Wyatt v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge William Connelly on 4/11/2012. (nk, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
MITZIE WYATT
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN
)
AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
Civil Action No. WGC-11-444
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Mitzie Wyatt (“Ms. Wyatt”) brought this action against the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) and Sylvester Proctor (“Mr. Proctor”)
alleging negligence against each Defendant. Ms. Wyatt was a passenger on the WMATA bus.
Mr. Proctor operated a motorcycle which collided with the WMATA bus. Jeannie Dawson
(“Ms. Dawson”) was the bus driver operating the WMATA bus which collided with Mr.
Proctor’s motorcycle.
The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all further
proceedings in the case and the entry of a final judgment. See ECF No. 27. Pending before the
Court and ready for resolution is Mr. Proctor’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24).
Ms. Wyatt filed a Response not contesting the motion for summary judgment filed by Mr.
Proctor (ECF No. 26). WMATA filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 28) and Mr. Proctor
filed a Reply (ECF No. 30). No hearing is deemed necessary and the Court now rules pursuant
to Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
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BACKGROUND
In her Complaint Ms. Wyatt asserts the WMATA bus driver “made a left turn onto
Parliament Place in front of Defendant Proctor’s path causing a collision.” Compl. ¶ 2. “Also at
the same time and place, Defendant Sylvester Proctor, was traveling west on Martin Luther King
Highway and struck the front right side of Defendant WMATA, causing a collision.” Id. at 3.
Ms. Wyatt describes the negligent conduct of WMATA as follows:
The negligence of the Defendant, Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, was the proximate cause of the accident in that
said Defendant’s agent negligently failed to yield the right-of-way,
negligently failed to keep proper control of its vehicle, negligently
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles, negligently
operated its vehicle at a speed too great for the conditions existing,
and was otherwise careless and negligent, thereby causing a
collision with the [motorcycle] operated by [Defendant, Sylvester
Proctor].
Id. ¶ 6
Ms. Wyatt describes the negligent conduct of Mr. Proctor as follows:
The negligence of the Defendant, Sylvester Proctor, was the
proximate cause of the accident in that said Defendant negligently
operated his motorcycle at a speed too great for the conditions
existing, negligently failed to keep proper control of his
motorcycle, negligently failed to keep a proper lookout for other
vehicles, and was otherwise careless and negligent, thereby
causing a collision with the motor vehicle owned and operated by
Defendant WMATA.
Id. ¶ 8.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has original jurisdiction over this civil action based on Federal Question, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, specifically, pursuant to Section 81 of the WMATA Compact, Section 80 Stat.
1350, Pub. L. 89-774 (November 6, 1996), as outlined in Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 10-204(81),
which states:
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The United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the courts of Maryland, Virginia and the District
of Columbia, of all actions brought by or against the Authority and
to enforce subpoenas issued under this title. Any such action
initiated in a State or District of Columbia court shall be removable
to the appropriate United States District Court in the manner
provided by Act of June 25, 1948, as amended (28 U.S.C. 1446).
Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The Court
notes WMATA removed this case from state court to federal court. See ECF No. 1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues “that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party,” then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam
Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor
Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394
(4th Cir. 1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pulliam Inv. Co., 810 F.2d at 1286 (citing
Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir.
1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each
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element of his or her claim. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . .
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
On those issues where the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is that
party’s responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other
similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. However, “’[a] mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough to create a fact issue.’” Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theaters, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff’d, 388
F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968)). There must be “sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Proctor asserts he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence that
he was negligent in operating his motorcycle or that he violated any duty owed to Ms. Wyatt.
For instance, in answering interrogatories and at her deposition, Ms. Wyatt did not know the
speed of Mr. Proctor’s motorcycle before the collision between his motorcycle and the WMATA
bus. Ms. Wyatt was unable to quantify the rate of speed.
In support of his motion Mr. Proctor attaches the deposition transcript of Ms. Dawson
(the WMATA bus driver), the deposition transcript of Roxanne Jones, a non-party witness, and a
statement by Andrew Foy, another non-party witness. Mr. Proctor notes the WMATA bus driver
did not indicate any acts or omissions by Mr. Proctor regarding the accident. Ms. Jones, the nonparty witness operating a motor vehicle approximately three car lengths behind Mr. Proctor’s
motorcycle, testified about the speed (45 miles per hour) at which she and Mr. Proctor traveled,
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Mr. Proctor’s use of the correct hand signals before the accident and the fact that Mr. Proctor had
no time to take any evasive action because the WMATA bus pulled out in front of Mr. Proctor’s
motorcycle. Third, Mr. Foy, the driver of the large box truck, stated Mr. Proctor had a fraction
of a second to respond when the WMATA bus made a left turn in front of him. Mr. Foy opined
that he could not imagine what Mr. Proctor could have done to avoid the collision.
