Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland

Filing 438

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/30/2022. (sat, Chambers)

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 1 of 52

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:

YASMIN REYAZUDDIN

:

v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-951

:

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending and ready for resolution in this Rehabilitation Act
case is the motion of Plaintiff Yasmin Reyazuddin for an award of
attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs.

(ECF No. 426).

The issues

have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

Because Ms. Reyazuddin obtained

sufficient relief to warrant attorneys’ fees, her motion will be
granted in part, and the court will award $837,923.49 in attorneys’
fees, expenses, and costs. 1
I.

Background
Plaintiff

Yasmin

Reyazuddin

Defendant Montgomery County.

seeks

attorneys’

from

The facts of this litigation are

recited in more detail in the court’s prior opinions.
36, 56, 108, 353, and 409).

fees

(ECF Nos.

The procedural history is long and

need not be detailed in full here.

A brief overview follows.

Also pending is the Defendant Montgomery County’s consent
motion to exceed page limits. (ECF No. 430). That motion will be
granted.
1

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 2 of 52

Ms. Reyazuddin is blind.

She worked as a customer service

representative for Montgomery County in the Department of Health
and Human Services.

In 2009, the County consolidated its customer

service representative employees from all departments into a new
call center called MC311, using a computer software that was, at
the time, not accessible by blind people.

As a result, Ms.

Reyazuddin was not transferred to MC311 at that time.

Instead,

the County offered her—and she worked in—several alternate jobs.
Ms. Reyazuddin did not consider the alternate jobs to be
commensurate with her prior position, so she sued the County for
failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability.
She brought claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

After the court granted summary judgment,

(ECF Nos. 108 and 109), and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part, Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County (Reyazuddin
I), 789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015), only the Rehabilitation Act claim
went to trial. The jury rejected the County’s substantial hardship
defense and found that the County had failed to provide Plaintiff
a reasonable accommodation, but awarded $0 in damages.

(ECF No.

221).
Following trial, Ms. Reyazuddin sought injunctive relief to
remedy the discrimination found by the jury.

She sought an order

requiring the County to make MC311 accessible and to give Plaintiff
a job as a customer support representative.
2

(ECF No. 228, at 7).

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 3 of 52

Before the injunctive relief issue could be resolved, the County
transferred

her

to

MC311.

(ECF

No.

258-1,

at

1).

Still

dissatisfied with the limitations of the position, Ms. Reyazuddin
modified her request for injunctive relief.

(ECF No. 295).

The

court denied her request because she was now employed at MC311.
(ECF Nos. 353 and 354).

Ms. Reyazuddin appealed, (ECF No. 361),

and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County
(Reyazuddin II), 754 Fed.App’x. 186 (4th Cir. 2018).
Ms. Reyazuddin then filed a motion for attorneys’ fees.

(ECF

403). This court denied that motion, reasoning that Ms. Reyazuddin
was not a “prevailing party.”

(ECF No. 409).

On appeal, the

Fourth Circuit held that she was a prevailing party and remanded.
Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County (Reyazuddin III), 988 F.3d 794,
798 (4th Cir. 2021).

Ms. Reyazuddin then filed another motion for

attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. (ECF No. 426).

The County

opposed the motion, (ECF No. 431), and Ms. Reyazuddin replied.
(ECF No. 433).
II.

Availability of Attorneys’ Fees
While a party usually must pay its own attorneys’ fees, see

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), Congress permits
fee-shifting in civil rights cases because “the private market for
legal services fail[s] to provide many victims of civil rights
violations with effective access to the judicial process.”
of

Riverside

v.

Rivera,

477

U.S.
3

561,

576

(1986)

City

(citations

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 4 of 52

omitted).

Indeed, such victims “ordinarily cannot afford to

purchase legal services at the rates set by the private market.”
Lefemine v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 576).

Thus, the Rehabilitation

Act—like many other civil rights statutes—provides a court with
discretion to award a prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s
fee.”

29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).

Ms. Reyazuddin is a prevailing party,

see Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County (Reyazuddin III), 988 F.3d 794
(4th Cir. 2021), and she has thus moved for a fee award.

(ECF No.

426).
Ms. Reyazuddin’s prevailing party status means only that she
is “eligible for, rather than entitled to,” attorneys’ fees.
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005).

In a case

in which “the judgment lacks significant damages recovery,” the
prevailing plaintiff may have won a mere “technical” victory “for
which the reasonable fee is zero.”

Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe,

589 Fed.App’x. 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 117 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).

Thus, to

decide attorneys’ fees in a case involving little or no damages,
a court conducts a two-step inquiry.

Mercer, 401 F.3d at 203-12.

First, it examines whether the plaintiff’s victory is sufficiently
“material” to “warrant a[] [fee] award” in the first place.
at 204, 207.

Id.

Second, if a fee is warranted, the court then

calculates a “reasonable” award.

Id. at 209.
4

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A.

Factors to determine if fees should be awarded

To “separate” a mere “technical . . . victory” (for which a
fee is not warranted) from a “material” victory (for which a fee
is warranted), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considers three factors adopted from Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).

See Mercer,

401 F.3d at 203-04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
court

considers

plaintiff.”

“the

extent

Id. at 204.

of

the

relief

First, the

obtained

by

the

Second, it examines “the significance of

the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 206

And third, it asks “whether

the litigation served a public purpose, as opposed to simply
vindicating the plaintiff’s individual rights.”

Id. at 207.

A

plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors to earn a fee award.
See id. at 208-09.

Rather, the central question is whether a

plaintiff’s victory is “technical” or “material,” and the FarrarMercer factors “help” courts make that distinction.

Id. at 203-

04, 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1.

Relief Obtained

First, courts examine “the extent of the relief obtained by
the plaintiff.”

Mercer, 401 F.3d at 204.

To evaluate this factor,

a court compares the relief a plaintiff sought with the relief she
eventually

attained.

Project

Vote/Voting

for

Dickerson, 444 Fed.App’x. 660, 662 (4th Cir. 2011).
5

Am.,

Inc.

v.

For example,

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 6 of 52

this factor weighs against a plaintiff where she seeks “only
compensatory damages” and receives mere nominal damages.
Lewis, 675 Fed.App’x 254, 258 (4th Cir. 2017).

Kane v.

By contrast, when

a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, “the relevant comparison . .
. [is] the scope of the injunctive relief sought to the relief
actually granted.”

Mercer, 401 F.3d at 205.

What is more, a fee award is warranted when a plaintiff
seeking an injunction persuades the defendant to provide most of
the real-world relief the injunction would have provided, making
the injunction itself unnecessary.
at 663-64.
asks

a

Project Vote, 444 Fed.App’x.

For instance, this factor favors a plaintiff where it

court

to

enjoin

enforcement

of

a

regulation,

and

it

persuades the government to enter a settlement in which it agrees
to

stop

enforcing

the

regulation

injunction is no longer needed.

on

its

own,

Id. at 662-64.

such

that

the

A court’s later

denial of injunctive relief is based on the plaintiff’s success in
obtaining a timely surrender, rather than her failure to prove the
“merits” of her claim.

Id. at 663; cf. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115,

(attorneys’ fees not warranted where “a plaintiff recovers only
nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential
element of his claim”) (emphasis added).
Here, this factor favors a fee award because, according to
the Fourth Circuit, Ms. Reyazuddin’s trial victory caused the
County to give her most of the real-world relief she sought, such
6

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 7 of 52

that an injunction itself was no longer needed.

In her complaint,

Ms. Reyazuddin sought an injunction that would require the County
“to reinstate [her] as an information specialist within the [MC311]
call center” and to update its software so that the job would be
“independently accessible” to her.

(ECF No. 1, at 8).

The Fourth

Circuit found that Ms. Reyazuddin’s trial victory caused the County
to “capitulate” to her demands by “transferring her to MC 311” and
providing her accessible software.
798.

Reyazuddin III, 988 F.3d at

And it was that timely surrender that made an injunction

unneeded: This court declined to grant an injunction because the
County

had

“provided

the

relief

Plaintiff

sought”

when

it

“transferred [her] to MC 311” and “ceased” “its discriminatory
conduct.”

(ECF No. 353, at 6, 29, 35).

