Tasciyan v. Medical Numerics et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 12/6/2011. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 12/6/11)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TALIN A. TASCIYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-1467 AW
MEDICAL NUMERICS et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Talin A. Tasciyan brings this action against the following Defendants: Medical
Numerics; Textron Systems; and Overwatch Geospatial Systems. Tasciyan asserts claims of sex
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pending before the
Court are (1) Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The Court has reviewed the entire record, as well as the pleadings and exhibits,
and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the following
reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from an employment dispute between Plaintiff Talin A. Tasciyan and the
following Defendants: Medical Numerics; Textron Systems; and Overwatch Geospatial Systems.
On May 31, 2011, Tasciyan filed a Complaint against Defendants. Doc. 1. Tasciyan asserted
claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. Defendants eventually filed Motions to Dismiss or
for Summary Judgment (“Motions to Dismiss”). Docs. 13–15. In a Memorandum Opinion and
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Order (“Opinion”) issued on October 31, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Docs. 24–25. In this Opinion, the Court held that Tasciyan
stated a cognizable claim for retaliation. However, the Court dismissed Tasciyan’s sex
discrimination claim. In the Opinion, the Court stated that its dismissal of Tasciyan’s claim was
without prejudice to the right of Tasciyan to file an Amended Complaint within fourteen days.
On November 2, Tasciyan filed a document containing the dual-caption of “Plaintiff’s
Reply to Memorandum Opin[i]on” and (2) “Amendment to Complaint.” Doc. 26. The Court
treats this Document as both an Amended Complaint and Motion for Reconsideration and
alternatively refers to it as such. The Amended Complaint adds very little, if anything, to
Tasciyan’s Complaint. Arguably, it is more deficient in that Tasciyan omits most of the factual
allegations from her Complaint. Considering that Tasciyan is a pro se plaintiff, the Court
construes the Amended Complaint liberally and treats it as incorporating the allegations from the
original Complaint. For all that, the Amended Complaint essentially adds just one new
allegation: that Medical Numerics failed to promote Tasciyan in 2007 even as it promoted
similarly situated men.
Additionally, a few days before the Court issued its Opinion, Tasciyan filed a document
that she captioned as “Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.” Doc. 23. Tasciyan’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is a rambling half-page document to which Tasciyan
attaches no evidence. On December 2, 2011, Defendants answered. Doc. 29.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Motion to Dismiss
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint.
See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In two recent cases, the
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U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). These cases
make clear that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This showing must
consist of at least “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should first review the complaint to determine
which pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. In so doing,
the court must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court
need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County
Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations
devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847
(4th Cir. 1979).
B.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). The Court must
“draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of
credibility and of the weight to be accorded to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
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255 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come
forward with affidavits or other similar evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A
disputed fact presents a genuine issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Material disputes are those
which “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
Although the Court should believe the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all
justifiable inferences in his or her favor, the nonmoving party cannot create a genuine dispute of
material fact “through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” See Beal
v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, if the nonmoving party “fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Finally, hearsay statements or conclusory statements with no
evidentiary basis cannot support or defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Greensboro
Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n, Local 3157 v. City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1995).
C.
Motion for Reconsideration
In pertinent part, Rule 54(b) provides that Courts may revise interlocutory orders “at any
time before the entry of a judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp.
v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (footnote omitted) (noting that “every order short
of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge”). In view of this
discretion, “[m]otions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are not subject to the strict
standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment.” Am. Canoe Ass’n v.
Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Nevertheless,
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“doctrines such as law of the case . . . have evolved as a means of guiding” district courts’
discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders. Id. at 515 (citing Sejman v. Warner–Lambert Co.,
Inc., 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1988)). The law of the case doctrine dictates that courts must
follow the law that a prior decision establishes unless “‘(1) a subsequent trial produces
substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of
law applicable to the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work
manifest injustice.’” See Sejman, 845 F.2d at 69 (quoting EEOC v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Assoc.,
623 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1980)). Albeit omnipresent, the law of the case doctrine cannot
positively prohibit a district court from reconsidering an interlocutory order in light of federal
courts’ “ultimate responsibility . . . to reach the correct judgment under law.” Murphy Farms,
326 F.3d at 515. Yet “concerns of finality and judicial economy” may temper this responsibility.
Id. Therefore, relief is rarely ever appropriate “[w]hen the motion raises no new arguments, but
merely requests the district court to reconsider a legal issue or to change its mind.” Pritchard v.
Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 3 Fed. App’x 52, 53 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Sua Sponte Dismissal of Sex Discrimination Claim
Despite its temptation, the Court declines to dismiss Tasciyan’s sex discrimination claim
sua sponte. The following discussion demonstrates the pleading deficiency of Tasciyan’s
Amended Complaint. Notwithstanding this deficiency, it is unsettled whether a district court may
dismiss an amended complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.8 (1989); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th
Cir. 1996). To be sure, this decision does not prejudice the right of Defendants to move for
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judgment on the pleadings. See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(c); see also Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v.
Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405–06 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, considering that
Defendants raised the defense of failure to state a claim in their Answer, Defendants may still
have wiggle room to move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See generally 5C Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1361 & n.7 (3d ed.) (collecting cases); but see
Lane v. Wynne, Civil No. PJM-04-1051, 2006 WL 4711891, at *2 n.6 (D. Md. June 23, 2006)
(“However, given the clear language of Rule 12(b), the Court does not see how a Motion to
Dismiss filed after an Answer could ever be deemed timely. As such, the best course of action is
to simply treat the Motion as one for judgment on the pleadings.”).
The Court recites the following pertinent section of its prior Opinion by way of
background:
Tasciyan’s Complaint fails to state a facially plausible claim for sex
discrimination. Tasciyan bases her sex discrimination claim on the following
factual allegations: (1) she was the only female employee at Medical Numerics;
(2) she was not promoted based on her sex; and (3) Defendants retaliated against
her when she complained in 2009 that she might not have been promoted because
of her sex. These threadbare allegations fail to support the inference that Tasciyan
actually applied for a promotion in 2009. Even if they did, they still fail to support
the inference that Defendants’ failure to promote Tasciyan owed to her sex.
Tasciyan fails to allege that her employer referred to her in sex-specific terms,
code words, or otherwise communicated to her in a way indicating sexual animus.
Nor does Tasciyan allege that one or more similarly situated males received a
promotion. Although Ms. Tasciyan’s being the only female employee at Medical
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Numerics may suggest sexual underrepresentation, Medical Numerics is such a
small outfit that this allegation is, at best, marginally significant. Indeed, Tasciyan
acknowledges that one of the persons involved in her termination, Zako, is a
woman. Granted, Tasciyan’s allegations, if true, make it plausible that her
employer retaliated against her for complaining about perceived sex
discrimination. But an allegation of retaliation, per se, is insufficient to justify the
inference that the firing owed to the employee’s sex. Other things being equal, it
is just as likely that the retaliation was a reaction to the employee’s complaint, not
her sex. Cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867–86 (2011)
(noting that an employer fired a female employee’s boyfriend after she filed a
charge of sex discrimination and holding that these facts, if true, could violate
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision).
Tasciyan v. Med. Numerics, Civil Action No. 11–1467 AW, 2011 WL 5119465, at *8 (D. Md.
Oct. 28, 2011) (footnote omitted).
The facts in this case differ from those recounted in the preceding excerpt only insofar as
the Amended Complaint states that Medical Numerics failed to promote Tasciyan in 2007 even
as it promoted similarly situated men. If the Court accepted the truth of this allegation, the Court
might be inclined to rule that Tasciyan has stated a cognizable claim for sex discrimination. The
added allegation, however, relates to a 2007 incident. As the Court indicated in its Opinion,
Tasciyan’s allegations from 2007 are “entitled to no weight because Tasciyan failed to file an
EEOC charge within 300 days of the underlying incident.” Id. n.2 (citing Van Slyke v. Northrop
Grumman Corp., 115 F. Supp.2d 587, 592–94 (D. Md. 2000)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
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5(e)(1) (providing that Title VII plaintiffs in deferral states must file charges of discrimination
“within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred”).
Tasciyan does not dispute that she did not file an EEOC charge until June 18, 2009.
Therefore, as a general matter, Tasciyan must base her sex discrimination claim on events that
transpired no later than August 22, 2008. Construed leniently, Tasciyan appears to argue in an
earlier brief that the Court should consider incidents in 2007 based on the theory that they were
part of a continuing violation.
“The continuing violation theory (a type of equitable tolling) applies where the ‘plaintiff
proves that it would have been impossible for a reasonably prudent person to learn that [an
employment action] was discriminatory.’” Van Slyke v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 115 F.
Supp.2d 587, 593 (D. Md. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Olson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 904
F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1990)) (some internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, “[s]uch
impossibility exists only where the plaintiff is unaware of the facts giving rise to the claim
because the defendant has intentionally concealed them.” See id. (citing Olson, 904 F.2d at 201).