Finally Mr. Proctor notes that he previously sued WMATA as a result of the same
accident of April 9, 2008.
According to Mr. Proctor WMATA settled the lawsuit for a
significant amount of money.1
In its Opposition WMATA notes, on the day of the accident, Ms. Wyatt gave a signed,
verified statement to an investigating Prince George’s County police officer.
Ms. Wyatt
described the collision as follows:
Bus [was] turn[ing] from M[artin] L[uther] K[ing] [Highway] onto
Washington Business Park. A truck (white w/ tan writing) was
stopped. Bus turned and as it turned I saw that a bike was coming
at a high speed. At the same time (before you could say or do
anything[)] it hit the bus full force.
ECF No. 28-3.
Another passenger on the WMATA bus, Christina Dodoo, also provided a signed,
verified statement to an investigating Prince George’s County police officer on the day of the
accident. During the January 23, 2009 deposition, Ms. Dodoo read her handwritten statement.
Q:
Now, can you, for the record, so that when I go back to my
office, can you read your handwriting, because it’s not different
from this typewritten one on number two, can you read your
handwriting that is beginning with statement, under statement can
you read for the court reporter out loud what you wrote?
A:
Okay. I was on the bus from 450 coming to Lottsford Vista
Road when we reached 450 Annapolis we’re turning to Business
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Mr. Proctor does not state that WMATA admitted liability in settling the prior litigation. From the undersigned’s
experience, when a case settles, the party paying the “settlement” typically does not admit or deny liability.
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Park a truck was on the left turning and the driver stopped. Trying
to make a left turn. All of a sudden we saw a motorcycle speeding,
hit the bus and the helmet and – – what is that – – some of his stuff
started flying all over the street.
ECF No. 28-4 (Dodoo Dep. 52:22 – 53:12).
Counsel further inquired about the “speeding” motorcycle.
Q:
[D]id you see a motorcycle speeding, those are your words,
before impact, yes or no?
A:
Yes. He was speeding.
Q:
How fast was he going?
A:
I can’t tell.
Id. (Dodoo Dep. 58:16 - 21).
WMATA notes that questions of primary negligence are generally reserved for a jury
under Maryland law. Conflicts and ambiguities should not be resolved on motions for summary
judgment. “Whether Co-Defendant Sylvester Proctor was ‘speeding’ under the circumstances
and whether such ‘speeding’ constituted negligence and a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries
and damages are issues for the jury.” ECF No. 28 at 5.
In his Reply Mr. Proctor argues WMATA takes two witness statements out of context to
suggest Mr. Proctor’s “speeding” may have contributed and/or caused the accident. Mr. Proctor
notes that both Ms. Wyatt and Ms. Dodoo subsequently elaborated on their signed, verified
written statements given on the day of the accident. At the January 21, 2009 deposition of Ms.
Wyatt, counsel inquired further about Ms. Wyatt’s statement that the motorcycle was
“speeding.”
Q:
Now, you conclude the sentence by saying “at a high
speed.” Those are your words. Is that correct?
A:
Right.
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Q:
What did you mean?
A:
It happened so fast.
Q:
I understand it happened so fast. But when you say at a
high speed, you’re describing the motorcycle, correct?
A:
Right.
Q:
My question is, what did you mean by a high speed?
A:
There wasn’t enough braking time.
*
*
*
THE WITNESS:
I would say it seemed like [the motorcycle]
was going fast and that it didn’t have enough stopping room,
braking room.
ECF No. 30 at 9, 12 (Wyatt Dep. 46:4 – 16, 49:1 – 3).
In an undated affidavit Ms. Dodoo clarified her verified, signed written statement of
April 9, 2008 as follows:
The bus turned left in front of a motorcycle from the
opposite direction.
I saw the motorcycle coming, but not for a period long
enough to judge its speed. The collision happened about one or
two seconds after the bus turned left. I simply cannot give an
opinion as to its speed. It seems like it was fast, but the speed limit
on Martin Luther King Highway of 45 mph IS fast.
I cannot say that the motorcycle was going faster or slower
than 45 mph immediately before impact.
Id. at 14 (Dodoo Aff.).
In support of his Reply Mr. Proctor attaches a portion of Ms. Dodoo’s deposition
transcript omitted by WMATA. The quoted passage below picks up where WMATA’s version
of the deposition transcript, cited supra, ends.
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Q:
Well, how do you know he was speeding?
A:
That’s, he was just coming so that’s the way I figure both
of them are speeding, the driver, the bus driver was speeding, the
motorcycle was coming. So when I was writing that I probably
was confused a little. But it’s supposed to be the driver, bus driver
was the one speeding. And the motorcycle was coming.
Q:
I understand that.