All told, Ms. Reyazuddin

has achieved sufficient relief to warrant attorneys’ fees. 2
This court is less certain than the Fourth Circuit that Ms.
Reyazuddin’s trial victory was the sole cause of the County’s
decision to transfer her. In its answer to the original complaint,
the County stated that it originally chose not to transfer Ms.
Reyazzudin because doing so would be “cost . . . prohibitive.”
(ECF No. 10, at 4). That suggests that the County might have later
transferred her when accommodating her became more affordable.
Indeed, MC311 has other blind employees, (ECF Nos. 431, at 20;
382, at 21, 135, 154-55), and it employs a Technology Manager whose
regular job duties include making the County’s technology
“accessible” and conducting “accessibility training.”
(ECF No.
300-14, at 1-2). Thus, it is possible that—independent of this
lawsuit—the County would have made its systems accessible once
doing so was no longer cost—prohibitive and would have transferred
Ms. Reyazuddin once it completed those accessibility upgrades.
The County does not raise any such argument in its papers here.
It does not argue that it always planned to transfer Ms. Reyazuddin
once it was affordable to do so. It likewise does not argue that
2

7

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 8 of 52

In a similar case, the Fourth Circuit held that the extentof-relief factor favored a plaintiff seeking an injunction because
the plaintiff had persuaded the defendant to surrender most of the
real-world relief that the injunction would have provided.
Project Vote, 444 Fed.App’x. at 662-664.

See

In Project Vote, the

Maryland Transit Administration imposed a rule that barred voting
rights groups from registering voters at bus and train stations.
Id. at 661.

Several such groups sued, arguing that the rule was

unconstitutional and asking a court to enjoin the government from
enforcing it.

Id.

a

settlement

preliminary

After the suit was filed, the parties entered
in

which

the

agreed to cease the rule’s enforcement.
later

decided

that

the

rule

was

Transit
Id.

indeed

Administration

The district court

unconstitutional

but

declined to grant the requested injunction because the Transit
Administration’s

voluntary

cessation

“unnecessary” to enjoin the rule.

of

enforcement

Id. at 663.

made

it

The Fourth Circuit

later held that attorneys’ fees were warranted in part because the
voting rights group had “br[ought] the [Transit Administration]

the accommodations Ms. Reyazuddin sought became more affordable as
her suit progressed. Indeed, it does not even attempt to identify
any potential alternate cause for the transfer other than its loss
at trial. Because the County has done little to suggest that the
transfer was anything other than the “timely capitulation” the
Fourth Circuit believed it to be, this court adopts that
conclusion. Reyazuddin III, 988 F.3d at 798.
8

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 9 of 52

into a settlement . . . which afforded Plaintiffs most of the
equitable relief sought in the complaint.”
This case is effectively the same.
Plaintiff

sought

an

Defendant

voluntarily

injunction.
gave

Here, as in Project Vote,

Here,

Plaintiff

Id. at 664.

as

in

Project

“most

of

the

Vote,

equitable

relief” she requested before a court had a chance to grant an
injunction. And here, as in Project Vote, that voluntary surrender
made the injunction “unnecessary.”
Vote,

the

extent-of-relief

Plaintiff[].”

Id. at 664.

The

argues

County

factor

that

this

Thus, just like in Project
“weighs

factor

in

favor

weighs

of

[the]

against

Ms.

Reyazuddin because she requested added injunctive relief after her
transfer, and this court denied that request.
13-15).

That argument sets the bar too high.

(ECF No. 431, at
To be sure, after

her transfer, Ms. Reyazuddin argued that the County was required
to accommodate her further by upgrading certain software and
assigning her added tasks, and she unsuccessfully requested an
injunction to force those accommodations.
2).

(ECF No. 295-1, at 1-

But the Fourth Circuit has never held that attorneys’ fees

are warranted only when a plaintiff obtains every last bit of realworld relief she seeks.

To the contrary—the extent-of-relief

factor weighs in a plaintiff’s favor as long as she obtains “most
of the equitable relief sought in the complaint.”
444 Fed.App’x. at 664 (emphasis added).
9

Project Vote,

Ms. Reyazuddin has done

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 10 of 52

that:

Her

complaint

sought

a

transfer

implementation of accessible software.

to

MC311

and

the

(ECF No. 1, at 8).

Her

trial victory caused the County to—in its own words—“transfer[]
her to [MC311]” and “make the software accessible for Plaintiff.”
(ECF No. 300-2, at 43, 44).

She may not have received every last

software upgrade and work assignment she wanted, but that means
only that she got “most” of her desired relief rather than all of
it.

And “most” is enough.

Project Vote, 444 Fed.App’x. at 664.

Looking past this logic, the County argues that attorneys’
fees

are

unwarranted

because

courts

“usually”

do

not

award

attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff “who seeks compensatory damages,
but receives only nominal damages.” (ECF No. 431, at 13).

That

argument misunderstands how the Fourth Circuit measures the extent
of a plaintiff’s relief.

Courts measure relief not by counting

the money a plaintiff won at trial, but by “compar[ing] the relief
obtained by [a plaintiff] to the relief she sought.”

Mercer, 401

F.3d at 204.
Granted, when a plaintiff seeks “only compensatory damages”—
and “not injunctive or declaratory relief”—she achieves “limited
success”

by

obtaining

a

nominally

favorable

accompanied by next-to-nothing in damages.
258 (emphasis added).

jury

verdict

Kane, 675 Fed.App’x at

That is why a plaintiff who receives mere

nominal damages often gets no attorneys’ fees—because such a
plaintiff is usually seeking only monetary relief and nothing else.
10

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 11 of 52

But where, as here, a plaintiff seeks an injunction, she achieves
a

meaningful

victory

when

she

obtains

a

jury

verdict

that

“entitle[s]” her to “equitable relief,” Reyazuddin III, 988 F.3d
at 798, and persuades the defendant to surrender most of the relief
she sought in the first place, see Project Vote, 444 Fed.App’x. at
663-64.

That such a victory does not come with damages may

somewhat reduce a plaintiff’s success on this factor, but it hardly
means she is so unsuccessful that she ought not receive any
attorneys’ fees at all.
(“[A]

plaintiff

who

See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11

failed

to

recover

damages

but

obtained

injunctive relief . . . may recover a fee award.”). 3
Finally, the County argues that Ms. Reyazuddin should get no
credit for her transfer because the transfer was “voluntary” and
“extra-judicial.”

(ECF No. 431, at 14).

That is irrelevant.

Any

surrender is technically voluntary because it involves a party
voluntarily choosing to give up rather than continuing toward
expected defeat.
claimed

that

Indeed, in Project Vote, the government likewise

its

decision

to

cease

enforcement “was entirely voluntary.”

the

challenged

Id. at 662.

rule’s

But the Fourth

Circuit held that fees were nonetheless warranted in part because
the

plaintiff’s

success

caused

the

government

voluntarily

to

surrender “most of the equitable relief sought in the complaint.”
Degree of success is again considered in determining what
is a reasonable award.
3

11

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 12 of 52

Project Vote, 444 Fed.App’x. at 663-64.

So too here: Voluntary or

not, Ms. Reyazuddin’s trial win caused the County to provide most
of the relief she sought, and that is enough for the extent-ofrelief factor to weigh in her favor.
2.

Id. at 664.

Significance of Legal Issue

The second factor courts consider is the “the significance of
the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.”

Mercer, 401

F.3d at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A plaintiff

satisfies this factor when her case establishes “novel . . . [or]
important precedent.” Pitrolo, 589 Fed.App’x at 630. For example,
this factor favors attorneys’ fees when a plaintiff persuades a
circuit court to “provide[] the framework” for a new category of
statutory liability and then, operating within that framework, a
jury makes a “first-of-its-kind liability determination.”

Mercer,

401 F.3d at 207.
Here, determining whether this factor weighs for or against
attorneys’ fees is difficult.

Ms. Reyazuddin established no novel

or important precedent related to her underlying civil rights
claims, but she did establish novel precedent about what it means
to be a “prevailing party.”

See Reyazuddin III, 988 F.3d at 794.

Because it is unclear whether such precedent is relevant to the
legal significance inquiry, it is unclear whether Ms. Reyazuddin’s
suit carries the legal significance required for this factor to
weigh in her favor.
12

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 13 of 52

a.
To

start,

important

Ms. Reyazuddin’s
claims
Ms.

precedent

Reyazuddin
related

Rehabilitation Act claims.

underlying

established
to

her

civil

little

rights

novel

underlying

ADA

or
and

Rather, she obtained a jury verdict

stating that the County took an adverse employment action against
her and otherwise failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation.
(ECF No. 221).
“a

jury

But success on this factor “require[s] more” than

verdict

discrimination.”

stating

the

defendant

engaged

Pitrolo, 589 Fed.App’x at 630.

in

unlawful

That is because

such a verdict by itself “d[oes] not alter the landscape of civil
rights

law”—rather,

it

is

“wholly

determined

by

landscape” that existed before the plaintiff sued.

the

legal

Gray ex rel.

Alexander v. Bostic, 720 F.3d 887, 896 (11th Cir. 2013).
Resisting

this

conclusion,

Ms.

Reyazuddin

argues

that

Reyazuddin I—the Fourth Circuit’s opinion on her summary judgment
appeal—established two novel rules.

789 F.3d at 407.

She is

unpersuasive on both scores.
First, she argues that Reyazuddin I “established that the
failure

to

provide

meaningful

reasonable accommodation.”

work

can

be

[a]

(ECF No. 426-2, at 6).

denial

of

a

The Fourth

Circuit did note that “a reasonable accommodation should provide
a meaningful equal employment opportunity.”

