Johnson v. Prince George's County, Maryland et al
Filing
58
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/5/12. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
STEVE JOHNSON
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 10-0582
:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
MARYLAND, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this civil rights
case is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Ruben
Paz (ECF No. 55).
The issues have been fully briefed, and the
court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
105.6.
For
the
following
reasons,
the
motion
Local Rule
for
summary
judgment will be denied.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
As set forth in detail in the memorandum opinion dated
March 1, 2011 (ECF No. 29), there is little accord about the
material facts in this case.
The parties agree that early on
the morning of September 5, 2009, Prince George’s County Police
Officers
Ruben
complaining
Landover,
of
Paz
and
disorderly
Maryland.
Richard
Clark
conduct
Somehow,
the
at
responded
7625
situation
Ingrid
to
a
Place
escalated,
call
in
and
Officer Paz sprayed Plaintiff Steve Johnson in the face with
Oleoresin Capsicum (“O.C.”) spray.1
ground.
Johnson ended up on the
He was then arrested and criminally charged with the
offenses of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and failure to
obey a lawful order of the police.
dismissed
nolle
prosequi.
Those charges were later
Beyond
these
basic
points
of
agreement, the vast majority of the facts remain in dispute.
According to Johnson’s version of events – which will be
set forth only briefly here – he was quietly talking to his
friend, Rashaun Adkins, in front of Adkins’s house when two
police officers approached and immediately ordered them to the
ground.
When Johnson asked “why?,” the officers repeated their
order without any explanation.
second
time
and
inquired
When Johnson asked “why?” a
whether
he
was
under
arrest,
Paz
sprayed him with O.C. spray and tackled him to the ground.
The
officers then beat him on the back of his legs before ultimately
arresting him.
Officers Clark and Paz recount the night much differently.
After receiving a citizen complaint, they arrived on the scene
to find a group of loud and disorderly men.
When they ordered
the men to disperse, everyone complied, except Johnson.
Johnson
declined
officers
ordered
1
to
tell
Johnson
the
to
officers
produce
where
he
lived,
identification,
which
OC spray is commonly referred to as pepper spray.
2
When
the
he
refused to do.
The officers also ordered Johnson to take his
hands out of his pockets for safety reasons.
responded hostilely and refused to comply.
Johnson again
Because of Johnson’s
repeated refusals to comply with the officers’ orders to (1) sit
down on the ground, (3) provide identification, and (3) show his
hands, Paz attempted to arrest Johnson.
When Johnson resisted,
Paz sprayed him with O.C. spray.
Johnson fell to the ground and
a
the
minor
struggle
ensued
before
officers
handcuffed
him.
Both officers maintain, however, that they never hit, beat, or
kicked Johnson.
B.
Procedural Background
On January 27, 2010, Johnson filed his complaint in the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland.
2).
(ECF No.
That complaint asserted six counts against Officer Paz:
state law claims for assault, battery, negligence, and false
arrest, as well as constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for excessive force and arrest without probable cause.
The
complaint
also
asserted
two
Section
1983
counts
(Id.).
against
Prince George’s County premised on excessive force and arrest
without probable cause.
(Id.).
After removal to this court on
March 8, 2010 (ECF No. 1), Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on March 26, 2010
(ECF No. 14).
That motion and an accompanying motion to strike
3
(ECF
No.
19)
were
rendered
moot
when
Johnson
amended
his
complaint (ECF No. 21).2
On April 23, 2010, Defendants again moved to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 20).
In a
memorandum
on
2011,
opinion
and
order
issued
March
1,
Defendants’ motion – which was construed as one for summary
judgment because of Defendants’ reliance on materials extrinsic
to the amended complaint – was denied in part and granted in
part.
(ECF Nos. 29 & 30).
Johnson’s claim for punitive damages
against Prince George’s County was dismissed, but genuine issues
of material fact precluded judgment on all of Plaintiff’s other
claims.
(See
ECF
No.
29).
With
respect
to
Plaintiff’s
constitutional claims against Paz, the court held that, viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Johnson, a reasonable
jury could conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to
seize Johnson and that the force they used in tackling, beating,
and pepper spraying Johnson was “entirely unreasonable.”
at 10, 13).
(Id.
