Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland
Filing
56
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/18/12. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
YASMIN REYAZUDDIN
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 11-0951
:
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
this
disability discrimination case is a motion filed by Plaintiff
Yasmin Reyazuddin for leave to file an amended or supplemental
complaint.
(ECF No. 53).
The issues are fully briefed and the
court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being
deemed necessary.
For the reasons that follow, the motion will
be granted.
I.
Background
Plaintiff Yasmin Reyazuddin commenced this action on April
12, 2011, by filing a complaint against Defendant Montgomery
County,
Maryland
(“the
County”),
alleging
disability
discrimination in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the County
violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to make reasonable
accommodations for her disability and by failing to provide her
with alternative employment appropriate for her skill level and
experience.
“[b]ecause
As
of
relevant
its
here,
receipt
of
the
complaint
federal
recited
financial
that,
assistance,
including financial assistance in the Department of Health and
Human Services and Office of Public Information[,] the County is
subject to the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 701 et seq.”
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 5).
The County timely filed an answer on September 1, 2011.
In
response to Plaintiff’s allegation regarding federal funding,
the
County
admitted
that
it
“receives
federal
funding
but
denie[d] that any federal funding was received in connection
with the implementation of the [consolidated call] [c]enter.”
(ECF No. 10 ¶ 5).
The next day, the court issued a scheduling
order establishing, inter alia, a deadline of October 17, 2011,
for any amendment of the pleadings.1
On
November
pleadings,
15,
arguing
the
County
that
administrative remedies.
moved
Plaintiff
for
judgment
failed
to
on
the
exhaust
Plaintiff responded, on November 29,
by filing a motion for leave to amend her complaint, along with
a consolidated memorandum of law in support of that motion and
opposing Defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff sought leave to amend,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), in order “to add a claim under
1
The schedule was revised several times after the date for
amendment.
The current schedule sets a discovery deadline of
December 21, 2012, and a dispositive motions deadline of January
30, 2013. (ECF No. 52).
2
Title
II
of
the
[Americans
with
Disabilities
Act
(“ADA”)],”
which she asserted “would provide essentially the same remedies
as those sought under the present Complaint.”
2).
(ECF No. 26-1, at
In opposing the motion to amend, the County argued that
because the deadline for amendment of the pleadings had passed,
Plaintiff was required to show good cause for modification of
the schedule, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b), and that she had
failed to do so.
In her reply papers, Plaintiff maintained that
there was good cause for modification of the schedule because,
in
its
discovery
responses,
the
County
“denied
that
the
[consolidated call] [c]enter received federal funding for the
past five years . . . [and] the possibility that [it] may not
[receive federal funding] could complicate Plaintiff’s requested
relief.”
(ECF No. 35, at 2).
Plaintiff suggested that she did
not learn of this possibility until after the pleading deadline
had passed and that she filed her motion for leave to amend soon
thereafter.
Both motions were denied by an opinion and order issued
January 4, 2012.
(ECF Nos. 36, 37).
Regarding the motion for
leave to amend, the court agreed with the County that Plaintiff
was required to show good cause for modifying the scheduling
order under Rule 16(b).
In rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that
there was good cause, the court reasoned:
3
While it seems unlikely that relief under
the Rehabilitation Act will be precluded
because the . . . call center, as distinct
from the County itself, did not receive
federal funding, the County plainly admitted
in its answer that “it receives federal
funding, but denie[d] that any federal
funding was received in connection with the
implementation of the [call] [c]enter.”
(ECF No. 10 ¶ 5).
Thus, the County’s
assertion to the same effect in its answers
to interrogatories should have come as no
surprise to Plaintiff, and this “event” does
not constitute good cause for modification
of the schedule.
(ECF No. 36, at 13-14).
On January 18, 2012, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration.
(ECF No. 45).
In that motion, she expressed concern that the
County had not yet supplemented an answer to interrogatory with
regard to whether the HHS department receives federal funding,
contending that if a supplemental answer were to reveal that it
does not, relief under the Rehabilitation Act may be foreclosed.
