined not to consider them.
v.

FedEx

Ground

Package

Sys.,

Inc.,

451

See Clawson

F.Supp.2d

731,

734

(D.Md. 2006) (“The ordinary rule in federal courts is that an
argument
memorandum

raised

for

the

will

not

be

first

time

considered.”).7

in

a
Not

reply
only

brief

or

does

the

6

The proposed second amended complaint would also drop the
defamation and false light claims against Prawdzik. (Id.).
7

Even if Plaintiff’s arguments were considered, they would
still not establish good cause. The reasons Plaintiff provides
in the reply are technically reasons for requesting leave of
court to amend the complaint and not reasons for seeking a
modification of the scheduling order.
None of the reasons
address the timeliness of the motion. At best, Plaintiff points
10

careless

lawyering

by

Plaintiff’s

counsel

warrant

this

treatment, it is also a sign of a lack of diligence — without
which the court is hard-pressed to conclude that good cause
exists to modify the scheduling order.

See Rassoull, 209 F.R.D.

at 374.
Without good cause to modify the scheduling order per Rule
16,

Plaintiff’s

complaint

per

arguments
Rule

15

for

need

granting
not

be

leave

to

considered.

amend

the

In

sum,

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied, and the amended complaint
(ECF No. 36) will remain the operative complaint, subject to the
court’s various orders issued in this case.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for leave to file
second amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Matthew J. Crouch
will be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

to deposition testimony that implicates Pile and Roski as to
certain counts, though, notably, he never suggests that these
depositions were delayed for reasons outside his control.
Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that he already “suspected” Pile’s
and Roski’s involvement and waited to incorporate them into the
complaint only after he had “developed a sufficient factual
basis.”
(ECF No. 108, at 20).
As previously discussed, to
amend his complaint, Plaintiff need not have waited until he had
all the evidence he needed to prove his claims.
11