Henson v. Lt. Natale et al
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 7/13/11. (apl, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 7/14/11)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMES A. HENSON, JR. #331-667
Plaintiff
:
v
:
LT. PHILLIP R. NATALE1
SGT. STAN RALEY
LT. OLAN CREEK
Civil Action No. RWT-10-1725
:
:
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James A. Henson, Jr., a Maryland Division of Correction (DOC) prisoner confined at
Western Correctional Institution in Cumberland (WCI), alleges a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights and seeks money damages and injunctive relief.2
Henson claims that
Defendants3 conspired to place him in danger with an alleged gang known as the “Cumberland
Prison Assault Team.” As a result of this alleged conspiracy, Henson claims that he was
assaulted on four different occasions by three fellow prisoners: Richard Janey on January 23 and
February 20, 2008; Deshawn Patterson on July 1, 2008; and Roland Saxon on April 28, 2010.
Henson also claims generally that he was deprived of medical care by unidentified corrections
staff members on one occasion.
1
The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full and proper spelling of Defendants’ names.
2
The injunctive relief requests are listed in ECF No. 1 at 4. Henson‘s request for a new trial to attack his
conviction is outside the purview of this civil rights action. Such relief may be granted by way of habeas corpus
review. He has no entitlement to the criminal prosecution of various corrections department personnel; thus, to the
extent that he complains that he has been unable to press criminal charges against such individuals Henson has
failed to allege a violation of a constitutional right, because Aa private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.@ Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Otero
v. United States Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141 (11th Cir. 1987). HIV testing has been provided, as set forth more
fully herein. Finally, Henson’s complaints concerning access to the law library and other conditions while housed
on segregation status are not the core allegations raised in the Complaint. Henson is free to address such concerns
by way of a separate civil rights action following exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3
Defendant Creek is a retired DOC officer. Defendants Natale and Raley remain employed by the DOC.
The case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22), which shall be treated as a motion for summary
judgment, and Henson’s opposition thereto.4 ECF No. 24. No hearing is required. See Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Standard of Review
Motion for Summary Judgment
Under the December 10, 2010 revisions to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a):
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim
or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for
granting or denying the motion.
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to....the nonmovant, and draw all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). "The party opposing a properly
4
Henson’s opposition is not a model of clarity. Henson seems to argue that he has in fact completed
administrative exhaustion of his claims. The Court will accept Henson’s assertion that he has completed ARP
remedies for the purpose of review of the pending dispositive motion.
2
supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of [its]
pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
Failure to Protect
Deliberate indifference in the context of a prisoner failure-to-protect claim requires that a
defendant "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official
must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994); see also Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302-303 (4th Cir. 2004);
Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997). Under Fourth Circuit law, liability under
the Farmer standard requires two showings. First, the evidence must show that the official in
question recognized a substantial risk of harm. It is not enough that the officers should have
recognized it; they actually must have perceived the risk. See Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340
n.2 (4th Cir.1997). Second, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively
recognized that his actions were Ainappropriate in light of that risk.@ Id. As with the subjective
awareness element, it is not enough that the official should have recognized that his actions were
inappropriate; the official actually must have recognized that his actions were insufficient. See
Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2001). Further, to state a claim for damages, the
prisoner must show a serious physical injury. See De=Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F. 3d 630, 634 (4th
Cir. 2003); see also Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1996).
Denial of Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue
of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
3
(1976). “Scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not limited to those punishments authorized
by statute and imposed by a criminal judgment.” De Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th
Cir. 2003); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). To state an Eighth Amendment claim for
denial of medical care, Henson must demonstrate that the actions of Defendants (or their failure
to act) amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that,
objectively, the prisoner was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the
prison staff were aware of the need for medical attention but failed to either provide it or ensure
the needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.
