Sagar v. Oracle Corporation

Filing 154

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 11/26/2012. (bas, Deputy Clerk)(c/m on 11/29/12 bca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
VIDYA SAGAR
Plaintiff,
v.
ORACLE CORPORATION
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil No.: PJM 10-3510

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Vidya Sagar has sued his former employer Defendant Oracle Corporation
(Oracle), alleging that his termination from employment violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq (ADEA). Oracle has filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment which Sagar opposes, and has filed his own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Oracle’s Motion and DENIES Sagar’s CrossMotion.
I.
In early 2005 Oracle acquired a corporation known as Peoplesoft.

Sagar was an

employee of Peoplesoft at the time of the acquisition. Following the acquisition, Oracle offered
Sagar employment as a billable Consultant. At the time Sagar was 58 years old.
Sagar worked under several different managers at Oracle until December 2006, when he
was assigned to a newly formed group at Oracle known as North American Strategic Accounts
(NASA). Sagar continued on as a billable Consultant1 in the new group until December 2007
when Oracle dissolved the group. Around this same time Sagar was promoted to the status of
1

A “billable employee” is one who is expected to attribute a certain percentage of his or her
working time to activities which can be directly billed to a client.
1

billable Project Manager. After dissolution of the NASA group, Bradley Sachar, Senior Director
of the Advanced Technology Services Group (ATS) at Oracle, offered Sagar a position within
his group. Sagar accepted and transferred into the ATS group in December 2007. At the time
Sagar was 60 years old.
During Sagar’s employment with Oracle, as the national economy declined, Oracle found
its business drastically reduced.

Between June 2008 and November 2009, the company

conducted six rounds of layoffs, affecting over 730 employees. When forced to choose people to
terminate in the ATS group, Bradley Sachar decided to use each employee’s “utilization rate” 2
for the two preceding quarters as the determining factor. Since Sagar had the lowest utilization
rates of all ATS group employees for the quarters measured (i.e., fourth quarter of FY2008 and
first quarter of FY2009), on September 5, 2008, he was laid off.
The parties agree that prior to joining the ATS group Sagar was a billable employee
expected to meet companywide utilization rate expectations.3 During this time Sagar received
generally favorable performance evaluations and had utilization rates within ranges acceptable to
his supervisors. But Sagar also asserts that upon moving into the ATS group he was promoted
from a billable Project Manager to Portfolio Manager, a non-billable position that had no
minimum utilization rate expectations. Oracle denies this and claims that Sagar was only hired
into the ATS group as a billable Project Manager and remained such until his termination.
In support of his assertion that he was a non-billable Portfolio Manager as of the time of
his termination, Sagar offers anecdotal evidence which demonstrates that he performed certain
tasks which would normally be done by a Portfolio Manager. While Oracle does not dispute
2

The percentage of time an employee spends on “billable” activities is referred to as the
“utilization rate.”
3
Oracle had and has a companywide expectation that all “billable” employees will maintain 75
percent utilization rates.
2

this, it claims that Sagar was assigned this work in order to give him gainful activity during a
period when he was unable to find billable work to meet his utilization rate expectations. Oracle
asserts that Sagar at all times remained a billable employee; was continuously told to seek out
billable work; and was continuously aware that the position of Portfolio Manager remained open
and that the company was actively seeking someone other than Sagar to fill the position
permanently. In other words, Oracle says Sagar knew that he was not a Portfolio Manager and
knew that he was still expected to maintain minimum utilization rates. Oracle offers substantial
evidence in support of this assertion including personnel records, performance evaluations and
emails. Many of these bear Sagar’s acknowledgment that he remained a billable employee,
discussing his utilization rate expectations.
Apart from this, Sagar claims that he was chosen for termination because of his age, and
that Sachar sought to have a “young” team. He points out that Michelle Probst, age 59, was
terminated around the same time as he was. He also claims that he “heard rumors” around the
office that Oracle always fires people about 60 years of age. In particular, he cites an incident
where Sachar “looked him up and down,” allegedly to assess his overall health. Sagar claims
that all of these events amount to proof that he was the victim of age discrimination.
Oracle denies that age had anything at all to do with Sagar’s termination. It points out
that Susan Curry, who is two years older than Sagar, was in fact retained by the ATS group and
continues to work at Oracle to this day. Oracle also states that there were several legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Sagar. In general the company was suffering a severe
decline in business and was forced to implement a reduction in force. As a result, there was not
a large pipeline of work for employees like Sagar, who had the lowest utilization rates in the
entire ATS group.

