Ennis v. USA - 2255

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Ms. Ennis 6/10/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/10/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
QUINITA JESSE ENNIS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 10-1015
Criminal Case No. DKC 08-0529

:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is a motion to
vacate,

set

aside,

Quinita Jesse Ennis.

or

correct

sentence

(ECF No. 114).

filed

by

Petitioner

The relevant issues have

been briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule
105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary.

For the reasons that

follow, the motion will be denied.
I.

Background
Petitioner

was

charged

by

a

ten-count

offenses arising from an armed bank robbery.

indictment

with

Pursuant to a

written agreement with the government, she pleaded guilty, on
December 29, 2008, to conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery
(18 U.S.C. § 371), armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) &
(d)), and making a false statement in connection with a firearm
purchase (18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)).

On June 1, 2009, she was

sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 120 months, to be

followed by a five-year term of supervised release.

Petitioner

did not appeal.
On
pending

April

23,

motion

2010,

to

the

vacate,

clerk

set

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

received

aside,

or

for

filing

correct

(ECF No. 114).

the

sentence

The government

was directed to respond, and did so on June 8, 2010.

(ECF No.

121).
II.

Standard of Review
To

be

eligible

for

relief

under

28

U.S.C.

§

2255,

a

petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
his

or

her

“sentence

was

imposed

in

violation

of

the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without

jurisdiction

to

impose

such

sentence,

or

that

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law[.]”
U.S.C. § 2255(a).
entitled

to

have

consideration.
Cir. 1978).

the
28

A pro se movant, such as Petitioner, is
her

arguments

reviewed

with

appropriate

See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151-53 (4th

But if the § 2255 motion, along with the files and

records of the case, “conclusively show[s] that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief,” the claims raised in the motion may be
summarily denied.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

III. Analysis
Petitioner

advances

claims

of

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel based on allegations that her counsel failed to conduct
2

proper

investigation

advice

regarding

of

her

background,

application

of

the

provided

sentencing

incorrect
guidelines,

failed to object to enhancements under the guidelines, failed to
call character witnesses, and failed to devote appropriate time
to

the

case.

She

further

contends

that

her

plea

was

not

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by
the familiar standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Strickland
v.

Washington,

466

U.S.

668

(1984).

Under

Strickland,

Petitioner must show both that her attorney’s performance fell
below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness

suffered actual prejudice as a result.
at 687.

and

that

she

See Strickland, 466 U.S.

To demonstrate actual prejudice, Petitioner must show

that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”
In

Id. at 694.

scrutinizing

counsel’s

performance,

courts

must

be

highly deferential; indeed, there exists a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonably
professional conduct.
F.2d

1354,

1363

(4th

Id. at 688-89; Bunch v. Thompson, 949
Cir.

1991).

Courts

must

judge

the

reasonableness of attorney conduct “as of the time their actions
occurred, not the conduct’s consequences after the fact.”
3

Frye

v.

Lee,

235

determination

F.3d

897,

need

not

906

(4th

be

made

Cir.

2000).

concerning

Furthermore,
the

a

attorney’s

performance if it is clear that no prejudice would have resulted
from the alleged deficiency.
A

petitioner

who

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

pleads

guilty

has

an

especially

high

burden in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.

As

the Supreme Court recently explained, “[t]he plea process brings
to the criminal justice system a stability and a certainty that
must not be undermined by the prospect of collateral challenges
in cases . . . where witnesses and evidence were not presented
in the first place.”

Premo v. Moore, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct.

733, 745-46 (2011).

Thus, a petitioner alleging ineffective

assistance in the context of a guilty plea has a “substantial
burden . . . to avoid the plea[.]”

Id. at 746.

That burden has not been met here.

Petitioner asserts that

her trial counsel failed to investigate her family history and
psychiatric background, but provides no substantiation for her
claim.

In fact, the record reflects that counsel apprised the

court of relevant facts regarding Petitioner’s background in a
sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing.

It is

unclear what additional facts could have impacted Petitioner’s
sentence, and Petitioner has failed to identify any.

