Snead v. Prince Georges' County Board of Education et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 9/2/11 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/2/11. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
NANCY V. SNEAD
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 11-0503
:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
this
employment dispute is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Prince George’s County Educators’ Association (ECF No. 7) and a
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Board of Education of Prince George’s County
(ECF No. 16).1
The issues are fully briefed and the court now
rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed
necessary.
For the reasons that follow, both motions will be
granted.
I.
Background
Plaintiff Nancy Snead was employed by Defendant Board of
Education of Prince George’s County (“the Board”) in various
capacities from November 1999 until March 2005, when “the Board
refused to allow [her] to return to work from [a] work related
1
The complaint incorrectly identifies Defendants as “Prince
Georges’ County Educator’s Association” and “Prince Georges’
County Board of Education.”
The docket will be corrected to
reflect their proper names.
injury
with
medical
restrictions”
(ECF No. 1, at 2).2
retire.
Plaintiff
was
Educators’
a
member
Association
interests
of
Board
agreement
with
the
she
was
“forced”
to
At all times during her employment,
of
Defendant
(“the
Prince
Union”),
employees
Board.
and
under
During
which
a
George’s
represented
collective
her
County
the
bargaining
employment,
Plaintiff
“complained to the Union about her pay and leave issues” on
numerous occasions, but the Union allegedly failed to “pursue[]”
any “grievances” on her behalf.
On
November
counsel,
8,
alleging
2006,
that
the
(Id. at 6).
Plaintiff
Union
filed
breached
a
its
complaint,
duty
of
by
fair
representation in violation of the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, et seq., and that the Board
failed to pay all of her wages in violation of the Maryland Wage
Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl.
§
3-507.1.
See
Snead
v.
Prince
George’s
County
Education, et al., Civ. No. AMD-06-2941 (D.Md.).
Board
of
On March 12,
2007, Judge Davis issued an order directing Plaintiff to show
cause
why
her
complaint
should
not
be
dismissed
without
prejudice due to her failure to serve Defendants within 120
2
Because the pages of Plaintiff’s initial complaint and a
later-filed supplement are not numbered, references to these
documents are according to the court’s electronic case filing
system.
2
days.
In
response,
Plaintiff
filed
a
notice
of
voluntary
dismissal and the complaint was dismissed.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced the instant action
against the same defendants on February 22, 2011.
(ECF No. 1).
In addition to raising claims under the LMRA and MWPCL identical
to those brought in the initial case, the complaint included a
handwritten portion citing “Rehabitation [sic] Act of 1973 as
amended 29 USC 701 for discrimination on basis of a disability
by an employer” and “American Disability Act of 1990, ADA Both
section 504.”
(Id. at 3).
Noting that the complaint was “not a
model of clarity,” the court directed Plaintiff to supplement by
clearly setting forth the basis of federal jurisdiction and, to
the extent she intended to raise claims under the Rehabilitation
Act
or
ADA,
describing
“when
and
how
she
exhausted her employment discrimination claims.”
administratively
(ECF No. 3, at
1, 2).
On April 13, 2011, Plaintiff supplemented her complaint,
addressing the court’s concerns and attaching numerous exhibits
in
support.
(ECF
No.
4).
In
her
supplemental
pleading,
Plaintiff “invokes federal review under . . . Labor Management
Relations[,] 29 USC 141 & 159a[,] Duty of Fair Representation[;]
Rehabilitation
Act
of
1973
as
Amended
29
USC
701[,]
for
Discrimination on the basis of a Disability by an Employer;
[and] American Disability Act of 1990, ADA both sections 504.”
3
(Id. at 1).
She further asks the court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her MWCPL claim.
As to exhaustion, Plaintiff
asserts that she “went to [the] Maryland Commission on Human
Relations with the complaint of Discrimination,” but the “agency
determined
it
does
not
have
jurisdiction.”
(Id.
at
3).3
Thereafter, according to Plaintiff, she sought assistance from
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), which “suggest[ed]
[that she] contact [the] Md. State Labor Relations Bd.”
(Id.).4
According to Plaintiff, “every entity or source [she] approached
passed the buck to another similar agency.”
(Id.).
