Jackson v. City of Hyattsville et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 3/19/12. (eb2, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LESLIE RENEE JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF HYATTSVILLE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 10-cv-00946-AW

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Memorandum Opinion
Pending before the Court is Defendant Danielle Gray (“Gray”)’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. Doc. No. 52.1 The Court has reviewed the record and finds that no hearing is
necessary. See D. MD. LOC. R. 105(6) (2010). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion
will be granted.

I.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion with changes

as necessary to reflect subsequent developments in the discovery record. Around 8:30 p.m. on
February 19, 2009, Defendant Officer Davis observed Plaintiff’s teenage son, Antwaun, standing
inside the stairwell of an apartment building. Doc. No. 52 Ex. 1 at 99. Davis radioed in that he
was making a suspicious person stop.2 Id. Ex. 2 at 0:02-0:16; Ex. 3 at 11.
1

Defendants Andrew Davis and Danielle Gray are the only remaining defendants in this case. Because genuine
disputes of material fact remain as to Plaintiff’s claims against Davis, Davis is not moving for summary judgment.
See Doc. No. 52 at 1.
2
Gray has provided the Court with a CD recording of the police radio transmission relating to the incident, which
Plaintiff contends is hearsay and should be stricken. The Court agrees that the transmission is hearsay but finds it
admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) as a statement of Davis’s then-existing state of mind and
intent.

Davis entered the apartment complex, to which he had a key, and proceeded to subject
Antwaun to a pat-down search. Davis did not find anything during the search. Davis then
instructed Antwaun to go outside. When Plaintiff learned from a neighbor that Davis was
confronting Antwaun, her son, she went outside and found Davis yelling at Antwaun. Plaintiff
identified herself as Antwaun’s mother and asked Officer Davis what her son had done. She
contends that Davis ordered her back into the building, saying “Shut, [sic] the fuck up and get
back in the building.”
Plaintiff did not have with her the keys to unlock the apartment complex door. Davis,
who had keys to the complex, unlocked the door but let it close before Plaintiff could re-enter.
Plaintiff put her hands out and gestured that she did not know what to do. She began praying to
herself. Davis told her to “shut the fuck up” repeatedly. Antwaun told the officer not to speak to
his mother that way. Plaintiff put her hand over her son’s mouth and told him not to say
anything. Antwaun stood up and told Davis that he was reaching into his pocket in order to
retrieve his keys to let his mother back into the building. Davis cursed and told Antwaun that he
“better not fucking do anything.” Plaintiff began to pray to herself again. As the situation
escalated, Davis requested that the back-up units “step it up!” and a “Signal 13” was called out,
indicating that Davis was an officer in distress. Id. Ex. 2 at 1:41-1:44, 2:15-2:20.
Plaintiff then heard a “pop” sound and felt a burning sensation in her left breast. She fell
to the ground. Without provocation or warning, Davis had shot her in the chest with his Taser
gun. Davis contends that Plaintiff lunged at him causing him to deploy his Taser at her, Doc. No.
53 Ex. 3 at 168; however, Plaintiff contends she was merely standing and praying when Davis,
without warning, fired the Taser. Upon seeing his mother shot with a Taser, Plaintiff’s son went
after Officer Davis, and a physical struggle between the two ensued. Id. Ex. 2 at 86-87.

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During this time, Plaintiff remained frozen on the ground, until a young man helped her
stand up. Id. Ex. 1 at 78. At that point, Defendant Officer Gray arrived at the scene. Gray saw
Davis, who was injured, and who said to Gray “mom goes too”—apparently indicating that Gray
was to arrest Plaintiff. Id. Ex. 5 at 16. Plaintiff was not wearing shoes, so Gray instructed
someone to get Plaintiff’s shoes for her. Doc. No. 52 Ex. 7 at 80. After Plaintiff had put on a pair
of slippers, Gray explained to Plaintiff that Gray was going to have to handcuff Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff was then placed in the front of Gray’s patrol vehicle. See id. at 79-80.
During the ride to the police station, Plaintiff asked Gray what was going on and “what is
all this for.” Doc. No. 53 Ex. 5 at 20-21. Gray said “I just got here; I don’t know. I’m just doing
what I’m told.” Id. at 21.
After turning Plaintiff over to the Prince George’s County Department of Corrections,
Gray began to complete the paperwork relating to the arrest. Doc. No. 52 Ex. 1 at 183. Davis
arrived and provided Gray with the following account of events so that Gray could complete the
incident report, statement of probable cause, and statement of charges. See id. at 51; Ex. 6 at 2425.
The Court infers from the statement of probable cause that Davis told Gray that Plaintiff
had come running out of the building and immediately placed herself between Davis and
Plaintiff’s son. Id. Ex. 5 at 1. Davis told Gray that he had given a loud clear verbal command to
Plaintiff to step back and not interfere with the investigation, but that Plaintiff had refused to
obey his commands. Id. Davis told Gray he had attempted to maneuver around Plaintiff, but
that she had matched his movements, keeping herself between her son and Davis. Id. Davis told
Gray that he then gave another loud and clear verbal command for Plaintiff to step away and go
back into the building and to stop interfering, but that Plaintiff instead became irritated and