As noted above, the medical condition at issue must be serious. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (no expectation that prisoners will be provided with unqualified
access to health care). Proof of an objectively serious medical condition, however, does not end
the inquiry. The second component of proof requires “subjective recklessness” in the face of the
serious medical condition. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. “Actual knowledge or awareness on the
part of the alleged inflicter …becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference ‘because
prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment.’”
Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844). If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an official may avoid
liability “if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged in light of the risk
the defendant actually knew at the time. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2001),
(citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998)). Mere medical negligence or
malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
4
Analysis
The “gang” referenced in the Complaint – the “Cumberland Prison Assault Team” – is
not known to WCI prison personnel. ECF No. 22, Exhibit B at 1, ¶ 4, Affidavit of Case
Management Supervisor Bruce McKenzie. Prisoners at WCI typically share a cell. Id., Exhibit
A, ¶ 3, Declaration of Tennille Winters. Prior to placing two prisoners in the same cell, prison
personnel screen to determine whether a known risk of conflict between the prospective
cellmates exists. Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 4. If a prisoner is known to be in danger from placement in
general population, that prisoner will be placed on administrative segregation or protective
custody status. Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 3 and attached records, p. 27.
Known enemies are recorded on the “Enemies List” contained in a prisoner’s Offender
Based Corrections Information System (OBCIS) record. Neither Deshawn Patterson nor Roland
Saxon is listed on Henson’s OBCIS Enemies List. Nothing in Henson’s base file indicates that
he had previously fought with either man, id., Exhibit A, p. 4 and Exhibit B, ¶¶ 5-6, and medical
records likewise fail to corroborate Henson’s claim that he was assaulted by Patterson or Saxon.5
Id., Exhibit B, pp. 5-45. Medical records likewise fail to corroborate Henson’s claim that he was
assaulted by Richard Janey on January 23, 2008.6 Id.
The parties agree that Janey and Henson fought in their cell on February 20, 2008. On
that date, an officer observed the fight and intervened. Both men were removed from their cell
and taken for medical evaluation. Id., Exhibit A, pp. 4, 6-7, and 18-22. Henson was treated for
5
On April 25, 2010, Henson requested medical treatment for back pain resulting from a fight. The
altercation with Saxon is alleged to have occurred several days later, on April 28, 2010. ECF No. 22, Exhibit B, ¶ 5.
6
Henson claims he was denied medical treatment on that day. ECF No. 1 at 4. None of the named
Defendants is implicated in this alleged denial of medical care. The Court notes that Henson did receive medical
care on several occasions during January and February of 2008. The Court further notes that Henson received HIV
testing each time he made such a request. ECF No. 22, Exhibit B, pp. 6, 8-11, 17, 19 and 24-25.
5
bruises, scratches and a red eye. Id., Exhibit A, pp. 19 and Exhibit B, p. 9.7
Prior to this
incident, neither prisoner had reported a problem with the other; afterward, each was placed on
the other’s Enemies List and housed in different cells. Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 4 and pp. 6, 11-12 and
17 and Exhibit B, ¶ 5. Henson was sentenced to 90 days of segregation for assaulting Janey. Id.,
Exhibit A, p. 17.
Prison administrators believe that Henson, who on May 3, 2010, filed an Administrative
Remedy Procedure (ARP) complaint stating that he did not want to share a cell with “violent and
dangerous criminals,”8 is attempting to manipulate his prison housing assignment. ECF No. 22,
Exhibit B at 3. Nothing in the record demonstrates otherwise. Defendants’ dispositive motion
shall be granted and the case closed by way of a separate order.
Date: July 13, 2011
/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
Page 9 contains a typographical error; the date reading “2/02/08” is incorrect; the correct date is
“2/20/08.” ECF No. 22 at 4 n. 3.
8
Henson is serving a twenty-year sentence, all but fifteen years suspended, following his 2005 conviction
in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for first-degree burglary. See Maryland Judiciary Case Search,
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiryDetail.jis?caseId=02K05000730&loc=60&detailLoc=K
6
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