The court also held that the doctrine of qualified
immunity would not shield Paz from liability for Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims if Johnson proved his version of events at
trial.
(Id. at 16-17).
As to Johnson’s state law claims, the
2
The amended complaint restates the same counts as the
original complaint, but with additional facts. (ECF No. 22).
4
court
held
that
a
reasonable
officers
(1) committed
battery,
and
false
(2) exhibited
the
arrest
malice
in
jury
could
intentional
without
how
torts
legal
they
conclude
that
of
assault,
justification;
responded
to
the
and
Johnson’s
“ordinary questions,” so as to preclude Paz from relying on the
doctrine of public official immunity.
On
July
28,
2011,
Johnson’s
(Id. at 18, 20-21).
Section 1983
claims
against
Prince George’s County were bifurcated from his claims against
Paz for purposes of discovery and trial.
(ECF Nos. 36 & 37).
The first stage of discovery closed on January 30, 2012.
No. 53).
(ECF
On March 1, 2012, Paz filed the instant motion for
summary judgment.
(ECF No. 55).
Johnson filed an opposition
(ECF No. 56), and Paz replied (ECF No. 57).
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be entered only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson,
532
F.3d
291,
297
(4th
Cir.
2008).
Summary
judgment
is
inappropriate if any material factual issue “may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash.
Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
5
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
[his]
pleadings,’
but
rather
must
‘set
forth
specific
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
facts
Bouchat v.
Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
proof . . . will
not
suffice
to
“A mere scintilla of
prevent
summary
judgment.”
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003).
“If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.”
249–50 (citations omitted).
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
At the same time, the facts that
are presented must be construed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
III. Analysis
The
parties
discovery
dispute
resolves
the
whether
genuine
the
issues
evidence
of
adduced
material
during
fact
that
existed when Defendants previously (and unsuccessfully) moved
for
summary
deposition
judgment.
testimony,”
corroborates
the
Paz
contends
including
officers’
that
“recently
“Johnson’s
versions
of
own
events
testimony,”
and
summary judgment in his favor.
(ECF No. 57, at 1).
rejoins
“based
that
allegations”
Paz’s
that
motion
were
is
rejected
6
in
upon
the
the
obtained
warrants
Plaintiff
same
factual
memorandum
opinion
denying
Defendants’
earlier
motion.
(ECF
No.
56,
at
2).
Johnson is correct that Paz’s motion must be denied for the same
reasons that Defendants’ previous motion was denied.
The
crux
of
Paz’s
motion
is
that,
during
discovery,
Plaintiff “admit[ted] that he refused to obey the commands of
the officers and never sat down as requested.”
at 10).
(ECF No. 55-2,
Paz argues that this “admi[ssion]” necessarily leads to
the following conclusions:
(1) that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Johnson for the offense of failure to obey a
police
order;
(2)
that
the
force
used
by
the
officers
was
objectively reasonable because failing to obey a police order
constitutes
a
“serious
infraction”;
(3)
that
Paz
had
legal
justification for all of his actions; and (4) that Paz did not
act with malice.
(Id. at 9-24).
In Paz’s view, it likewise
follows from Plaintiff’s “admi[ssion]” that none of Johnson’s
constitutional rights were violated, that Johnson’s state law
claims must fail, and that, in any event, Paz is entitled to
both qualified immunity (as to Johnson’s constitutional claims)
and public official immunity (as to Johnson’s state law claims).
(Id.).
Paz primarily bases this line of reasoning on the following
excerpt from Johnson’s deposition:
Q: How many times did they ask you to sit on
the ground?
7
A: At least twice.
Q: Twice maybe more? Do you recall?
A: No. I don’t think it was more than twice,
though.
Q: Okay. So on two occasions they asked you
to sit on the ground?
A: Yes.
Q: And on two occasions you declined to do
so?
A: I asked them why twice.
Q: Okay.
And in terms of asking them why,
you still declined to do as the officer
asked; is that correct?
You never sat
down on the ground?
A: No.
(ECF No. 55-5, Johnson Dep. at 65:2-16).
Despite
Paz’s
attempt
to
characterize
it
as
“newly
obtained” evidence, this excerpt is entirely consistent with the
affidavit Johnson submitted in opposition to Defendants’ last
motion
Johnson
for
summary
Aff.).
judgment.
