Crouch v City of Hyattsville, et al

Filing 130

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 11/30/12. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MATTHEW CROUCH
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 09-2544

:
CITY OF HYATTSVILLE, et al.,
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this civil rights
case are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Kirk
Pile, Mark Roski, and Todd Prawdzik.

(ECF Nos. 124, 126).

The

issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
hearing being deemed necessary.
following

reasons,

the

joint

Local Rule 105.6.
motion

of

Corporal

For the
Pile

and

Lieutenant Roski motion for summary judgment will be granted,
and the motion of Officer Prawdzik for summary judgment will be
granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Background1
A.

Factual Background

Shortly

after

midnight

on

the

morning

of

September

29,

2008, Plaintiff and his friend Joseph Anthony Heidenberg drove
1

As three opinions in this case have come before this, some
familiarity with the facts is assumed.
See Crouch v. City of
Hyattsville, No. DKC 09–2544, 2012 WL 718849 (D.Md. Mar. 5,
2012); No. DKC 09–2544, 2010 WL 3653345 (D.Md. Sept. 15, 2010);
Crouch v. City of Hyattsville, No. DKC 09–2544, 2010 WL 4868100
(D.Md. Nov.23, 2010).

from

College

Hyattsville

Park

by

to

way

the

of

home

of

Queensbury

one

Road.

Avenue near their friend’s house.

of

their

They

friends

parked

on

in

41st

After finding that their

friend was not home, they returned to their car.

At that point,

they saw a red truck fail to stop at a stop sign at the corner
of Queensbury Road and 41st Avenue, and they began to shout and
gesture to the truck to slow down.

The driver of the truck

stopped in the middle of 41st Avenue to confront them.
Heidenberg approached the truck to tell the driver to go
away when a white male — later identified as Defendant Todd O.
Prawdzik — jumped out with a handgun pointed at Heidenberg.
According

to

the

complaint,

Heidenberg repeatedly.”

Prawdzik

“began

(ECF No. 36 ¶ 19).

to

assault

Plaintiff then

approached, at which point Prawdzik identified himself as an
off-duty

Hyattsville

Plaintiff.

police

Plaintiff

officer

raised

his

and

pointed

hands

in

his
the

gun
air

at
to

“surrender,” but Prawdzik still “physically attacked [Plaintiff]
to effect his arrest, striking him multiple times about the head
with his handgun.”
trauma,

was

neighbor

in

(Id.).

rendered
the

area

Plaintiff sustained severe open head

unconscious,
called

911

and

bled

to

report

profusely.
the

A

incident.

Corporal Pile — the first officer to make it to the scene — took
Officer Prawdzik’s gun from him and requested medical assistance
for Mr. Crouch.

After Plaintiff left the scene, Corporal Pile
2

interviewed Officer Prawdzik, who told him that an object flew
across his windshield, and that Mr. Crouch punched him in the
head after Officer Prawdzik was forced to subdue Mr. Heidenberg.
Corporal Pile also observed a contusion on Officer Prawdzik’s
head,

for

treated.

which

he

was

transported

to

the

hospital

and

was

Because Mr. Crouch was upset at the scene of the

incident, Corporal Pile did not interview him.
An ambulance transported Plaintiff to Washington Hospital
Center, where he was treated for lacerations, open-head trauma,
and other injuries.
for Mr. Crouch.
of

Columbia

Corporal Pile applied for an arrest warrant

Mr. Crouch was later released to the District

Metropolitan

Police

Department

and

taken

to

the

Fifth District precinct.
At the police station, Plaintiff became ill from lack of
insulin, as he is an insulin-dependent diabetic.

On September

30, 2008, after his initial appearance, Plaintiff was taken to
Providence Hospital for treatment for his diabetes.
was

taken

back

proceedings.
consciousness.
where

he

was

to

the

During

Fifth
those

District
proceedings,

to

Later, he

await

further

Plaintiff

lost

He was admitted to Howard University Hospital,
diagnosed

blood glucose levels.

with

diabetic

ketoacidosis

from

high

Plaintiff was released from the hospital

on October 8, 2008.

3

Following Plaintiff’s release, he experienced “persistent
attacks of post-traumatic anxiety” and has been under the care
of

a

neuro-psychiatrist

After

Mr.

