Smith v. University of Maryland University College
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 11/18/2011. (c/m to plaintiff 11/18/11 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LORETTA G. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 8:10-cv-01687-AW
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Loretta G. Smith brings this action against Defendant University of Maryland
University College (“UMUC”). Smith asserts federal claims for violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a state law libel claim. Pending before the Court is
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). The Court
has reviewed the entire record, as well as the pleadings and exhibits, and finds that no hearing is
necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 21, 2010, Plaintiff Loretta G. Smith filed a Complaint wherein she requested
damages in the amount of $50,000 and an injunction ordering “reinstatement without prejudice”
and “expungement from the record.” Doc. 1. The Complaint is a form complaint containing
neither factual allegations nor a theory of relief. On June 26, 2010, the Court ordered Smith to
supplement her Complaint. Doc. 3. In this Order, the Court explained to Smith that her form
complaint was deficient in that it failed to “include any information regarding the actual claim.”
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Id. at 1. The Court also cautioned Smith that “her failure to file a supplemental complaint in
compliance with the directives contained in this Order will result in the dismissal of her
complaint without further notice from this Court.” Id. at 1–2.
Smith supplemented her Complaint on July 15, 2010. Doc. 5. In the supplement, which
the Court treats as an Amended Complaint, Smith alleges that she had previously studied at
UMUC and sought to re-register. Smith further alleges that UMUC delayed processing her
student loan because of a mix-up in paperwork and the false accusation that she was not a
Maryland resident.1
Smith states that she went to UMUC to resolve the problem. Allegedly, as Smith talked
to a clerk about the relevant forms, a UMUC employee named Courtney Brown interrupted
Smith’s conversation. Smith admits that she “asked [Brown] to refrain because no one was
talking to her.” Supposedly, Brown grew belligerent and started threatening Smith. Security
intervened in the argument and asked Smith if she wanted to file a complaint, to which Smith
agreed. The paperwork was eventually located, whereupon Smith registered as planned.
According to Smith, “the tables turned” after she filed the complaint against Brown.
Allegedly, UMUC sent Smith a letter accusing her misconduct in connection with her argument
with Brown. Smith specifically asserts that UMUC maligned her reputation in the letter by (1)
informing her that it had banned her from UMUC grounds for one year and (2) telling her that
she could not reenter UMUC without taking anger management classes. Finally, Smith admits
that Brown was “a young black lady.”
Based on these allegations, Smith asserts three claims: (1) First Amendment violation; (2)
Fourteenth Amendment violation; and (3) libel. UMUC filed its Motion to Dismiss on October
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The Court accepts this allegation as true. The Court observes, however, that Smith listed a New York address in
her form complaint and (erroneously) stated that diversity was the basis for federal jurisdiction.
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13, 2011. Doc. 13. Two days later, the Clerk of the Court sent Smith a Rule 12/56 Letter. Doc.
14. The Rule 12/56 Letter states in boldface that “[y]ou have the right to file a response to this
motion within seventeen (17) days from the date of this letter.” The Letter also warns in boldface
that “[i]f you do not file a timely written response, the Court may dismiss the case.” Smith has
not responded to UMUC’s Motion to Dismiss.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint.
See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In two recent cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). These cases
make clear that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This showing must
consist of at least “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should first review the complaint to determine
which pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. In so doing,
the court must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court
need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County
Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations
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devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847
(4th Cir. 1979).
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1.
First Amendment
The First Amendment provides as follows: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Smith’s Amended Complaint
sounds in a violation of the Free Speech Clause. The nature of Smith’s Free Speech Clause claim
is that UMUC unconstitutionally retaliated against her because of her argument with Brown and
associated complaint.
To state a prima facie case for a Free Speech Clause retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
establish three elements. “First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her speech was
protected.” Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted). “Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged retaliatory action
adversely affected the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected speech.” Id. (citaton omitted). “Third,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that a causal relationship exists between its speech and the
defendant’s retaliatory action.” Id. (citation omitted). Generally, to establish that his or her
speech is protected, the free speech retaliation plaintiff must show that “the expressions which
are alleged to have provoked the retaliatory action relate to matters of public concern.” See
Huang v. Bd. of Gov’rs of Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1990) (footnote omitted)
(citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
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In this case, Smith’s factual allegations fail to state a facially plausible claim that her
speech was protected. The allegation that Smith “asked [Brown] to refrain because no one was
talking to her” is a fleeting, feisty request pertaining to a petty, private dispute. The same goes
for Smith’s formal complaint. That is, the Amended Complaint lends itself only to the inference
that the formal complaint’s allegations focused on Smith’s de minimis dispute with Brown.
Nowhere does Smith allege that she complained of racial discrimination or any other matter
sufficiently substantial to warrant First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the Amended
Complaint fails to state a cognizable First Amendment claim.
2.
Fourteenth Amendment
Smith alleges that UMUC discriminated against her based on her race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State officials’ conduct violates the
Equal Protection Clause only insofar as it results from a discriminatory purpose. Thompson v.
U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp.2d 398, 412 (D. Md. 2005) (citing Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977)). “Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
(citation, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). “It implies that the decisionmaker . . .
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite
of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks
omitted). Courts generally look to the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether
discriminatory purpose animates a state actor’s adverse action. Cf. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
In this case, Smith fails to adequately allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Smith’s allegations do not plausibly permit the Court to infer that UMUC or Brown intentionally
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discriminated against her. The gravamen of Smith’s Amended Complaint is that Brown
provoked an argument with her and that the university sided with Brown and suspended Smith.
Although Smith stresses that she is African American, it is irrational to infer that state actors’
adverse actions toward African Americans are automatically discriminatory. In fact, Smith
acknowledges that Brown is a “black lady,” which weighs against the inference of invidious
discrimination. Smith speculates that if she “were a white woman it certainly would not have
happened that way.” Yet factual allegations that fail to raise the right to relief above a
speculative level are insufficient to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Thus, one can
conclude a fortiori that speculation itself does not satisfy this standard. In short, Smith fails to
state a cognizable claim that UMUC purposefully discriminated against her.
3.
Libel
“To establish a prima facie case of libel under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show: (1)
that defendants published statements of or concerning plaintiff to a third party; (2) that the
statements were false and defamatory; (3) that the statements were published with the degree of
fault required by the constitution; [and] (4) that the statements resulted in harm to the plaintiff.”
Henry v. Nat’l Ass’n of Air Traffic Specialists, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (D. Md. 1993)
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Smith’s Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently state that UMUC published
the allegedly libelous statements to a third party. Unequivocally, the Amended Complaint states
that “[UMUC] wrote me a letter telling me I needed anger management . . . .” Thus, the
Amended Complaint is devoid of facts from which one could plausibly infer that UMUC
communicated the contents of the letter to a third party. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint
fails to adequately allege that the supposedly libelous statements caused Smith harm. Smith
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simply states that UMUC wrote a letter in which it libeled her by informing her that it had
banned her from UMUC grounds and that she could not reenter UMUC without taking anger
management classes. Arguably, the actions that underlie these statements might have caused
Smith harm (i.e. the decision to ban her from the university). The Amended Complaint, however,
contains no allegations from which one could plausibly infer that the statements themselves
caused Smith harm. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable libel claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
13), with the consequence that the Court dismisses Smith’s Amended Complaint with prejudice.
November 18, 2011
Date
/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
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