Crouch v City of Hyattsville, et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 11/23/10. (sat, Chambers)

Crouch v City of Hyattsville, et al

Doc. 48

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MATTHEW J. CROUCH v. CITY OF HYATTSVILLE, MARYLAND, et al. : : : : : Civil Action No. DKC 09-2544

MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case are two motions. First, Defendant William Gardiner

has filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment (ECF No. 41), which remains unopposed as of this

signature date.

Second, Plaintiff Matthew Crouch has filed a

"motion to alter and amend the judgment" (ECF No. 44), which asks the court to reverse certain aspects of its memorandum opinion and order on September 15, 2010 (ECF Nos. 34 & 35). The

court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Gardiner's

motion will be granted and Crouch's motion will be denied. I. Background As the court explained in its earlier opinion (ECF No. 34), Plaintiff Matthew J. Crouch alleges that he was the victim of excessive force and an unlawful arrest on the morning of

September 29, 2008.

According to Crouch, former Hyattsville

Dockets.Justia.com

Police Officer Todd Prawdzik launched a brutal and unprovoked attack on Crouch, during which he "pistol-whipped" Crouch to unconsciousness. Crouch maintains that, after the attack,

several parties acted in concert to conceal evidence of the incident and pursue a malicious prosecution against him. Crouch originally filed a complaint in this court on

September 29, 2009 (ECF No. 1), which asserted twelve counts against eleven defendants. In a memorandum opinion dated

September 15, 2010, the court dismissed several of these claims. (ECF No. 34). that two Of particular note here, the court determined claims against Hyattsville mayor

negligence-based

William Gardiner and Hyattsville police chief Douglas Holland (counts seven and eight) were barred by public official (ECF

immunity, while certain intentional tort claims were not. No. 34, at 10-14).

The court also dismissed all claims against

the State of Maryland ("the State"), Glenn Ivey (the State's Attorney for Prince George's County), and a Jane Doe Assistant State's Attorney (collectively, "the State Defendants"). Such

counts failed to state a claim and were barred by the Eleventh Amendment or prosecutorial immunity. (Id. at 14-21).

In the same opinion, the court granted Crouch leave to file an amended complaint that stated additional facts concerning the remaining defendants and claims. 2 (Id. at 21-26). The court

determined, however, that Crouch would not be permitted to use the amended complaint Finally, to the reinstate court claims against dismissed for

defendants.

denied

Crouch's

request

leave to file a new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The following claims and defendants now

(Id.). remain in the

Amended Complaint: · · · · · · Count I: Excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Prawdzik; Count II: False arrest, asserted against Prawdzik; Count III: False imprisonment, asserted against Prawdzik; Count IV: Assault, asserted against Prawdzik; Count V: Battery, asserted against Prawdzik; Count VI: Malicious prosecution, asserted against Prawdzik, Corporal Kirk Pile, Lieutenant Mark Roski, and a John Doe police officer; Count IX: Gardiner; Count X: Gardiner; Defamation, False light, asserted asserted against against Prawdzik Prawdzik and and

· · · ·

Count XI: Intentional infliction of emotional distress, asserted against Prawdzik and Gardiner; and Count XIII: State constitutional claims under Articles 24 & 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, asserted against Prawdzik, Gardiner, and the City of Hyattsville.

Shortly after the court issued its opinion, on September 29, 2010, Gardiner filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, 3

for summary judgment as to the remaining claims against him. (ECF No. 41). As noted above, that motion is apparently

unopposed.

On October 13, 2010, Crouch filed a "motion to alter

or amend" which requests that: (1) the negligence-based claims be reinstated against Holland and Gardiner; (2) the claims

against the State Defendants be reinstated; and (3) Crouch be permitted "to freely amend to conform the Complaint to newlyemerging evidence." (ECF No. 44-1, at 7). Holland, Gardiner,

and the State Defendants all oppose. II. Motion to Alter or Amend Crouch has moved to alter or

(ECF Nos. 45 & 47).

amend

the

court's

prior

"judgment" pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court's prior decision, however, was not a final Rather, Rule 54(b) orders that do not

judgment and Rule 59(e) does not apply. governs reconsideration of interlocutory

constitute final judgments in a case. "any order or other decision,

That rule provides that designated, that

however

adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating the all the

claims."

Fed.R.Civ.P.

54(b).

Because

court's

prior

decision did not adjudicate all of Plaintiff's claims, it falls under the scope of Rule 54(b). See Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy

Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2003). 4

In the Fourth Circuit, the precise standard that should govern a motion such as this one is somewhat unclear.

Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1472 (4th Cir. 1991). For instance, the Rule 60(b)

standard does not bind the court on motion to a reconsider an interlocutory order. 514. newly Id. at 1470; Am. Canoe Ass'n, 326 F.3d at

Even so, courts sometimes use the Rule 60(b) factors discovered evidence, excusable neglect, etc. as

"guideposts" in deciding when to reconsider an earlier decision. Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Grp. Corp., 252 F.R.D. 275, 291 (D.Md. 2008). "Doctrines such as law of the case . . . have

[also] evolved as a means of guiding [the court's] discretion." Am. Canoe Ass'n, 326 F.3d at 515. With those principles in mind, the court concludes that it would be inappropriate to reconsider its prior decision here. As an initial matter, the motion is untimely. Local Rule 105.10

provides that "any motion to reconsider any order issued by the court shall be filed with the Clerk not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of that order." The court's memorandum opinion

was issued on September 15, 2010; Crouch's motion came 28 days later on October 13, 2010. Even if the motion had been timely, it would not support reconsideration. Crouch cites 5 to a page of the Amended

Complaint and states that it provides enough facts to "raise the inference of malice to defeat public official immunity." No. 44). and (ECF

The court has already reviewed the Amended Complaint otherwise. An argument like this one which

decided

essentially invites the court to change its mind ­ gives too little weight to the law of the case and is not a proper ground for reconsideration, even under the Rule 54(b) standard. Such

arguments were available at the time of the initial motion and Crouch should have made them then. Crouch According reasonable also to offers certain new the "newly discovered evidence." beyond Attorney

Crouch, that

evidence Office of

"demonstrates the State's

dispute

spoliated all the evidence in the case," such that the State Defendants should be stripped of prosecutorial immunity. No. 44, at 2). (ECF

Crouch ignores two important facts: (1) the

Eleventh Amendment would still protect the State from liability (ECF No. 34, at 15-16); and (2) "[e]ven if prosecutorial

immunity did not apply, [Crouch] . . . inadequately pled each of his claims against [the remaining State Defendants]." 17-21). Any spoliation is irrelevant. also says that he "has learned that specific (Id. at

Crouch

documentation exists" that purportedly shows that Holland was "aware of the failure of the Hyattsville Police Department to 6

comply with its own general orders." Crouch believes this evidence would

(ECF No. 44-1, at 2). be enough to defeat

Holland's and Gardiner's claims of qualified immunity; as such, he should be permitted to amend his complaint to plead those facts. (Id. at 4). Quite obviously, these facts have nothing Even as to Holland, however, Crouch fails

to do with Gardiner.

to explain in any way how such facts would indicate that Holland acted with a hate-driven, willful intent to harm Crouch.

Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md.App. 268, 300 (2000) ("Malice can be established by proof that the [individual]

intentionally performed an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the

plaintiff." (quotation marks omitted)).

Even viewing them in

the best possible light, such facts do not reflect a specific intent to harm Crouch. Therefore, given the general irrelevance

of Crouch's proffered facts, reconsideration must be denied.

7

III. Motion to Dismiss A. Standard of Review

Gardiner has moved to dismiss the claims remaining against him.1 The purpose 12(b)(6) of is a to motion test to the dismiss pursuant of to the

Fed.R.Civ.P.

sufficiency

plaintiff's complaint. F.3d 231, 243 (4th

See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 Except in certain specified

Cir. 1999).

cases, a plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the "simplified pleading standard" of Rule 8(a), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Nevertheless, "Rule 8(a)(2)

still requires a `showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." 544, 555 n.3 (2007). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

That showing must consist of more than "a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s] v. Iqbal, devoid 129 of S.Ct. further 1937, factual 1949 enhancement."

Ashcroft

(2009)(internal

citations omitted).

The court treats Gardiner's motion as a motion to dismiss because it may be resolved without reference to matters outside the complaint. 8

1

In its determination, the court must consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999)(citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). The court need not, however, accept unsupported

legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). See also 2009). to Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

infer

complaint has alleged, but it has not `show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950

(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

Thus, "[d]etermining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

9

B. Four

Analysis claims remain against Gardiner. The court will

address each in turn. First, Crouch's defamation and false light claims against Gardiner must be dismissed. As the court explained in its prior

opinion, Crouch must establish four elements to present a prima face case of defamation under Maryland law: "(1) the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person, (2) the statement was false, (3) the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement, and (4) the plaintiff thereby suffered harm." v. Brenner, 402 Md. 191, 198 (2007). Offen

To establish a prima facie

case of false light under Maryland law, Crouch must show: (1) the false light in which he was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (2) Gardiner had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which Crouch would be placed. Holland v. Psychological Assessment Res., Inc., 482 F.Supp.2d 667, 681 (D.Md. 2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). Although the complaint is not perfectly clear on the

matter, Crouch's claims apparently stem from the publication of certain facts relating to his arrest on a database containing criminal history records. (See 10 ECF No. 36 ¶ 66). This

database,

called

the

Maryland

Criminal

Justice

Information

System ("CJIS"), includes certain law enforcement data ­ such as arrest dates, release dates, etc. ­ that law enforcement

agencies are required by law to provide. Crim. Proc. §§ 10-214, 10-215. from the publication Case of

See Md. Code. Ann.,

Crouch's claims might also stem case data on the Maryland certain

criminal

Judiciary

Search

("MJCS"),

which

reports

information about cases in the Maryland judiciary. The court has already dismissed similar false light and defamation claims against the State Defendants. The same

reasons justifying dismissal against those Defendants require the court to dismiss the claims against Gardiner. then explained, "Plaintiff's complaint is As the court a basic

missing

element of both torts: falsity.