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started yelling loudly. Id. at 2. Davis told Gray that he had again commanded Plaintiff to be
quiet, but that Plaintiff had refused and began loudly addressing a small crowd that had formed,
attempting to incite them to interfere with the situation. Id. Davis said he had told Plaintiff
loudly to sit down and that she was under arrest, but that Plaintiff did not comply. Id. Davis told
Gray that Plaintiff’s son then jumped up and attempted to get around his mother so that he could
get at Davis. Id. Davis said that Plaintiff then assumed an aggressive stance and charged Davis.
Id. Davis told Gray he had recognized that Plaintiff was about to attack him and had deployed his
Taser at her as he had been trained. Id.
Based on the facts Davis told Gray, she completed and signed an Incident Report,
Statement of Probable Cause, and Statement of Charges. See Doc. No. 53 Exs. 6-8. Based on the
facts she had been given, Gray directed that Plaintiff be charged with disorderly conduct, failure
to obey a lawful police order, and resisting/interfering with a lawful arrest. Id. Ex. 8. Davis told
Gray to add charges for second degree assault and obstructing and hindering a lawful police
investigation, which she did. Id. Ex. 5 at 31.
Plaintiff was detained at the police station overnight. The next morning, Commissioner
McLaughlin informed her about the criminal charges filed against her. After attending a number
of proceedings relating to her criminal case, the charges were nolle prosssed, and the case
dismissed on August 24, 2009.
On April 16, 2010, Plaintiff brought this action against the City of Hyattsville (“City”),
the City of Hyattsville Chief of Police (“Chief of Police”), Davis, and Gray, alleging causes of
action under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. On December 13, 2010, the Court dismissed City and Chief of Police and
dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims except for her malicious prosecution claim under state law and

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her § 1983 claim premised on Fourth Amendment violations. On January 20, 2012, Gray moved
for summary judgment as to her liability on all remaining counts. Because Davis acknowledges
that genuine issues of material fact remain as to the events leading up to Gray’s arrival, Davis is
not seeking summary judgment.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). The Court must “draw all justifiable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded
to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with
affidavits or other similar evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Although the
Court should believe the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in
his or her favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere
speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” See Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213,
214 (4th Cir. 1985).

III.

ANALYSIS
Gray seeks summary judgment on all remaining claims against her: a common law

malicious prosecution claim (Count VI) and a § 1983 claim premised on Fourth Amendment
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violations for unlawful seizure, excessive force, and malicious prosecution (Count VIII). Plaintiff
has since withdrawn her excessive force claim against Gray. See Doc. No. 53 at 14. Gray
contends that the remaining claims against her fail because Gray has established probable cause
for both Plaintiff’s arrest and the initiation of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff.

A.

Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff states a § 1983 claim against Gray based on unlawful seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff’s allegations of false arrest and malicious prosecution are both part
of her unlawful seizure claim, and the Court will proceed to analyze each separately. See
Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that “there is no such thing as a
‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution’ claim” but that such a claim is viable as “simply a claim founded
on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of
malicious prosecution- specifically, the requirement that the prior proceeding terminate
favorably to the plaintiff.”) (citation omitted).
1.

False Arrest

Plaintiff alleges that Gray unlawfully arrested Plaintiff because Gray had no probable
cause to arrest her. Gray contends that she has established probable cause for her arrest and that
summary judgment is thus proper on this claim.
“A warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where
there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists
where the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge … are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person … in the circumstances shown, [to conclude] that the suspect has committed, is

