Williams v. United States of America

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Mr. Williams 3/21/12 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/21/12. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
HARRY J. WILLIAMS
:
v.

:

Criminal No. DKC 10-0102
Civil Action No. DKC 11-0950

:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is
a motion filed by Petitioner Harry J. Williams to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(ECF No. 181).

The issues are fully briefed and the court now

rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed
necessary.

For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s motion

will be denied.1
I.

Background
On March 10, 2010, the grand jury returned an indictment

charging

Petitioner

and

two

co-defendants

with

submitting

a

false claim to the Internal Revenue Service in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 287.

Following his initial appearance, Petitioner was

conditionally released pending trial.

1

At a March 30 attorney

Petitioner has also filed seven motions to expedite a
ruling on his motion. (ECF Nos. 183, 192, 196, 197, 198, 199,
200). These motions will be denied as moot.

inquiry

hearing,

he

declined

legal

representation,

opting

instead to proceed pro se.
By a superseding indictment filed on May 26, 2010, the
grand jury charged Petitioner and Thomas Arrona Johnson with one
count of conspiring to defraud the United States, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 286, and eight counts of submitting false claims,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287.

Petitioner appeared before a

magistrate judge for arraignment on the superseding indictment
on

June

3,

at

which

time

the

indictment

was

formally

read,

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, and reiterated his
desire to represent himself.
On July 23, Petitioner filed a document entitled “Action in
Quo

Warranto”

superseding
documents,

(ECF

No.

indictment
Petitioner

84)2
(ECF

and
No.

advanced

a

motion

85).

In

arguments

to

dismiss

both

typically

of

the
these

associated

with so-called “flesh and blood” ideology – colloquially named
for the distinction professed by adherents between the accused
named in the indictment and the “flesh and blood” person of the
defendant

himself.

novel in this court.

These

arguments,

unfortunately,

are

not

See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 405

2

“Quo warranto is addressed to preventing a continued
exercise of authority unlawfully asserted[.]”
Allah v. Linde,
No. C07-827-JLR, 2008 WL 1699441, at *1 (W.D.Wash. Apr. 10,
2008).
Such a proceeding “can be brought only by the United
States, and not by private individuals.” Id. (citing Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 502 (1933)).
2

F.Supp.2d 602, 603-05 (D.Md. 2005) (discussing the origin and
characteristics
characterized
representation;

of
by

these
the

beliefs).

They

defendant’s

refusal

to

are

insistence

acknowledge

his

generally
on

name

selfand/or

signature; purporting not to understand the plain language of
legal

instruments;

jurisdiction.
argued

in

his

and

repeated

Consistent
motion

to

with

challenges
these

dismiss

to

the

practices,

that

the

court’s

Petitioner

“court

lacks

jurisdiction in personam [general & specific] and subject matter
to make any valid adjudications other than dismissing the case”
because he is “not a corporate citizen of the United States
Inc.”

(ECF No. 85, at 2).

He further “demand[ed] that this

case be dismissed as the prosecution has no merits in its claims
that are based in law” and that “[i]f the court believes that it
does have jurisdiction it must provide evidence and proof of
such in written form or official testimony[.]”

(Id. at 3).

The court denied the motion to dismiss by a memorandum
opinion and order issued July 29, 2010.

(ECF Nos. 91, 92).

Regarding Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge, it explained:
To the extent that Mr. Williams’ motion
is
intelligible,
he
challenges
the
jurisdiction of the court over him and seeks
dismissal of the indictment as lacking in
merit.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, this
court has jurisdiction over all persons
alleged to have violated the laws of the
United States.
He was properly brought
before the court based on the indictment and
3

superseding indictment charging him with
violations of federal law. United States v.
Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810-11 (9th Cir. 2008).
Furthermore,
the
government
need
not
preliminarily
demonstrate
that
it
has
evidence to proceed, nor will the court
examine the evidence presented to the grand
jury.
United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d
69, 73 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)).
The
superseding
indictment
clearly
and
validly charges the offenses of conspiracy
to make false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287.
(ECF

No.

91,

at

3).

