Hare v. Opryland Hospitality, LLC et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/9/11. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JOSHUA HARE
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 11-1439
:
OPRYLAND HOSPITALITY, LLC
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this personal
injury case are two motions:
the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Opryland Hospitality, LLC and Anthony Rakis (ECF No.
9), and the motion to consolidate filed by Plaintiff Joshua Hare
(ECF No. 10).
The issues have been fully briefed, and the court
now rules, no hearing deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For
the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted,
and the motion to consolidate will be denied as moot.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Joshua Hare alleges the following facts.
evening
of
June
28,
2008,
Hare
attended
friends
at
the
Pose
Ultra
Lounge,
which
a
is
party
On the
with
located
at
some
the
Gaylord National Resort and Convention Center (“the Gaylord”) in
National Harbor, Maryland.
Defendant Opryland Hospitality, LLC
(“Opryland”) operates the Gaylord.
In the early morning of June 29, 2008, as Hare’s group was
preparing to leave the party, an Opryland bouncer named Karl
Hedgeman “assaulted” one of Hare’s friends.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 4).
Hare “tried to shield his friend from further assault,” when
Hedgeman “punched . . . Hare several times and knocked him to
the floor.”
(Id. ¶ 5).
Hedgeman then “smashed . . . Hare in
the head with a liquor bottle,” causing a “significant wound” to
Hare’s left cheek.
(Id. ¶ 6).
Defendant Anthony Rakis was working as the manager of the
Pose
Ultra
Lounge
on
the
night
of
June
28,
2008.
Rakis
“observed . . . Hedgeman’s assault first on . . . Hare’s friend
and then on . . . Hare from several feet away.”
(Id. ¶¶ 9-10).
Rakis did not intervene to stop Hedgeman’s actions.
After the
incident, Rakis ordered Hedgeman to go to Rakis’s office.
Hare
went to a local hospital for emergency treatment and follow-up
care.
As
a
result
of
the
events
of
that
night,
he
has
a
“significant disfiguring scar on his face which is permanent.”
(Id. ¶ 14).
B.
The
Procedural Background
procedural
complicated.
history
of
this
case
is
somewhat
Before the instant case was filed, Hare first
brought suit on November 28, 2008, against Gaylord Entertainment
Co. and Gaylord National, LLC in the Circuit Court for Prince
2
George’s County, Maryland (“Hare I”).1
this court.
That case was removed to
Hare then filed a first amended complaint naming
Opryland as the sole defendant and asserting that (1) Opryland
was liable for Hare’s injuries inflicted by Hedgeman under the
theory of respondeat superior and (2) Opryland was liable for
negligent
hiring,
retention,
and
training
Discovery
proceeded
throughout
most
of
the
of
Hedgeman.
following
year,
closing on October 30, 2009.
On January 25, 2010, Hare filed a motion for leave to file
a second amended complaint that added a request for punitive
damages as well as claims that Opryland’s employees mishandled
the
closing
procedures,
that
Opryland’s
manager
negligently
supervised its employees, and that Opryland negligently trained
staff other than Hedgeman.
In a September 17, 2010, memorandum
opinion and order, this court granted in part and denied in part
Hare’s motion.
Hare was barred from seeking punitive damages
and
claims
adding
new
related
to
Opryland’s
supervision
and
training of employees other than Hedgeman, but he was permitted
to
add
certain
allegations
pertaining
training, and retention of Hedgeman.
to
Opryland’s
hiring,
After the issuance of the
opinion, Hare did not move for reconsideration within the time
1
Hare v. Opryland Hospitality, LLC, No. DKC 09-0599 (D.Md.
filed Mar. 10, 2009).
3
permitted under the Local Rules, nor did he file a complaint
with the permitted amendments.
As Hare explained at a pretrial conference on December 13,
2010, he understood the September 17th opinion as barring only
those claims related to the employees other than Hedgeman, but
that a claim of negligent supervision of Hedgeman himself was
permitted — and was to be presented at trial.