Crouch

was

for

treatment

arrested,

and

for

his

upon

head

hearing

trauma.

that

Mr.

Heidenberg provided an alternate version of events to Prince
George’s County police officers, Lieutenant Roski investigated
the altercation further.

This ultimately turned into a formal

internal investigation of Officer Prawdzik.
B.

Procedural Background

On September 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this
court asserting twelve causes of action against eleven total
defendants.

(ECF No. 1).

As a result of two motions to dismiss

(ECF Nos. 5, 7), several Defendants were dismissed from the
case,

and

some

counts

Defendants

(ECF

No.

were

35).

dismissed

At

the

as

same

to

time,

granted leave to file an amended complaint.

the

remaining

Plaintiff

(Id.).

was

After a

third motion to dismiss by certain Defendants was granted (ECF
No. 49), the following Defendants remained in the case: (1) City
of Hyattsville; (2) Prawdzik; (3) Corporal Kirk Pile; (4) John
Doe

Police

Officer;

and

following claims remain:
U.S.C.

§

1983,

false

(5)

Lieutenant

Mark

Roski.

The

violation of civil rights under 42
arrest,

false

imprisonment,

assault,

battery, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Prawdzik alone; malicious prosecution
4

against Prawdzik, Pile, Roski, and the John Doe Police Officer;
and state constitutional claims under Articles 24 and 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights against City of Hyattsville.
Defendant
summary

Prawdzik

judgment

filed

on

the

pending

Plaintiff’s

motion

claims

for

for

partial

malicious

prosecution, defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and
intentional
Defendants

infliction
Pile

and

of

Roski

emotional

move

for

distress

summary

(“IIED”).

judgment

on

the

malicious prosecution claim remaining against them.
II.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be entered only if there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson,
532

F.3d

291,

297

(4th

Cir.

2008).

Summary

judgment

is

inappropriate if any material factual issue “may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash.
Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
[his]

pleadings,’

but

rather

must

‘set

forth

specific

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

facts

Bouchat v.

Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.
5

2003) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
proof . . . will

not

suffice

to

“A mere scintilla of

prevent

summary

judgment.”

Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003).

“If the

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.”
249–50 (citations omitted).

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

At the same time, the facts that

are presented must be construed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
III. Analysis
A.

Malicious Prosecution

Officer Prawdzik, Corporal Pile, and Lieutenant Roski each
seek

summary

claims.

judgment

on

Plaintiff’s

malicious

prosecution

All three Defendants argue that probable cause existed

to arrest Plaintiff for assault, that they lacked malice in
arresting him, and that they are entitled to immunity.

Officer

Prawdzik argues that he did not institute a criminal proceeding
against Plaintiff.
The elements of malicious prosecution require Plaintiff to
show: (1) the defendant instituted a criminal proceeding against
the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant did not have probable cause
to institute the proceeding; and (4) the defendant acted with
malice or a primary purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
6

justice.

Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 553 (2004); see also

Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 183 (2000). “[The plaintiff] must
produce evidence with regard to all four elements of malicious
prosecution in order successfully to oppose a motion for summary
judgment.” Nasim v. Tandy Corp., 726 F.Supp. 1021, 1024 n. 4
(D.Md. 1989).
1.

Officer Prawdzik

Because

a

reasonable

jury

may

conclude

that

Officer

Prawdzik presented false information to the prosecuting officers
regarding the altercation, summary judgment is inappropriate as
to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against him.
a.
As

Initiation of Criminal Proceeding
a

threshold

matter,

it

is

irrelevant

that

Officer

Prawdzik did not swear out the arrest warrant for Plaintiff
because an individual may still be liable when he “inspire[s] in
any fashion a criminal preceeding against the (plaintiff) within
the contemplation of the law of torts.”

Smithfield Packing Co.,

Inc. v. Evely, 169 Md.App. 578, 593 (2006) (quoting Wood v.
Palmer Ford, Inc., 47 Md.App. 692, 701-02 (1981));

see also

Safeway Stores v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 (1956) (holding that
malicious

prosecution

claim

should

be

presented

to

the

jury

because, even though the defendant did not swear out a warrant,
he

was

“the

imprisonment”).

moving

cause

of

[the

plaintiff’s]

subsequent

Further, a defendant cannot be held liable for
7

malicious prosecution if he makes a “full disclosure of all
material facts relative to the charges being made.”