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committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
“Whether probable cause exists in a particular situation … always turns on two factors in
combination: the suspect’s conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense
thought to be committed by that conduct. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted). “Probable cause therefore could be lacking in a given case, and the arrestee’s
right violated, either because of an arresting officer’s insufficient factual knowledge, or legal
misunderstanding, or both.” Id. (citation omitted).
In determining the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest as to an assisting officer, the inquiry
turns not on events that occurred before the officer’s arrival of which the officer was unaware,
but on whether the officer’s decision to assist in the arrest was “objectively reasonable in light of
the circumstances”—i.e., the circumstances known to the assisting officer at the time of the
arrest—“and existing law.” Carter v. Jess, 179 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (D. Md. 2001). When an
assisting officer arrives late to the scene, the lawfulness of his or her arrest can be predicated on
information relayed by officers already at the scene. See Ware v. James City Cnty., 652 F. Supp.
2d 693, 703 (E.D. Va. 2009) (assisting officers not required to conduct an independent
investigation to establish probable cause prior to making arrest where they were told by officer
already at the scene that probable cause existed, as “[s]uch a requirement would be unworkable
in the environments in which the police operate.”); see also Guerrero v. Deane, 750 F. Supp. 2d
631, 652-53 (E.D. Va. 2010) (same).
Plaintiff contends that Gray’s decision to arrest her was objectively unreasonable
because, unlike the assisting officers in Ware and Guerrero, Gray was not told that probable
cause existed to make the arrest and was told by Davis only that “mom goes too.” Plaintiff
contends that, from Davis’s statement “mom goes too,” Gray could actually have inferred that

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Davis wanted Plaintiff arrested simply because Plaintiff was Antwaun’s mother, and that no
reasonable assisting officer could have found an arrest to be lawful under those circumstances.
Based on the circumstances known to Gray at the time she arrested Plaintiff, the Court
finds that Gray’s actions were in fact objectively reasonable. First, Gray heard Davis’s initial call
over the radio seeking back-up due to a suspicious person sighting. Gray presumably also heard
Davis’s later calls to “step it up!” in which Davis was breathing heavily and sounded frantic, as
well as the officer in distress signal that was sent out. Based on information provided by Davis,
which Plaintiff has not contested, a small crowd had gathered by the time of Gray’s arrival.
Plaintiff also does not contest that Gray would have seen Davis bruised, with contusions to his
head and face and a broken nose. It would be impractical under these circumstances to establish
a Miranda-like requirement on officers like Davis, obligating them, regardless of injury or the
presence of danger, to recite a statement of probable cause before back-up officers like Gray
would be permitted to make an arrest. Although the officers in Ware and Guerrero did make
such a statement of probable cause to the assisting officers, the Court finds that Gray could
reasonably infer from Davis’s statement “mom goes too” that Davis had found sufficient
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
Moreover, the Court finds unreasonable Plaintiff’s contention that Gray should have
inferred an ulterior motive from Davis’s statement. Under the circumstances of which Gray was
aware at the time of her arrival, Gray would have no particular reason to suspect that Davis
wanted Plaintiff arrested in order to take revenge on Plaintiff’s son. Rather, the facts suggest that
Gray had no reason to believe that Davis was acting as anything other than a reasonable officer
at the time. Certainly Gray had no obligation to inspect Davis’s motives on the scene before
assisting him.

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As the Court finds that Gray committed no unlawful arrest, Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim premised on false or unlawful arrest fails as a matter of law.
2.

Malicious Prosecution

In order to establish a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim as part of a § 1983
action for unlawful seizure, a plaintiff must establish that she was maliciously prosecuted under
Maryland law and that the prosecution deprived her of her constitutional rights. See Asuncion v.
City of Gaithersburg, No. 95-1159, 1996 WL 1842, at *2 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The
elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) a prosecution initiated against the plaintiff by the
defendant; (2) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant did
not have probable cause to institute the proceeding; and (4) the defendant acted with malice or
with a motive other than to bring the offender to justice. Solis v. Prince George’s Cnty., 153 F.
Supp. 2d 793, 804 (D. Md. 2001) (quotation omitted).
The parties do not dispute that Gray initiated the prosecution against Plaintiff or that the
criminal proceeding was later entered nolle prosequi, meaning that it resolved in Plaintiff’s
favor. However, Gray argues that she had probable cause, given the facts relayed to her by
Davis, to institute the proceeding against Plaintiff and that she did not act with malice or other
ulterior motive in bringing the charges. Because the Court finds that Gray had probable cause to
bring the charges, it declines to discuss the element of malice.
Plaintiff essentially argues that Gray had no probable cause to institute proceedings
against her because Gray had no probable cause to arrest her. The Court agrees that Gray would
have had insufficient probable cause to bring charges against Plaintiff based only on the facts
known to Gray at the time of the arrest. Yet Plaintiff appears to be conflating the question of
whether probable cause existed for her arrest with the question of whether probable cause existed