Following the
pretrial conference, on December 15, 2010, Hare filed a motion
for
reconsideration
dismissal
so
negligent
that
opinion
he
supervision
reconsideration
purpose.
or
of
the
voluntary
could
dismissal.
refile
his
or,
in
claim
September
17th
case
Hare
to
the
opinion
sought
include
a
alternative,
for
the
same
On September 15, 2011, this court issued a memorandum
and
order
granting
in
part
and
denying
in
part
the
motion, thereby permitting Hare to add a claim of negligent
supervision of Hedgeman.
Trial was set for May 2012.
On May 26, 2011, after Hare moved for reconsideration or
voluntary dismissal but before this court ruled, Hare filed the
complaint in the instant case against Opryland and Rakis in this
court (“Hare II”).
This complaint contains four counts arising
from the same nucleus of facts of the still-pending Hare I case:
(1) battery; (2) negligence; (3) negligent supervision; and (4)
negligent training.
All counts are asserted against Opryland,
while only Count Two is asserted against Rakis.
4
In addition,
this
complaint
seeks
punitive
damages.
This
case
was
temporarily stayed pending the resolution of Hare’s motion for
reconsideration or voluntary dismissal in Hare I.
That motion
now having been decided, Defendants moved to dismiss the Hare II
complaint on October 6, 2011.
2011,
Hare
opposed
(ECF
Defendants
replied
to
Separately,
on
motion
to
No.
12),
Hare’s
October
Rakis from the case.
(ECF No. 9).
21,
and
Hare
2011,
I
November
7,
2011,
(ECF
No.
16).
opposition
Hare
(ECF No. 11).
consolidate
on
On October 21,
voluntarily
That same day, Hare filed a
and
Hare
II.
(ECF
Opryland filed an opposition on November 7, 2011.
On November 23, 2011, Hare replied.
II.
dismissed
No.
10).
(ECF No. 15).
(ECF No. 17).
Analysis
Defendants
dismissed
first
because
litigation.
argue
this
that
case
is
the
complaint
duplicative
of
should
the
be
Hare
I
Hare does not address this argument, explaining
only that he filed the complaint “to preserve [his] claim within
the
statute
Because
this
of
limitations
issue
is
period.”
dispositive,
(ECF
No.
12,
Defendants’
at
1).
remaining
arguments need not be addressed.
It is within a district court’s power to stay or dismiss
a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit.
See
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976) (“As between federal district courts, . . . the
5
general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.”).
This
rule against duplicative litigation, also referred to as “claim
splitting,” is the “‘other action pending’ facet of the res
judicata doctrine.’”
(6th Cir. 1998).2
Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 613
“Like res judicata, claim splitting ‘prohibits
a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal, and requires
that all claims arising out of a single wrong be presented in
one
action.’”
Sensormatic
Sec.
Corp.
v.
Sensormatic
Elecs.
Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d 621, 626 (D.Md. 2006) (quoting Myers v.
Colgate–Palmolive Co., 102 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1224 (D.Kan. 2000)).
Thus, when a suit is pending in federal court, a plaintiff has
no right to assert another action “on the same subject in the
same
court,
against
the
same
defendant
at
the
same
time.”
Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000).
In a claim splitting case, as with the traditional
res
judicata analysis, the second suit will be barred if the claim
2
The rule against claim splitting is based on the same
principles as res judicata. Res judicata applies, however, when
a second suit is filed after a final adjudication of a first
suit, and claim splitting applies when, like here, two suits are
pending at the same time.
Regardless of the differences in
form, both doctrines intend to “foster[] judicial economy and
protect[] the parties from vexatious and expensive litigation.”
Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). To
meet these objectives, courts faced with duplicative suits may
stay the second suit, dismiss it without prejudice, enjoin the
parties from proceeding with it, or consolidate the two actions.
See id. at 139 (citing cases in which courts took various
actions).
6
involves the same parties or their privies and “arises out of
the same transaction or series of transactions” as the first
claim.
See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265,
1269–70 (11th Cir. 2002).
The court must “assess whether the
second suit raises issues that should have been brought in the
first.”
Curtis, 226 F.3d at 140.
This court previously held
that:
Very often, the doctrine of claim splitting
applies to bar a plaintiff from filing a new
lawsuit after the court in an earlier action
denied leave to amend the complaint to add
those claims.
See N. Assurance Co. v.
Square D Co., 201 F.3d 84, 87–88 (2d Cir.