Reyazuddin I, 789

F.3d at 416 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 66 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349)).
13

But that principle—

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 14 of 52

which

the

court

pulled

verbatim

from

Representatives report—is hardly novel.

a

1990

House

of

To the contrary: Courts

in and out of this circuit have been applying the same rule for
years.
Inc.,

See, e.g., Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md.,
923

F.Supp.

accommodation

should

720,

737

provide

(D.Md.
a

1996)

(“[A]

reasonable

meaningful

equal

employment

opportunity.”); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir.
1998) (“The intent of the ADA is that an employer needs only to
provide meaningful equal employment opportunities.”) (emphasis
removed). 4

If Ms. Reyazuddin instead means to argue that Reyazuddin I
established a new rule that an employer must provide an employee
with work she finds personally meaningful or fulfilling, the Fourth
Circuit held no such thing. Rather, it held that the County may
not have reasonably accommodated Ms. Reyazuddin because it
reassigned her from a full-time job to a part-time job. Reyazuddin
I, 789 F.3d at 416. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited
an email in which a county employee expressed concern that Ms.
Reyazuddin’s reassigned role may not provide her “with a full day
of meaningful work.” Id. That email, the court reasoned, was an
“example” of evidence showing that her reassignment “did not amount
to full-time employment,” which “create[d] a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the accommodation provided by the
County was reasonable.” Id. That is hardly a novel or landscapealtering conclusion. Months before Reyazuddin I, another court in
this circuit recognized that “reassignment to a permanent parttime position is not a reasonable accommodation . . . when an
employee’s primary position is full-time.” Nartey-Nolan v. Siemens
Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 91 F.Supp.3d 770, 775 (E.D.N.C. 2015);
see also Hoffman v. Zurich Fin. Servs., No. 06 C 4980, 2007 WL
4219414, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 28, 2007) (“[R]eassignment to a
permanent part-time position is not a reasonable accommodation.”)
(collecting cases).
4

14

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 15 of 52

Ms.
precedent

Reyazuddin
by

next

persuading

argues
the

that

Fourth

she

established

Circuit

to

hold

novel
that

a

government defendant’s undue hardship must be measured against the
defendant’s “budget as a whole.”
is not a novel proposition.

(ECF No. 426, at 8).

That again

True enough, the Fourth Circuit

reasoned that “[t]he County’s overall budget” is a “relevant
factor[]” in analyzing the County’s hardship.
F.3d at 418.

Reyazuddin I, 789

But that rule came straight from the Rehabilitation

Act itself, which states that courts may evaluate a defendant’s
undue hardship by considering “the overall financial resources of
the covered entity.”
this

case

established

42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(iii).
little

novel

precedent

All told,

related

to

the

underlying civil rights claims on which Ms. Reyazuddin prevailed
at trial.
b.

Ms. Reyazuddin’s pursuit of attorneys’ fees

Ms. Reyazuddin also argues that Reyazuddin III—the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion on her attorney fee appeal—established novel
precedent about what it means to be a “prevailing party.”
No. 426-2, at 6).

(ECF

That argument has some merit—Reyazuddin III did

indeed establish novel precedent.
There, the Fourth Circuit held—for the first time—that a
plaintiff qualifies as a “prevailing party” under civil rights
fee-shifting statutes when she achieves a merits victory in the
district court and then persuades a defendant to “capitulate”
15

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 16 of 52

before an injunction can be granted.
798.

Reyazuddin III, 988 F.3d at

Before that holding, a plaintiff could only be a prevailing

party if she had “obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree,
or settlement.”

S–1 and S–2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N.C., 21 F.3d

49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

And a plaintiff likewise could

not be a prevailing party if her lawsuit merely “operate[d] as a
catalyst for post-litigation changes in a defendant’s conduct.”
Id.

Reyazuddin III thus established novel precedent by creating

a whole new class of prevailing plaintiff: One who lacks an
enforceable judgment or settlement but still obtains a merits
victory that persuades a defendant to forfeit the relief sought.
988 F.3d at 798. 5
The County argues that Reyazuddin III is not so important
because it purported to reach a “narrow” holding, see 988 F.3d at
798.

(ECF No. 431, at 18).

The holding is “narrow” in that it

does not apply to a wide array of factual circumstances.

But that

does not change the fact that Reyazuddin III “changed the law” by
creating a new class of prevailing party.

See Gray, 720 F.3d at

896.

Other circuit courts have advanced similar rules, see, e.g.,
Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587 F.3d 445, 454 (1st Cir. 2009)
(collecting cases), but the legal significance factor is satisfied
by first-of-its-kind in-circuit precedent. See Doe v. Kidd, 656
Fed.App’x. 643, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Doe’s case was the first to
so hold in this Circuit[.]”) (emphasis added).
5

16

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 17 of 52

And however narrow that class may be, the Fourth Circuit has
already applied Reyazuddin III to hold another plaintiff to be a
prevailing party.

See Grabarczyk v. Stein, 32 F.4th 301, 307 (4th

Cir. 2022) (“Reyazuddin [III] governs this case.”).

There, the

Fourth Circuit noted that, “[u]nder Reyazuddin, when a state ceases
the activity challenged in a lawsuit after a court has ruled on
the lawfulness of the activity and in response to that ruling, the
plaintiff has prevailed.”
the

court

even

Grabarczyk, 32 F.4th at 307.

distinguished

prior

in-circuit

Indeed,

precedent

that

purported to require a prevailing party to have an enforceable
judgment, see S–1 and S–2, 21 F.3d at 51, by noting that the prior
precedent “had no occasion to address the different circumstances
we later passed on in Reyazuddin.”

Grabarczyk, 32 F.4th at 309.

Reyazuddin III appears to be something of a precedential milestone—
a case that established a new rule and altered the landscape of an
area of civil rights law.
It

remains

unclear,

however,

whether

relevant to the Farrar-Mercer analysis.

Reyazuddin

III

is

The second Mercer factor

is concerned with the significance of “the civil rights claim on
which the plaintiff prevailed.”

Pitrolo, 589 Fed.App’x. at 630;

see also Kane, 675 Fed.App’x. at 258 (“The second factor requires
us

to

consider

the

‘general

legal

importance’

of

underlying the plaintiff’s victory.”) (emphasis added).

the

issue

Thus, it

seems that the relevant consideration is whether a plaintiff
17

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 18 of 52

established a novel legal principle related to her underlying
“civil rights claim.”

Pitrolo, 589 Fed.App’x. at 630.

Ms.

Reyazuddin did not do that: She brought civil rights claims under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and she established little
novel precedent related to either of those claims.

Rather, she

established

pursuit

novel

precedent

related

to

her

later

of

attorneys’ fees, which would seemingly be irrelevant to the FarrarMercer analysis.
But none of the Fourth Circuit’s prior case law applying the
Farrar-Mercer factors has involved a plaintiff who established
novel precedent on an attorney fee issue unrelated to her merits
victory.

The Fourth Circuit has not yet “had . . . occasion to

address the different circumstances” present here.
F.4th at 309.

Grabarczyk, 32

Thus, it is unclear how much weight should be given

to imprecise language in prior opinions that are not on-point.
Luckily, the court need not resolve this conundrum because, as
explained below, even if her case is legally insignificant, Ms.
Reyzuddin has obtained sufficient relief to warrant attorneys’
fees.
3.

Public Purpose

Finally, courts ask “whether the litigation served a public
purpose,

as

opposed

to

simply

vindicating

the

plaintiff’s

individual rights.” Mercer, 401 F.3d at 207. A plaintiff prevails
on this factor when “the effect of . . . [her] case reaches well
18

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 19 of 52

beyond [the plaintiff] herself.”

Id. at 208.

For instance, the

public purpose factor favors attorneys’ fees when a plaintiff’s
case leads to a “change in [public] practice or policy,” Kane, 675
Fed.App’x. at 260, or where her success “prevent[s] the enforcement
of an unconstitutional government regulation,” Project Vote, 444
Fed.App’x.

at

664.

By

contrast,

this

factor

weighs

against

attorneys’ fees where “the only goal [of the case is] . . . personal
to the [p]laintiff.”

Pitrolo, 589 Fed.App’x. at 630.

By any of these measures, Ms. Reyazuddin falls short.

Her

suit did not stop the enforcement of an unconstitutional rule or
change a public policy.
anyone beyond herself.
individualized:
discriminating

She

Nor did she obtain relief that affected
Rather, the relief she achieved was highly

persuaded

against

her

a

(and

government
her

defendant

alone),

accommodations to her (and her alone).

and

to

to

stop

provide

In accommodating Ms.

Reyazuddin, the County built a special web application for her
exclusive use and performed extensive training “dedicated solely
to her.”

