Brengle v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 4/11/11. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DARLENE BRENGLE
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 10-2133

:
GREENBELT HOMES, INC.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this Fair Housing
Act case is the motion of Defendant Greenbelt Homes, Inc. to
dismiss count III of Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 13).
The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to
Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary.

For the

reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion will be denied.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Darlene Brengle initiated this lawsuit against

Defendant

Greenbelt

(ECF No. 1).

Homes,

Inc.

(“GHI”)

on

August

3,

2010.

Her amended complaint asserts three counts:

count

I alleges that GHI discriminated against her in violation of the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; count II alleges
that GHI is liable for negligence; and count III alleges that
GHI is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”).1

GHI

has

moved

to

dismiss

only

count

III

and

accordingly this memorandum is limited to a discussion of the
alleged facts relevant to that count.
Ms. Brengle is a fifty-four year old woman disabled by
kidney

disease

and

(ECF No. 11 ¶ 1).

respiratory

and

immune

system

disorders.

GHI is a non-profit corporation and housing

cooperative consisting of approximately 1,600 homes, including
townhouses,

attached

Greenbelt, Maryland.

homes,

and

(Id. ¶ 7).

related

common

areas

in

From November 1999 until May

20, 2009, she resided within the GHI community at 52A Ridge
Road,

Greenbelt,

Brengle’s

sole

Maryland.
source

of

(Id.
income

disability insurance benefits.

¶ 6).
has

Since

been

social

1999,

Ms.

security

Ms. Brengle alleges that GHI was

aware of her disabilities and her source of income at the time
she moved into the community.

(Id. ¶¶ 6, 9).

She also alleges

that prior to moving into the community, she obtained assurances
from

GHI’s

management

that

it

did

not

use

the

kinds

of

pesticides that caused severely adverse health effects for her
when she was exposed to them in 1993.

1

(Id. ¶¶ 10-11).

Ms. Brengle’s initial complaint contained the same three
counts. GHI moved to dismiss count III of the initial complaint
on October 22, 1010 (ECF No. 9).
Rather than opposing the
motion, Ms. Brengle filed an amended complaint on November 5,
2010. (ECF No. 11).
2

In

October

2007,

Ms.

Brengle

learned

that

GHI

was

considering using certain toxic chemicals to eliminate bamboo
and other invasive plants in areas near to her unit.
¶ 13).

At

that

time

she

asked

GHI

to

refrain

from

(Id.
using

pesticides or herbicides near her home because of the potential
adverse

effects

on

her

health.

Along

with

her

request

she

submitted a letter from her doctor stating that “exposure to
pesticides and herbicides ‘will greatly jeopardize her health
and

possibly

cause

irrevocable

damage’

because

Ms.

Brengle’s

fragile health left her ‘unable to metabolize these [chemicals]
adequately and therefore [she] can have more severe reactions.’”
(Id.

¶

14).

Beginning

in

October

2007,

Ms.

Brengle

also

contacted her neighbors, the GHI Board of Directors, and GHI
management about the potential harm to her from the use of the
proposed chemicals, had a letter published in the local paper,
gathered signatures from neighbors for a petition protesting the
use of the pesticides, and engaged in other activities to notify
the GHI staff and Board of her concerns.
Brengle

alleges

that,

in

response,

the

(Id. ¶ 15).
GHI

Board

Ms.

members,

management, and staff “belittled her; expressed skepticism about
the effect of the chemicals on her health; provided incomplete
and

misleading

information

concerning

chemicals

to

be

used;

impugned her character and falsely accused her of gaining access
to a GHI office without permission; and insisted that GHI would
3

continue

to

use

pesticides

and

Directors deemed it advisable.”

herbicides

if

(Id. ¶ 17).

its

Board

of

Nevertheless, GHI

also made written and oral promises to provide Ms. Brengle with
advance notice before applying the chemicals so that she had an
opportunity to be absent from the premises during those times.
(Id. ¶ 17).
Despite these assurances, on May 20, 2009, GHI permitted a
contractor

to

apply

the

pesticide

immediately below Ms. Brengle’s unit.

“Phantom”

to

(Id. ¶ 19).

the

unit

GHI did not

provide Ms. Brengle with advance warning, but she happened to be
away from her unit at the time.
the

building

sensation

on

she

experienced

her

face

Within moments of her return to

and

“a

in

strong

her

eyes

and

painful

and

throat

developed a severe headache and nausea.”

