Tasciyan v. Medical Numerics et al
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 10/28/2011. (rss, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 10/31/2011 (c/m to plaintiff 10/31/11 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TALIN A. TASCIYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-1467 AW
MEDICAL NUMERICS et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Talin A. Tasciyan brings this action against the following Defendants: Medical
Numerics; Textron Systems; and Overwatch Geospatial Systems. Ms. Tasciyan alleges claims of
sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pending before
the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
to Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Time Extension Motion”); (2) Defendant Textron System’s
(“Textron”) Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; (3) Defendant Overwatch Geospatial
System’s (“Overwatch”) Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; and (4) Defendant
Medical Numeric’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the
entire record, as well as the pleadings and exhibits, and finds that no hearing is necessary. Local
R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES-AS-MOOT Defendants’
Time Extension Motion; GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Textron’s Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Overwatch’s
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment; and GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-INPART Medical Numeric’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Except where otherwise indicated, the Court takes the following facts from Plaintiff Talin
A. Tasciyan’s Complaint and views them in a light most favorable to her. Tasciyan received a
PhD in biomedical engineering from Duke University in 1989. In 1999, Sensor Systems hired
Tasciyan to participate in software development efforts regarding a product called MEDx. In
2003, Tasciyan “started representing the company at NIH as one of two contractors on behalf of
Medical Numerics providing support for [MEDx] . . . .” Doc. 1 ¶ 9. Tasciyan remained in this
capacity until her dismissal in March 2009.
Tasciyan alleges that Defendants Medical Numerics and Overwatch were divisions of
Sensor Systems. Tasciyan further alleges that Defendant Textron “bought over” Medical
Numerics and Overwatch in 2007.
Tasciyan alleges that Medical Numerics “had more than 15 employees.” The evidence,
however, plainly contradicts this allegation. The Senior Director of Medical Numerics, Douglas
Tucker, swears by affidavit that “Medical Numerics did not employ more than 14 employees
from the period between 2008 and 2009.” Doc. 15-2 ¶ 5; see also Doc. 17-14. Furthermore,
Tasciyan wrote in her EEOC Intake Questionnaire that Medical Numerics had only twelve
employees. Doc. 17-9. Additionally, Tasciyan essentially concedes in her Opposition to
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment that Medical Numerics employed no
more than fourteen employees. Tasciyan writes:
At the time the plaintiff was employed by Medical Numerics, there were 2
employees at NIH and hence Medical Numerics had a total of 14 full time
employees. Catherine Zako of Overwatch served the plaintiff with the
disciplinary report. Ms. Zako was not a Medical Numerics employee. Bob
Cuddyer dismissed the plaintiff. Mr. Cuddyer was employed by Textron, not with
Medical Numerics.
Doc. 17 ¶ 16 (emphasis added).
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Tasciyan was the only female employee at Medical Numerics. During an October 2007
meeting, Tasciyan “half-jokingly” inquired whether she had been denied promotion because of
her gender. After Textron acquired Medical Numerics, a written evaluation system was
introduced to provide a means for employees to self-evaluate and to voice their annual goals. In
her January 2009 self-evaluation form, Tasciyan expressed concerns that the company’s failure
to promote her owed to her gender.
On February 19, 2009, a Medical Numerics manager asked Tasciyan to remove her
accusatory statements from the form and told her that “no one really reads these things.” In early
March 2009, Overwatch’s Human Resources Officer, Catherine Zako, served Tasciyan with a
disciplinary report. The report stated that everything had progressed reasonably well until
January 5, 2011, the date of Tasciyan’s performance review. On March 10, 2009, the manager of
Medical Numerics ordered Tasciyan to go home, and Tasciyan disobeyed. On the following day,
Tasciyan went to Overwatch, presumably to communicate with Catherine Zako, who was not in
the office. Tasciyan was told to contact Bob Cuddyer of Textron. Cuddyer ordered Tasciyan to
stay at home while he investigated her concerns. On March 16, 2009, Cuddyer called Tasciyan to
inform her of her termination. On the same day, Tasciyan received a dismissal letter “on Textron
stationery” bearing Cuddyer’s signature.