(ECF No. 300-2, at 12); (ECF No. 300-14, at 2-5).

Attaining these concessions was no doubt a meaningful victory, but
it did little to benefit anyone beyond Ms. Reyazuddin herself.
Ms. Reyazuddin argues that her case “opened MC311 as an
available job option for blind individuals,” (ECF No. 426, at 8),
but she does not specifically explain how it did so.

If she means

to argue that her suit persuaded the County to cease some kind of
19

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 20 of 52

widespread discriminatory hiring policy, then the record shows no
such policy existed.

Long before Ms. Reyazuddin’s trial victory,

MC311 employed at least two other blind people.

(ECF No. 431, at

18); (ECF No. 433, at 7); (ECF No. 382, at 21, 135, 154-55).

And

while Ms. Reyazuddin argues—without citation—that these employees
do not actually work at MC311 “on a regular basis,”
at 7), the opposite appears to be true.

(ECF No. 433,

One is MC311’s “call

center trainer”—he onboards the call center’s new hires.
382, at 24).

(ECF No.

The other is the call center’s “supervisor and

project manager”—he “manages . . . [MC311’s] daily operations.”
(ECF No. 382, at 155-56).

All told, the record disproves Ms.

Reyazuddin’s apparent assertion that her lawsuit blazed a path at
MC311 for blind employees.
If she instead means to argue that her suit persuaded the
County to implement measures that benefit other blind employees,
that argument likewise fails.

The software and web applications

that the County implemented to accommodate Ms. Reyazuddin were
intended to remedy her specific needs and were designed for her
exclusive use.

(ECF No. 300-14, at 2-5).

She points to nothing

in the record to suggest that any other blind MC311 employee
benefits

from—or

even

uses—the

accommodations

she

received.

Indeed, Ms. Reyazuddin admits that other employees do not use the
same accessibility technology that she does.

(ECF No. 433, at 7)

(noting that “other blind County employees” do not “use[] a screen
20

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 21 of 52

reader

like

Ms.

Reyazuddin”).

Thus,

whatever

benefit

her

accommodations provide, that benefit falls on Ms. Reyazuddin and
her alone. 6
4.

Weighing Factors

Even if Ms. Reyazuddin established no new precedent and
benefited no one beyond herself, she obtained sufficient relief to
warrant attorneys’ fees.

The Supreme Court has long held that the

extent of a plaintiff’s relief is the “most critical” factor in
deciding

her

fee

award.

Hensley,

461

U.S.

at

435.

Thus,

attorneys’ fees are warranted when a plaintiff achieves “excellent
results” or “substantial relief.”

See id. at 435, 440.

What is

more, when a plaintiff has obtained such relief, the Court has
never conditioned that plaintiff’s fee award on her ability to
establish

novel

precedent

Rather,

“substantial

“compensatory fee.”

or

benefit

others

relief”—standing

See id. at 435, 440.

beyond

herself.

alone—warrants

a

When a plaintiff obtains

The Fourth Circuit has also held that a lawsuit serves a
public purpose where it establishes novel precedent. See Mercer,
401 F.3d at 209-10; Kidd, 656 Fed.App’x. at 653 (plaintiff’s suit
served a public purpose because it “was the first to establish” a
novel kind of civil rights claim and “marked a milestone in the
development of the law”). Thus, if the novel “prevailing party”
precedent Ms. Reyazuddin established in Reyazuddin III counts
towards the Farrar-Mercer analysis, then the public purpose factor
would likewise favor attorneys’ fees. That said, this court need
not resolve this issue because Ms. Reyazuddin is entitled to
attorneys’ fees even if her case benefitted no one beyond herself.
6

21

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 22 of 52

substantial relief, that “result is what matters.”

Fox v. Vice,

563 U.S. 826, 834 (2011) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
That approach makes good sense: Congress authorized feeshifting in civil rights cases to improve judicial access for
plaintiffs who have “meritorious civil rights claims” but cannot
afford an attorney.

City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 576, 578.

A

plaintiff who prevails at trial and obtains her desired relief no
doubt has a “meritorious” claim.

Thus, even when her case is not

one-of-a-kind, awarding her an attorney fee fulfills Congress’s
“statutory purposes.”

See Fox, 563 U.S. at 834.

And while a small

handful of meritorious civil rights claims are ground-breaking and
publicly significant, most are not.

Indeed, “[t]he vast majority

of civil rights litigation does not result in ground-breaking
conclusions of law.”
1996).

Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.

If a fee award requires breaking new ground, then the “vast

majority”

of

plaintiffs

whose

claims

are

meritorious—but

not

ground-breaking—would be unable to recover fees and would thus
lose the judicial “access” that Congress sought to guarantee. City
of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 576, 578.
Here, attorneys’ fees are warranted because Ms. Reyazuddin
obtained “substantial relief.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
Indeed, she got most of what she originally asked for.
may

have

benefited

few

others

and

its

legal

Her suit

significance

is

unclear, but, in the end, when a plaintiff obtains “meaningful
22

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 23 of 52

relief,” “that result is what matters.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Fox, 563 U.S. at 834

Ms. Reyazuddin got the result

she wanted—and that is enough. 7
The Fourth Circuit has held that a case’s legal significance
and public purpose may “help” a court decide whether attorneys’
fees are warranted.

See Mercer, 401 F.3d at 204.

But it has never

held that a plaintiff who obtained most of the relief she sought
must also establish novel precedent or serve the public to get a
fee award. To the contrary—it has noted that “[t]he vast majority”
of

civil

rights

plaintiffs

conclusions of law.”
omitted).

do

not

establish

“ground-breaking

See id. at 210 (internal quotation marks

Thus, a plaintiff remains an “appropriate candidate[]

for [a] fee award[]” as long as she obtains “meaningful relief.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Just so here: Whether or

not her case is “ground-breaking,” Ms. Reyazuddin’s
relief” warrants attorneys’ fees.

“meaningful

Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).
That conclusion finds support in the very opinion on which
the Mercer factors are based: Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).

In Farrar, the Supreme

Cf. Burke v. Mattis, 315 F.Supp.3d 907, 913 (E.D.Va. 2018)
(attorneys’ fees warranted even though the “case was not novel,
did not establish important precedent, or otherwise advance the
law” in part because the plaintiff obtained the injunctive relief
she sought).
7

23

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 24 of 52

Court’s majority held that a prevailing plaintiff was not entitled
to attorneys’ fees because he obtained mere “nominal” relief—that
is, he “received nominal damages instead of the $17 million in
compensatory damages that [he] sought.”
103, 114 (1992).

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.

Writing separately, Justice O’Connor agreed with

the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff obtained “[n]ominal
relief” because he “asked for a bundle and got a pittance.”
at 121.

Id.

But she also reasoned that a plaintiff who obtains such

limited relief may still be entitled to attorneys’ fees if “other
factors”

make

his

victory

“material”

rather

than

merely

“technical.” Id. at 120. For instance, she reasoned, “his success
might be considered material if [he] also accomplished some public
goal” or if he “succeeded on a significant [legal] issue.” Id. at
121-22.
Justice O’Connor examined the suit’s public purpose and legal
significance as alternate paths to a fee award for a plaintiff
whose relief is limited—“other factors” that become relevant when
a plaintiff obtains mere nominal relief.

Id. at 121-22.

By

Justice O’Connor’s logic, when a plaintiff “ask[s] for a bundle
and g[ets] a pittance,” she may still obtain attorneys’ fees by
otherwise furthering “some public goal.”

Id. at 121.

But where—

as here—a plaintiff asks for a bundle and gets most of it, she has
already achieved a level of relief sufficient to warrant a fee

24

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 25 of 52

award, even with limited success on the “other factors.”

Id. at

120-21.
III. Reasonable Fee Analysis
Ultimately, Plaintiff seeks an award of $1,672,575.93 in fees
and $357,933.49 in costs and expenses, divided between Brown,
Goldstein & Levy, LLP (“BGL”) and TRE Legal Practice (“TRE”).

Ms.

Reyazuddin seeks attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for three
“blocks” of time:
(1) Pre-filing to the conclusion of the jury trial on February
26, 2016 ($1,191,836.60 in fees for 2556.8 hours billed);
(2) End of jury trial to October 26, 2016, the date on which
Ms. Reyazuddin moved to MC311 ($252,521.07 in fees for 567
hours billed); and
(3) Work done on her motion for attorneys’ fees ($228,218.26
in fees for 568.3 hours billed).
(ECF No. 426, 10-11, ECF No. 433 at 13).

She does not seek fees

for the time from her transfer to MC311 to the Fourth Circuit’s
Reyazuddin

II

decision

except

for

work

on

the

fee

petition.

Plaintiff asserts that she has already eliminated from her fee
request

any

billing

entries

unsuccessful, or duplicative.”

for

work

that

was

“unneeded,

(ECF No. 426, at 16).