Petitioner

promptly

moved

for

reconsideration (ECF No. 94), and that motion was denied on the
record prior to the start of trial.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on August 3, 2010.

On

August 11, the jury returned a verdict finding Petitioner guilty
on all counts.

Sentencing was scheduled for November 15, 2010.

When Petitioner failed to appear on that date, he was sentenced
in absentia to concurrent terms of imprisonment of sixty and
seventy-two months, to be followed by three years of supervised
release.
imposed

(ECF
and

No.

138).

Petitioner

was

A

$900.00

ordered

to

special
pay

assessment

$1,149,170.19

was
in

restitution.
Petitioner did not appeal.

Instead, he filed, on April 12,

2011, the pending motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

4

(ECF No.

181).3

The Government opposed on June 22, 2011 (ECF No. 188),

and Petitioner replied eight days later (ECF No. 191).
II.

Standard of Review
Title

28,

§

2255

requires

a

petitioner

to

prove

by

a

preponderance of the evidence that “the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law.”

A pro se petitioner, such as Mr. Williams, is, of course,

entitled

to

have

consideration.
Cir. 1978).

his

arguments

reviewed

with

appropriate

See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151-53 (4th

Where, however, a § 2255 petition, along with the

files and records of the case, conclusively shows the petitioner
is

not

entitled

unnecessary
summarily.

and

to
the

relief,
claims

a

hearing

raised

on

the

therein

may

his

“flesh

motion

be

is

dismissed

28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

III. Analysis
Petitioner

continues

to

press

and

blood”

ramblings in the instant motion, arguing generally that “[t]he
3

This was the third such motion filed by Petitioner. The
first, filed approximately three weeks after the verdict (ECF
No. 116), was denied without prejudice as premature (ECF No.
142).
The second, filed December 2, 2010, was submitted by
Petitioner’s wife, Karita Kirk-Williams, who purportedly had
power of attorney conveyed to her by Petitioner in August 2010.
(ECF No. 150). The court subsequently denied Ms. Kirk-Williams
leave to proceed as Petitioner’s next-friend and dismissed the §
2255 motion filed by her without prejudice. (ECF No. 178).
5

court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction due to due
process violations and fraud on the court.”
(emphasis removed)).

(ECF No. 181, at 2

The vast majority of the specific grounds

he raises, however, have no bearing on the court’s jurisdiction.
Rather, they relate largely to evidentiary concerns rooted in
Petitioner’s fanciful notions that documentary evidence admitted
by the government at trial was somehow inauthentic and/or that
the

government’s

witnesses

were

incompetent.

Petitioner

was

required to pursue these claims on direct appeal, if at all, and
his failure to do so, or to show cause and prejudice or actual
innocence, renders them procedurally barred in the context of
the instant motion.

To the extent that he raises jurisdictional

concerns that may be cognizable, his arguments are virtually
identical

to

those

raised

in

his

motion

to

dismiss

the

superseding indictment and fail for the same reasons.
The ordinary rule is that “an error can be attacked on
collateral review only if first challenged on direct review.”
United States v. Harris, 183 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1999); see
also United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be
allowed

to

do

service

citation

omitted)).

defaulted

a

for

an

Where

constitutional

a

claim

appeal”

(internal

petitioner
by

failing

has
to

marks

and

procedurally
raise

it

on

direct appeal, it may be raised for the first time in a § 2255
6

motion only upon a showing of either “cause and actual prejudice
resulting

from

the

errors

of

which

he

complains,”

or

a

demonstration that “a miscarriage of justice would result from
the refusal of the court to entertain the collateral attack.”
United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir.
1999).
A showing of cause for a procedural default “must turn on
something external to the defense, such as the novelty of the
claim

or

a

denial

of

effective

Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493.

assistance

of

counsel.”

To establish actual prejudice,

the petitioner must show that the error worked to his “actual
and

substantial

disadvantage,”

possibility of prejudice.
(1986).
would

than

merely

creating

a

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494

A petitioner demonstrates that a miscarriage of justice

result

defaulted

rather

if

claim

the
by

court
showing

does

not

“actual

consider

a

innocence

procedurally

by

clear

and

convincing evidence” – in other words, “actual factual innocence
of the offense of conviction,

i.e., that petitioner did not

commit the crime of which he was convicted[.]”