Furthermore, during both of his last two assignments, Sagar received

3

complaints from both customers and colleagues to the effect that he was difficult to work with.
Oracle submits that these were the factors that led to the decision to terminate Sagar, not his age.
II.
A.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” “The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must
‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore
Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable
to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor without weighing the
evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc.,
290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court, however, must also abide by the “affirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
proceeding to trial.”

Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate where a party fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the elements essential to the party’s claim and on which
the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. There must be
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986), and a “mere scintilla of proof . . . will not suffice to
prevent summary judgment.” Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003). When both

4

parties have moved for summary judgment, as is the case here, it does not “establish that there is
no issue of fact and require judgment be granted to one side or another,” but rather each motion
should be evaluated independently. World-Wide Rights Ltd. v. Combe Inc., 955 F.2d 242, 244
(4th Cir. 1992) (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354
F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1988)); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 592
(6th Cir. 2001); and Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2nd Cir. 2001).
This means that when the Court is reviewing Plaintiff’s motion the facts are construed in the
light most favorable to Defendant and vice versa.
A plaintiff proceeding pro se is held to a “‘less stringent’” standard than is a lawyer, and
the court must construe his claims liberally, no matter how “‘inartfully pleaded.’” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Nonetheless, even a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from the requirement that his complaint
contain more than mere “‘labels and conclusions’” or “‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
[a] cause of action.’” Walden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 F. App’x 223, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
B.
Sagar alleges age discrimination in violation of the ADEA.
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee based on the
employee’s age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1985). The circumstances must suggest that, but for the
employer’s motive to discriminate on this basis, the employee would not have suffered the
adverse action. Fink v. Western Elec. Co., 708 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1983). As plaintiff, Sagar has
the burden of establishing the defendant’s discriminatory intent for all of the claims, a burden
which can be met either by direct evidence of discriminatory animus (Goldberg v. B. Green &

5

Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.1988); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231,
233-34 (4th Cir. 1991)), or through the indirect burden-shifting proof scheme set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (see also Mereish v. Walker, 359
F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir.2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims)).
Because he has offered no direct evidence of discriminatory animus, Sagar’s claims are properly
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Mereish, 359 F.3d at 334.
Under McDonnell Douglas, to justify an inference of discrimination, the plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The central focus of the inquiry is whether
the employer has treated some people less favorably than others because of a protected status,
such as age or race. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (quoting
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)). More specifically, in order to
establish a prima facie case in the context of reductions in force, the plaintiff must prove that:
“(1) he was protected by the ADEA; (2) he was selected for discharge from a larger group of
candidates; (3) he was performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those
of the group retained; and (4) the process of selection produced a residual workforce including
some persons in the group who were substantially younger than him and who were performing at
a level lower than that at which he was performing.” Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., 206 F.3d 420, 430 (4th Cir. 2000).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises,
which the employer may rebut by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment decision. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
The employer’s burden is merely one of production, not persuasion. Id. at 255–56. If the

6

employer meets this burden, the presumption raised by the plaintiff’s prima facie case is rebutted
and the factual inquiry proceeds to a “new level of specificity.” Id. at 255.
At that juncture, the plaintiff must prove that “the legitimate reasons offered by the
agency were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 253; see also
Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir.1989). To support a finding of pretext,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s articulated reasons have no basis in fact or that
its reasons were not the “real” reason for the adverse employment action. See Johnson v. City of
Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir.1996). “The plaintiff must establish that he was the
better qualified candidate for the position” to meet his burden of proving that the company’s
explanation is pretextual and that he was the victim of intentional discrimination. Evans v. Techs.
App. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir.1996).
The ultimate burden of showing that the employer intentionally discriminated against him
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Even if the plaintiff
demonstrates a prima facie case and sufficient pretext, however, the defendant will still be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if “no rational factfinder could conclude that the action
was discriminatory.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000); see
also Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416–17 (4th Cir.1998) (explaining that
the plaintiff must develop some evidence on which a juror could reasonably base a finding that
discrimination motivated the challenged employment action).
III.
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that Sagar was not chosen for termination during a
company-wide reduction in force because of his age.
A.