(Id. ¶ 21).

thereafter

distress

she

experienced

respiratory

and

burning
and

she

Shortly
“acute

airway obstruction to the point she nearly stopped breathing”
and was taken to the emergency room.

(Id. ¶¶ 22-23).

At the

hospital, tests confirmed that she had been exposed to toxic
chemicals and had an acute asthma attack, and she was advised
not to return to her home until the chemicals were removed.
(Id. ¶¶ 23-24).

In the following weeks, Ms. Brengle consulted

five other physicians regarding her condition.
that

the

chemical

exposure

exacerbated

a

They concluded
number

of

her

conditions and diagnosed her with chemical poisoning, reactive
4

upper and lower airway disease of severe degree, significant
toxic

encephalopathy,

and

mild

peripheral

neuropathy.

(Id.

¶¶ 27-28).
On May 22, 2009, Ms. Brengle notified the General Manager
of GHI, Gretchen Overdurff, about her reaction to the pesticide
and

her

chemicals

doctor’s
had

recommendation

been

removed.

not

Ms.

to

Brengle

return
also

until

the

informed

Ms.

Overdurff that she was “out on the street” and needed GHI to
provide alternative housing, either in a motel or permission to
stay in GHI’s “Guest House”, but Ms. Overdurff said “there was
nothing” she could do.

(Id. ¶¶ 29-32).

GHI made no efforts to

provide alternative housing for Ms. Brengle or to assist her
with

cleaning

up

or

mitigating

the

exposure, at that time or thereafter.

effects

of

(Id. ¶ 33).

the

chemical

At her own

expense, Ms. Brengle’s unit was thoroughly cleaned by GreenLight
Cleaners on June 24, 2009, but a chemical residue remained.
(Id. ¶¶ 34-36).

Ms. Brengle has not lived in her unit since May

20, 2009, and cannot spend more than ten minutes in the unit
without experiencing symptoms similar to those she experienced
on May 20, 2009.

(Id. ¶ 37).

She has been sleeping in her car

or staying with friends in Greenbelt and Lanham, and she has
been unable to use nearly all of her possessions, valuables, and
keepsakes that were in the unit because they have traces of the
chemical residue.

(Id. ¶¶ 39, 41).
5

In count III of her amended complaint Ms. Brengle alleges
that

“through

its

mistreatment

.

.

.

and

its

extreme

callousness, and by exposing her to toxic chemicals despite her
repeated warnings that such exposure could be extremely harmful
to her health and well-being, GHI caused [her] severe emotional
distress.”

(Id. ¶ 43).

She alleges that she is “often overcome

physically and emotionally by the enormity of these difficult
circumstances, and by anxiety, fear and distress about not being
able to recover both physically and financially and to get back
into stable housing.”

(Id.).

She further alleges that her

distress “is debilitating and prevents her from being able to
interact with others and attend to basic requirements concerning
sleep and diet, which further affects her physical health” and
that her emotional distress “is further exacerbated by her loss
of a stable living environment or any semblance of a ‘home.’”
(Id. ¶¶ 67-68).
GHI moved to dismiss count III of the amended complaint on
November 22, 2010, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim.
motion.
II.

(ECF No. 13).

Ms. Brengle opposes the

(ECF No. 14).

Analysis
A.

Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6)

is

to

test

the

sufficiency
6

of

the

plaintiff’s

complaint.

See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243

(4th

1999).

Cir.

Except

in

certain

specified

cases,

a

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading
standard” of Rule 8(a), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 513 (2002), which requires a “short and plain statement of
the

claim

showing

Fed.R.Civ.P.
requires

a

that

the

8(a)(2).

is

Nevertheless,

‘showing,’

rather

entitlement to relief.”
544, 555 n.3 (2007).

pleader

than

a

entitled
“Rule

to

relief.”

8(a)(2)

blanket

still

assertion,

of

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

That showing must consist of more than “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or
“naked

assertion[s]

Ashcroft

v.

Iqbal,

devoid

of

further

129

S.Ct.

1937,

factual
1949

enhancement.”

(2009)(internal

citations omitted).
In its determination, the court must consider all well-pled
allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Harrison v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999)(citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir.

1993)).

The

court

need

not,

however,

accept

unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm’rs,
882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, or conclusory
7

factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events,
United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.
1979).

See

also

(4th Cir. 2009).