Id. at 594

(citing Brown v. Dart Drug Corp., 77 Md.App. 487, 493 (1989));
see

also

Nasim,

726

F.Supp.

at

1025

(noting

that

“the

mere

provision of information to the authorities does not constitute
instituting

or

continuing

a

criminal

proceeding,”

and

that

“citizens should be encouraged to assist and to participate in
the enforcement of the criminal law without thereby themselves
incurring civil liability”) (citations omitted).

Conversely, if

a defendant “gave information which he knew to be false and so
unduly influenced the authorities, he may be held liable” for
malicious

prosecution.

Wood,

47

Md.App.

at

700;

see

also

Fernandes v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 10-0752, 2012 WL 1664086, at
*4 (D.Md. May 10, 2012) (noting that a defendant is responsible
for

initiating

a

proceeding

for

purposes

of

a

malicious

prosecution claim if he “knowingly provided false information,
thereby unduly influencing the prosecutor”) (citing Smithfield
Packing, 169 Md.App. at 595); Dart Drug, 77 Md.App. at 491-93
(holding that because defendant failed to provide police with
exculpatory evidence regarding the plaintiff, summary judgment
was inappropriate as to a malicious prosecution claim).
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff,

a

reasonable

jury

could

conclude

that

Officer

Prawdzik presented false information to Corporal Pile when he
8

alleged that Plaintiff was the aggressor in the fight.

Simply

providing Officer Pile false information, however, is not enough
to find that he “instituted” the criminal proceeding against
Plaintiff.

“That information must also have unduly influenced

[Corporal

Pile]

to

commence

or

continue

the

proceedings.”

Smithfield Packing, 169 Md.App. at 599 (citing Wood, Md.App. at
701).
Plaintiff

produced

deposition

testimony

evincing

that

Officer Prawdzik was the aggressor in the confrontation.

(ECF

Nos. 124-1, at 76; 124-2, at 70-76).

If this statement is

credited, Prawdzik provided a false statement to the arresting
officer

by

telling

Pile

that

Plaintiff

first

attacked

him.

Corporal Pile further testified that he relied only on this
statement from Officer Prawdzik and the fact that Prawdzik had a
contusion on his head in deciding that there was probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff.

He did not interview Plaintiff before

swearing out an arrest warrant, nor did he question the neighbor
who called 911 to report the attack.
an

independent

investigation

that

Officer Prawdzik of liability.

This does not constitute
might

otherwise

absolve

Wood, 47 Md.App. at 701 (noting

that a defendant is not liable for malicious prosecution if “the
officer makes an independent investigation”) (quoting Prosser,
Law of Torts 836-37 (4th ed. 1971)).
presented

evidence

that

Officer
9

Therefore, Plaintiff has

Prawdzik’s

statement

was

the

persuasive,
decision”

“determining

to

factor

in

prosecute

Plaintiff,

inducing

and

the

Officer

instituted the proceedings against Plaintiff.

officer’s

Prawdzik

thus

Id.; see also

Martens v. Mueller, 122 Md. 313, 321 (1914) (“[I]f there was any
evidence tending to show that the swearing out of the warrant
was

directed

or

authorized

by

the

defendant,

or

that

he

voluntarily aided or assisted in the prosecution, a case was
made out for submission to the jury.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
b.

Resolution in Plaintiff’s Favor

Defendants

do

not

contest

that

following

Plaintiff’s

arrest, he was charged with assault.

It is also uncontested

that

for

the

state

declined

to

prosecute

lack

of

evidence.

Thus, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff satisfies the
first two elements of the tort against Officer Prawdzik.
c.

Probable Cause

To determine whether Officer Prawdzik had probable cause to
institute the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, there must
be

“facts

and

circumstances

within

the

officer’s

knowledge

[which] would warrant the belief of a prudent person that the
arrestee had committed or was committing an offense.”

