Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 45 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/27/12. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
YASMIN REYAZUDDIN
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-0951

:
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Yasmin Reyazuddin commenced this action on April
12,

2011,

by

filing

a

complaint

against

Montgomery

County,

Maryland (“the County”), alleging disability discrimination in
violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1

The

complaint recites that Plaintiff, who is blind, worked for a
number of years as an information specialist in the telephone
call

center

of

the

Services (“HHS”).
those

associated

February 2010.

County’s

Department

of

Health

and

Human

The HHS call center was consolidated with
with

other

county

departments

in

or

around

Unlike the HHS call center, the consolidated

call center, which was managed by the County’s Office of Public
Information,

was

not

configured

accessible to blind employees.
1

in

a

manner

that

made

it

As a result, Plaintiff was not

Section 504 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

permitted to transfer to the consolidated call center when it
opened.

Instead, she was reassigned to a lower level support

position within HHS and was told that her pay would be reduced
because she was not required to utilize the same degree of skill
in this new position.
Plaintiff

alleged

that

the

County

violated

the

Rehabilitation Act by failing to make reasonable accommodations
for

her

disability

alternative
experience.

and

employment

by

failing

appropriate

for

to

provide

her

skill

her

with

level

and

As relevant to the instant motion, the complaint

recites that, “[b]ecause of its receipt of federal financial
assistance, including financial assistance in the Department of
Health and Human Services and Office of Public Information[,]
the County is subject to the provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.”

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 5).

The County answered on September 1, 2011.

In response to

Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the receipt of federal funding,
the

County

admitted

that

it

“receives

federal

funding

but

denie[d] that any federal funding was received in connection
with the implementation of the [consolidated call] [c]enter.”
(ECF No. 10 ¶ 5).

On the following day, the court issued a

scheduling order establishing, inter alia, a deadline of October
17, 2011, for the amendment of pleadings.

2

On

November

15,

the

County

moved

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings.

Plaintiff responded, on November 29, by filing a

motion

leave

for

to

amend

her

complaint,

along

with

a

consolidated memorandum of law in support of that motion and
opposing Defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff sought leave to amend,

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), in order “to add a claim under
Title

II

which,

of

the

she

[Americans

asserted,

with

(“ADA”)],”
same

remedies as those sought under the present Complaint[.]”

(ECF

that

Plaintiff

provide

Act

the

No. 26-1, at 2).2

“would

Disabilities

essentially

In opposing this motion, the County argued

had

applied

the

wrong

legal

standard.

It

observed that, because the deadline for amendment of pleadings
had

expired,

Plaintiff

was

required

to

show

good

cause

for

modification of the schedule under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b), and that
she failed to do so.

In her reply papers, Plaintiff maintained

that

cause

there

was

good

for

modification

of

the

schedule

because, in its discovery responses, the County “denied that the
[consolidated call] [c]enter received federal funding for the
past five years . . . [and] the possibility that [it] may not
[receive federal funding] could complicate Plaintiff’s requested
relief.”

(ECF No. 35, at 2).

Plaintiff suggested that she did

not learn of this possibility until after the pleading deadline
2

More importantly, the ADA claim Plaintiff wished to add
would not be contingent upon the receipt of federal funding by
the relevant entity.
3

had passed and that she filed her motion for leave to amend soon
thereafter.
Both motions were denied by an opinion and order issued
January 4, 2012.

(ECF Nos. 36, 37).

Regarding Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend, the court agreed with the County that
Plaintiff was required to show good cause for modifying the
scheduling order under Rule 16(b).

In rejecting Plaintiff’s

argument that there was good cause, the court reasoned:
While it seems unlikely that relief under
the Rehabilitation Act will be precluded
because the . . . call center, as distinct
from the County itself, did not receive
federal funding, the County plainly admitted
in its answer that “it receives federal
funding, but denie[d] that any federal
funding was received in connection with the
implementation of the [call] [c]enter.”
(ECF No. 10 ¶ 5).
Thus, the County’s
assertion to the same effect in its answers
to interrogatories should have come as no
surprise to Plaintiff, and this “event” does
not constitute good cause for modification
of the schedule.
(ECF No. 36, at 13-14).
On January 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed the pending motion to
reconsider the denial of her motion for leave to amend.
No. 45).
initial
call]

(ECF

Despite the fact that she argued in support of her
motion

[c]enter

that

“the

may

not

possibility
[receive

that
federal

the

[consolidated

funding]

could

complicate [her] requested relief” (ECF No. 35, at 2), she now
purports to be concerned with the fact that the County has not
4

yet

supplemented

whether

the

HHS

an

answer

to

department

interrogatory

receives

with

federal

regard

funding.

to
In

Plaintiff’s view, if a supplemental answer were to reveal that
HHS

does

not

receive

such

funding,

Rehabilitation Act may be foreclosed.

relief

under

the

Thus, she contends, “the

receipt of new information justifies modifying the scheduling
order to allow Plaintiff to amend her complaint.”
1, at 7-8).

