Quittman v. Village of Chevy Chase

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 2/28/2013. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 3/1/13)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KENNETH A. QUITTMAN,
Plaintiff
v.
CHEVY CHASE VILLAGE,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil Action No. RWT 10-3407

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On December 6, 2010, Defendant Chevy Chase Village (“the Village”) filed a motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Kenneth Quittman’s (“Quittman”) complaint, see ECF No. 4, as well as a
motion for a more definite statement as to Quittman’s state and federal constitutional claims. See
ECF No. 6. Quittman, in turn, filed a motion to remand to state court, see ECF No. 12, a motion
for default judgment, see ECF No. 16, and a motion for sanctions, see ECF No. 17.
On July 25, 2012, this Court granted the Village’s motion to dismiss, describing
Quittman’s complaint as a “hopeless hodgepodge of vague, inconsistent and overlapping
allegations that utterly fails to comply” with minimum pleading standards. See ECF No. 19 at 4;
ECF No. 20. The Court further denied Quittman’s motions for remand, default judgment, and
sanctions. See ECF No. 20. The Court ordered Quittman to show cause within 30 days why he
should not be sanctioned for filing a meritless complaint and motions, and ordered the Village to
submit a statement breaking down its fees and expenses to assist the Court in determining the
appropriate sanction, should one be appropriate. Id. The Court additionally granted the motion
for a more definite statement, allowing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to correct his
“currently unintelligible” federal and state constitutional claims, while cautioning Plaintiff to

consider whether his best course of action would be to “exit from the stage without further harm
inflicted” on himself. See ECF No. 19 at 8, 11; ECF No. 20.
On August 8, 2011, the Village filed an affidavit briefly describing its attorney’s fees and
costs. See ECF No. 21, Ex. 1. On August 19 and 22, 2011, Quittman filed a litany of excuses
and rehashed complaints regarding the conduct of the Village and this Court in response to the
Court’s show cause order. See ECF Nos. 22 and 23. He did not, however, file an amended
complaint, choosing instead to “exit from the stage” as advised by the Court. See ECF No. 22
at 6.
DISCUSSION
As Quittman has chosen not to amend his federal and state constitutional claims, his
complaint will now be dismissed with prejudice.
As to the issue of sanctions, under Maryland Rule 1-341, if a court finds in a civil action
that the “conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or
without substantial justification, the court may require the offending party or the attorney
advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the cost of the proceeding and
the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the adverse party in
opposing it.” Analogous provisions are contained in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
As this Court previously noted, the “vast bulk” of Quittman’s filings were “wholly
without merit.” ECF No. 19. Quittman has failed to offer any valid reason for why he should
not be sanctioned accordingly, as his responses to the Court’s show cause order consist largely of
witty repartee and weak explanations, and contain no legitimate justifications for his slew of
meritless motions or his poorly researched and crafted complaint. The Court shall therefore

2

impose a sanction against Quittman to help compensate the Village for the expenses it incurred
in defending against the present action.
To aid in the determination of an appropriate sanction, the Court requested that the
Village submit a statement of its fees and expenses. Id. According to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling
in Robinson v. Equifax Information Servs., LLC, if an award of attorney fees is to be made it
should be based on the “lodestar” amount, or the hours reasonably expanded multiplied by the
reasonable hourly rate. 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009). The fee applicant bears the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of a requested hourly rate. Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277
(4th Cir. 1990). “In addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce
satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the
type of work for which he seeks an award.” Id. Examples of information that is sufficient to
verify prevailing market rates include affidavits of local lawyers familiar with the type of work
involved, the relevant community, and the skills of the fee applicants; evidence of what attorneys
earn for providing similar services in similar situations; and evidence of what the prevailing
party’s attorney actually charged the client in the case at hand. See Robinson, 560 F.3d at 245;
Depaoli v. Vacation Sales Assocs., L.L.C., 489 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 2007). In addition to
establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rate requested, a fee applicant also must establish
the reasonableness of the hours for which compensation is sought. See Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). When the documentation of hours is vague or incomplete, the court
may reduce the award accordingly. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780,
788-89 (D. Md. 2000).
The Village’s statement of fees and expenses does not fully comply with the standards
established by the Fourth Circuit in Equifax. See ECF No. 21.

3

In support of its motion for

sanctions, the Village filed only the two-page affidavit of its counsel, Kevin Karpinski. See id.,
Ex. 1 In his affidavit, Karpinski lists seven categories of work that he performed on behalf of the
Village in this action, such as “Research and draft Motion to Dismiss” and “Draft Notice of
Removal.”

For each category, he provides a lump sum fee amount ranging from $147.60 to

$4,644.48. The total fees and costs allegedly incurred is $9,438.63. Karpinski fails, however, to
describe in his affidavit how he reached these numbers. He does not identify and document the
hourly rate he used and the numbers of hours he worked, nor does he attempt to justify the
reasonableness of his calculations.
Rule 11(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a “sanction imposed
under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. This sanction may include non-monetary directives; an
order to pay penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence,
an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other
expenses directly resulting from the violation.” Rule 11(c)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a “monetary sanction may not be imposed by the court on its own,
unless it issued a show cause order against the party proposed to be sanctioned,” which was done
in this case.
The Court has already detailed in its Memorandum Opinion filed July 25, 2011
[ECF No. 19] the conduct justifying sanctions in this case, and it will not here be repeated. The
Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has learned a lesson from his experience in this case and does
not believe a sanction in the full amount of the fees and expenses of the Defendant would be
appropriate. Nevertheless, a sanction in the form of a payment to the Defendant for some of its

4

fees and expenses is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will enter a sanction in the amount of
$1,000.00 payable to the Defendant by the Plaintiff on or before April 1, 2013.
CONCLUSION
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court shall, by separate Order:
1) Dismiss Plaintiff Quittman’s complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice; and
2) Impose sanctions of $1,000.00 against Plaintiff Quittman.

February 28, 2013

/s/
Roger W. Titus
United States District Judge

5