Both of

Plaintiff’s law firms have also voluntarily reduced their fee
request as a matter of “billing discretion.”
16).

(ECF No. 426, at 9,

They do so in different ways: BGL applied a 5% reduction to
25

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 26 of 52

its lodestar calculation, (ECF No. 426, at 4, 12), and TRE did not
include 4.6% of its hours in its lodestar calculation to account
for work that was “duplicati[ve]” and “inefficien[t],” (ECF No.
426-8, at 8).
The County objects to Plaintiff’s calculation of fees, costs,
and expenses, arguing that the hours requested are the result of
overstaffing, the requested rates are unreasonable, and there
should be an overall reduction to account for the minimal degree
of success.

It also contests some of the expenses sought.

Although Plaintiff has, in some ways, appropriately limited
her request for attorneys’ fees, she oversteps in other ways.

As

will be discussed, the hourly rates are too high, particularly
when she seeks fees for multiple highly paid lawyers in overlapping
roles.

She

also

does

not

apply

a

sufficient

reduction

for

limitations on success.
A reasonable fee is one that is “adequate to attract competent
counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys.”
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).

Blum

To calculate a reasonable

fee award, a court follows “a three-step process.”
Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013).

McAfee v.

First, it “determine[s]

the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours
expended times a reasonable rate.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Second,

it

“subtract[s]

fees

for

hours

unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones.”
26

spent

on

Id. (internal

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 27 of 52

quotation marks omitted). Third, it awards “some percentage of the
remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by
the plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.

Lodestar Calculation

First, courts calculate the lodestar fee award by multiplying
the reasonable hours a party’s attorneys expended by a reasonable
hourly rate.

McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88.

To decide reasonable hours

and rates, courts consider the so-called Johnson factors, which
are:

(1)

the

time

and

labor

expended;

(2)

the

novelty

and

difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required properly
to

perform

the

legal

services

rendered;

(4)

the

attorney’s

opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at
the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by
the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal
community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of
the professional relationship between attorney and client; and
(12) attorney’s fees awards in similar cases. Id. at 88 n.5 (citing
Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978)).
While the Johnson factors assist a court in calculating a
reasonable fee award, a district court need not “consider all
twelve

Johnson

factors.”

Martin
27

v.

Mecklenburg

County,

151

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 28 of 52

Fed.App’x. 275, 283 (4th Cir. 2005); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434
n.9 (“The district court also may consider other factors identified
in Johnson.”) (emphasis added). 8
Johnson

factor

is

implicitly

And when consideration of a

“incorporated

into

the

analysis,” a court need not analyze it “a second time.”

lodestar
E. Assoc.

Coal Corp. v. Dir., OWCP, 724 F.3d 561, 570 (4th Cir. 2013).
Here, several Johnson factors are relevant to this case, and
they are discussed in more detail below.

For instance, the

lodestar calculation and the court’s subsequent degree-of-success
reduction turn in part on the court’s consideration of Factor 1
(the time attorneys expended in this case), Factor 3 (the skill
required to render the services performed), Factor 5 (customary
fees for similar work), Factor 8 (results obtained), Factor 9
(counsel’s experience), and Factor 12 (fee awards in other cases).
Meanwhile, Factor 2—the “novelty of the legal theories” in the
case, see Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 180
(4th Cir. 1994)—carries unclear weight because, as discussed above,
Ms. Reyazuddin’s underlying claims did not involve novel legal
issues, but her pursuit of attorneys’ fees did.

See also In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 86 F.3d 364, 376 (4th
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court is under no obligation to go
through the inquiry of th[e] [Johnson] factors that do not fit.”);
Baust v. City of Virginia Beach, 574 F.Supp.3d 358, 364 (E.D.Va.
2021) (“A court need not consider all twelve Johnson factors, only
those relevant to the particular litigation.”).
8

28

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 29 of 52

Finally, there are several Johnson factors that carry little
weight because they “do not fit” this case.
Co., Inc., 86 F.3d at 376.

In re A.H. Robins

Factor 4 is not relevant because

Plaintiff asserts that her attorneys’ “acceptance of this case”
did not “preclu[de] . . . other employment.”
23).

(ECF No. 426, at

Factor 7 likewise does not apply because Plaintiff asserts

that “time limitations” were not “imposed by the client or the
circumstances.” (ECF No. 426, at 23).

Factor 10 does not apply

because Plaintiff asserts that this case was not “undesirable.”
(ECF No. 426, at 23).

And Factor 11 is not relevant because

“Plaintiff was not previously known to counsel.”

(ECF No. 426, at

23).
1.

Reasonable Rates

To determine reasonable hourly rates, a court “looks to the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”

Perdue v.

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

While a court may rely on affidavits from local

attorneys opining on the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s requested
rates, see Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235,
244-45 (4th Cir. 2009), it may also “take judicial notice of its
own knowledge of the local legal market,” see Carrera v. EMD Sales,
Inc., No. 17-3066-JKB, 2021 WL 3856287, at *4 (D.Md. Aug. 27,
2021).

And in the District of Maryland, “that ‘market knowledge’

is embedded in . . . Local Rules, Appendix B,” which provide
29

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 30 of 52

guideline rates that vary based on an attorney’s experience level.
Id. (quoting Chaten v. Marketsmart LLC, No. 19-1165-PX, 2020 WL
4726631, at *3 (D.Md. Aug. 14, 2020)).
The Appendix B guideline rates are as follows: $150-225 for
lawyers admitted to the bar less than five years; $165-300 for
lawyers admitted for five to eight years; $225-350 for lawyers
admitted for nine to fourteen years; $275-425 for lawyers admitted
for fifteen to nineteen years; and $300-$475 for lawyers admitted
for twenty years or more. The rate for paralegals and law clerks
is $95-150.
Although

these

rates

“presumptively reasonable.”

are

not

“binding,”

they

are

Carrera, 2021 WL 3856287, at *4

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, while a plaintiff may

obtain an “upward departure[]” from the guideline rates, see id.,
she bears “[t]he burden . . .

to establish the reasonableness of

a requested rate.”

Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation

marks

To

omitted).

carry

that

burden,

she

must

“produce

satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in
the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an
award.”

Id. at 244-45.

Ms. Reyazuddin requests the following rates for her attorneys
and paralegals, all of which are higher than the guideline rates
in the District of Maryland:

30

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 31 of 52

•

Daniel F. Goldstein (20+ years admitted to the bar throughout
this litigation): $625

•

Joseph B. Espo (20+ years admitted to the bar throughout this
litigation): $595

•

Timothy R. Elder (0-6 years admitted to the bar when he worked
on this case; 12 years now): $525

•

Rebecca Rodgers (1-2 years admitted to the bar when she worked
on this case; 11 years now): $450

•

Kevin Docherty (6-9 years admitted to the bar when he worked
on this case; 10 years now): $475

•

Mathias L. Niska (1-3 years admitted to the bar when he worked
on this case; 10 years now): $450

•

Albert Elia (1-2 years admitted to the bar when he worked on
this case; 8 years now): $390

•

Paralegal Barbara Thompkinson: $265

•

Paralegal Angela Lima: $240

•

Paralegal Kristopher Nelson: $265
Ms. Reyazuddin has met her burden to justify an hourly rate

a bit higher than the current guideline rates for Mr. Goldstein
and

Mr.

Espo.

Both

are

highly

experienced

and

credentialed

attorneys, and Ms. Reyazuddin has presented evidence that a local
attorney

with

similar

experience

31

charges

a

rate

above

the

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 32 of 52

guidelines. (ECF No. 426-20). Their requested rates are, however,
too high. Their time will be assessed at $550 per hour.
On the other hand, as will be explained, Ms. Reyazuddin
requests rates that are too high for her other attorneys, and rates
within the guidelines will be applied.

First, for Mr. Elder, she

requests

Mr.

a

specialized

rate

of

$525

experience

per

hour.

litigating

technology for blind people.

cases

Elder

no

involving

doubt

has

assistive

(ECF No. 426-8, at 5) (explaining

Mr. Elder’s work as co-counsel on a case in which the Ninth Circuit
held that blind examinees may take the Bar Exam using assistive
technology, see Enyart v. Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs, Inc., 630
F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011)).

But Ms. Reyazuddin has not justified

why Mr. Elder—who had fewer than six years of legal experience
throughout his work on this case—is entitled to a rate so far above
the guidelines.

Indeed, as Plaintiff’s own affidavits show, Omar

Melehy—a local attorney with decades of experience—charges about
$600 per hour, which is not much higher than the rate Mr. Elder
requests.

(ECF No. 426-20, at 6).

She also requests more than

$300,000 for an expert in the same field.

(ECF No. 426-24).

The

court will reduce Mr. Elder’s rate to $200 per hour for the first
year that he worked on this case as an associate at BGL and $250
per hour for the remaining hours he billed to this case while
working for TRE.