Francis

v.

Giacomelli,

588

F.3d

186,

193

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged, but it has not ‘show[n] . . . that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950

Thus, “[d]etermining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”
B.

Id.

Analysis

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
was first recognized by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Harris
v.

Jones,

281

Md.

560

(1977).

To

recover

Maryland law, a plaintiff must show that:

for

IIED

under

(1) the defendant’s

conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme
or outrageous; (3) there is a causal connection between the
wrongful

conduct

and

the

emotional

emotional distress is severe.

distress;

and

(4)

the

Id. at 566; see also Interphase

Garment Solutions, LLC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 566
F.Supp.2d 460, 466 (D.Md. 2008)(citing Hamilton v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 66 Md.App. 46, 58 (1986)).

All four elements must

be established, and the liability for the tort should be imposed
8

sparingly, “its balm reserved for those wounds that are truly
severe and incapable of healing themselves.”
Bowden,

330

Md.

632,

642

(1993)(quoting

Caldor, Inc. v.

Figueiredo-Torres

v.

Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 653 (1991)).
GHI argues that Ms. Brengle has failed to plead adequate
facts to establish an IIED claim.
that

Ms.

Brengle

has

failed

to

Specifically, GHI contends
allege

facts

sufficient

to

establish three of the requisite elements—that GHI’s conduct was
intentional

or

outrageous,

and

distress.
that

she

reckless,
that

that

Ms.

(ECF No. 13-1).
sufficiently

(ECF No. 14-1, at 1).

its

Brengle

conduct
suffered

was

extreme

extreme

and

emotional

Ms. Brengle disagrees and maintains

pled

each

element

of

her

claim.

Each contested element will be discussed

in turn.
1.

Intentional or Reckless Conduct

To satisfy the first element of an IIED claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant either “desired to inflict
severe emotional distress, knew that such distress was certain
or substantially certain to result from his conduct, or acted
recklessly

in

deliberate

disregard

of

a

high

probability that emotional distress would follow.”

degree

of

Interphase

Garment Solutions, LLC, 566 F.Supp.2d at 466 (quoting Foor v.
Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md.App. 151, 175 (1989)).

9

Ms.

Brengle

exposure

to

argues

pesticides

that

GHI

was

made

would

have

severe

well

and

aware

adverse

that

health

consequences for her, including severe emotional distress, and,
thus,

its

decision

to

use

Phantom

near

her

unit

“cannot

be

considered anything less than an act of reckless disregard.”
(ECF

No.

14-1,

at

6).

In

support,

Ms.

Brengle

points

to

paragraphs 14, 16, and 63 of her amended complaint, where she
alleges that she “informed GHI of the potentially grave effects
of pesticides and herbicides on her health,” (ECF No. ¶ 3), that
“GHI was fully apprised of the severe physical and emotional
distress Ms. Brengle was likely to experience if she were to be
exposed,” (id. ¶ 16), and that “by violating its prior promises
of advanced warnings, allowing a pesticide to be applied to the
unit neighboring Ms. Brengle’s and failing to give Ms. Brengle
any prior notice of the chemical use, GHI intentionally caused
Ms.

Brengle

significant

emotional

distress

or

acted

with

reckless disregard for the strong likelihood that Ms. Brengle
would suffer emotional distress.”

(Id. ¶ 63).

Although Ms.

Brengle does not allege the details of her conversations with
GHI or fully specify exactly what health risks GHI was informed
were

a

possible

result

of

her

exposure,

she

has

pleaded

sufficient facts to establish the plausibility of this element.

10

2.

Outrageous or Extreme Conduct

To satisfy the second element, the conduct in question must
“completely violate human dignity,” and “strike to the very core
of one’s being, threatening to shatter the frame upon which
one’s emotional fabric is hung.”

Interphase Garment Solutions,

LLC, 566 F.Supp.2d at 466 (quoting Hamilton, 66 Md.App. at 5960); see also Kohler v. Shenasky, 914 F.Supp. 1206, 1212 (D.Md.
1995)(“For conduct to be ‘extreme and outrageous,’ it must go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and . . . be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
(internal quotations omitted).

“The mere fact that the actor

knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or
will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.”

Kentucky Fried

Chicken Nat’l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663, 672 (1992).
In evaluating whether the identified conduct is extreme and
outrageous, courts should consider multiple factors, including
the context in which the conduct occurred, the personality of
the plaintiff and her susceptibility to emotional distress, and
the

relationship

between

the

defendant

and

plaintiff.

