Ground Zero Museum Workshop et al v. Wilson

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING without prejudice to renewal 82 motion for default judgment (c/m to Gary Suson 1/17/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 1/17/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
COMMITTEE FOR GROUND ZERO
MUSEUM WORKSHOP, et al.

:

v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 09-3288

:
WILLIAM WILSON
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs
executive

Ground

director,

Zero

Gary

Museum

Marlon

Workshop

Suson,

(“GZM”)

commenced

against William Wilson on December 10, 2009.
answer

to

the

complaint,

Wilson

and

this

its

action

Along with his

asserted

a

counterclaims, which Plaintiffs moved to dismiss.

number

of

Following the

denial of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs twice amended their
complaint.

After answering, Wilson filed motions for summary

judgment and for leave to amend his counter-complaint.

By a

memorandum opinion and order issued August 24, 2011, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Wilson as to all but one of
the

claims

raised
Wilson

complaint.

by

Plaintiffs

was

counter-complaint,

which

fraud;

of

meruit;
common

(2)

breach

(4)

unjust

law

also

in

permitted

asserted

contract

enrichment;
trademark

the

implied
(5)

their
to

file

following
in

breach

of

his

amended
amended

counts:

fact;

infringement,

1

second

(3)

(1)

quantum

contract;

(6)

passing-off,

misappropriation; (7) misuse of trade secret; (8) intentional
infliction

of

emotional

distress;

(9)

declaratory judgment; and (11) accounting.
Following

the

denial

of

defamation;

(10)

(ECF No. 62).

Plaintiffs’

motion

reconsideration, their counsel moved to withdraw appearance.

for
By

an order issued January 11, 2012, the court granted the motion
to withdraw, advising GZM that it “must have new counsel enter
an appearance or be subject to dismissal of [the sole remaining
count]

of

the

Second

Amended

Complaint

and

default

on

counterclaims against it,” further directing GZM to show cause
why that result should not obtain.
failed

to

respond,

the

(ECF No. 74).

corporate

defendant’s

When GZM

complaint

was

dismissed and default was entered against it with respect to
Wilson’s counter-complaint.

Because Suson failed to answer the

amended counter-complaint within the requisite time period, the
court directed Wilson “to file and serve . . . a motion for
entry of default by the Clerk or provide a report as to why such
motion would be inappropriate.”

(ECF No. 79).

Wilson moved for entry of default against Suson on March
30,

2012.

When

Suson

default against him.

failed

to

respond,

(ECF No. 81).

the

clerk

entered

On June 1, Wilson filed the

pending motion for default judgment against GZM and Suson.
No. 82).

No response has been filed.

2

(ECF

Upon the entry of default, “the well-pled allegations in a
complaint as to liability are taken as true, but the allegations
as to damages are not.”
422 (D.Md. 2005).

S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.Supp.2d 418,

The question remains, however, as to whether

the well-pled allegations are sufficient to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

As one court recently explained:

A plaintiff is not entitled to default
judgment simply because the defendant fails
to respond to the complaint. “A default is
not treated as an absolute confession by the
defendant of his liability and of the
plaintiff’s right to recover.” Ryan v.
Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780
(4th Cir. 2001) (citing Nishimatsu Constr.
Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d
1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Thomson
v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885))).
Foremost, a court must be satisfied that the
complaint states a legitimate cause of
action.
See
Anderson
v.
Found.
for
Advancement, Educ. & Emp’t of Am. Indians,
155 F.3d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the district court erred in granting
default judgment to the plaintiff where the
plaintiff
failed
to
state
a
claim);
GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com,
250 F.Supp.2d 610, 612 n. 3 (E.D.Va. 2003)
(“Upon default . . . the appropriate inquiry
is whether the facts alleged [in the
complaint] state a claim.”). Although the
Court “must accept the facts alleged in a
complaint as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff,”
Coleman v. [Maryland Court of Appeals], 626
F.3d 187, 188 (4th Cir. 2010), threadbare
“legal conclusion[s] . . . [are] not
entitled
to
the
assumption
of
truth.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
Moreover,
the
well-pleaded
facts
of
a
complaint must permit the court to infer the
plausibility
rather
than
the
mere
3

possibility of misconduct entitling the
plaintiff to relief. Id.; Coleman, 626 F.3d
at 190; Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Richardson v. William Sneider and Associates, LLC, No. 4:12CV25,
2012 WL 3525625, at *2 (E.D.Va. July 24, 2012); see also Bixler
v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[A] defendant’s
default

does

default

judgment.”

Nat.

Bank,

not

515

in

itself

(citing

F.2d

warrant

the

Nishimatsu

1200,

1206-08

court

Constr.

(5th

Cir.

in

entering

Co.

v.

1975)

a

Houston

(vacating

district court’s entry of default judgment because the pleadings
were insufficient to support the judgment)); Capitol Records v.
Carmichael, 508 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1086 (S.D.Ala. 2007) (“a default
judgment

cannot

stand

on

a

complaint

that

fails

to

state

a

claim” (quoting Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353,
1370 n. 41 (11th Cir. 1997)); 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688 at
63 (3d ed. 1998) (“Even after default, . . . it remains for the
court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a
legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not
admit to mere conclusions of law.”).
In his motion, Wilson asserts, in conclusory fashion, that
liability has been established.

Specifically, the motion papers

recite, “Plaintiffs have admitted the operative facts in their
own pleadings, answers to Defendant’s discovery requests, or by

4

their failure to respond to Defendant’s Counterclaim,” citing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6).

(ECF No. 82, at 2).

Plaintiffs’ operative pleading at the time of default, however,
is

in

conflict

with

Defendant’s

amended

counter-complaint

in

virtually every material respect, and while discovery may have
shed some light on the relevant issues, the court has not been
presented with any of the relevant documents.

Furthermore, Rule

8(b)(6) – which provides that the effect of failing to deny an
allegation

is

that

the

responsive

pleading

is

allegation
required

is

and

deemed
the

“admitted

allegation

is

if

a

not

denied” – does not mean that the allegations are sufficient to
state a claim.
In its independent review of the pleading, the court is
unable to conclude that liability as to any of the counterclaims
has been established.

Thus, the requested relief cannot be

granted on the instant record.

Defendant will, however, be

permitted to renew its motion, providing a full analysis of its
claims with citation to relevant legal authority.
ACCORDINGLY, it is this 17th day of January, 2013, by the
United

States

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Maryland,

by

Defendant

ORDERED that:
1.

The

motion

for

default

judgment

filed

William Wilson (ECF No. 82) BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEWAL; and
5

2.
Memorandum

The

clerk

Opinion

is
and

directed
Order

to

to

transmit

counsel

for

copies

of

Defendant

this
and

directly to Plaintiffs.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

6