2000) (collecting cases dismissing claim in
second suit that was duplicative of claim
sought to be amended in first suit); In re
Kevco,
Inc.,
309
B.R.
458,
465–66
(Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex.
2004)
(same).
The
preclusion of a claim not only prohibits a
plaintiff from filing duplicative suits and
from circumventing an earlier ruling of the
court, it is in keeping with “the rule that
a plaintiff must bring suit against the same
defendant on all claims that relate to the
same conduct, transaction or event at the
same time.” Curtis, 226 F.3d at 139.
Sensormatic
Sec.
Corp.
v.
Sensormatic
Elecs.
Corp.,
329
F.Supp.2d 574, 579 (D.Md. 2004).
Here, it is undisputed that the parties, the forum, and the
underlying conduct giving rise to the claims in Hare I and Hare
II
are
not
just
similar,
but
are
identical.
concedes as much in the Hare II complaint:
7
Hare
readily
Plaintiff has a case pending before this
Court (Civil Case No. 8:09-cv-00599) that is
based on the same underlying facts set forth
in this Complaint.
In that case, Plaintiff
is awaiting a ruling from the Court on his
Motion
for
Voluntary
Dismissal
or
to
Reconsider, filed on December 15, 2010. Due
to the approaching Statute of Limitations
date, Plaintiff files this Complaint.
(ECF No. 1, at 1 n.1) (emphasis added).
II
Substantively, the Hare
complaint differs from the operative
three
main
respects.
First,
it
Hare I
includes
a
complaint in
new
claim
for
negligence; second, it includes an explicit claim for negligent
supervision;
damages.
and
third,
it
includes
a
request
for
punitive
Under the doctrine of claim splitting, none of these
issues may proceed.
To begin, Hare does not explain — nor could he — why he
failed to include a negligence claim in Hare I.
Because the
negligence claim is founded upon the same set of allegations
that is presented in Hare I, a negligence claim could have been
asserted in that case at the earliest stages of the pleadings.
Hare may not use this parallel proceeding to effect an end-run
around the deadline for amending the complaint in Hare I, which
was April 27, 2009.
Hare filed the complaint in this case on
May 26, 2011 — over two years after that deadline.
Similarly, this proceeding is an inappropriate mechanism
for asserting a negligent supervision claim in Hare I.
In Hare
I, Hare moved for reconsideration with respect to the court’s
8
September 17, 2010, order, in which Hare’s motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint was denied.
By granting in part
the motion for reconsideration, the court essentially granted
Hare
leave
to
file
a
second
negligent supervision claim.
amended
complaint
to
include
a
If Hare still intends to pursue a
negligent supervision claim, his avenue to do so lies in Hare I,
not here.
Finally,
this
court
expressly
considered
and
rejected
Hare’s request for punitive damages when it initially denied
Hare’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in
Hare I.
The court found a lack of diligence on Hare’s part in
seeking punitive damages such that good cause for altering the
scheduling
order
to
allow
complaint was not shown.
amendments
to
the
first
amended
When Hare sought reconsideration of
the court’s September 17th order, he sought reconsideration with
respect to only the negligent supervision claim.
motion,
nor
subsequently
in
the
filed,
two
did
supplements
Hare
even
to
the
mention
Nowhere in his
motion
punitive
that
he
damages.
Indeed, the court did not address this issue in its September
15, 2011, memorandum opinion and order.
Here, Hare asserts that
“his claim for punitive damages belongs in this case, where
Opryland’s employee Mr. Hedgeman acted with the intent to injure
and with evil motive when he intentionally struck Mr. Hare in
the head with a bottle.”
(ECF No. 10, at 4).
9
As with the other
“new” issues identified in Hare II, however, Hare still fails to
explain why his request for punitive damages could not have been
timely brought in Hare I.
Accordingly, the complaint in this
case shall be dismissed.
Because the complaint here will be dismissed, Hare’s motion
to consolidate will be denied as moot.
E.g., Int’l Org. of
Masters, Mates, & Pilots v. Prevas, 20 F.Supp.2d 895, 898 (D.Md.
1998); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 946 F.Supp.
420, 422 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Opryland Hospitality, LLC and Anthony Rakis will be
granted.
The motion to consolidate filed by Plaintiff Joshua
Hare will be denied as moot.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
10
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