Fuese v. Broan-Nutone, LLC

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/31/10. (sat, Chambers)

Fuese v. Broan-Nutone, LLC

Doc. 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : JAMIE FUESE : v. BROAN-NUTONE, LLC MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is Plaintiff's motion to remand. (Paper 5). The court now rules : : : Civil Action No. DKC 10-2174

pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion will be granted. I. Background Plaintiff Jamie Fuese originally filed suit against

Defendant Broan-Nutone, LLC in the District Court of Maryland for Charles County. Plaintiff alleges that a bathroom fan

manufactured by Defendant caused a fire at the home in which Plaintiff lived. (Paper 2 ¶¶ 4-5). Plaintiff's complaint seeks

damages of $10,000 plus court costs, premised on theories of strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence. (Id. at 3-4). On August 9, 2010, Defendant removed this case from state court, reasoning that a related action by the homeowner already pending in this court provided supplemental jurisdiction over

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this case.

(Paper 1, at 2 (citing Sloan v. Broan-NuTone LLC, Defendant

Case No. 8:09-cv-03040-DKC (removed Nov. 16, 2009))).

apparently intends to seek to consolidate the present case with Sloan. (Paper to 6 ¶ 6). After removal, and Plaintiff requested filed an

"opposition" (Paper 5). II. Analysis

Defendant's

removal

remand.

Because removal jurisdiction raises "significant federalism concerns," the removal statutes, and resulting subject matter jurisdiction, must be strictly construed. Dixon v. Coburg

Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Mulcahey v. Columbia Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th 1994)). "[T]he party seeking removal bears the Cir. of

burden

proving that the requirements for federal jurisdiction have been met." In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 332 F.Supp.2d

890, 892 (D.Md. 2004) (citing St. Paul Reins. Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, is 1253-54 doubtful, (5th the Cir. case 1998)). must be Where federal Id.

jurisdiction

remanded.

(citing Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). A defendant may remove a state action that could have been filed in federal Inc. v. court pursuant 482 to U.S. 28 U.S.C. 392 § 1441. (1987);

Caterpillar

Williams,

386,

Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), however, 2

only a "civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to the

district court." (emphasis added). This court cannot exercise original jurisdiction over this case. There is no hint of a federal question. And while the

parties are diverse, the amount in controversy does not meet the statutory threshold necessary for diversity jurisdiction. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (requiring an amount in controversy of more than $75,000). Recognizing that the court lacks federal

question or diversity jurisdiction, Defendant recites that this is an action over which to the 28 court U.S.C. would § have supplemental Obviously, by

jurisdiction

pursuant

1367.

definition, then, this is not an action over which this court would have original jurisdiction. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Indeed, the United States Circuit recently rejected a

similar attempt to remove an action from state court, where the action was arguably based on the same catastrophic event (a flood and fire) as a pending federal claim. See generally

Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 603 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2010). That court explained: Where, as here, the plaintiff files an action in state court with no federal question or complete diversity, the original jurisdiction necessary for removal under 3

§ 1441 does not exist. Congress specified that federal courts have removal jurisdiction under § 1441 only if the district court otherwise has "original jurisdiction" over the "civil action." . . . [Section] 1367, by its own terms, cannot fill the void. Section 1367 grants "supplemental jurisdiction" over state claims, not original jurisdiction. Id. at 294 (footnotes omitted); accord Motion Control Corp. v. SICK, Inc., does 354 not F.3d 702, 705-06 removal (8th at Cir. 2003) ("Section this

1367(a)

mention

all.

...

While

statute does allow factually related state law claims to be joined with the claim over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, it plainly does not provide a separate basis for removal of independent state law actions."); Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The supplemental-jurisdiction subject-matter may not base statute is a not a source of

original therefore

jurisdiction,

and

removal

petition on the

subject-matter

jurisdiction

supplemental-jurisdiction statute, even if the action which a defendant seeks to remove is related to another action over which the federal and district even if court already has be subject-matter efficient.")

jurisdiction,

removal

would

(citations omitted). Here, Defendant stretches to concoct a rationale for

removal jurisdiction past the breaking point. 4

Defendant cites,

for example, Sayre v. Potts, 32 F.Supp.2d 881 (S.D.W.Va. 1999), as a case that it asserts is "directly on point." 4). In Sayre, a husband and wife asserted (Paper 9, at against The

claims

defendants that related to a single automobile accident.

wife asserted claims against the defendants that exceeded the jurisdictional limit, while the husband's claims did not clear the limit. Id. at 888-89. The court correctly exercised

supplemental jurisdiction over the husband's claim. 90.

Id. at 889-

This case is inapposite to the present one, however, as the two claims in in state

Defendant overlooks one critical distinction: Sayre court. action were filed together, in a single

complaint,

Id. at 883. it was

Because the matter was filed as a single as a single or action. Likewise, with if the

removable had

Plaintiff's

claim

been

brought

consolidated

Sloan action in state court prior to removal to this court, it might have been removable along with the larger Sloan claim. But, it was not consolidated in state court and cannot be

independently removed so that it can be consolidated here.

See,

e.g., In re Estate of Tabas, 879 F.Supp. 464, 467 (E.D.Pa. 1995) ("[T]he supplemental jurisdiction statute does not allow a party to remove an otherwise unremovable action to federal court for consolidation with a related federal action."). the case was improperly removed by Defendant. 5 Accordingly,

III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand

will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

/s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

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