32

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 33 of 52

The rates for Ms. Reyazuddin’s other attorneys will also be
reduced to match the guidelines.

Mr. Niska, Ms. Rodgers, and Mr.

Elia all had fewer than two years of legal experience when they
worked on this case.

Mr. Docherty likewise had fewer than ten

years of experience.

Yet, for each of these attorneys, Ms.

Reyazuddin requests rates appropriate under the guidelines for
attorneys with 15+ years of experience.
To justify these upward departures, she argues that these are
“the same rates that Plaintiff’s counsel has billed and been paid.”
(ECF No. 433, at 11).

But while an attorney’s “customary rate[]”

is “a Johnson factor to consider,” it is “not dispositive,” and
the guideline rates “are more representative of a broader range of
fees

charged

Maryland.”

by

practitioners

appearing

in

federal

court

in

Carrera, 2021 WL 3856287, at *6 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Thus, courts in this district have declined to

depart from the guideline rates to match an attorney’s customary
fee.

See, e.g., id.; Burley v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. 18-1743-

SAG, 2020 WL 1984906, at *4 (D.Md. Apr. 27, 2020).
Ms. Reyazuddin next argues that the court should award fees
based on her attorneys’ current experience levels “to compensate
for delay in payment.”

(ECF No. 433, at 10).

To be sure, “payment

today for services rendered long in the past deprives the eventual
recipient . . . of the use of the money in the meantime,” which,
“in an inflationary era, is valuable.”
33

West v. Potter, 717 F.3d

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 34 of 52

1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, a court “must consider the effect of delay in payment . . .
on the calculation of a reasonable fee.”

Johannssen v. Dist. No.

1–Pac. Coast Dist., MEBA Pension Plan, 292 F.3d 159, 180 (4th Cir.
2002), abrogated on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,
554 U.S. 105 (2008).

A district court “retains discretion to

determine the particular method for accounting for the lost timevalue of money due to delay in payment.”

Id.

For instance, a

court may calculate a fee award using “current hourly rates instead
of historical ones,” see Reaching Hearts Intern., Inc. v. Prince
George’s County, 478 Fed.App’x. 54, 60 (4th Cir. 2012), or instead
“adjust[] the fee . . . to reflect [the] present value” of the
services based on the experience that the attorney had when she
performed the work, see Perdue, 559 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asks not only for inflation-adjusted rates,
but for her attorneys to be paid based on experience they did not
have when they performed the work for which they are billing.
Because this litigation has stretched nearly twelve years, that
approach

would

result

in

a

particularly

unfair

windfall

for

Plaintiff’s counsel—it would allow certain lawyers to be paid as
if they had more than a decade of experience, even though they
actually had only a couple of years of experience when they did
the work.

That result would be inappropriate because a reasonable
34

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 35 of 52

hourly rate should generally reflect the experience an attorney
had “when [he] actually performed the work.” Randolph v. PowerComm
Constr., Inc., No. 13-1696-GJH, 2016 WL 6462167, at *4 (D.Md. Oct.
31, 2016), vacated on other grounds, Randolph v. PowerComm Constr.,
Inc., 715 Fed.App’x. 227 (4th Cir. 2017). 9
What is more, applying the guideline rates here actually helps
neutralize

any

losses

caused

by

the

time

value

of

money.

Plaintiff’s counsel began work on this case in 2010—four years
before the guideline rates were last updated in 2014.

Applying

the guideline rates to work that Plaintiff’s counsel performed
before 2014 already accounts for some losses the delay may have

See also Flores v. Hoge, No. 15-1988-DKC, 2016 WL 2924918,
at *5 (D.Md. May 19, 2016) (deciding hourly rate by noting that
“when performing the work on this case, the attorneys had been
admitted to the bar for approximately six years”); Thompson v.
Barrett, 599 F.Supp. 806, 814 (D.D.C. 1984) (noting that because
a reasonable fee should “reflect[] the background, experience and
expertise” an attorney had “at the time the services were
performed,” “[i]t would be a windfall indeed if services performed
almost twelve years ago . . . could now be reimbursed” at a rate
reflecting experience the attorney did not have when he worked the
case).
Ms. Reyazuddin also points to several out-of-circuit cases in
which a court calculated attorneys’ fees using “an attorney’s
hourly rate at the time of the fee request, rather than the rate
that applied at the time the work was performed, to compensate for
delay in payment.” (ECF No. 433, at 10). But reasonable rates
are decided by looking to the “the relevant community,” see Perdue,
559 U.S. at 551, and courts in the district of Maryland have in
the past awarded attorneys’ fees based on the experience an
attorney had “when [he] actually performed the work, rather than
applying the current rate to all hours of work performed in a
case.” Randolph, 2016 WL 6462167, at *4; Flores, 2016 WL 2924918,
at *5.
9

35

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caused.

And Plaintiff’s counsel has not actually experienced a

“delay in the payment of fees,” see Perdue, 559 U.S. at 556,
because her attorneys were “paid along the way” by a third-party
funder—the National Federation of the Blind.
10).

(ECF No. 433, at

Thus, it is less important for Plaintiff’s counsel to be

“[c]ompensate[ed]” through a rate adjustment.

Perdue, 559 U.S. at

556. 10
Nor can Ms. Reyazuddin justify an upward departure from the
guideline rates simply by arguing that the guidelines are outdated.
(ECF No. 426, at 19).

While the guideline rates were last updated

in 2014, that fact “is not automatically dispositive with respect
to whether they reflect prevailing market rates in the community.”
Carrera, 2021 WL 3856287, at *5.

Indeed, courts in the district

of Maryland continue to apply the guidelines rates in cases where
a plaintiff cannot justify an upward departure.

See, e.g., id.;

Orellana v. Don Pollo of Bethesda, Inc., No. 20-2795-PWG, 2021 WL
2187014, at *4 (D.Md. May 28, 2021); Castro v. Early Learning
Language Acads., LLC, No. 18-2421-CBD, 2021 WL 915106, at *6 (D.Md.
Mar. 9, 2021).

And while plaintiff points to a recent case in

which her attorneys’ requested rates were approved, see Boyd v.
SFS Comms., LLC, No. 15-3068-PJM (D.Md. Aug. 24, 2021), ECF No.
The Fourth Circuit has not yet answered whether a fee award
should account for delay of payment in a case where Plaintiff’s
counsel received “ongoing payments . . . during the litigation.”
See Reaching Hearts, 478 Fed.App’x. at 61-62.
10

36

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197, she likewise admits that fee petition was “unopposed.”

(ECF

No. 433, at 12). 11
To prove that Mr. Docherty, Mr. Elia, Ms. Rodgers, and Mr.
Niska are entitled to the higher rates they seek, Ms. Reyazuddin
must provide “specific evidence” that those rates match the market
“for the type of work for which [s]he seeks an award.”

See

Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ms.

Reyazuddin’s evidence is not sufficiently specific.

While she

provides affidavits from local attorneys, those affidavits merely
state that Plaintiff’s requested rates as a whole are “generally
comparable” to “market rates,” (ECF No. 426-21, at 3), and “in
line with” rates charged at another firm, (ECF No. 426-20, at 5).
Beyond

those

generalized

statements,

Ms.

Reyazuddin

does

not

provide specific evidence that local attorneys with experience
comparable to Mr. Docherty, Mr. Elia, Ms. Rodgers, and Mr. Niska
charge the requested rates for comparable work.

Thus, to match

the guidelines, Mr. Docherty’s rate will be reduced to $400, and
the rates for Mr. Elia, Ms. Rodgers, and Mr. Niska will be reduced
to $200.

Ms. Reyazuddin also relies on a case in which the Maryland
Bankruptcy Court awarded heightened attorney fees to the global
law firm Littler Mendelson. See In re: Creative Hairdressers, Inc.,
No. 20-14583 (D.Md.Bank. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. 778.
Even if
that case were comparable, that fee request was likewise unopposed
and granted in a two-page unreasoned order. See id. at ECF No.
793.
11

37

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Finally, Ms. Reyazuddin’s requested rates for the paralegals
that worked on her case are also too high.

Ms. Reyazuddin provides

no specific evidence to explain why these paralegals ought to
receive a rate more than one hundred dollars greater than the
guideline rate for paralegals.

Thus, because Ms. Reyazuddin

“do[es] not explain why the experience or services rendered by
each of [her] paralegals . . . justify an hourly rate above the .
. . relevant Appendix B rate,” their time will be billed at $150
per hour.

Carrera, 2021 WL 3856287, at *6.
2.

Reasonable Hours

To determine reasonable hours expended, a court must “exclude
from

its

.

.

.

fee

calculation”

“hours

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”

that

are

excessive,

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

For example, a court may reduce Plaintiff’s requested hours when
Plaintiff’s

counsel

“overstaffed”

the

case,

id.,

or

when

Plaintiff’s hours are “duplicative.” Nelson v. A & H Motors, Inc.,
No. 12-2288-JKS, 2013 WL 388991, at *1 (D.Md. Jan. 30, 2013).
Plaintiff has the burden to “show that the number of hours for
which [s]he seeks reimbursement is reasonable.”

