Chambers v. Chambers et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 8/8/2011. (c/m to pro se Defendants 8/10/11 ns)(ns, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TERESA CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BONITA CHAMBERS, et al.,
Defendants.
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* Civil Case No.: RWT 11-765
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Teresa Chambers has filed suit against her siblings, Defendants Bonita
(“Bonnie”) and Dennis Chambers (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff seeks damages and
injunctive relief for Defendants’ alleged defamatory statements made against her.
Pending
before the Court is Defendants’ pro se Motion to Dismiss all Counts of Plaintiff’s Original
Complaint for Injunctive Relief. ECF No. 7. Defendants assert that this Court does not have
subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants, and that
venue is improper. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of Maryland and the current Chief of the United States Park Police.
Compl. ¶ 6. Bonnie Chambers is a resident of the State of Florida and Dennis Chambers is a
resident of Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 2, 3; Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 1-2.
In 2004, the United States Park Police dismissed Plaintiff from her position as its Chief
after she publicly commented on the low staffing levels in her department and its effect on
national park safety. Id. ¶ 6. After her dismissal, Plaintiff was appointed as Chief of Police in
Riverdale Park, Maryland. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff challenged her dismissal and, after a seven-year
battle with the Department of the Interior, she was reinstated as Chief of the United States Park
Police in January, 2011. Id.; T. Chambers Decl. ¶ 2, Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. A. As
a result of these events, Plaintiff garnered the nickname “Honest Chief.” Id. ¶ 27.
On July 8, 2008, the parties’ father, William Chambers, passed away. Id. ¶ 10. His estate
was opened in the Orphans Court for Allegany County, Maryland, naming Plaintiff as its
Personal Representative. Id. Thus, Plaintiff was charged with managing the affairs of the estate
in accordance with her father’s will. Id. These affairs included directing the sale of her father’s
home in Maryland, providing an accounting of the estate, and distributing the estate between the
named parties. Id. The estate included the proceeds from a medical malpractice suit regarding
the parties’ mother, Margaret Chambers, who predeceased William. Id. ¶ 8-10. The settlement
agreement in the malpractice suit allegedly contained a strict confidentiality clause, and Margaret
Chambers had previously instructed Plaintiff not to discuss the suit with anyone except
Plaintiff’s father and Plaintiff’s husband prior to her death. Id. ¶ 8-9.
The distribution of William Chambers’ estate and the confidentiality agreement caused
Plaintiff’s relationships with Defendants to deteriorate significantly. Id. ¶ 11-13. Defendants
became unsatisfied with the way Plaintiff was handling the estate and became suspicious that
Plaintiff was improperly hiding assets from them. Id. Defendants allegedly asked Plaintiff to
“circumvent the estate process and distribute estate funds” prematurely. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants filed a “wholly unwarranted ‘Motion for Sanctions’” in the estate case, in
addition to various other court filings that falsely asserted Plaintiff had misappropriated the
estate funds. Id. ¶ 16, 20. After failing to appease her siblings’ concerns while remaining within
the parameters of her position as Personal Representative, Plaintiff cut off all communication
with her siblings on June 1, 2009, except as necessary to administer the estate. Id. ¶ 13-14.
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Plaintiff alleges that this rift caused Defendants to initiate a campaign to “disseminate
defamatory and false information regarding Plaintiff in an effort to tarnish her reputation, harass
her and cause her emotional distress.” 1 Id. ¶ 17. Dennis Chambers initiated the campaign on or
about March 23, 2010, by allegedly sending an email to the general public mailbox for Riverdale
Park, whereby he advocated for Plaintiff’s dismissal from her position as Chief of the Riverdale
Park Police. Id. ¶ 18.
In support, he cited her “botched standoff during the North Carolina
tractor incident (3/17/03), the 2003 eulogizing of her dog, the patronizing of her concubine with
helicopter rides while presumably protecting our president . . . [and] her recent defiant contempt
in the Allegany County, MD orphan’s court.” Id. On May 2, 2010, Dennis Chambers allegedly
sent a mass email to many of Plaintiff’s “personal and professional contacts,” outlining a
detailed, false account of the Plaintiff’s actions in the estate matter. Id. ¶ 24. On or about
March 1, 2011, Dennis Chambers allegedly drove from Maryland to the United States Park
Police headquarters in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 39. He sat outside the headquarters with a guitar
and sang a song that “called into question Plaintiff’s honesty and integrity and contained veiled
threats to harm Plaintiff should she not comply with Defendants’ demands related to the pending
estate case.” Id. ¶ 39.