On June 18, 2009, Tasciyan filed a complaint with the EEOC. Defendants contend that
Tasciyan named only Textron in her EEOC charge. See, e.g., Doc. 14-1, at 5 (citing Doc. 4-1).
The evidence in the record contradicts this contention. Tasciyan named all three Defendants in
her EEOC Intake Questionnaire. Doc. 17-9. The EEOC summarized the employer in the charge
as “Textron Systems/Medical Numerics” and stated the employer’s address as that of NIH in
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Bethesda, which housed Medical Numerics. Although the charge does not explicitly name
Overwatch, the above facts indicate that this is an oversight on the EEOC’s part.
The EEOC issued a Right to Sue Letter on March 22, 2011. Doc. 4-1. On May 31, 2011,
Tasciyan filed a Complaint. Doc. 1. Count I asserts a claim for sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII, and Count II asserts a claim for retaliation in violation of the same.
On September 23, 2011, Defendants field a Time Extension Motion. (Doc. 9.) Seven days
later, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 13–15.)
Defendants’ filing of these motions mooted their Time Extension Motion.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Motion to Dismiss
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint.
See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In two recent cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). These cases
make clear that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This showing must
consist of at least “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
In addressing a motion to dismiss, a court should first review a complaint to determine
which pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. In its
determination, the court must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999).
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The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations,
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
In sum, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
In the context of employment discrimination, the Supreme Court has clarified that
pleadings need not “contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under
the framework set forth” in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). To require otherwise would essentially
create a “heightened pleading standard” under which a plaintiff without direct evidence of
discrimination would need to plead a prima facie case even though she might uncover direct
evidence during discovery. Id. at 511–12. This would create the “incongruous” result of
requiring a plaintiff “to plead more facts than [s]he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on
the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.” Id. Furthermore, before discovery
“it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a
particular case.” Id. at 512; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70 (explaining that Swierkiewcz
is consistent with more recent case law).1
1
Although Twombly overruled the general 12(b)(6) standard used in Swierkiewicz, Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 192 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009), the analysis discussed here remains good law. Reed v. Airtran Airways, 531 F. Supp.2d
660, 666 (D. Md. 2008) (“The Twombly Court made clear that its holding did not contradict the Swierkiewicz rule
that ‘a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit [need] not contain specific facts establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination.’”) (citations omitted).
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B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). The Court must
“draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of
credibility and of the weight to be accorded to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come
forward with affidavits or other similar evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A
disputed fact presents a genuine issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Material disputes are those
which “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
Although the Court should believe the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all
justifiable inferences in his or her favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact
“through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” See Beal v. Hardy,
769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, if a party “fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the
court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
Finally, hearsay statements or conclusory statements with no evidentiary basis cannot support or
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Greensboro Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n, Local 3157 v.
City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1995).
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C.
Propriety of Treating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as One for Summary
Judgment
Rule 12(d) provides that courts must treat 12(b)(6) motions as motions for summary
judgment where the court considers matters outside the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In such
cases, courts must give the defendant a “reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.” Id. (emphasis added). The term “reasonable opportunity” entails two
basic requirements. One, the defendant must have some indication that the court is treating the
motion as one for summary judgment. See Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted). A defendant’s awareness that material outside the pleadings is pending
before the court satisfies this notice requirement. See id. Two, courts must satisfy themselves that
the nonmoving party has had a fair opportunity to discover information essential to oppose the
motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(f)).
In this case, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgments’ alternative
captions and attached exhibits satisfy the notice requirement. See Laughlin v. Metro Wash.
Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (1998). The fairness requirement, however, is satisfied
only in part. It is appropriate for the Court to consider evidence relating to whether Medical
Numerics employs fewer than fifteen employees because Tasciyan’s own documentation, which
Tasciyan attached to her Opposition, clearly indicates that Medical Numerics has fewer than
fifteen employees. Moreover, Tasciyan more or less concedes as much in her Opposition. Given
that Tasciyan’s own evidence and declarations agree with Defendants evidence, Tasciyan has
had a fair opportunity to discover evidence essential to oppose the motion. In other words, it is
exceedingly unlikely that any evidence exists by which Tasciyan could oppose Medical
Numeric’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment on this ground.
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The Court declines, however, to consider materials outside the Complaint in relation to
Defendants’ argument that Medical Numerics is not integrated with Textron and Overwatch for
the purposes of the integrated employer test. The Court explains below why it would be unfair
for the Court to do so.
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Is Medical Numerics an Employer Under Title VII and, if not, Is Medical Numerics
Integrated with Textron and Overwatch?
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate on the basis of
sex. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. “‘Employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .” Id. § 2000e (emphasis added). An
employer who employees fewer than fifteen employees does not satisfy Title VII’s statutory
definition of employer and, therefore, is not subject to discrimination actions founded on Title
VII. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 212 (1997).
A plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim against an employer with fewer than fifteen
employees where that employer is “integrated” with another employer/s with a sufficient number
of employees. See, e.g., Glunt v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp.2d 847, 874 (D. Md.
2000). Courts apply the “integrated employer test” to make this determination. Id. (citing Hukill
v. Auto Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir.1999)). Under this test, “the court considers the
existence of four factors between the parent and its subsidiary: (1) common management; (2) the
interrelation between operations; (3) centralized control; and (4) the degree of common
ownership and financial control.” Id. (quoting Hukill, 192 F.3d at 442). The Glunt court
expounded the meaning of these factors:
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In applying the integrated enterprise test, courts have noted the following to be
probative evidence that one company employs the other’s employees for purposes
of Title VII liability: (1) one company’s employees hired and fired the other’s
employees and/or authorized [layoffs], recalls, and promotions of such
employees; (2) one company routinely transferred employees between it and the
other company, used the same work force, and/or handled the other’s payroll, (3)
one company exercises more than general oversight of the other’s operations by
supervising the other’s daily operations, such as production, distribution,
purchasing, marketing, advertising, and accounts receivable, (4) the companies
have common management in the form of interlocking boards of directors and/or
common officers and managers, (5) the companies fail to observe basic
formalities like keeping separate books and holding separate shareholder and
board meetings, (6) the companies fail to maintain separate bank accounts, and (7)
the companies file joint tax returns.
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bet Sound–Stage Rest./BrettCo, Inc., 61 F. Supp.2d 448 (D. Md. 1999)).
The integrated employer test necessitates a fact-intensive inquiry. Compare Johnson v. Flowers
Indus., 814 F.2d 978, 982 (noting that the integrated employer test mirrors the piercing the
corporate veil analysis in the corporate law context), with Winner Acceptance Corp. v. Return on
Capital Corp., Civil Action No. 3088–VCP, 2008 WL 5352063, at *5 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(characterizing the piercing the corporate veil analysis as a “fact intensive inquiry”). Therefore, it
is ordinarily inappropriate for courts to apply the integrated employer test at the motion to
dismiss stage. Cf. Johnson v. Ross, 419 Fed. App’x. 357, 363 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying West
Virginia law) (stating that the piercing the corporate veil analysis is so fact-intensive that it is
ordinarily inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage); Glunt, 123 F. Supp.2d at
874 (applying the integrated employer test “[a]fter months of discovery”).