United

States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 376 (4th Cir. 1984); see also
Cox v. State, 161 Md.App. 654, 668 (2005) (“Whether probable
cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn
10

from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the
arrest.”).
Plaintiff
assault.

The

ultimately
elements

was
of

charged

that

crime

with
must

second
be

degree

examined

determine whether probable cause existed in this instance.

to
In

Maryland, second degree assault codifies and criminalizes common
law assault.

See MD Code Ann. Crim. Law § 3-203 (West 2010);

Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385, 403 (2012) (noting that “the
offense of second degree assault retains its common law meaning
[and] . . . is committed by causing offensive physical contact
with another person.”).

For second degree assault, the Maryland

Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions require the State to prove
that Plaintiff: (1) caused offensive physical contact with, or
harm

to,

the

victim;

(2)

the

contact

was

the

result

of

an

intentional or reckless act and was not accidental; and (3) the
contact was not consented to by the victim or was not legally
justified.

See MPJI-Cr 4:01 (2007 Supp.); Epps v. State, 333

Md. 121, 127 (1993).
The parties present two very conflicting versions of what
transpired

among

Plaintiff,

Prawdzik,

and

Heidenberg.

These

disputed facts go to the heart of whether probable cause existed
to arrest Plaintiff for second degree assault, rendering summary
judgment inappropriate.

11

With

regard

to

Plaintiff’s

arrest,

Plaintiff

and

Mr.

Heidenberg both testified that neither man ever struck Officer
Prawdzik.

What

Heidenberg

is

a

transpired
matter

between

of

the

disputed

parties

fact

and
that

that

Mr.
is

determinative of whether Officer Prawdzik was acting within the
contours of his authority during the altercation.

Construing

the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Crouch, it cannot
be said, as a matter of law that Officer Prawdzik had probable
cause to initiate proceedings against Plaintiff for the crime of
second degree assault.
d.

Malice

The Court of Appeals of Maryland has long held that “the
‘malice’ element of malicious prosecution may be inferred from a
lack

of

probable

cause.”

citations omitted).

Okwa,

360

Md.

at

188

(internal

Further, summary judgment on a malicious

prosecution claim is improper where there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether a defendant had probable cause to
institute criminal proceedings against a plaintiff.

See id.

(vacating summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim and
concluding that “[b]ecause we have determined Appellees may not
have had probable cause to arrest Mr. Okwa, further analysis of
[the

malice]

element

is

unnecessary.”).

Therefore,

summary

judgment in Officer Prawdzik’s favor on Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim is inappropriate because questions of material
12

fact

exist

as

to

whether

he

had

probable

cause

to

initiate

proceedings against Plaintiff, and malice may be inferred from a
lack of probable cause.2
Finally, under Maryland law, a public official is immune
from

tort

liability

if

he

or

she

acted

“in

a

discretionary

capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official’s
employment or authority.”

Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md.

1, 12 (2004) (quoting MD Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5507(b)(1) (West 1997)).

Because a reasonable jury may find that

Officer Prawdzik acted maliciously, he is not entitled to public
official immunity.
2.

Corporal Pile

The first two elements of a malicious prosecution claim are
met as to Corporal Pile because he swore out an arrest warrant
and arrested Plaintiff.
Plaintiff

is

a

Whether he had probable cause to arrest

separate

question

that

must

be

analyzed

independently from whether Officer Prawdzik had probable cause
to institute the proceedings against Plaintiff.

See Nasim, 726

F.Supp. at 1026 (in malicious prosecution analysis, separately

2

As discussed, Plaintiff offers facts that Officer Prawdzik
beat Plaintiff with a pistol, without provocation. These facts
alone could establish Officer Prawdzik’s malice. See Sawyer v.
Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 261 (1991) (holding that, under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act, “[w]restling another to the ground,
pulling his hair, and hitting him on the face, [] without cause
or provocation, is certainly malicious conduct.”).
13

analyzing probable cause for the proceeding-initiating defendant
and the arresting police officer, when the defendant allegedly
provided

critical

evidence

arrested the plaintiff).

to

the

police

officer

who

later

Because the circumstances warranted a

reasonable officer in Corporal Pile’s position to believe in
good faith that Officer Prawdzik was the victim of an assault at
the

hands

of

Plaintiff,

probable

cause

exists.