Carrera, 2021 WL

3856287, at *7 (quoting Travis v. Prime Lending, Civ. No. NKM-070065, 2008 WL 2397330, at *4 (W.D.Va. June 12, 2008)).
This court has adopted some guidelines for compensable time
in Appendix B to the Local Rules which appear to have been followed
in this fee request.

For example, only one lawyer is to be
38

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compensated for attending depositions or hearings, or for intraoffice conferences, unless specifically justified.
The

County

argues

that

Plaintiff’s

requested

hours

are

unreasonable because it claims that her counsel overstaffed the
case—both by having seven attorneys work the case throughout
litigation and by having two highly experienced attorneys attend
the trial.

(ECF No. 431, at 23-24).

The County also argues that

Plaintiff’s counsel billed too many hours for Block 1 (from prefiling to the conclusion of trial) because the trial presented
“common

issues”

such

as

“reasonable

accommodation,

adverse

employment action, undue burden and non-economic damages.”
No. 431, at 24).

(ECF

Ms. Reyazuddin responds that, while seven

attorneys worked her case, their work was “largely sequential, not
concurrent” and that, at any given time, the case “was generally
staffed with one partner and one associate.”

(ECF No. 433, at 8).

She also argues that her counsel did not overstaff the trial
because she “bore the burden of proof” and her “legal team was
staffed with the resources she needed to win.”

(ECF No. 433, at

8-9).
After considering the parties’ arguments and the Johnson
factors, the court finds that the hours Plaintiff’s counsel billed
for the jury trial are excessive.

Three attorneys attended trial,

and all three took significant roles.

But it was a luxury and not

a necessity to have all of them there.

Surely, either Mr. Espo or

39

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 40 of 52

Mr. Goldstein could have conducted the trial with some assistance.
Indeed, at times, Mr. Goldstein completed tasks at trial that did
not require his advanced experience. He at one point held physical
exhibits to show the court what was at issue.

At other points, he

assisted in making sure Ms. Reyazuddin knew she could take a throat
lozenge if needed and in inquiring if a spectator could use her
own equipment to access the audio.

While helpful, these tasks

could have been performed by a much less experienced person,
particularly when Mr. Espo was also at trial.

To remedy this

overstaffing, the court will remove from its lodestar calculation
all hours Mr. Goldstein billed during Block 1 except for the 95
hours that he spent on the summary judgment appeal in Reyazuddin
I.

(ECF No. 433-2, at 3, 19-20).
The County’s other arguments for hour reductions in Block 1

are unavailing.

While seven total attorneys did indeed work

Plaintiff’s

throughout

case

the

course

of

the

11-year-long

litigation, Plaintiff’s counsel usually had one partner and one
associate working the case at any given time, with minimal overlap.
(ECF No. 433, at 8).

Nor is the County right to argue that

Plaintiff’s counsel spent too long preparing for trial because the
trial involved “common issues.”
involved

live

complex

expert

demonstrations
testimony.

of
The

The trial was not simple—it
screen
County

reader
fails

technology
to

identify

and
any

specific instances in which it believed that a particular attorney
40

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 41 of 52

spent too long on a particular trial-preparation task, and the
court does not find unreasonable the overall hours Plaintiff’s
counsel billed while preparing for trial, particularly when Mr.
Goldstein’s hours have been removed. 12
The County also objects to all hours and expenses for Block
2, the time from the jury verdict until Plaintiff’s transfer to
MC311. (ECF No. 431-1, at 6).
and

motions

practice

had

It argues that all of the discovery

to

relate

to

Plaintiff’s

injunctive relief, as to which she was unsuccessful.

requested
Plaintiff

counters that she is entitled to compensation for this work because
she did achieve the injunctive relief she sought—transfer to MC311—
and that work during this time helped her to obtain that relief.
(ECF No. 433, at 6).

While not entirely free from doubt, the court

will not reduce the lodestar by entirely eliminating these hours.
It may have been that preparing for the hearing on injunctive
relief, with its attendant discovery and motions practice, is what
ultimately persuaded the County to make the transfer and to prepare
the necessary software upgrades.

The Fourth Circuit described the

transfer as the County’s capitulation.

The timing may, on the

Indeed, throughout the entirety of this more-than-decadelong litigation, the County identifies only one specific instance
in which it believed that a particular attorney spent too long on
a particular task: It argues that Mr. Elder spent too long reading
cross-motions for summary judgment (6.1 hours). (ECF No. 431, at
24).
But as Plaintiff notes, she has not counted that billing
entry toward her requested fee award. (ECF No. 433, at 8).
12

41

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 42 of 52

other hand, have been merely fortuitous and unaffected by the
litigation that was ongoing.

It is also likely that some of the

discovery from this period was used in the later, unsuccessful,
attempt to persuade the court that her position at MC311 was not
adequate.

But that fact does not convert otherwise compensable

time to work on an unsuccessful claim.

The doubt about this time

will, however, be considered in the degree of success reduction.
All told, after applying the reduced hourly rates and reducing
Plaintiff’s requested hours, the lodestar is $1,117,700.00.
B.

Subtracting Fees for Unsuccessful Claims

After calculating the lodestar, a court “subtract[s] fees for
hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones.”
Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Ms. Reyazuddin has already omitted the hours her counsel
spent unsuccessfully pursuing some of her claims and injunctive
and declaratory relief after the County transferred her to MC311.
(ECF No. 26, at 10-11). In contrast, other time “devoted generally
to the litigation as a whole”, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, is
indivisible.

In such a case, “the district court should focus on

the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff
in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”
Id.
Ms. Reyazuddin requests fees only for hours spent on matters
on which she succeeded (at least in part), including the jury
42

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 43 of 52

trial, the successful appeal in Reyazuddin I, and her successful
pursuit of attorney fees.

Thus, no further subtractions for

unrelated, unsuccessful claims are warranted.

See Carrera, 2021

WL 3856287, at *4 (declining to make “further reductions . . .
under the second prong” because “counsel for Plaintiffs has already
omitted hours spent in pursuit of unsuccessful motions”).

Overall

degree of success will be assessed next.
C.

Degree-of-Success Adjustment

Finally,

a

court

may

reduce

a

plaintiff’s

“depending on the [plaintiff’s] degree of success.”
F.3d at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted).

fee

McAfee, 738

A plaintiff’s fee

award should “properly reflect her success in th[e] case.”
94.

award,

Id. at

And if a plaintiff achieves “only part of the success she

sought, the lodestar amount may be excessive.”

Id. at 93. Indeed,

even when—as here—a plaintiff has achieved “significant” relief,
the court may reduce the fee award if the plaintiff’s success “is
limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.”
Id. at 92.

For instance, a court may reduce a fee award when a

plaintiff pursues—and fails to obtain—damages at trial.
93.

Id. at

The County argues that a 90% reduction is appropriate,

reducing the award to less than $100,000. (ECF No. 431, at 38).
Here,

in

obtaining

a

transfer

obtained “substantial relief.”

to

MC311,

Ms.

Reyazuddin

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.

But her

success was also limited in other ways, which warrants a reduction
43

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 44 of 52

to her fee.

Id. at 439-40 (“A reduced fee award is appropriate if

the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the
scope of the litigation as a whole.”) (emphasis added). While she
ultimately was transferred to MC311, as noted at the outset, she
may have gotten there without litigation and it is far from
conceded that the litigation, particularly in Block 2, played any
role.

The County always recognized its obligation to provide a

reasonable accommodation in the form of alternate work until it
would be able economically to transfer her to an accessible MC311.
The bulk of the litigation surrounded the County’s attempts to do
so and the County’s assertion of undue hardship.

Plaintiff also

sought $129,000 in damages at trial—yet the jury gave her $0.

That

failure is relevant to Johnson Factor 12 (fee awards in similar
cases)

because—as

the

County

points

out—“Plaintiff

fails

to

identify any cases in which [a plaintiff] was awarded zero dollars,
zero injunctive relief and zero declaratory relief, but still
achieved [over $1 million] dollars in attorney’s fees.”
431, at 37-38).
position

she

(ECF No.

And no court decided whether the final alternate
was

offered

before

trial

was

a

reasonable

accommodation.
All told, this case, vigorously litigated by both sides, has
taken more than a decade to get to this point, with a jury trial,
a

bench

trial,

and

three

appeals

to

Understandably, the fee request is large.
44

the

Fourth

Circuit.

But, even with the

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 45 of 52

reductions in the lodestar fashioned above, an attorneys’ fee over
$1 million is simply too high. Thus, the court will apply an
overall reduction of 30%, which includes the reductions suggested
by Plaintiff’s counsel.
IV.