See,

e.g., Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md.App. 1, 17, cert. denied, 304 Md.
631 (1985); Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 654.

“[T]he extreme

and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct may arise
from his abuse of a position, or relation with another person,
which gives him actual or apparent authority over him, or power
11

to affect his interests.”

281 Md. at 569 (citing Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 46 comment e (1965)).

Furthermore, “[i]n

cases where the defendant is in a peculiar position to harass
the plaintiff, and cause emotional distress, his conduct will be
carefully scrutinized by the courts.”

Id. at 569 (citing 1 F.

Harper & F. James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 9.1 at 666-67 (1956);
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 12 at 56 (4th ed.
1971)); see also Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 654 (recognizing
that

a

psychologist

is

in

a

unique

position

to

influence

a

patient’s emotional well-being and their conduct must be closely
scrutinized); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt., 326 Md. 663,
677 (1992)(recognizing that the employer/employee relationship
may

be

significant

factor

liability for tort of IIED).

in

determining

whether

there

is

Where reasonable jurors may differ

as to whether the defendant’s conduct may be regarded as extreme
and outrageous, the question should be submitted to a

jury.

Harris, 218 Md. at 569; Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1324-25
(4th Cir. 1993).

Thus at the pleading stage, a plaintiff need

only allege conduct that a reasonable juror might deem extreme
or outrageous.
In this case, Mr. Brengle alleges that it was extreme and
outrageous

for

GHI

recklessly

to

expose

her

to

chemical

poisoning after repeated warnings that doing so would cause her
significant and permanent physical and emotional harm and for
12

GHI to refuse to permit Ms. Brengle to stay in GHI’s guest unit
or otherwise assist her with finding alternate housing with the
knowledge

that

Ms.

Brengle

was

effectively

homeless.

(ECF No. 14-1, at 11)(citing ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 16, 30-33, 43, 6365).

Ms.

Brengle

also

notes

that

there

are

prior

cases,

including controlling precedent, holding that one who engages in
conduct

that

affliction

is

with

“highly
a

likely”

serious

to

illness

result
with

in

another’s

permanent

health

consequences has committed extreme and outrageous conduct.

(Id.

at 11)(citing B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 146-48 (1988); Gonzalez
v. Moffitt, 178 F.3d 1294 (6th Cir. 1999)(unpublished); German v.
Fed. Home Mortg. Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537, 571-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Leonard v. BASF Corp., No. 06-cv-00033, 2006 WL 3702700, at *9
(E.D.Mo.

Dec.

No. 02-cv-5193,
2003);

13,

2003

Abbatiello

(S.D.N.Y.
defendants
acquiring

2006);

v.

2007)).
who

WL

Mut.

21196261,

Monsanto

In

B.N.

knowingly

sexually

Amica

at

Co.,

v.

K.K.

exposed

transmitted

Ins.

Co.

*3-4

(N.D.Ill.

522

Mortgage

Corp.,

Leonard

and

Gonzalez

plaintiffs

diseases

v.

BASF

Henderson,

to

were

May

15,

524,

F.Supp.2d

committed extreme and outrageous conduct.
Home

v.

536

v.

the
held

Moffit

risk
to

of

have

In German v. Federal
Corp.,

Amica

Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Henderson, and Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co. the
defendants were alleged knowingly to have exposed plaintiffs to
chemicals

or

toxins

in

their
13

homes

and

failed

to

provide

adequate warning or concealed the danger.

In each case, the

court deemed the allegations sufficiently extreme and outrageous
to survive motions to dismiss.

See German, 885 F.Supp. at 571-

72 (denying motion to dismiss where landlords knowingly exposed
tenants to lead paint, “a highly toxic substance to children,”
thereby putting them at risk for physical and mental injuries);
Leonard, 2006 WL 3702700 at *9 (denying motion to dismiss IIED
claim where defendant knowingly exposed plaintiff to dangerous
levels of carcinogens at the manufacturing plant where he was
employed causing plaintiff’s colon cancer); Amica Mut. Ins. Co.,
2003 WL 21196261, at *3-4 (denying motion to dismiss IIED claim
where defendants allegedly failed to warn plaintiffs of toxic
mold in their home); Abbatiello, 522 F.Supp.2d at 536 (finding
that

an

allegation

individuals

to

that

exposure

to

defendants
the

highly

knowingly
toxic

subjected

substance,

PCB,

“while purposefully concealing from those so exposed the serious
injuries that might result from such exposure, and in reckless
disregard

of

these

risks,

may

constitute

‘extreme

and

outrageous’ conduct”).
GHI argues that Ms. Brengle’s allegations are insufficient
because

there

is

no

allegation

that

she

suffered

from

any

emotional or psychological ailments that made her vulnerable to
emotional distress and because breaching promises or engaging in
conduct that a defendant knows will cause physical harm does not
14

rise to the level of outrage necessary to find liability for the
tort.

