Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland

Filing 409

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/19/2019. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
YASMIN REYAZUDDIN
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-0951

:
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this disability
discrimination case is Plaintiff Yasmin Reyazuddin’s motion for a
finding that she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses.

(ECF No. 403).

The issues have been

fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the

motion will be denied.
I.

Background
In April of 2011, Ms. Reyazuddin sued Defendant Montgomery

County (“Defendant” or the “County”) for violation of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation
Reyazuddin’s

Act,
claim

29

U.S.C.

stemmed

§

from

794.
the

(ECF

No.

County’s

accommodate her disability: Ms. Reyazuddin is blind.

1).
failure

Ms.
to

As alleged

in the complaint, as of 2009, the County employed Ms. Reyazuddin
as a customer service representative at a County call center. When
the County moved to a new call center (“MC311”), Ms. Reyazuddin

was denied the opportunity to make the move.

The County’s new

call center came with new software, which was not then accessible
to the blind.

(Id.)

Instead, Ms. Reyazuddin was placed in a

series of alternate positions.
Ms. Reyazuddin sought declaratory and injunctive relief from
the

County,

as

well

as

compensatory

damages,

based

on

the

Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

In

2014, this court granted summary judgment in favor of Montgomery
County.

(ECF No. 108).

Ms. Reyazuddin successfully appealed with

regard to the Rehabilitation Act claim, (ECF No. 113), and, in
2016, the remaining issues went to trial.

The jury found that the

County had failed to provide a reasonable accommodation but awarded
$0 in damages.

(ECF No. 221).

Several months later, the County

finally transferred Ms. Reyazuddin to MC311.

(ECF No. 403, at 4).

In August 2017, this court denied Ms. Reyazuddin’s request for
injunctive relief on the ground that she was no longer employed in
inadequate alternate positions and was now employed at MC311. (ECF
No. 353).
because

The court also declined to issue a declaratory judgment
“[t]he

jury

made

clear

that

Defendant’s

earlier

accommodation was insufficient[]” and “[f]urther expounding on the
jury’s verdict would be superfluous[.]”

(Id. at 41-42).

Ms.

Reyazuddin again appealed and the Fourth Circuit affirmed this
court’s judgment.

(ECF No. 398-1).
2

On January 18, 2019, Ms. Reyazuddin filed a motion for
attorneys’ fees claiming she is a “prevailing party” under the
Rehabilitation Act.
II.

(ECF No. 403).

Analysis
Under the Rehabilitation Act, “[i]n any action or proceeding

to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the
costs.”

29 U.S.C. § 794a.

“The term ‘prevailing party’. . . is

a ‘legal term of art,’ . . . and is ‘interpreted. . . consistently’
– that is, without distinctions based on the particular statutory
context in which it appears.”

Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282

F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598,
603 n. 4 (2001))(internal citations omitted).
To be considered a “prevailing party,” a plaintiff must obtain
“an enforceable judgment . . . or comparable relief through a
consent decree or settlement.”

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111

(1992) (internal citations omitted).
or settlement in this case.

There is no consent decree

Thus, the only avenue open to Ms.

Reyazuddin is the first of the Farrar options: an enforceable
judgment.

As will be discussed, while Ms. Reyazuddin has won a

3

judgment,

it

cannot

be

characterized

as

an

enforceable

one

sufficient to make her a prevailing party.
Plaintiff relies on a case from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Select Milk Producers, Inc.
v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2005), as well as a Fourth
Circuit case, Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr. Inc., 290 F.3d
639, 652-53 (4th Cir. 2002), for the proposition the amount of
damages is irrelevant.

(ECF No. 406, at 3).

Justice O’Connor’s

much-cited concurrence in Farrar, which plaintiff relies on – and
which forms the basis of both Select Milk Producers and Dennis makes clear that there is a difference between nominal damages and
no damages: there, the plaintiff “obtained an enforceable judgment
for one dollar in nominal damages.

One dollar is not exactly a

bonanza, but it constitutes relief on the merits.

And it affects

the defendant’s behavior toward the plaintiff, if only by forcing
him to pay one dollar — something he would not otherwise have
done.”

Farrar, 506 U.S. 103, 116–17 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

In sum, to claim “prevailing party” status, the judgment must
“materially alter[] the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits
the plaintiff.”

Id. at 111-12 (majority opinion).

4

One dollar

technically accomplishes that (even if it does not ultimately
warrant an award of attorneys’ fees), but zero dollars does not.
Put another way, “a judicial pronouncement that the defendant
has violated the [law],” standing alone, “does not render the
plaintiff a prevailing party.”

Id. at 112; see also Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762 (1987) (“the moral satisfaction of knowing
that a federal court concluded that [a plaintiff’s] rights ha[ve]
been violated” is insufficient to render plaintiff a prevailing
party”).

There has been no material alteration of the legal

relationship between the parties by virtue of a judgment in this
case.
Plaintiff argues that her claim “is even stronger than that
of many other plaintiffs who have recovered fees. For example,
plaintiffs are routinely found to be prevailing parties when a
defendant settles[.]” (ECF No. 403, at 5).

Ms. Reyazuddin,

however, can point to no case in this circuit or out where a
settlement

alone

was

found

to

have

the

necessary

“judicial

imprimatur” to render a plaintiff the “prevailing party.”

All of

Ms. Reyazuddin’s cited cases involve a judicial grant of equitable
relief.
The court has found, of course, that the County has now
reasonably

accommodated

Ms.

Reyazuddin

and

Reyazuddin has achieved a measure of success.
5

thus

that

Ms.

That success,

however,

lacks

the

requisite

“judicial

imprimatur.”

Ms.

Reyazuddin ultimately did “prevail[] on the most significant issue
in this litigation (her request to be transferred to the MC311
Call Center with accommodations[.)]”

(ECF No. 403, at 11).

Plaintiff may even be correct that “[t]he jury’s verdict was the
predicate for the relief that Ms. Reyazuddin obtained.”
406, at 2) (emphasis added).

(ECF No.

This, however, is just another way

of saying that “the jury’s verdict was the catalyst for the relief
that Ms. Reyazuddin obtained.”
In other words, Plaintiff is simply advancing the “catalyst
theory,” which “posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if
it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about
a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.”
U.S. at 601.

Buckhannon, 532

The Supreme Court has expressly held that “the

‘catalyst theory’ is not a permissible basis for the award of
attorney[s’] fees[.]”

Id. at 610.

It bears repeating that “prevailing party” is a legal term of
art, and is not met even if Ms. Reyazuddin has “prevailed” in the
everyday meaning of the word.

Ms. Reyazuddin does not meet the

legal definition of a “prevailing party,” as there has been no
“court-ordered

change

in

the

legal

6

relationship

between

the

plaintiff and the defendant.”

Id. at 604 (internal citations and

quotations omitted).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for a finding that
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees
will be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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