Taylor v. The State of Maryland et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/16/10. (sat, Chambers)

Taylor v. The State of Maryland et al

Doc. 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND JOSEPH TAYLOR v. THE STATE OF MARYLAND, et al. : : : : : Civil Action No. DKC 10-2167

MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for review is the motion of Defendant St. Mary's County, Maryland for bifurcation and a stay of discovery. The issues are fully briefed and the court now

rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. be granted. I. Background Plaintiff (ECF No. 20 Joseph In Taylor his is a resident complaint, of the Maryland. State of For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion will

¶ 1).

amended

Maryland, St. Mary's County, Maryland, and Deputy Sheriff Keith Moritz are named as Defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that

on June 28, 2009, he was sprayed in the eyes with mace by Defendant Moritz without warning or provocation and sustained personal injuries. counts for battery, (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9). negligence, and Plaintiff's suit asserts violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant St. Mary's County,

Dockets.Justia.com

Maryland is allegedly liable for battery and negligence pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior (id. ¶¶ 16, 20) and for violation of Plaintiff's civil rights under § 1983 because of the county's "custom, policy, and practice of failing to take action to stop, the widespread and on-going use of excessive force by the County's police officers." Plaintiff's initial complaint was (Id. ¶ 27). filed in the Circuit

Court for St. Mary's County, Maryland and subsequently removed to federal court on August 9, 2010. (ECF Nos. 1-2). Defendants

filed a motion to dismiss on August 13, 2010, but the motion was rendered moot prior to a court decision because the Plaintiff submitted Defendants an amended their complaint. answer to (ECF the Nos. 9 and 20). on

filed

amended

complaint

October 21, 2010.

(ECF No. 22).

Defendant St. Mary's County,

Maryland then moved for bifurcation and a stay of discovery concerning the § 1983 claim only. II. (ECF No. 25).

Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery A. Standard of Review

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b), the court may, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy," order separate trials of any claims or issues. The court has broad discretion in

deciding whether to bifurcate claims for trial, and the exercise of that discretion will be set aside only if clearly abused. 2

Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440, 1443 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993). B. Analysis

Defendant argues that bifurcation is appropriate because the viability of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the County is dependent upon the resolution of his claims against Defendant Moritz and Plaintiff cannot prevail against the County unless and until he prevails against Defendant Moritz. at 3). (ECF No. 25-1,

Defendant maintains that bifurcation of the claims will

speed the discovery and trial processes and also prevent any prejudice incidents to of Defendant police Moritz that are might arise as if prior to

brutality

introduced

evidence

establish a county custom or policy of tolerating or prescribing the use of excessive force. Id. Plaintiff opposes bifurcation

and argues that the motion should be denied because (1) he is a person of limited financial means and bifurcation will increase his financial burden; (2) any potential prejudice to Defendant Moritz could be cured with proper jury instructions; and (3) Defendant discovery has a pending impair motion to dismiss ability and to a stay of the

would

Plaintiff's

develop

evidence necessary to oppose the motion. Counties § 1983 where and other municipalities practice,

(ECF No. 28, at 1-2). can or be liable of under the

some

custom,

policy

municipality is the proximate cause of the violation of the 3

plaintiff's Dep't of

constitutional Soc. can Servs., only be

rights. 436 U.S.

Monell 658,

v.

New

York

City A the

692-94 under §

(1978). 1983 if

municipality

held

liable

plaintiff first establishes that some county employee violated his constitutional rights. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238

F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir. 2001); James v. Frederick Cnty. Pub. Schs., 441 F.Supp.2d 755, 761 (D.Md. 2006). Because potential of the secondary under § nature 1983, of a municipality have on

liability

courts

frequently

bifurcated discovery and or trial so that cases proceed first with a trial against the individual defendant(s) alleged to be primarily (granting liable. motion See, to e.g., James, and 441 F.Supp.2d first at 762

bifurcate

proceed

against

individual defendant); Jones v. Ziegler, 894 F.Supp. 880, 883 (D.Md. 1996), aff'd by, Jones v. Welham, 104 F.3d 620 (4th Cir. 1997); Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318, 230 (D.Md. 1991); Dawson v. Prince George's Cnty., 896 F.Supp. 537, 540 (D.Md. 1995). Not only does bifurcation in such situations

streamline the issues for trial, it prevents prejudice to the individual defendants that would otherwise arise from the

introduction of evidence of prior incidents of police brutality in order to make a case against the municipality. See

Marryshow, 139 F.R.D. at 320.

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Against bifurcation

this are

backdrop

Plaintiff's First, the

arguments potential

against for an

unpersuasive.

increased financial burden for Plaintiff as a result of the bifurcation is small. Streamlining the issues and limiting

discovery to the claim against Defendant Moritz initially will curb rather than increase costs, and if a second trial trial will is be

necessary,

any

issues

litigated

in

the

first

binding upon the parties during the second phase.

Second, while

a jury instruction could limit the harm to Defendant Moritz from prejudicial evidence, no instruction is likely to remove

entirely the potential for prejudice.

Finally, and as noted

above, the pending motion to dismiss referenced by Plaintiff in his opposition has been denied as moot. And even if the motion

were still pending it was based on deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleading which could not be refuted with evidence uncovered

through discovery. Absent any compelling arguments from Plaintiff, bifurcation of the § 1983 claim against St. Mary's County, Maryland and a stay of discovery are warranted.

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III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for

bifurcation and a stay of discovery will be granted. Order will follow.

A separate

/s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

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