On April 22, 2010, Plaintiff received a favorable ruling in her lawsuit against the
Department of the Interior in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
prompting many blogs and news sites to post articles discussing the case. Id. ¶ 21. Bonnie
Chambers allegedly posted remarks in the comments section of these web articles, including the
blogs “Fedsmith.com,” “Yubanet,” “As it Stands,” and the “Margie Burns Blog.” Id. ¶ 22, 26.
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The Complaint contains multiple, detailed accusations of Defendants’ conduct, but only those
bearing the most significance on Defendants’ motion to dismiss are outlined below.
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In these comments, Bonnie Chambers accused Plaintiff of improper management of the estate
and “called into question Plaintiff’s honesty and character.” Id.
On May 11, 2010, Bonnie Chambers established a blog entitled “Honest Chief?” Id. ¶
27. On this website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants use a variety of aliases to “publicly . . .
assassinate Plaintiff’s character.” Id. The aliases make comments that Plaintiff lied under oath
and skimmed money from their father’s estate to fund her own lawsuit against the Department of
the Interior. Id. Bonnie Chambers has also posted the blog’s web address on many other sites,
including some of the above-mentioned blogs. Id. ¶ 28. Defendants have also allegedly posted
similar accusations on multiple well-known websites in the greater Maryland area, such as the
Washington Post and NBC Washington websites. Id. ¶ 32, 33.
Plaintiff alleges that, since 2008, she has made “every reasonable effort to settle the estate
of her family expeditiously,” yet Defendants “continue to engage in a public attack on Plaintiff’s
reputation, specifically calling into question her fitness as a law enforcement officer, her
integrity, and her honesty.” Id. ¶ 43.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed a five-count Complaint with this Court, alleging:
Defamation; Invasion of Privacy – False Light; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Civil
Conspiracy; and a Request for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief. ECF No. 1. On
May 9, 2011, Defendants, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(3). ECF No. 7. Plaintiff filed
an opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on May 26, 2011, and Defendants filed a reply
in support of their motion on June 17, 2011. ECF Nos. 8-9. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all
Counts of Plaintiff’s Original Complaint for Injunctive Relief is now ripe for resolution.
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ANALYSIS
Defendants argue this action should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2), and for
improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). Each argument will be addressed in turn.
I.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a plaintiff’s claims. See Adams v.
Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). “[T]he moving party should prevail only if the
material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.” Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765,
768 (4th Cir. 1991).
Defendants’ sole argument challenging this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is that
“there are other venues that could serve consistent with the rights of the Defendants.” Def.’s
Mot. Dismiss at 2. This is an incorrect statement of the law. United States District Courts have
subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is a citizen of Maryland, Bonnie Chambers is a
citizen of Florida, and Dennis Chambers is a citizen of Massachusetts. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 12. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 in compensatory damages, Compl. ¶¶ 50, and Defendants do not
challenge the amount in controversy. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
she has sufficiently pled that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1). Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 (D. Md.
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2001). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction will
be denied.
II.
Personal Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) challenges
whether the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. “When . . . a district court decides a
pretrial personal jurisdiction motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need
only make a prima facie showing of a personal jurisdiction.” Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst
Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Under this type of
motion, a court “must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the proof, and resolve all
factual disputes, in the plaintiff’s favor.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir.
1993).
A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when two
conditions are satisfied: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by the forum state’s
long-arm statute, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396.
Maryland has
construed its long-arm statute to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent
allowable under the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citations
omitted). Nevertheless, the Court must fit its exercise of personal jurisdiction under one of the
enumerated provisions of Maryland’s long-arm statute. See Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F. Supp. 2d
540, 547 (D. Md. 2006) (clarifying that Maryland Court of Appeals still requires an analysis
under the Maryland long-arm statute in addition to a due process analysis).
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Maryland’s long-arm statute enumerates six circumstances whereby a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. It states, in pertinent part, that a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person who, directly or by an agent:
(3) [c]auses tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the
State; [or] (4) [c]auses tortious injury in the State or outside of the
State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct
in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food,
services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103(b)(3) to (4). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ conduct
satisfies both of these provisions. Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 11. The Court agrees.
Section 6-103(b)(3) requires that both the tortious injury and the tortious act occur in
Maryland. Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F. Supp. 2d 540, 547 (D. Md. 2006) (citations omitted). At the
very least, Defendants’ allegedly false filings with the Orphans Court for Allegany County,
Maryland constitute an act that occurred in Maryland. These filings are publicly available. It
follows that Plaintiff’s asserted injury—defamation—also occurred in her home state of
Maryland. This is sufficient to make a prima facie showing under § 6-103(b)(3).
Plaintiff has also made a prima facie showing that Defendants’ alleged conduct outside of
Maryland fits within the requirements of § 6-103(b)(4). In addition to the Orphans Court filings,
Defendants allegedly made a concerted effort to further publicize their false beliefs.