(ECF

No.

13-1,

at

18-20).

GHI

also

attempts

to

distinguish the facts alleged here from the cases where IIED
claims have survived motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 15, at 11-15).
The alleged conduct in this case is perhaps not as extreme
or outrageous as the conduct in the cases cited by Ms. Brengle,
but this is also more than a run-of-the-mill breach of contract
or physical tort case.

Ms. Brengle went to great lengths to

convey to GHI the potential harm to her health that would result
from her exposure to pesticides or other toxic chemicals.2

2

Her

GHI contends that Ms. Brengle’s factual allegations relate
only to GHI being told that exposure to chemicals would put her
at the risk of physical harm and make no reference to emotional
harm.
(ECF No. 15, at 15).
The paragraph of the amended
complaint then referenced by GHI reads:
In October and November 2007, Ms. Brengle
asked
GHI
not
to
use
pesticides
or
herbicides in, or in the vicinity of, her
unit, and informed GHI of the potentially
grave effects of pesticides and herbicides
on her health. Her request was subsequently
supported by a letter from her doctor in
November 2007, indicating that exposure to
pesticides and herbicides “will greatly
jeopardize her health and possibly cause
irrevocable damage” because Ms. Brengle’s
fragile
health
left
her
“unable
to
metabolize these [chemicals] adequately and
therefore
[she]
can
have
more
severe
reactions.
15

conduct and fervor in protesting the chemicals’ proposed use
should have conveyed to GHI her deep emotional investment in the
issue and that her sensitivity to the issue was far greater than
the average resident.

With that knowledge, GHI proceeded to

apply the pesticides without advance warning and then refused to
assist Ms. Brengle in finding alternate housing or otherwise
alleviating or remedying her situation.

The allegations in this

case rise above the level of mere insults, annoyances, or simple
rudeness.

See B.N., 538 A.2d at 1181; Hamilton v. Ford Motor

Credit Co., 66 Md.App. 46, 502 A.2d 1057 (finding bad taste and
poor judgment in connection with the collection of a lawful debt
did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct), cert. denied,
306 Md. 118 (1986).
insufficiently

While the conduct may ultimately be found

outrageous

or

extreme

to

permit

recovery,

the

allegations are sufficient to proceed at this stage.
3.

Extreme Emotional Distress

To satisfy the fourth element, one must suffer “a severely
disabling

emotional

response

Harris, 281 Md. at 570.
be

severe,

it

need

not

to

the

defendant’s

conduct.”

But “while the emotional distress must
produce

total

emotional

or

physical

(ECF No. 11 ¶ 14.)
This paragraph refers to grave effects on
Ms. Brengle’s “health.”
Health is not obviously limited to
physical health, but rather the term is broad enough to
encompass mental and emotional health as well.
16

disablement” and “severity must be measured in light of the
outrageousness of the conduct and the other elements of the
tort.

B.N., 312 Md. at 147 (citing Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md.App.

511, 513-14).

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ decision

in Moniodis v. Cook, provides a clear illustration of the level
of distress which is necessary to recover for IIED.

64 Md.App.

1.

against

In

Moniodis

four

employees

filed

IIED

claims

a

former employer that had required all its employees to submit to
polygraph tests regarding inventory shortages and terminated the
plaintiffs when they refused to take the tests.

Although the

jury returned favorable verdicts on the IIED claim for all four
plaintiffs,

the

court

overturned

the

verdict

as

to

three

plaintiffs whose evidence of emotional disablement was testimony
that

they

were

upset

and

suffered

symptoms

such

as

hives,

increased smoking, and lost sleep, but who ably managed to take
care of their households and tend to daily activities.
at 15-16.

Id.

The evidence regarding the fourth employee, however,

demonstrated

deep

emotional

disturbance.