Although the charges against

Plaintiff were ultimately dropped, he was in fact charged with a crime and the publication of that fact on MJCS [or CJIS] was not false." (ECF No. 34, at 19). Without some allegation that MJCS

or CJIS reported a fact that was not true (i.e., reported events that did not occur), the amended complaint does not state a claim for defamation or false light.2

Because the court concludes that the Amended Complaint does not state a claim for defamation or false light, the court need not consider Gardiner's additional arguments that he would also be entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. 11

2

Second, the Amended Complaint does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. intentional infliction of emotional distress, To recover for Crouch must be

able to show that Gardiner's conduct was (1) intentional or reckless, (2) extreme and outrageous, (3) causally connected to Crouch's emotional distress, and (4) the distress caused was severe. Baltimore-Clark v. Kinko's Inc., 270 F.Supp.2d 695, 701 "Each It

(2003) (citing Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977)).

of these elements must be pled and proved with specificity.

is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that they exist; he must set forth facts that, if true, would suffice to

demonstrate that they exist."

Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin.,

78 Md.App. 151, 175 (1989); see also Arbabi v. Fred Myers, Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 462, 466 (D.Md. 2002). Although it conclusorily states that "Defendants' conduct was intentional, reckless, and in deliberate disregard to a high probability that emotional distress would result," the Amended Complaint does not provide facts evidencing any outrageous

conduct by Gardiner. discussion of conduct

(ECF No. 36 ¶ 74). specific to Gardiner

Indeed, the only relates to his

alleged publication of case information on the databases already discussed. That conduct does not even begin to "strike to the

very core of one's being, threatening to shatter the frame upon 12

which one's emotional fabric is hung." Credit Co., 66 Md.App. 46, 59-60 (1986).

Hamilton v. Ford Motor

Moreover, Crouch has insufficiently alleged that Gardiner's conduct distress. caused Crouch the requisite degree of emotional

"In order for distress to be sufficiently severe to

state a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress, the plaintiff must show that he suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct, and that the

distress was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." brackets Thacker, 135 Md.App. at 315 (quotation marks and Crouch effects states of that he suffers from the in

omitted).

"neuro-psychiatric

[traumatic

brain

injury,"

addition to depression, fear, and emotional torpor. ¶¶ 75-76).

(ECF No. 36

But there is no indication that Gardiner's acts in

particular caused these effects and certainly no indication that the effects were so severe as to stop Crouch from continuing with "normal life activities." In asserting his claim Thacker, 135 Md.App. at 316. for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, Crouch goes to great lengths to emphasize the extreme nature of Prawdzik's actions. be so, but Prawdzik's deeds may not be (Id. ¶ 75). imputed to That may Gardiner The

merely by dubbing Prawdzik Gardiner's "agent."

(Id.).

court recognizes that such references are an attempt to invoke 13

the

doctrine

of

respondeat

superior.

"The

doctrine

of

respondeat superior is, of course, a means of holding employers, including local governments, vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an employee acting within the scope of his/her

employment."

Serio v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 373, 397 (2004).

"For an employee's tortious acts to be considered within the scope of employment, the acts must have been in furtherance of the employer's business and authorized by the employer." Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 481 (2003). S.

The Amended

Complaint alleges that several Defendants, including Gardiner, are liable for the acts of Prawdzik and other Hyattsville police officers. But the complaint is entirely devoid of facts ­ as

opposed to unsupported legal conclusions ­ that the officers were Gardiner's agents and acted within the scope of that agency relationship when they committed the acts at issue here.

Without more, there can be no respondeat superior liability. Third, and finally, Crouch's claim under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights must be dismissed against Gardiner. Here again, Crouch fails to provide any facts that Instead, the Amended Complaint

actually implicate Gardiner.3

The court looks only to facts directly implicating Gardiner because, as explained, the Amended Complaint does not provide facts establishing respondeat superior liability. 14

3

speaks only to the purportedly unlawful seizure committed by Prawdzik and then imputes liability to "the Hyattsville City Police Department and the said Defendants." Crouch cannot impose liability on (ECF No. 36 ¶ 84). and the other

Gardiner

Defendants merely by grouping them together with the central wrongdoer. See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen

IDEC, 381 F.Supp.2d 452, 455 (D.Md. 2005) ("A plaintiff does not satisfy Rule 8 when the complaint `lump[s] all the defendants together and fail[s] to distinguish their conduct because such allegations fail to give adequate notice to the defendants as to what they did wrong.'" (quoting Appalachian Enters., Inc. v.

Epayment Solutions Ltd., No. 01-CV-11502, 2004 WL 2813121, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2004)). The state constitutional claims

against Gardiner will be dismissed. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Gardiner's motion to dismiss

will be granted and Crouch's motion to "alter or amend" will be denied. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

15