In this case, a reasonable juror could only conclude that Medical Numerics is not an
employer within the meaning of Title VII. The undisputed evidence shows that Medical
Numerics did not have fifteen employees during the time that Tasciyan alleges that Medical
Numerics engaged in the discriminatory conduct. Douglas Tucker states in his affidavit that
Medical Numerics employed no more than fourteen employees in 2008 and 2009. Tellingly,
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Tasciyan wrote in her EEOC Intake Questionnaire that Medical Numerics had only twelve
employees. And if the foregoing evidence does not dispose of the issue, Tasciyan explicitly
states that “[a]t the time the plaintiff was employed by Medical Numerics, . . . Medical Numerics
had a total of 14 full time employees.” Doc. 17 ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Granted, Tasciyan goes
on to argue that “the staff of Medical Numerics was augmented by other employees, making the
total greater than 15.” Id. But the relevant evidence in the record, including Tasciyan’s own
documentation, flatly contradicts this assertion. Furthermore, Tasciyan’s assertion that other
employees augmented Medical Numeric’s staff makes no sense in context. Tasciyan writes:
At the time the plaintiff was employed by Medical Numerics, there were 2
employees at NIH and hence Medical Numerics had a total of 14 full time
employees. Catherine Zako of Overwatch served the plaintiff with the disciplinary
report. Ms. Zako was not a Medical Numerics employee. Bob Cuddyer dismissed
the plaintiff. Mr. Cuddyer was employed by Textron, not with Medical Numerics.
So, the staff of Medical Numerics was augmented by other employees, making
the total greater than 15.
Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, Tasciyan states that Zako and Cuddyer were “not” Medical
Numerics employees; see also Doc. 14-2 (Zako’s declaration that she is an employee of
Overwatch). It is thus illogical to assert that these employees “augment” the staff of Medical
Numerics. Accordingly, the Court grants Medical Numeric’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment in relation to its argument that Medical Numerics is not, per se, an employer under
Title VII.
Defendants also argue that Medical Numerics is not integrated with them for the purposes
of the integrated employer test. It is premature for the Court to consider this argument. As
expounded above, the integrated employer test entails a fact-intensive inquiry and, therefore, is
ordinarily inappropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. In other words, without
some discovery, Tasciyan would not have a meaningful opportunity to satisfy the elements of the
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integrated employer test. Therefore, the Court declines Defendants’ invitation to treat their
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment as one for summary judgment with respect to their
argument that Medical Numerics is not integrated with Textron and Overwatch. To be sure, this
ruling does not prejudice the rights of Defendants to renew this argument at a later stage in the
proceedings.
Albeit in dicta, the Court notes that Tasciyan has adduced some evidence tending to
indicate that Textron and Overwatch had a meaningful relationship with Medical Numerics. This
evidence includes: (1) a disciplinary report with the heading “Textron Systems” stating that the
location of underlying incident was “Medical Numerics/NIH,” Doc. 4-3; (2) a termination letter
from Textron, Doc. 4-4; (3) a pay stub from Textron, Doc. 17-6; and (4) a letter Zako (i.e.
Human Resources Manager at Overwatch) sent Tasciyan in connection with her termination
bearing the heading “Overwatch/Textron Systems.” Doc. 17-15. The Court does not suggest that
this evidence suffices to satisfy the integrated employer test. The Court highlights it merely to
illustrate that Tasciyan has made some efforts to demonstrate that Medical Numerics was
integrated with Textron and Overwatch.
As for the Complaint, Tasciyan asserts that Textron “bought over” Medical Numerics and
Overwatch. She also avers that Medical Numerics continued to use the “Human Resources and
Accounting personnel of Overwatch on a regular basis and reported to Overwatch several times
during the year.” Doc. 1-1 ¶ 12. Given the fact-intensive nature of the integrated employer test,
these allegations, if true, state a plausible claim that Defendants were integrated employers for
Title VII purposes.
In sum, no reasonable juror could conclude that Medical Numerics, per se, is an
employer within the meaning of Title VII. It is premature, however, for the Court to rule on
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Textron’s and Overwatch’s Motions for Summary Judgment in relation to the argument that they
lack integration with Medical Numerics. Finally, Tasciyan has stated a cognizable claim that
Defendants were integrated employers under Title VII.
B.
Did Tasciyan Exhaust Administrative Remedies?