A:
So I can’t tell – –
*
*
*
A:
We were on the bus, but the motorcycle was coming, and
the driver, the bus driver was the one speeding. She was speeding,
she should have watched what she was doing because the van was
on the left side and she’s supposed to watch before turning. But
she wasn’t watching. And then the motorcycle was coming and
then she hit the motorcycle.
Id. at 18 (Dodoo Dep. 58:22 – 59:9, 16 – 22).
The post-April 9, 2008 testimonies and affidavit by Ms. Wyatt and Ms. Dodoo tend to
support the observations by non-party witnesses Mr. Foy and Ms. Jones. In an undated statement
Mr. Foy describes what he recalled and observed, stating in pertinent part:
I was on Martin Luther King Highway in the left turning
lane, waiting to turn left.
I was driving a large box truck.
Coming from the opposite direction on the Martin Luther
King Highway was a large bus. This bus was also in the left
turning lane. Thus, my vehicle partially obstructed the bus driver’s
view of the traffic coming from behind me.
Suddenly, the bus began a left turn to go to Parliament
Place. When it did so, it turned directly into the path of oncoming
traffic. A fraction of one second after beginning to turn left the bus
collided with a motorcyclist. This motorcycle rider had less than
one second to react to the bus driver’s sudden turn in front of him.
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After striking the motorcyclist, the bus continued across
Martin Luther King Highway into Parliament Place, where it
stopped. The bus was driven by a female.
The motorcyclist came from behind me. I saw him only for
a fraction of a second before impact, and thus I am not able to
estimate his speed in any manner. Neither can I say if he took any
evasive action, though with the fraction of one second he had to
react I cannot imagine anything he could have done. The
motorcyclist had absolutely no chance to avoid this accident.
ECF No. 24-1 at 20.
Ms. Jones testified about a sequence of events similar to the sequence outlined in Mr.
Foy’s statement.
Q:
And if you back up, say, a football field from where this
accident happened, just tell us what happened.
A:
Okay. Both of us [Ms. Jones and Mr. Proctor] were driving
down the road. And I remember we were both going 45. And I
remember seeing the bus to my left. She was in a turning lane.
Where she was you can just go straight across up the road into kind
of like a business area.
And I remember watching her kind of inch forward and
inch forward a little bit, like, you know, how when a bus is turning
or when you’re trying to move forward, you know, gauge – – and
she just pulled right out in front of him. There was no time to stop.
I remember it clear as day, because I thought, this man – –
because I was watching it. And I thought, he does not – – he’s not
even putting his brakes on. He doesn’t even know what is about to
happen. And I knew from then he was going to hit. She was not
going to make it across. And sure enough he T-boned that bus
right dead smack in the middle.
He hit full force. There was no time to brake, no time for
him to do anything. And when he hit, it looked like his body flew
headfirst, kind of like a donkey bucks, his back legs. It looked like
he went headfirst into the bus.
Id. at 17-18 (Jones Dep. 10:7 – 11:10).
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The WMATA bus driver, Ms. Dawson, conceded the collision occurred within seconds
of her turning the bus.
Q:
Would it be fair to say that your view was blocked by the
box truck?
*
*
*
THE WITNESS: Yes.
*
*
*
Q:
And when you began your left turn, how long was it before
there was impact with the motorcycle?
A:
Within seconds.
Q:
Did you see this motorcycle coming before the impact?
A:
No.
Q:
So, if you didn’t see it coming, you have no way to judge
its speed. Is that correct?
A:
I saw it moments before it hit. I saw him try to slow down,
and he fishtailed a little bit. And then he just braced for the
impact. So I did see that.
Id. at 11-12 (Dawson Dep. 10:8 – 9, 11, 13 – 11:3).
WMATA opposes Mr. Proctor’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr.
Proctor’s rate of speed was a proximate cause of Ms. Wyatt’s injury. Maryland law recognizes
that several negligent acts may work together to cause an injury. See Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md.
167, 205, 929 A.2d 19, 42 (2007) (“It is well settled that several negligent acts may work
together to cause an injury, and that each person whose negligent act is a cause of an injury may
be legally responsible.”). On the day of the accident two witnesses on the WMATA bus,
including Ms. Wyatt, described Mr. Proctor’s operation of the motorcycle as “speeding” or
riding at a “high speed.” The subsequent clarifications of these statements raise credibility
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issues, matters proper for a jury to resolve, and not this Court at the summary judgment stage.
Because the issue of the motorcycle’s speed is disputed, a jury must decide whether the rate at
which Mr. Proctor’s motorcycle was traveling was a proximate cause of Ms. Wyatt’s injuries
sustained on April 9, 2008.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds there are genuine issues as to a material fact
and thus Mr. Proctor is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An
Order will be entered separately denying Mr. Proctor’s motion for summary judgment.
April 11, 2012 ________
Date
______________/s/_____________________
WILLIAM CONNELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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