Costs and Expenses
Ms. Reyazuddin requests reimbursement for costs and expenses

in the amount of $357,933.49.
“Expert Fees.”
specifically

This includes $302,400.00 for

(ECF No. 426-2, at 13).

with

Ms.

Reyazuddin’s

The County takes issue

request

for

expert

fees

because, according to its reading of the statute, expert fees are
not recoverable under the Rehabilitation Act.
36).

Ms.

Reyazuddin

acknowledges

that

there

(ECF No. 431 at
is

a

split

of

authority among district courts, and that no circuit court—let
alone

the

Fourth

Circuit—has

addressed

whether

a

prevailing

plaintiff is entitled to recover expert witness fees in a case
brought under The Rehabilitation Act. (ECF No. 429).
Despite the absence of clear guidance, Ms. Rayazuddin argues
that the 2009 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act clarified that
any remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3), including
“expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee,” are available under
the Rehabilitation Act. (ECF No. 433).
The Rehabilitation Act provides:
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth
in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsection
45

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 46 of 52

(e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2000e-5), applied to claims of discrimination
in compensation) shall be available to any
person aggrieved by any act or failure to act
by any recipient of Federal assistance or
Federal
provider
of
such
assistance
under section 794 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).

The portion in parentheses—“(and in

subsection (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5),
applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)”—was added in
2009.

See Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), which
begins at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, contains no provision that allows
prevailing plaintiffs to recover expert fees as a remedy.

The

Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 allows for recovery
of attorney’s fees in actions proceeding under Title VI, among
other civil rights laws not relevant here, but it only allows for
recovery of expert fees in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1981a (not pertinent to Ms. Reyazuddin’s case). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b).

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)

begins at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Title VII contains a provision that

allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover expert fees as well as
attorney’s fees at § 2000e-5(k).
The

question

is

essentially

whether,

in

adding

the

parenthetical to 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2), Congress intended to
extend the remedies available under Title VII only to “claims of
discrimination in compensation” or more broadly to “any person
46

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 47 of 52

aggrieved” under the Rehabilitation Act.

As the parties note,

this is an unsettled question of law about which no circuit court
has expressed an opinion.
The plain text of the provision conditions the expanded
remedies to those complaining of “discrimination in compensation.”
Because Ms. Reyazuddin has not claimed such discrimination, the
remedies in Title VII are not available to her—she may only take
advantage of the remedies available under Title VI.

This reading

is supported by language in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the
law that amended the Rehabilitation Act in 2009.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 amended Title VII
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “to clarify that a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is
unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid
pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice.”

Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.

It also “modif[ied]

the operation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973” to reflect that clarification.
Id.

To that end, the legislation states that the amendments made

to Title VII at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) “shall apply to claims of
discrimination in compensation brought under sections 501 and 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”

Id.

This context emphasizes

Congress’s intention that the language added to the Rehabilitation
Act incorporating the Title VII remedies “set forth . . . in
47

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 48 of 52

subsection (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5)”
only be “applied to claims of discrimination in compensation”
brought under the Rehabilitation Act.
the legislative history.

This is also supported by

See 155 Cong. Rec. H547 (daily ed. Jan.

27, 2009) (statement of Rep. George Miller) (“Finally, S. 181
ensures that these simple reforms extend to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act to provide these same protections for victims
of age and disability discrimination.”).
Having

brought

no

claims

involving

discrimination

in

compensation, Ms. Reyazuddin can only avail herself of the remedies
set forth in Title VI. 13

Therefore, she is not entitled to

There does not appear to be a decision by any other court
interpreting the 2009 amendments in this way. Indeed, many other
district courts have interpreted the 2009 amendments as extending
the remedies available under Title VII to all prevailing
Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs. See, e.g., Lawton v. Success Acad.
Of Fort Greene, No. 15-cv-07058-FB-SMG, 2021 WL 911981, at *1-2
(E.D.N.Y. March 10, 2021) (stating that “[n]umerous courts have
made clear that the 2009 Amendment to [the Rehabilitation Act]
allows for the reimbursement of expert fees” and authorizing the
recovery of expert fees in a case not involving discrimination in
compensation); Jones v. George Fox Univ., No. 3:19-cv-0005-JR,
2022 WL 4120783, at *4 (D.Or. Sept. 9, 2022) (noting that
“amendments to the Act indicate that remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) shall be available to any person aggrieved
under section 794” but citing a section in Title VII for the
proposition that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees)
as part of the costs” for a Rehabilitation Act case not involving
pay discrimination); I.H. ex rel D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch.
Dist., 842 F.Supp.2d 762, 777 (M.D.Pa. 2012) (“We believe that
[the Rehabilitation Act] thus contemplates an award of expert fees
13

48

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 49 of 52

compensation for expert fees.

In so concluding, this court is

mindful of the Supreme Court’s holding in W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey that it “transcends the judicial function” for courts
to shift expert fees when not explicitly authorized to do so by
statute. 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (quoting Iselin v. United States,
270 U.S. 245, 250–251 (1926)).
Even if Ms. Reyazuddin were eligible to recover expert fees,
she has not made the requisite showing of reasonableness for her
request for $302,400 in expert fees. It is Ms. Reyazuddin’s burden
to establish the reasonableness of her expert fees.

See Royal

Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Malachinski, No. 96-C-6135, 2001 WL
290308, at *16 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 20, 2001).

She points out that her

expert was instrumental to her success in the case and that the
County subsequently adopted many of the expert’s recommendations.
(ECF No. 426, at 19).

But Ms. Reyazuddin provides no evidence

supporting the exorbitant amount of expert fees beyond a list of
dates and payments that add up to $302,400.00.
250-51).

(ECF No. 426-3, at

It is unclear, for example, how many hours the expert

spent working on the case, what work she performed on certain
dates, or what rate she charged.

“When the reasonableness of an

expert’s fees is not fully explained, the Court may exercise its
to the prevailing party in its assumption of the rights and
remedies of the Civil Rights Act.”).
However, analysis by the
courts that have addressed this question has been underdeveloped
and sometimes contradictory.
49

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 50 of 52

discretion

to

determine

a

reasonable

fee.”

Penberg

v.

HealthBridge Mgmt., No. 08-CV-1534(CLP), 2011 WL 1100103, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (collecting cases).

Courts have “denied

requested expert fees in their entirety where the documentation
proffered in support of the award was ‘plainly deficient,’ in that
it failed to itemize the expert’s hourly rate, number of hours
spent, and a description of the work performed.” Ariza v. Luxottica
Retail N. Am., No. 17-CV-5216(PKC)(RLM), 2022 WL 970779, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022).

In any event, Ms. Reyazuddin’s request

for expert fees will be denied.
The County does not dispute the other $55,533.49 in costs and
expenses Ms. Reyazuddin requests, other than for the reasons
previously discussed—her “minimal degree of success.”
The Fourth Circuit has recognized a “presumption that costs
are to be awarded to the prevailing party,” which a district court
can only overcome “by articulating some good reason for doing so.”
Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Only those costs delineated

in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 may be recovered as costs.

Wyne v. Medo

Indus., Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d 584, 586 (D.Md. 2004).

The following

costs for which Ms. Reyazuddin seeks reimbursement are allowed
under § 1920:
Process,

Hearing/Trial

Copying,

Transcripts,

Deposition

Videographers, and Witness Fees.
50

Court

Costs,

Transcripts,

Private

Deposition

All other expenses are not

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 51 of 52

taxable as costs under § 1920 but are recoverable as part of
attorney’s fees: those related to travel, research, technology
used

in

preparation

for

trial,

teleconference,

postage,

and

delivery services. 14
Parties seeking costs must generally support their request
with

an

affidavit

that

each

cost

“is

correct

and

has

been

necessarily incurred in the case and that the services for which
fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed.”
28 U.S.C. § 1924.

Ms. Reyazuddin’s attorneys have submitted

affidavits that describe the costs and expenses she requests
(though not in great detail), state that they were “necessary for
the results obtained,” and attach spreadsheets listing each cost
and the date it was incurred.
8, 10).

(ECF Nos. 426-2 through 426-5, 426-

The affidavit from BGL acknowledges that receipts were

not included but offers to provide them if required.
County

does

not

challenge

the

specific

costs

Because the
and

expenses

requested, other than expert fees, Ms. Reyazuddin’s request for
costs and expenses in the amount of $55,533.49 will be granted.
V.

Conclusion
Ms. Reyazuddin’s motion for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and

costs, will be granted in part and denied in part.

The court will

See Thomas v. Treasury Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.R.D. 364, 372
(D.Md. 1994) (noting that costs for legal research, local
transportation, postage, and courier services are part of
attorneys’ fees).
14

51

Case 8:11-cv-00951-DKC Document 438 Filed 09/30/22 Page 52 of 52

award $782,390 in attorneys’ fees and $55,533.49 in costs and
expenses.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

52