Defendants Medical Numerics and Overwatch argue that Tasciyan failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies in relation to them by failing to name them in her EEOC charge. This
argument is specious. The only evidence these Defendants cite to support this argument is
Tasciyan’s Right to Sue Letter. It states in this letter’s bottom, left-hand corner that the EEOC
sent a carbon copy to “Textron Systems.” How this proves Tasciyan failed to name Overwatch
and Textron in her EEOC charge is beyond the Court’s ken. Besides, as set forth above, more
relevant evidence (e.g. the charge itself) indicates that Tasciyan named Medical Numerics and
Overwatch in her charge. Compare Doc. 17-10, with Doc. 17-9. Accordingly, no reasonable
juror could conclude that Tasciyan failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on this ground.
C.
Sex Discrimination
Defendants argue that Tasciyan has failed to state a claim for sex discrimination under
Title VII. The McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework applies to sex discrimination claims
based the failure to promote. Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Mont.
Cmty. College, 928 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1991)). Under this framework, the plaintiff must
prove that: “(1) [s]he is a member of a protected group; (2) [s]he applied for the position in
question; (3) [s]he was qualified for the position; and (4) [s]he was rejected for the position
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Alvarado, 928 F.2d at 121). Although the law contains no
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per se requirement that the plaintiff allege each element of the prima facie case, a complaint still
“must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Compare Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citation omitted).
Tasciyan’s Complaint fails to state a facially plausible claim for sex discrimination.
Tasciyan bases her sex discrimination claim on the following factual allegations: (1) she was the
only female employee at Medical Numerics; (2) she was not promoted based on her sex; and (3)
Defendants retaliated against her when she complained in 2009 that she might not have been
promoted because of her sex.2 These threadbare allegations fail to support the inference that
Tasciyan actually applied for a promotion in 2009. Even if they did, they still fail to support the
inference that Defendants’ failure to promote Tasciyan owed to her sex. Tasciyan fails to allege
that her employer referred to her in sex-specific terms, code words, or otherwise communicated
to her in a way indicating sexual animus. Nor does Tasciyan allege that one or more similarly
situated males received a promotion. Although Ms. Tasciyan’s being the only female employee
at Medical Numerics may suggest sexual underrepresentation, Medical Numerics is such a small
outfit that this allegation is, at best, marginally significant. Indeed, Tasciyan acknowledges that
one of the persons involved in her termination, Zako, is a woman. Granted, Tasciyan’s
allegations, if true, make it plausible that her employer retaliated against her for complaining
about perceived sex discrimination. But an allegation of retaliation, per se, is insufficient to
justify the inference that the firing owed to the employee’s sex. Other things being equal, it is
just as likely that the retaliation was a reaction to the employee’s complaint, not her sex. Cf.
2
Tasciyan also alleges in her Complaint that she “half-jokingly” inquired in October 2007 that she had been denied
promotion because of her gender. This allegation is entitled to no weight because Tasciyan failed to file a EEOC
charge within 300 days of the underlying incident. See Van Slyke v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 115 F. Supp.2d 587,
592–94 (D. Md. 2000). In fact, Tasciyan concedes in her opposition that she does not base her sex discrimination
claim on this incident. Doc. 17 ¶ 7.
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Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867–86 (2011) (noting that an employer fired
a female employee’s boyfriend after she filed a charge of sex discrimination and holding that
these facts, if true, could violate title VII’s antiretaliation provision).
For the foregoing reasons, Tasciyan has failed to state a cognizable claim for sex
discrimination under Title VII. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count I of her Complaint. This
dismissal is without prejudice to the right of Tasciyan to file an Amended Complaint within
fourteen days of the Court’s issuance of this Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order.
D.
Retaliation
To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII, Tasciyan must show: (1) that she
engaged in protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against
her; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Davis v. Dimensions Health Corp., 639 F. Supp.2d 610, 616–17 (D. Md.
2009) (citing Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir.2007)). An employee
may satisfy the first element by showing that she opposed a practice that Title VII prohibits. Id.
(citing Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc., 247 F. Supp.2d 734, 747 (D. Md.2003)). One court has
defined opposition as “utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal
protests and voicing one’s opinions in order to bring attention to an employer’s discriminatory
activities.” Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir.