The
allegations of Defendants’ Internet activity are numerous and specific. Defendants created blogs,
posted comments on websites, and sent emails to Maryland residents and towns in an effort to
defame Plaintiff. Under the alleged facts, this is sufficient to warrant a prima facie finding of a
“persistent course of conduct” under § 6-103(b)(4).
Exercising personal jurisdiction in this action also comports with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. For a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to
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comport with due process requirements, the nonresident defendant must have sufficient
“minimum contacts” with the forum, “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 236 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
In evaluating whether sufficient minimum contacts exist, courts should
consider:
(1) the extent to which the defendant has purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether
the plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities directed at the
State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
be constitutionally reasonable.
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc. (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
Under the facts alleged, it is evident that Defendants have purposefully availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Maryland and that Plaintiff’s alleged
injuries arise out of Defendants’ Maryland-directed activities.
While Defendants are
beneficiaries to their father’s estate, they were not the ones charged with distributing the
proceeds. Nevertheless, they chose to intervene in the estate proceedings in the Orphans Court
for Allegany County, Maryland.
They allegedly filed false, misleading, and defamatory
statements against their sister, hoping Plaintiff would circumvent the legal process and allocate
funds from the estate to them.
Moreover, Defendants have purposefully availed themselves to Maryland through their
Internet activities. The Fourth Circuit has adopted a three-prong test when evaluating whether a
defendant’s Internet use gives the forum personal jurisdiction over that defendant. In ALS Scan
v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Circuit held that merely
“placing information on the Internet is not sufficient by itself to subject [a] person to personal
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jurisdiction in each State in which the information is accessed.” Id. at 712. But the court
explicitly stated:
a State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power
over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs
electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of
engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3)
that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause
of action cognizable in the State’s course.
Id.
The Fourth Circuit’s Internet-use standard is similar to the one articulated by the
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, the Court held that a Florida
citizen could be forced to answer a libel suit in California, even though its only contact with
California resulted from writing and publishing an allegedly false article in Florida. Id. at 789.
The Court found that the defendants’ “intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly
aimed at California” because the article focused on the state of California and the plaintiff’s
California activities. Id. The Court further held that “under the circumstances, [defendants]
must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there to answer for the truth of the statements
made in their article.” Id. at 790 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Under the facts alleged, Defendants intentionally directed electronic activity into
Maryland with the purpose of causing injury to a Maryland resident. See Silver v. Brown, 382 F.
App’x 723, 729-730 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant’s blog, set up in direct response to
a business deal and accusing plaintiff of wrongdoing, constitutes an intentional act expressly
aimed at the forum state with knowledge that the injury would be felt in that forum). They
posted on websites, sent emails to Maryland residents, and created blogs that all contain
information regarding a Maryland estate proceeding. Dennis Chambers intentionally sought out
Maryland residents when making the alleged defamatory statements about Plaintiff in an effort to
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harm her reputation. Bonnie Chambers created “HonestChief?” to publicize the Orphans Court
case and her disagreement with Plaintiff’s handling of it, as evidenced by the blog’s content and
by the consistent posting of its URL on websites with notably large audiences. These activities
go beyond merely “placing information on the Internet.” ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712. The
manifested intent of Defendants’ alleged conduct is to reach Maryland citizens—including
Plaintiff—creating a cognizable cause of action in Maryland. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712.
Under the alleged facts, Defendants must “reasonably anticipate being haled into court [here] to
answer for the truth of [their] statements.”
See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be denied.
III.
Venue
Rule 12(b)(3) provides that a claim may be dismissed on the grounds of improper venue.
When a civil action’s jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, see Part I, supra, venue
is proper in a “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Defendants argue that “[n]one of the alleged
events” in Plaintiff’s lawsuit took place within this Court’s jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at
3. Defendants also assert that Florida or Massachusetts “could easily satisfy as proper venue.”
Id.
As outlined above, William Chambers’ estate proceeding is based in Allegany County,
Maryland, and Defendants have directed their Internet activity at Maryland in an attempt to
injure Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s injury is likely to be felt in Maryland. Therefore, a substantial part of
the events that give rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within this Court’s jurisdiction.
Defendants’ argument that either Florida or Massachusetts would also serve as proper venue is
insufficient, as a plaintiff is given great deference when she chooses her home forum. See Piper
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Aircraft Co. v. Reno, 454 U.S. 235, 266 (1981). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
improper venue will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss All Counts of Plaintiff’s
Original Complaint for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 7) will be denied. A separate order follows.
Date: August 8, 2011
/s/
Roger W. Titus
United States District Judge
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