(ECF No. 45-

She further suggests that Defendant would not be

prejudiced by the proposed amendment and that “adding a claim
under the ADA [would] eliminate[] the need for the parties to
litigate the potentially complicated issues surrounding federal
funding and the Rehabilitation Act.”

(Id. at 8).

A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is
governed

by

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

54(b),

which

provides that “any order or other decision, however designated,
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims

and

all

the

parties’

rights

and

liabilities.”

The

precise standard governing such a motion in the Fourth Circuit
is unclear.

See Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders,

Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1472 (4th Cir. 1991).

While the standards

articulated

not

in

Rules

59(e)

and

60(b)

are

binding

in

an

analysis of Rule 54(b) motions, see Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy
5

Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2003), courts frequently
look

to

these

standards

for

guidance

in

considering

such

motions:
Public policy favors an end to litigation
and recognizes that efficient operation
requires
the
avoidance
of
re-arguing
questions that have already been decided.
Most courts have adhered to a fairly narrow
set of grounds on which to reconsider their
interlocutory orders and opinions.
Courts
will reconsider an interlocutory order in
the following situations: (1) there has been
an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) there is additional evidence that was
not previously available; or (3) the prior
decision was based on clear error or would
work manifest injustice.
Akeva, L.L.C. v. Adidas America, Inc., 385 F.Supp.2d 559, 565-66
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Beyond Sys., Inc.
v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. PJM-08-409, 2010 WL 3059344, at *1-2
(D.Md.

Aug.

4,

2010)

(applying

this

three-part

test

when

evaluating a motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b)).
Here,
analysis,

Plaintiff
urging

that

focuses

on

“failing

the
to

third

allow

her

prong

of

this

to

amend

her

complaint to add a claim under the ADA could result in the
manifest injustice of not having Plaintiff’s claim decided on
the merits.”

(ECF No. 45-1, at 7).

Although there is a policy

in the Fourth Circuit in favor of claims being resolved on their
merits, see Dow v. Jones, 232 F.Supp.2d 491, 494 (D.Md. 2002),
it

does

not

follow

that

the

failure

6

to

reach

the

merits

necessarily

constitutes

appears to suggest.

a

manifest

injustice,

as

Plaintiff

This is particularly true where, as here,

Plaintiff advances an argument in her motion for reconsideration
that could have been raised in her prior motion, but was not.
Almy v. Sebelius, 749 F.Supp.2d 315, 338 (D.Md. 2010) (denying
motion for reconsideration under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)
where she presented “arguments that were available to her and
should have been raised in her initial [m]otion”).

Indeed, the

record reflects that the answers to interrogatories cited by
Plaintiff

as

giving

rise

to

“the

ambiguity

regarding

HHS’

federal funding” (id.) were served on or about November 18, 2011
(ECF No. 45-3, at 15), well before Plaintiff filed her motion
for leave to amend.

Moreover, even if this argument had been

properly raised, it still would not explain Plaintiff’s failure
to move for leave to amend or for modification of the schedule
prior

to

the

amendment

deadline.

As

noted

in

the

previous

opinion, “the primary consideration of the court in considering
whether ‘good cause’ has been shown under Rule 16(b) relates to
the movant’s diligence” and “[l]ack of diligence or carelessness
are the ‘hallmarks of failure to meet the good cause standard.’”
(ECF No. 36, at 12 (quoting West Virginia Housing Dev. Fund v.
Ocwen Technology Xchange, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 564, 567 (S.D.W.Va.
2001)).
County

In any event, in responding to the instant motion, the
has

“clarif[ied]

th[e]

ambiguity”
7

cited

by

Plaintiff,

“admit[ting] that HHS has received significant federal funding
every year.”

(ECF No. 46 ¶ 5).

apparently not come to bear.

Thus, Plaintiff’s concerns have
To the extent she suggests that

the potential conservation of judicial resources and the lack of
prejudice

to

Defendant

justifies

reconsideration,

these

arguments were considered and rejected by the court in its prior
opinion.

(ECF No. 36, at 14).

See Beyond Sys., Inc., 2010 WL

3059344, at *2 (a motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b)
may not be utilized to reiterate arguments previously rejected
by the court).
Accordingly, it is this 27th day of February, 2012, by the
United

States

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Maryland,

by

Plaintiff

ORDERED that:
1.
Yasmin

The

motion

Reyazuddin

for

(ECF

reconsideration

No.

45)

BE,

and

filed
the

same

hereby

IS,

DENIED; and
2.

The

clerk

is

directed

to

transmit

copies

of

this

Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel for both parties.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

8