7

Indeed, Sagar fails to make out even a prima facie case for age discrimination. To repeat,
in order to proceed with his claim, Sagar must show that: (1) he was protected by the ADEA; (2)
he was discharged; (3) at the time he was discharged he was performing up to his employer’s
expectations; and (4) lower performing, substantially younger employees were retained. Stokes
v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 430 (4th Cir. 2000). Sagar fails to satisfy
the third and fourth prongs.
In choosing which employees to terminate during the reduction in force, Oracle evaluated
the utilization rates of every employee for the previous two fiscal quarters (fourth quarter
FY2008 and first quarter FY2009). Not only were Sagar’s utilization rates well below the
company-wide expectation of seventy-five percent; his utilization rates were the lowest of all the
billable employees in his group. While Sagar does not contest these figures, he asserts that this
manner of evaluation was unfair considering his “superb” performance prior to the evaluation
periods in question. The Court is not persuaded. It is well established that “in employment
discrimination cases involving a reduction in force, it is not the court’s duty to second guess the
business judgment of defendant’s employees and managers” or the manner in which the
reduction in force is carried out. Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 739 F.Supp. 1006,
1017-18 (D. Md. 1990), aff’d, 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
Sagar also argues that he was a non-billable Portfolio Manager instead of a billable
Project Manager, and as such, his utilization rates are irrelevant because non-billable Portfolio
Managers are not expected to maintain minimum utilization rates. In effect, he argues that he
was performing up to employer expectations and was in fact replaced by a substantially younger
Portfolio Manager, which, he submits, establishes a prima facie case. However, Sagar offers
nothing more than his own assertions and narratives to support the proposition that he was a non-

8

billable Portfolio Manager without utilization expectations. Oracle, on the other hand, has
submitted a plethora of direct and circumstantial evidence, including Sagar’s own concessions, to
show that Sagar was never promoted to Portfolio Manager, but at all times remained a Project
Manager with utilization expectations. In order to survive summary judgment Sagar must
provide more than “naked opinions” and “conclusory assertions.” Goldberg v. B. Green and
Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988). On this record, no trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that Sagar was a Portfolio Manager.
B.
Although enough has been said to deny Sagar’s age discrimination claim without more,
assuming arguendo that Sagar has established a prima facie case, Oracle cites several legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons for his discharge, which Sagar has not adequately demonstrated to be
pretextual or untrue. Oracle has shown that Sagar was not highly utilized, since the pipeline of
work for Project Managers was modest; that during his most recent projects both customers and
coworkers complained that Sagar was difficult to work with; and that the company was
experiencing a severe decline in business which necessitated a reduction in force. Further
undermining to Sagar’s attempt to show pretext is the simple fact that, although he was 60 years
of age at the time of his termination, Susan Curry, who was 62, was retained and continues to
work for Oracle. See Richter v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that retaining employees comparable in age to the plaintiff weakened an inference of
discrimination in employment termination case). It is also noteworthy that Sagar was fifty-eight
years old when Oracle hired him a mere two years earlier. “Employers who knowingly hire
workers within the protected group seldom will be credible targets for charges of pretextual
firing.” Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1994). Firing a protected

9

employee a “relatively short time” after hiring him creates a strong inference against age
discrimination. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) (considering two years a
“relatively short time”); see also Roberts v. Separators, Inc., 172 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1999)
(considering one year a “relatively short time”). Moreover, Sachar, the person who made the
decision to terminate Sagar, was the very individual who less than a year prior had brought Sagar
into the ATS group. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991) (“when the hirer and
firer are the same individual, there is a powerful inference relating to the ‘ultimate question’ that
discrimination did not motivate the employer.”). It strains reason to conclude that Sachar would
seek to bring a nearly sixty year old man onto his team only to discriminate against him in
pursuit of a “younger” workforce a few months later. Sagar’s claim of age discrimination cannot
stand.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Oracle Corporation’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Paper No. 79], and DENIES Vidya Sagar’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Paper No. 146]. Final Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
A separate Order will ISSUE.

/s/
___
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
November 26, 2012

10