The Union responded by moving to dismiss, arguing that the
LMRA does not apply to state employees and, even if it did, that
3
Among the exhibits attached to the supplemental complaint
is a letter, dated March 20, 2004, from the Maryland Commission
on Human Relations (“MCOHR”), advising Plaintiff that “[a]fter
careful review and consideration of the information that you
have provided, it has been determined that this complaint cannot
be authorized for investigation, as you did not articulate a
basis for the alleged discriminatory act as stated in Article
49B of the Annotated Code of Maryland.”
(ECF No. 4-6).
In
response to a follow-up letter from Plaintiff, the MCOHR further
advised, by letter dated April 7, 2004, “We do not have
jurisdiction to intercede in assault matters or in a situation
where one believes they were harmed as a result of filing an
assault charge, as in your case.” (ECF No. 4-7).
4
By letter dated September 8, 2005, Plaintiff informed the
NLRB that she had “concerns with the union’s . . . failure to
resolve grievances” and “request[ed] [its] intervention.”
(ECF
No. 4-5).
The NLRB responded several weeks later, advising
Plaintiff
that
“labor
relations
matters
involving
state
employees are covered by state legislation” and suggesting that
she contact “the Maryland State Labor Relations Board.”
(ECF
No. 4-4).
4
Plaintiff’s
complaint
would
be
time
barred.
(ECF
No.
7).
Shortly thereafter, the Board filed a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed
to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to her ADA and
Rehabilitation
Act
claims.
(ECF
No.
16).
Plaintiff
filed
papers opposing both motions (ECF No. 19) and both defendants
replied (ECF Nos. 23, 25).
II.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act
A.
Standard of Review
As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
While the Board seeks dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) only, it argues, in part, that Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, which may implicate
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
Regardless of the basis for the Board’s motion, the court
has an independent duty to satisfy itself of its own subject
matter jurisdiction and may raise the issue sua sponte, even
where the defendant does not directly challenge it.
Andrus v.
Charlestone
608
(1978).
Stone
Prods.
Co.,
Inc.,
436
U.S.
604,
n.
6
Indeed, “questions of subject matter jurisdiction must
be decided ‘first, because they concern the court’s very power
to hear the case.’”
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d
435, 442 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore et al.,
5
Moore’s
Federal
Practice
§
12.30[1]
(3d
ed.
1998)).
The
plaintiff always bears the burden of demonstrating that subject
matter jurisdiction properly exists in federal court.
See Evans
v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int’l Corp., 166 F.3d
642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
Dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is appropriate “only if the material jurisdictional
facts are not in dispute” and the defendant is “entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.”
Id. (internal marks omitted).
In
its analysis, the court should “regard the pleadings as mere
evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the
pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary
judgment.”
B.
Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
Analysis
Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual
with
a
disability
shall,
by
reason
of
such
disability,
be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
12132.
42 U.S.C. §
Similarly, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected
to
discrimination
under
any
receiving Federal financial assistance.”
6
program
or
activity
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Prior to filing a law suit alleging violations of the ADA
or
the
Rehabilitation
administrative remedies.
Act,
a
plaintiff
must
first
exhaust
See Adams v. Wallenstein, Civil Action
No. DKC 08-1601, 2011 WL 1807787, at *5 (D.Md. May 11, 2011)
(ADA); Kim v. Potter, Civil Action No. DKC 09-2973, 2010 WL
2253656, at *4 (D.Md. June 2, 2010) (Rehabilitation Act).
Under
both statutes, the exhaustion requirements and filing procedures
are identical to those applicable to claims under Title VII.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 29 U.S.C. § 749(a).
Thus, “[o]nly
those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge [filed
with
a
federal
reasonably
or
related
local
to
human
the
relations
original
commission],
complaint,
and
those
those
developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint
may be maintained” in a subsequent lawsuit.
Evans v. Techs.
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th
Cir. 1996).
Civil suits cannot present entirely new theories of liability
not found within the initial complaint, and a complaint will
generally be barred if the charge filed with the EEOC or local
agency
alleges
litigation
basis.
discrimination
advances
a
claim
on
of
one
basis
while
discrimination
on
the
a
civil
separate
See Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 1919 F.Supp.2d
637, 640-41 (D.Md. 2002) (granting summary judgment against an
employee who alleged race discrimination in his EEOC charge, but
brought suit under both Title VII and the ADA).