Mikalajunas, 186

F.3d at 493-94.
Petitioner initially argues that the “[i]ndictment failed
to state a crime” insofar as it “failed to allege any facts by
and

through

a

witness

competent

to

testify

.

.

.

to

authenticated evidence to show that a violation of federal law
7

had occurred under any statutory authority.”
2).

(ECF No. 181, at

He further contends that the arraignment on the superseding

indictment was improper because it was conducted by a magistrate
judge, and that this proceeding was, in effect, an attempt to
cover-up

unspecified

deficiencies

in

the

records

of

prior

proceedings; that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated; that his constitutional right to confront witnesses
was violated; that he was not provided with advance copies of
the

government’s

trial

exhibits,

“which

as

a

matter

of

substantive due process were required to be authenticated and
indexed and tabbed” (id. at 4); that certain evidence was not
properly authenticated; that the court violated his due process
rights by “not enforcing a subpoena of a necessary witness” and
that “the prosecution excluded exculpatory evidence . . . by
disregarding [his] subpoena” (id. at 5); and that the court
“fail[ed]

to

give

proper

administrative

review”

of

specified

administrative documents (id.).
Each
appeal,

of
and

these
it

is

claims

could

undisputed

have
that

been
no

raised

appeal

on

direct

was

filed.

Petitioner, therefore, bears the burden of either showing cause
and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged errors or that
he

is

actually

convicted.

innocent

of

the

crimes

for

which

he

stands

He has made no such showing, nor could he based on

the instant record.
8

The

only

claim

that

is

potentially

cognizable

is

Petitioner’s argument that a defect in the indictment divested
the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

“An indictment only

affects the Court’s jurisdiction if it is so insufficient that
it completely fails to charge an offense.”

United States v.

Boyd, 259 F.Supp.2d 699, 708 (W.D.Tenn. 2003) (citing United
States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Such an

allegation

because

may

be

cognizable

in

a

§

2255

petition

“subject-matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived .
.

.

[and]

jurisdiction

any
is

action
‘ultra

by

a

vires’

court
and

without

therefore

subject-matter
void.”

United

States v. Hartwell, 448 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
marks and citations omitted).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), “[t]he
indictment . . . must be a plain, concise, and definite written
statement

of

the

essential

facts

constituting

the

offense

charged and must be signed by an attorney for the government.”
“To

meet

the

demands

of

the

Fifth

and

Sixth

Amendments,

an

indictment must (1) contain the elements of the charged offense
and fairly inform a defendant of the charges against him, and
(2) enable him to plead double jeopardy in defense of future
prosecutions for the same offense.”
961 F.2d 476, 479 (4th Cir. 1992).

United States v. Sutton,
Petitioner does not allege

that his indictment failed to meet these requirements.
9

Rather,

he

appears

to

believe

that

something

along

the

lines

of

a

supporting affidavit or declaration was necessary to corroborate
the allegations contained therein.

He points to no authority

for this proposition, however, and the court is not aware of
any.

As noted in the prior opinion denying Petitioner’s motion

to dismiss, “[t]he superseding indictment clearly and validly
charges the offenses of conspiracy to make false claims under 18
U.S.C. § 286 and eight counts of making false claims under 18
U.S.C. § 287.”

(ECF No. 91, at 3).

Petitioner’s argument to

the contrary in the instant motion is patently meritless.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion to vacate,

set aside, or correct his sentence will be denied.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2255, the court is also required to
issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a
final

order

adverse

to

the

applicant.

A

certificate

of

appealability is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to an appeal
from the court’s earlier order.
F.3d

652,

659

(4th

Cir.

2007).

United States v. Hadden, 475
It

may

issue

“only

if

the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Where a motion

is denied on a procedural ground, a certificate of appealability
will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates both “(1) that
10

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
(2) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
court

Petitioner has not satisfied this standard.

will,

therefore,

decline

to

issue

a

certificate

The
of

appealability.
A separate order will follow.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

11