1998)). For such activity to constitute opposition, the plaintiff must have a reasonable and good
faith belief that the conduct that she opposes constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII.
See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). Opposition almost always
arises when an employee communicates to her employer her reasonable belief that that the
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employer has engaged in discrimination. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009).
In this case, Tasciyan alleges that she received a Ph.D. from a prestigious university and
worked for her employer for approximately six years before her termination. She further alleges
that she was the only female in the office. Tasciyan also asserts that, in January 2009, she
communicated to her employer in her evaluation form her belief that she had been denied
promotion because of her sex. Additionally, Tasciyan asserts that the manager of Medical
Numerics ordered her to remove her complaints from the evaluation form on February 19, 2009.
Finally, Tasciyan contends that her employer terminated her on March 16, 2011.
These allegations, albeit lacking, suffice to state a facially plausible claim for retaliation
under Title VII. Tasciyan communicated to her employer her belief that her employer’s failure to
promote her constituted discrimination; therefore, the key question is whether the allegations
sustain the inference that Tasciyan’s belief was reasonable. Although it is a close call, it is
plausible that the sole female employee in an office, untutored in the law, could have a
reasonable belief that her employer’s failure to promote her constituted unlawful discrimination.
After all, Tasciyan asserts that she had a Ph.D. from a prestigious university and worked for
Medical Numerics for around six years. Given her educational credentials, length of service, and
sexual singularity, it is plausible that discovery could reveal facts further substantiating the
reasonableness of Tasciyan’s belief that her employer discriminatorily failed to promote her.3
Defendants argue that the Tasciyan’s firing lacked sufficient temporal proximity to her
complaint of discrimination to warrant the inference of causation. The Court disagrees. Taken as
true, Tasciyan’s factual contentions demonstrate that her employer fired her two to two-and-a
3
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the Court’s conclusion that Tasciyan failed to state a cognizable claim for
sex discrimination. Whether a person plausibly has a reasonable belief that her employer has discriminated against
her is a separate inquiry from whether a person has stated a plausible claim for relief for sex discrimination.
15
half months after she complained about perceived discrimination. Although this length of time is
not insignificant, the Court declines to hold that two to two-and-a-half months is insufficient as a
matter of law to prove causation. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 454, 457 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee
filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation). The Court’s
disposition is particularly proper seeing that Tasciyan alleged that the manager ordered her to
remove the complaint from her evaluation form approximately one-and-a-half months after
Tasciyan submitted it. This allegation, if true, discredits the suggestion that Tasciyan relies on
temporal proximity alone to show causation. Defendants’ reliance on Pascual v. Lowe’s Home
Center, Inc., 193 Fed. App’x. 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2006), is therefore misplaced. The Pascual court
held that a “three to four” month gap between the employee’s termination and the protected
activity was too long to establish a causal connection by temporal proximity alone.” Id.
(emphasis added). Here, Tasciyan does not rely on temporal proximity alone and, furthermore,
the firing occurred only two to two-and-a-half months after she complained about discrimination.
Accordingly, Tasciyan has stated a cognizable claim for retaliation under Title VII.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES-AS-MOOT Defendants’ Time
Extension Motion (Doc. 9); GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Textron’s Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13); GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART
Overwatch’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14); and GRANTS-IN-PART
and DENIES-IN-PART Medical Numeric’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Doc.
15). Consequently:
16
•
The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Medical Numerics relative to
its argument that it is not an employer, per se, within the meaning of Title VII;
•
The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
in relation to the argument that they are not integrated employers within the
meaning of Title VII;
•
The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim for sex discrimination under Title VII
without prejudice, with the result that Tasciyan must submit an Amended
Complaint within fourteen days of the Court’s issuance of this Memorandum
Opinion and accompanying Order; AND
•
The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
in relation to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Title VII.
The Court will issue a Scheduling Order.
_____October 28, 2011____
Date
_________/s/__________
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
17
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