“[I]t

is

difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better
evidence of probable cause than an identification by name of
assailants provided by a victim.”

McKinney v. Richland Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 431 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Indiana, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th
Cir.

2003)

(“The

complaint

of

a

single

witness

or

putative

victim alone generally is sufficient to establish probable cause
to arrest unless the complaint would lead a reasonable officer
to be suspicious, in which case the officer has a further duty
to investigate.”); cf. Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th
Cir.

1999)

established,

(noting

that

officials

have

“once
‘no

probable

cause

constitutional

has

been

obligation

to

conduct any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering
potentially

exculpatory

evidence.’”)

(quoting

Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Eversole

v.

In Spiegel, probable

cause for battery was found on the basis of a single victim’s
statement and a single bruise on the victim’s body.
14

The Seventh

Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to dismiss a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim because the police officers may have lacked
probable cause by failing to investigate potentially exculpatory
evidence.
probable

See 196 F.3d 717.
cause

existed

The Seventh Circuit concluded that

notwithstanding

a

host

of

conflicting facts available at the time of arrest.

otherwise
Id. at 724

(noting that inconsistent and conflicting facts may “tend to
establish

[complainant’s]

bias,

these

facts

do

not

render

[complainant’s] report incredible as a matter of law”).

The

court explained that:
[P]olice officers need not exclude every
suggestion that a victim is not telling the
truth.
Many putative defendants protest
their
innocence,
and
it
is
not
the
responsibility of law enforcement officials
to test such claims once probable cause has
been established.
Consequently, the law
does not require that a police officer
conduct an incredibly detailed investigation
at the probable cause stage.
Accordingly,
the inquiry is whether an officer has
reasonable grounds on which to act, not
whether it was reasonable to conduct further
investigation . . . . The credibility of a
putative victim or witness is a question,
not for police officers in the discharge of
their considerable duties, but for the jury
in a criminal trial.
Spiegel, 196 F.3d at 724-25 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Similarly
Plaintiff

or

here,
any

Corporal

other

Pile’s

witnesses,

15

failure

including

the

to

interview

citizen

who

called 911 to report the altercation, does not undermine the
determination that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff
for second degree assault.
Prawdzik’s

statement

Once Corporal Pile received Officer

that

Plaintiff

attacked

him

and

saw

Prawdzik’s apparent injury, Pile had probable cause to arrest;
at that stage, he had no duty to investigate every avenue that
might yield exculpatory evidence.

See Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md.

437, 450 (1972) (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecution
claim, and noting that “[o]nce the investigating policeman has
crossed the threshold of probable cause, we will not place upon
him the additional burden of seeking out and negating possible
explanations

of

[guilt],

lest

he

press

charges

at

his

own

peril.”).
Construing

the

facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

Plaintiff, Corporal Pile had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
Therefore,

Plaintiff

has

not

made

out

every

element

of

his

malicious prosecution claim, and summary judgment in favor of
Corporal Pile is appropriate.
3.

Lieutenant Roski

Finally, summary judgment will be granted on Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim against Lieutenant Roski because he
fails to show facts that could establish the first element, that
is,

that

against

Lieutenant
Plaintiff.

Roski

instituted

Indeed,

Roski’s
16

a

criminal

only

alleged

proceeding
role

in

Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution is that, at some point after
Plaintiff was arrested, he became aware of an alternate version
of

events

Prawdzik’s

that

ultimately

emergency

became

suspension.

the

basis

Plaintiff

for

has

Officer

offered

no

evidence that Lieutenant Roski played any part in the decision
to

initiate

Therefore,

or

Roski

continue
is

the

entitled

prosecution
to

summary

of

Plaintiff.

judgment

on

the

malicious prosecution claim.3
B.

Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy4

Plaintiff

alleges

that

Officer

Prawdzik

defamed

him

by

falsely accusing him of assault, which resulted in his arrest,
and publishing that arrest on the Maryland Judiciary’s Courts

3

Lieutenant Roski and Corporal Pile also argue that they
are entitled to common law and statutory immunity.
Because
summary judgment is warranted on the underlying facts, this
question is moot and will not be reached. See Alabama v. North
Carolina, 130 S.Ct. 2295, 2316 (2010) (“The summary judgment
disallowing the underlying claims on their merits renders the .
. . immunity question . . . moot”); Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d
1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Our resolution of this case on the
merits accordingly moots the subsidiary immunity . . . issues
raised by the parties”).
4

Plaintiff advances both defamation and false light claims.
Plaintiff’s false light claim does not need to be addressed
separate and apart from his defamation claim because “[a]n
allegation of false light must meet the same legal standards as
an allegation of defamation.” Piscatelli v. Van Smith, 424 Md.
294, 306 (2012) (citing Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. 326,
337 (1972)).
17

and Judicial Information Systems website.5

Plaintiff failed to

offer any facts demonstrating that he suffered an injury as a
result

of

the

allegedly

defamatory

statement.

Therefore,

summary judgment in Officer Prawdzik’s favor is appropriate on
this claim.
To survive a motion for summary judgment on a defamation
claim

under

establish

Maryland

four

law,

must

“(1)

elements:

Plaintiff

the

that

show

facts

defendant

that

made

a

defamatory statement to a third person, (2) that the statement
was

false,

making

the

(3)

the

statement,

suffered harm.”
omitted).

that

defendant

and

(4)

was

that

legally

the

at

fault

plaintiff

in

thereby

Piscatelli, 424 Md. at 306 (internal quotations

Plaintiff characterizes his arrest as an undisputed

“reputation-killing event” that is defamatory per se.
127, at 16-17, 22).

(ECF No.

Even if the defamatory nature of the words

are assumed as defamatory per se, a plaintiff must still show
evidence of injury to survive a motion for summary judgment.
See

Indep.

Newspapers,

Inc.

v.

Brodie,

407

Md.

(2009) (noting that instances of both defamation

5

415,

441-42

per se

and

For a claim of defamation, public officials are entitled
to qualified, not absolute, immunity. See Smith v. Danielczyk,
400 Md. 98, 123-25 (2007) (noting that police officers enjoys
only qualified immunity from defamation for statements used to
obtain arrest warrant). As discussed above, a factfinder could
conclude that Officer Prawdzik acted with malice, which would
preclude immunity.
18

defamation per quod require proof of injury to establish prima
facie case of defamation).

Plaintiff has asserted other causes

of action seeking compensation for the damages allegedly caused
by the arrest.

Aside from asserting that the arrest hurt his

reputation in the community, Plaintiff has not proffered any
evidence that he suffered any injury as a result of the alleged
defamation.

Further, “there is no ‘defamation by arrest’ cause

of action in Maryland.”

Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135

Md.App. 268, 314 (2000) (affirming entry of summary judgment for
lack of evidence of actual injury when other causes of action
are

asserted

offers

no

in

connection

evidence

of

with

an

arrest).

injury

Because

resulting

Plaintiff

from

Officer

Prawdzik’s allegedly defamatory statement, Officer Prawdzik is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
C.

IIED

Officer Prawdzik also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
IIED claim, contending that Plaintiff has abandoned it.

Officer

Prawdzik’s contention is persuasive.
In his opposition, Plaintiff responded to all of the claims
for which Officer Prawdzik moved for summary judgment except the
claim for IIED.

“A plaintiff’s failure to respond to a summary

judgment motion may constitute a waiver or abandonment of a
claim.”
1825,

Estate of Edgerton v. UPI Holdings, Inc., No. CCB-09-

2011

WL

6837560,

at

*4

(D.Md.
19

Dec.

28,

2011)

(citing

Mentch v. Eastern Sav. Bank, FSB, 949 F.Supp. 1236, 1246-47
(D.Md.

1997)

harassment

(finding

claim

by

that

failing

the
to

plaintiff
address

that

“abandoned
claim

in

her
her

opposition to [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment, or to
offer clarification in response to [defendant’s] reply brief”
even

when

the

facts

support

plaintiff’s

abandoned

claim)).

Because Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on his IIED claim, he abandoned it, and summary
judgment in favor of Officer Prawdzik is appropriate.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed by Defendants Roski and Pile will be granted, and the
motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Prawdzik will be
granted in part and denied in part.

A separate order will

follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

20