In response, the County “clarif[ied] th[e] ambiguity” cited by
Plaintiff,
“admit[ting]
that
federal funding every year.”
HHS
has
received
(ECF No. 46 ¶ 5).
significant
In reply,
Plaintiff argued that the supplemental discovery response she
received was not fully responsive to her query insofar as she
had not received requested “documents reflecting ‘all federal
financial assistance received by defendant.’”
n. 2).
4
(ECF No. 47, at 2
By a memorandum and order issued February 27, the court
denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
(ECF No. 48).
It reasoned that the issue raised by Plaintiff could have been
raised in its initial motion for leave to amend, but was not,
and that, in any event, her “concerns have apparently not come
to
bear,”
citing
the
County’s
acknowledgement
department’s receipt of federal funding.
of
the
HHS
(ECF No. 48, at 8).
On July 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for
leave to file an amended or supplemental complaint.
53).
(ECF No.
Plaintiff now asserts that, on or about May 4, 2012, she
submitted
an
consolidated
application
call
center
for
and
an
was
open
position
subsequently
interview, but was not selected for the job.
in
granted
the
an
She alleges that
she was “discriminated against in the conduct of the interview
because she, unlike other applicants, was not provided with a
written copy of the questions she would be asked in a format
accessible
to
her.”
(ECF
No.
53-2
¶
31).
According
to
Plaintiff, the County “has an illegal per se ban on hiring blind
individuals for work in the call center.”
(ECF No. 53-1, at 5).
Based on this new event, she seeks to revise her complaint to
add a failure to hire claim under Title II of the ADA.
The County has opposed Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 54), and
Plaintiff has filed papers in reply (ECF No. 55).
5
II.
Standard of Review
While Plaintiff presents her motion as one to amend or to
supplement her complaint, it may only be considered as a motion
to supplement.
“An amended complaint filed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) typically relates to matters that
have taken place prior to the date of the pleading that is being
amended,” while a “supplemental complaint typically allows the
pleader to ‘set[] forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented.’”
Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 90 (1st
Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d)).
Plaintiff seeks to
“add[] to [the complaint] allegations about [a] second act of
discrimination,” which allegedly occurred over a year after the
suit was originally commenced.
(ECF No. 55, at 2).
Thus, her
motion is construed as one for leave to file a supplemental
complaint.
Motions to supplement are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d),
which provides:
On motion and reasonable notice, the court
may, on just terms, permit a party to serve
a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction,
occurrence,
or
event
that
happened after the date of the pleading to
be supplemented.
The court may permit
supplementation even though the original
pleading is defective in stating a claim or
defense.
The court may order that the
opposing party plead to the supplemental
pleading within a specified time.
6
Despite
the
distinction
between
amended
and
supplemental
pleadings, “the standards used by a district court in ruling on
a
motion
to
amend
on
a
motion
to
supplement
are
nearly
Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 198 n. 15 (4th Cir.
identical.”
2002).
or
“In either situation, leave should be freely granted,
and should be denied only where ‘good reason exists . . . , such
as prejudice to the defendants.’”
Id. (quoting Walker v. United
Parcel Serv., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2002)).
III. Analysis
The County contends that Plaintiff’s new claim is simply an
attempted
end-run
around
the
heightened
requirements
of
Rule
16(b) and the court’s prior rulings denying her leave to amend.
It maintains that the motion should be considered under the good
cause standard of Rule 16(b) and denied due to Plaintiff’s lack
of
diligence
in
filing
a
timely
motion
for
leave
to
amend.
Defendant further argues that the motion should be denied under
Rule
15(d)
require
additional
depositions, written discovery and legal analysis.”
(ECF No.
54,
place
at
because
7).
“[t]he
According
to
new
claim
the
will
County,
this
“would
an
onerous burden on Defendant and interfere with the timing of the
current Scheduling Order.”
(Id. at 8).
Despite the County’s argument to the contrary, Rule 16(b)
does
not
apply
in
this
context.
7
That
rule
provides,
in
subsection (4), that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good
cause and with the judge’s consent.”
noted,
the
schedule
in
this
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4).
case
set
an
deadline for amendment of the pleadings.