The

Moniodis

explained:
There was evidence that she did suffer from
a
pre-existing
nervous
condition;
her
emotional
state,
however,
deteriorated
significantly after her termination. She
took greater amounts of medication and began
to sleep most of the time. She became a
recluse, her husband testified, and did not
“come out of it” for a year. Relatives came
to the home to tend to household chores
17

court

which Ms. Cook could no longer perform. She
took pains to avoid contact with neighbors
who might ask her why she no longer worked
at Rite-Aid.
Id. at 16.
enough

to

The court held that this evidence was “more than
permit

a

severely distressed.”

jury

finding

that

[the

plaintiff]

was

Id.

Similarly, in Caldor Inc. v. Bowden,

the Maryland Court of Appeals held that where a plaintiff was
“upset,” “embarrassed,” “confused,” and “felt bad about himself”
there

was

insufficient

emotional response.
plaintiff

in

evidence

of

a

severely

330 Md. 632, 644 (1993).

Figueiredo-Torres

demonstrated

disabling

In contrast, the
severe

emotional

distress where he suffered:
systemic hypertension and loss of visual
acuity
in
his
left
eye,
required
hospitalization
for
severe
emotional
distress, shock and fright to his nervous
system; he suffered depression, anxiety,
obsession ... and impairment of his ability
to form intimate relationships with women,
all said injuries requiring psychological
therapy and counseling; he lost the benefit
received
from
prior
psychological
counseling.
321 Md. at 656.

Although the facts of each case will be unique,

these examples illustrate the severity of the emotional distress
that one must plead.
Here

GHI

contends

complaint

do

not

emotional

distress

that

state
was

the

facts

allegations
showing

severely

18

that

disabling

in

the

Ms.
and

amended

Brengle’s
that

mere

conclusory

allegations

(ECF No. 13-1, at 13).

to

that

and

“severe

“devastation,”

insufficient.

In addition to alleging that she

anxiety,”
(ECF

are

Ms. Brengle’s complaint contains more

than conclusory allegations.
experienced

effect

No.

“isolation,”
11

¶¶

44,

“extreme

49),

Ms.

sadness,”

Brengle

has

alleged that the distress is debilitating and it has prevented
her from attending to basic requirements of life such as having
a

permanent

home

and

interacting with others.

eating

and

sleeping

(Id. ¶ 67).

regularly

and

It is true that the facts

proven may ultimately show that these conditions were not caused
by the defendant’s actions or details may emerge in discovery
that

indicate

a

more

limited

level

of

disruption

in

Ms.

Brengle’s life, but taking the facts as pled she has alleged a
severe

level

complaint

of

emotional

contains

more

distress.

than

the

bare

Ms.

Brengle’s

allegation

amended

that

she

suffered severe emotional distress and is thus distinguishable
from the bare bones allegations that were deemed inadequate in
the recent cases cited by GHI.

(ECF No. 13-1, at 15)(citing

Templeton v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., No. WDQ-09-3280, 2010 WL
2292493 (D.Md. June 3, 2010); Hinks v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford
Cnty., No. WDQ-09-1672, 2010 WL 1664084 at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 20,
2010), modified by No. WDQ-09-1672, 2010 WL 5087598 (D.Md. Dec.
7, 2010)(changing prior order granting dismissal to one without
prejudice and permitting plaintiff to file amended complaint);
19

and

Ragland

2507426,

v.

*13

A.W.

(D.Md.

Indus.,
Aug.

Inc.,

13,

No.

2009)).

DKC-08-1817,
In

these

2009

cases

WL
the

plaintiff alleged only that he or she suffered “severe . . .
mental anxiety” and “extreme emotional distress for which she
incurred medical costs,” Templeton, 2010 WL 2292493 at *5, or
that

she

suffered

“severe

emotional

distress”

information about the extent of that distress.

with

no

Ragland, 2009 WL

2507426 at *13; see also Hinks, 2010 WL 1664084 at *6 (sole
allegation

about

plaintiff’s

emotional

distress

was

that

“Defendants’ misconduct has proximately caused the Plaintiff to
suffer extreme emotional distress and physical manifestations
thereof”).

Ms. Brengle’s complaint includes these allegations

in addition to facts to explain the extent of her distress, and,
thus, she has met the pleadings standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
count III of the amended complaint will be denied.

A separate

Order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

20