7
The failure to
exhaust administrative remedies deprives the federal court of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551
F.3d 297, 300-01 & n. 2 (4th Cir. 2009).
The documents attached to Plaintiff’s supplemental pleading
reflect that she filed a complaint with the Maryland Commission
on Human Relations (“MCHR”) on or about March 25, 2004.
No.
4-6).
While
the
complaint
MCHR’s responsive letters are.
itself
is
not
(ECF
attached,
the
In the first letter, dated March
30, 2004, the commission advised Plaintiff that her “complaint
cannot be authorized for investigation” because she “did not
articulate a basis for the alleged discriminatory act.”
The
MCHR
suggested
that
Plaintiff
“contact
the
(Id.).
Commission”
regarding “the re-filing of [the] complaint” if she had “more
information to provide.”
(Id.).
In a letter dated April 7,
2004, apparently written in response to a further inquiry by
Plaintiff, the MCHR explained why it was unable to accept her
claims for investigation: “In order to accept a complaint of
retaliation, the act of violation must be one that is covered by
Article 49B of the Annotated Code of Maryland.”
(ECF No. 4-7).
The letter further recited, “We do not have jurisdiction to
intercede
in
believes
they
assault
were
matters
harmed
charge, as in your case.”
as
or
a
(Id.).
8
in
a
result
situation
of
filing
where
an
one
assault
These letters do not support Plaintiff’s assertion that the
MCHR told her “it does not have jurisdiction.”
3).
(ECF No. 4, at
Rather, it appears that Plaintiff merely failed to state a
cognizable claim before the commission under former Article 49B,
which was, at that time, the analog to Title VII under Maryland
law.
See, e.g., State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Kaydon Ring
& Seal, Inc., 149 Md.App. 666, 695-96 (2003) (applying federal
Title VII standards in Article 49B discriminatory termination
case).
Moreover, it appears that the only claims Plaintiff
attempted to raise were related to alleged retaliation by the
Board.
of
There is no indication that Plaintiff asserted a claim
discrimination
on
the
basis
of
a
disability
in
her
MCHR
complaint and Plaintiff’s argument regarding exhaustion in her
opposition papers addresses the LMRA claim exclusively.
proper
exhaustion,
Plaintiff’s
claims
under
the
Lacking
ADA
and
Rehabilitation Act must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.5
III. Duty of Fair Representation
The Union has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for breach
of the duty of fair representation under the LMRA pursuant to
5
Even if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction,
Plaintiff’s complaint would be time barred.
See Walton v.
Guidant Sales Corp., 417 F.Supp.2d 719, 722 (D.Md. 2006)
(applying 300-day filing period requirement in ADA case); Ross
v. Board of Educ. of Prince George’s County, 195 F.Supp.2d 730,
735 n. 2 (D.Md. 2002) (“A three year statute of limitations
applies to Rehabilitation Act claims in Maryland”).
9
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that the court
lacks jurisdiction because “Plaintiff was a state employee and
thus fell outside the coverage of the [National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”)], which governs only private employers.”
7-1, at 4).6
subject
(ECF No.
While some courts have found that they lacked
matter
jurisdiction
under
these
circumstances,
see,
e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 546
F.3d 1169, 1176 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2008) (“a failure to state a claim
under section 301(a) of the LMRA is a defect in subject-matter
jurisdiction”), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S.Ct. 2847 (2010),
others have determined that that dismissal for failure to state
a
claim
is
appropriate,
see,
e.g.,
Strasburger
v.
Board
of
Educ., Hardin County Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 143 F.3d
351, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court’s dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6)).
A.
Standard of Review
The
purpose
of
a
motion
to
dismiss
pursuant
12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
to
Rule
Presley
v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
At
this
stage,
the
court
must
consider
all
well-pleaded
allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in
the
light
6
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff,
The NLRA was amended by the LMRA in 1947.
10
see
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, the court need
not accept unsupported legal allegations.
Revene v. Charles
County Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
agree
with
legal
conclusions
couched
as
Nor must it
factual
allegations,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950,
(2009),
or
conclusory
factual
allegations
devoid
of
any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604
F.2d
844,
847
(4th
Cir.
1979);
see
also
Francis
v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
B.