Johnson
has
(See
generally
steadfastly
ECF
maintained
No.
24-1,
that,
in
response to the officers’ requests for him get on the ground, he
first asked them “why?” and then requested a reason for “why
[he] should be sitting on the ground.”
(Id. ¶ 2).
As set forth
in detail in the memorandum opinion issued on March 1, 2011, if
Johnson proves this version of events at trial, a reasonable
jury could conclude that Johnson was pepper sprayed, tackled,
8
beaten, and arrested “merely [because] he asked two questions
when the officers arrived on the scene and began commanding him
to sit on the ground.”
(ECF No. 29, at 10).
Thus, Johnson’s
deposition testimony only serves to confirm that a reasonable
jury could find in favor of Plaintiff on both his constitutional
and state law claims.3
Moreover,
testimony
of
despite
Paz’s
witnesses
argument
Rashaun
to
Adkins
the
and
contrary,
Gladys
the
Adkins
corroborates Johnson’s story and likewise reaffirms that genuine
issues
of
material
fact
preclude
summary
judgment.
Specifically, Rashaun Adkins testified that, after the officers
ordered
him
and
Johnson
to
the
ground
upon
arriving
at
the
scene, Plaintiff first asked them “Um, why do we have to lay on
the ground.
What did we do?” and then stated that “I am not
3
To the extent that Paz is arguing that any failure to obey
any police order necessarily gives rise to probable cause and
justifies the use of force, such an argument is clearly
meritless. It is well-established in Maryland that the offense
of failure to obey an order “is contingent on the order being
both reasonable and lawful.” Swagler v. Sheridan, 837 F.Supp.2d
509, 531 (D.Md. 2011).
Where the order is neither reasonable
nor lawful, “the failure to obey a lawful order statute cannot
serve as the basis for probable cause.”
Id.
Johnson has
offered evidence indicating that he was not acting disorderly or
loudly when the officers approached the scene.
(ECF No. 55-5,
Johnson Dep. at 18:19-20; ECF No. 24-1, Johnson Aff. ¶ 2).
Based on the present record, therefore, a reasonable jury could
conclude that the officers’ orders to get down on the ground
were neither reasonable nor lawful (and therefore, cannot
establish probable cause to arrest or justify the type of force
Paz allegedly employed).
9
getting on the ground until you tell me why I have to lay on the
ground.”
(ECF No. 55-13, R. Adkins Dep. at 19:6-12).
According
to Rashaun Adkins, the officers repeated their request again,
Johnson again asked for an explanation, and then “[o]ne officer
pepper sprayed [Johnson] and the other one pulled a slap stick
out and hit him in his legs with his stick.”
(Id. at 22:1-14).
Gladys Adkins, Rashaun’s mother who observed some of the events
from her window, testified that she heard the officers order
Johnson and her son to the ground; observed that Mr. Johnson
“did not get on the ground”; and – although she did not actually
hear what Johnson said – surmised that Johnson “probably said I
ain’t getting on the ground; for what.”
(ECF NO. 55-15, G.
Adkins Dep. at 12:22-13:12) (emphasis added).
Gladys Adkins
further testified that “[t]hen the police hand cuffed him.
I
don’t know why they hand cuffed him, for no reason . . . [t]hey
hand cuffed him and then the police started hitting him and I
heard [Johnson] s[]ay, ‘My eye.
My eye.’”
(Id. at 14:12-16).
Thus, the testimony of both witnesses confirms Johnson’s version
of events (i.e., that he was arrested, pepper sprayed, tackled,
and beaten solely for asking the police officers to explain why
he should get on the ground).
In sum, Paz fails to point to any new evidence that alters
the court’s prior conclusion that genuine issues of material
fact preclude summary judgment.
10
Indeed, although characterized
as “undisputed,” the vast majority of the “facts” set forth in
Paz’s motion are based on the pre-discovery affidavits by Paz
and Clark and are unsupported by any corresponding citation to
the testimony of Johnson or the Adkinses.
3-7).
(See ECF No. 55-2, at
Thus, as Johnson contends, all of the material facts in
this case continue to be in dispute, and Paz’s motion must be
denied.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Ruben Paz will be denied.
A separate order
will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?