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to bring charges, when in this case, in relation to Gray’s liability, the two inquiries are distinct. In
determining whether Gray had probable cause to institute criminal proceedings against Plaintiff,
the Court must look at the facts and circumstances known to Gray at the time she instituted such
proceedings.
There is no dispute that Gray’s decision to bring certain criminal charges against Plaintiff
was predicated on the detailed narrative description provided by Davis, the first-arriving officer.
The Court cannot find that Gray was under any obligation to conduct an independent
investigation into the events that occurred before she arrived in order to incorporate Davis’s
description of events into the statement of probable cause. Plaintiff has provided the Court with
no reason as to why Gray would reasonably suspect that Davis was providing her with false
facts, and it appears that none of Davis’s statements conflict with the events observed by Gray.
The Court is aware of no rule or legal precedent whereby an assisting officer who lacks
personal knowledge of certain events may not rely on the personal observations of another
officer in drafting the statement of probable cause. As when a late-arriving officer assists in a
warrantless arrest, Gray is entitled here to rely on the statements of other officers as well as her
own observations, and need not interview Plaintiff, weigh Plaintiff’s word against Davis’s, or
otherwise conduct her own inquiry, in drafting the statement of probable cause. Plaintiff has also
provided no argument as to why Gray might have acted improperly in relying on the statement of
probable cause in drafting the statement of charges. The statement avers that, inter alia, Plaintiff
placed herself between Davis and the suspect, engaged in “loud interference” which drew a
crowd, ignored repeated commands to move even after being told she was under arrest, and
“charged” at Davis. These facts, upon which Gray reasonably relied, support the charges brought
by Gray for obstructing and hindering a lawful police investigation, assault in the second degree,

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disorderly conduct, failure to obey a lawful police order, and resisting/interfering with a lawful
arrest. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Gray lacked
probable cause to bring criminal charges against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
allegation fails as a matter of law.
3.

Qualified Immunity

It follows a fortiori from the Court’s above holdings that Gray did not violate Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights and is thus entitled to qualified immunity. Even if probable cause was
in fact lacking as to the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff, however, the Court finds that qualified
immunity would still apply. Qualified immunity protects government officials from “liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
In light of the clearly established law on probable cause for warrantless arrests, Gray
reasonably could have believed that her assisting arrest of Plaintiff was lawful. Although Davis
did not explicitly tell Gray that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, the surrounding
circumstances of the situation—Davis’s injuries, the radio transmissions, and Davis’s statement
“mom goes too”—would lead a reasonable officer to believe she could lawfully arrest Plaintiff.
Similarly, the Court finds that Gray’s conduct in bringing criminal charges against Plaintiff did
not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Although
Gray did not personally observe all or even most of the events contained in the statement of
probable cause, her conduct in relying on Davis’s statements as a basis for bringing charges
against Plaintiff again did not violate any clearly established rights. Accordingly, Count VIII is
dismissed.

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B.

Common Law Malicious Prosecution Claim

As discussed above in relation to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution,
which is premised upon the same elements, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish
that Gray lacked probable cause to institute criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. The existence
of probable cause to bring such charges is fatal to Plaintiff’s common law malicious prosecution
claim. Even if probable cause was found to be lacking, however, the Court finds that Gray would
be entitled to statutory immunity for her actions under § 5-507(b)(1). That statute provides that:
An official of a municipal corporation, while acting in a discretionary capacity,
without malice, and within the scope of the official's employment or authority
shall be immune as an official or individual from any civil liability for the
performance of the action.
Statutory immunity in Maryland is qualified rather than absolute and can be overcome by
proof of actual malice. See Nelson v. Kenny, 710 A.2d 345, 348 (1998). The only fact offered by
Plaintiff in support of her allegation of malice, however, is that Gray could have inferred from
Davis’s statement “mom goes too” that Davis wanted Plaintiff arrested solely to get revenge on
Plaintiff’s son. Even assuming that Davis did have such an ulterior motive, Plaintiff has
established no facts upon which Gray would be able to draw such an inference, especially since
Gray was unaware of what had transpired before her arrival.
Plaintiff additionally argues that in Maryland, actual malice can be inferred by a lack of
probable cause. While this is generally true, see Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 133 (2000), the
actual malice contemplated by § 5-507(b)(1) “has been defined as ‘an evil or rancorous motive
influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff.’” Branch
v. McGreeney, 718 A.2d 631, 641 (1998) (citing Town of Port Deposit v. Petetit, 688 A.2d 54,
62 (1997)). Moreover, if the malice required to preclude statutory immunity could be inferred by
a lack of probable cause, it would render the statutory protection illusory. Because Plaintiff has
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not established any actions by Gray even approaching malice, Gray is entitled to statutory
immunity even if probable cause were rendered absent.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Gray’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be

granted.3 A separate Order will follow.
March 19, 2012
Date

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/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge

The Court notes that Counts VI and VII remain in this case as to Defendant Davis only.

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