“It
Analysis
is
bargaining
well
agents
enforcement
of
established
in
the
collective
that
unions,
negotiation,
bargaining
as
exclusive
administration
agreements,
have
and
an
implicit duty ‘to serve the interests of all members without
hostility
or
discrimination
toward
any,
to
exercise
[their]
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct.”
Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of America, 276
F.3d 651, 657 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177 (1967)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
has
been
interpreted
as
imposing
“a
Thus, the NLRA
‘duty
of
fair
representation’ on labor unions, which a union breaches ‘when
its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary,
11
discriminatory, or in bad faith.’”
14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett,
556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1460 (2009) (quoting Marquez v.
Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998)).
The relevant statutory language makes plain, however, that
public
employers
are
not
covered.
See
29
U.S.C.
§
152(2)
(“[t]he term ‘employer’ . . . shall not include . . . any State
or political subdivision thereof”); see also Police Dep’t of the
City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n. 9 (“the National
Labor Relations Act specifically exempts States and subdivisions
(and therefore cities and their public school boards) from the
definition
of
‘employer’
within
the
Act”);
Teledyne
Economic
Development v. N.L.R.B., 108 F.3d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1997) (same).
“It necessarily follows that employees of a school district are
not ‘employees’ who can sue their unions under the NLRA for a
breach of the duty of fair representation.”
Roberts v. East
Lyme Bd. of Educ., 173 F.3d 846, 1999 WL 220104, at *1 (2nd Cir.
1999) (Table); see also Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 360 (“Since the
School Board is not an ‘employer’ and Strasburger is not an
‘employee,’ [29 U.S.C. § 185(a)] provides no federal basis for
his claim”).
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was employed by the
Board, which is a state agency.
See Lewis v. Board of Education
of Talbot County, 262 F.Supp.2d 608, 613 (D.Md. 2003) (“Maryland
law, through statute and judicial opinion, treats the county
12
school boards as agents of the state.”); see also Board of Educ.
of Prince George’s County v. Prince George’s County Educators’
Ass’n, 309 Md. 85, 96 n. 3 (1987) (“County boards of education
are, of course, state agencies and not agencies of the county
governments.”).
Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the duty
of fair representation cannot prevail under federal law.
But
see Byrne v. Mass Transit Admin., 58 Md.App. 501, 508 (1984)
(holding
that
public
employee’s
breach
of
duty
of
fair
representation claim “does not arise under the LMRA, but rather
as a private cause of action under State law for breach of
contract”).
IV.
Remaining State Law Claim
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court has discretion
to
retain
or
dismiss
nonfederal
claims
where,
as
federal basis of the action is no longer applicable.
here,
the
District
courts in the Fourth Circuit “enjoy wide latitude in determining
whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all
federal claims have been extinguished.”
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58
In deciding whether to exercise
discretion, courts consider factors such as the “convenience and
fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues
of
federal
policy,
comity,
and
considerations
of
judicial
economy.”
Id. (citing Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343,
n.
350
7,
108
S.Ct.
614,
13
98
L.Ed.2d
720
(1998)).
Ultimately,
supplemental
jurisdiction
flexibility,
designed
allow
involving
pendent
to
claims
in
“is
courts
the
manner
to
a
doctrine
deal
that
with
most
accommodates a range of concerns and values.”
of
cases
sensibly
Id. (quoting
Carnegie–Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350).
The sole remaining count of Plaintiff’s complaint is her
claim that the Board failed to pay all of her wages in violation
of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann.,
Lab & Empl. § 3-501, et seq.
Because the time for filing such a
claim has clearly expired, the court will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in the interest of judicial economy.
“[A] claim
under the MWPC must be filed within three years and two weeks
from the date on which the employer should have paid the wage.”
Butler v. VisionAIR, Inc., 385 F.Supp.2d 549, 554 (D.Md. 2005);
Md.
Code
Ann.,
Cts.
&
Jud.
Proc.
§
5-101.
As
Plaintiff’s
employment with the Board terminated in March 2005, her claim in
this regard is clearly time barred.
Accordingly, it will be
dismissed.7
7
To the extent Plaintiff may have had a state law cause of
action against the Union for breach of the duty of fair
representation, the statute of limitations for that claim has
also expired.
See England v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 764
F.Supp.2d
761,
770
(D.Md.
2011)
(three-year
statute
of
limitations applies to breach of contract claims in Maryland).
14
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss
will be granted.
A separate order will follow.
________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?