October
17,
As
2011,
Plaintiff’s motion,
however, is not one to amend, but to supplement her complaint
based on events that have transpired since the time the original
was
filed.
As
the
County
itself
observes,
this
claim
“is
founded on a new legal theory (violation of Title II of the ADA)
and a new set of facts that are separate and distinct from
Plaintiff’s
present
claim
of
discriminatory
selection
implementation of software under the Rehabilitation Act.”
No. 54, at 7-8).
and
(ECF
“Rule 16 does not require courts to set a
deadline for supplemental pleadings and the [c]ourt did not set
such a deadline” in this case; thus, that rule “is inapplicable
in this matter and Plaintiff[] need not demonstrate good cause
in
order
to
supplement
[her]
[c]omplaint.”
Ohio
Valley
Environmental Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 243
F.R.D. 253, 256 (S.D.W.Va. 2007).
The
result
County’s
due
to
unpersuasive.
argument
delay
While
in
that
the
significant
completion
additional
of
discovery
prejudice
discovery
will
is
will
also
certainly
be
necessary, the substance of Plaintiff’s ADA claim is similar to
the
Rehabilitation
Act
discovery to this point.
claim
that
has
been
the
subject
of
See Paulone v. City of Frederick, 787
8
F.Supp.2d 360, 369 (D.Md. 2011) (“the statutes ‘share the same
definitions of disability,’ id. at 433, and Title II of the ADA
explicitly
provides
that
‘[t]he
remedies,
procedures,
and
rights’ provided under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ‘shall be
the remedies, procedures, and rights [that Title II of the ADA]
provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of
disability.
.
.
.’
42
U.S.C.
§
12133.”).
Thus,
there
is
substantial overlap between the claims such that much of the
discovery that has already been completed will apply to both.
Moreover, if the court were to deny the motion, there would be
nothing to prevent Plaintiff from simply filing a new complaint
raising the ADA claim based on new events.
If that were to
occur, the new complaint would likely be consolidated with the
instant case, a process that would almost certainly result in
even
more
delay
and
expense.
See
Franks,
313
F.3d
at
198
(“‘requiring [a] plaintiff to go through the needless formality
and expense of instituting a new action when events occurring
after the original filing indicated he had a right to relief
[is] inconsistent with the philosophy of the federal rules’”
(quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1505 (2d. ed. 1990)).
Permitting Plaintiff to add an ADA claim will also help to
ensure that the case is ultimately adjudicated on its merits.
Apparently, a focus of discovery has been on the receipt of
9
federal
funding
by
the
relevant
County
with the consolidated call center.
department
associated
A key distinction between
the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA is that the
Rehabilitation Act applies to “any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”
“program
or
operations
activity”
of
.
.
.
is
a
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
defined
as
department,
including
agency,
“all
special
The term
of
the
purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local
government[.]”
29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A).
While the Act is
remedial in nature and its scope is quite broad, at least one
appellate court has found that “state or local governments may
not automatically incur liability for the discriminatory actions
of subordinate actors or agencies under the Rehabilitation Act”
and
required
a
showing
of
“a
sufficient
nexus”
federal funds and the discriminating entity.
between
the
See LaPier v.
Prince George’s County, Md., 2011 WL 4501372, at *3 n. 1 (D.Md.
Sept. 27, 2011) (citing Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d
957, 962 (7th Cir. 1991)).
Here, the County has consistently denied that the Office of
Public Information, the department that manages the consolidated
call center, or the consolidated call center itself received any
federal funding.
To the extent that it might argue on summary
judgment that it cannot be liable under the Rehabilitation Act
because there is an insufficient nexus between the call center
10
and federal funding, permitting Plaintiff to add a claim under
the ADA, which is not contingent upon the receipt of federal
money, will advance the Fourth Circuit’s “longstanding policy in
favor of merits-based adjudication.”
Colleton Prep. Acad., Inc.
v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417 n. 3 (4th Cir.
2010).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file a supplemental complaint will be granted.
A separate order
will follow.
________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
11
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