Similarly,

while Petitioner contends that her counsel gave incorrect advice
concerning application of the sentencing guidelines and failed
4

to object to enhancements, she has not provided any specific
information regarding her counsel’s alleged shortcomings in this
regard.

Absent any allegation as to what advice was incorrect

or why any enhancement was improperly applied, she cannot meet
her heavy burden under Strickland.

Petitioner also faults her

counsel for failing to call character witnesses, but she has not
volunteered who those witnesses might have been or what they
would

have

contributed.

Moreover,

the

record

reflects

that

members of Petitioner’s family were present at the sentencing
proceeding and her mother was permitted to address the court.
Insofar as Petitioner contends that her counsel failed to devote
sufficient time to the case, her claim is belied by the record.
At the plea colloquy, Petitioner was specifically asked whether
counsel

had

consultation
oath.

spent
with

the

time

her,

and

she

she

thought

answered

was

necessary

affirmatively,

in

under

Even if she had not sworn to the contrary during the plea

colloquy, Petitioner’s bare assertion that her trial counsel did
not spend enough time working on the case could not satisfy
either prong of the Strickland analysis.
B.

The Guilty Plea

Petitioner
unadvised
conduct
argument,

separately

that
could

contends

sentencing
apply,

raised

in

enhancements

rendering
purely

that

her

was

regarding

plea

conclusory
5

she

unaware

unrelated

unknowing.

fashion,

or

This

essentially

amounts to an attempt by Petitioner to withdraw her guilty plea
after-the-fact.
record,

The argument is, moreover, undermined by the

which

demonstrates

that

guideline

enhancements

were

spelled-out in the plea agreement and reviewed by the court.
The procedure by which the court considers and accepts a
defendant’s guilty plea is set forth in Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure.

Pursuant

to

that

rule,

the

defendant may be placed under oath and the court must advise and
question

her,

“personally

in

open

court,”

confirming

her

understanding of the litany of rights waived as a result of
pleading guilty.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1).

Before accepting the

plea, the court must determine that the plea is “voluntary and
did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than
promises in a plea agreement)” and that “there is a factual
basis for the plea.”

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(2), (3).

That procedure was scrupulously followed in this case, and
Petitioner
evidence

does
of

not

argue

innocence,

otherwise.
a

defendant

Absent
is

any

bound

credible
by

the

representations made under oath and may not attack the veracity
of those representations by way of a § 2255 motion.

See United

States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn
statements

made

during

a

Rule

11

colloquy

is

conclusively

established, and a district court should, without holding an
6

evidentiary hearing, dismiss any § 2255 motion that necessarily
relies on allegations that contradict the sworn statements.”);
United

States

v.

Bowman,

348

F.3d

408,

417

(4th

Cir.

2003)

(conclusory assertions of innocence do not justify withdrawal of
a guilty plea); Fields v. Attorney Gen. of Md., 956 F.2d 1290,
1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Absent clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary, a defendant is bound by the representations he
makes

under

oath

during

a

plea

colloquy”).

Petitioner

has

presented no evidence in support of her claim that her plea was
not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Because the record

conclusively establishes that it was, her post hoc, conclusory
allegation to the contrary cannot prevail.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion to vacate,

set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will
be denied.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2255, the court is also required to
issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a
final

order

adverse

to

the

petitioner.

A

certificate

of

appealability is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to an appeal
from the court’s order.
659 (4th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652,

A certificate of appealability may issue

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
7

denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Where the court denies a petitioner’s motion on its merits, a
prisoner
reasonable

satisfies
jurists

constitutional

this
would

claims

standard
find

the

debatable

or

by

demonstrating

court’s

assessment

wrong.

See

that
of

the

Miller–El

v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Where a motion is denied on a procedural

ground, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the
petitioner

can

demonstrate

both

“(1)

that

jurists

of

reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim

of

the

denial

of

a

constitutional

right

and

(2)

that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Rose v. Lee, 252

F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal marks omitted).
Upon

its

review

of

the

record,

the

court

Petitioner does not satisfy the above standard.

finds

that

Accordingly, it

will decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
A separate order will follow.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

8