In this case, Tasciyan neither alleges nor argues that Defendants have deliberately
concealed facts giving rise to her discrimination claims. In fact, as the Court’s prior Opinion
notes, Tasciyan explicitly states in her Complaint that she “‘half-jokingly’ inquired at the
October 2007 meeting whether she had been denied promotion because of her gender.” Doc. 1 ¶
15. The next line of the Complaint reads that “[Tasciyan] did not pursue the matter any further
for another year.” Id. Indeed, Tasciyan alleges no further incidents of discrimination until
January 2009. See id. at 4–6. In sum, Tasciyan’s own factual contentions illustrate that she knew
the 2007 incident was discriminatory and failed to file a charge in relation to it.
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that Tasciyan’s Amended Complaint adds one
allegation to her Complaint and that this allegation warrants no weight. Tasciyan has had two
bites at the apple and there is no reason to think that a third bite would bear fruit. Nevertheless,
the Court deems it advisable to resist the temptation to dismiss the Amended Complaint sua
sponte. At a minimum, the above analysis apprises Tasciyan of the deficiency of her Amended
Complaint.
B.
Motion for Reconsideration
As expounded above, granting a motion for reconsideration is rarely ever appropriate
when the motion raises no new arguments but merely requests the Court to change its mind. In
her Motion for Reconsideration, Tasciyan states that she “would greatly appreciate it if the Court
would reconsider the Plaintiff’s original gender/sex discrimination charge in view of the
evidence introduced in this Amendment to the Complaint.” Doc. 26 at 2. Tasciyan’s description
of her Motion for Reconsideration is inaccurate. Tasciyan includes no evidence with the Motion.
Rather, as stressed in the preceding section, Tasciyan asserts only that her “discrimination claim
goes back to 2007.” Id. at 1. To reiterate, Tasciyan’s failure to file a timely charge of sex
discrimination based on 2007’s events vitiates their legal force. Although the Motion for
Reconsideration contains some additional statements, they amount to a muddled rehash of
Tasciyan’s prior pleadings. Therefore, the Court denies Tasciyan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
C.
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
Pertinently, Rule 56 reads as follows:
(c) PROCEDURES.
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
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(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Here, with one possible exception, Tasciyan fails to cite
particular parts of materials in the record in her Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed,
Tasciyan’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is rambling half-page document that
regurgitates allegations from the Complaint. Therefore, save the argument addressed in the
following paragraph, the Court denies Tasciyan’s self-styled Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment for failure to comply with the above-excerpted section of Rule 56.
Reading the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment liberally, Tasciyan argues that no
genuine dispute exists whether Defendants are integrated employers because the evidence in the
record shows that (1) Textron issued Tasciyan’s paychecks and (2) Tasciyan’s business card had
an Overwatch mailing address. Although Tasciyan failed to properly cite this evidence in her
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court considers it under Rule 56 in light of the
Court’s familiarity with this evidence. All the same, as the subsequent passage from the Court’s
prior Opinion shows, this evidence completely fails to compel the conclusion that no genuine
dispute exists regarding Defendants’ integrated employer status:
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate on the
basis of sex. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. “‘Employer’ means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year . . . .” Id. § 2000e (emphasis added). An
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employer who employees fewer than fifteen employees does not satisfy Title
VII’s statutory definition of employer and, therefore, is not subject to
discrimination actions founded on Title VII. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 212 (1997).
A plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim against an employer with fewer
than fifteen employees where that employer is “integrated” with another
employer/s with a sufficient number of employees. See, e.g., Glunt v. GES
Exposition Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp.2d 847, 874 (D. Md. 2000). Courts apply the
“integrated employer test” to make this determination. Id. (citing Hukill v. Auto
Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir.1999)). Under this test, “the court considers
the existence of four factors between the parent and its subsidiary: (1) common
management; (2) the interrelation between operations; (3) centralized control; and
(4) the degree of common ownership and financial control.” Id. (quoting Hukill,
192 F.3d at 442). The Glunt court expounded the meaning of these factors:
In applying the integrated enterprise test, courts have noted the
following to be probative evidence that one company employs the
other’s employees for purposes of Title VII liability: (1) one
company’s employees hired and fired the other’s employees and/or
authorized [layoffs], recalls, and promotions of such employees;
(2) one company routinely transferred employees between it and
the other company, used the same work force, and/or handled the
other’s payroll, (3) one company exercises more than general
oversight of the other’s operations by supervising the other’s daily
operations, such as production, distribution, purchasing, marketing,
advertising, and accounts receivable, (4) the companies have
common management in the form of interlocking boards of
directors and/or common officers and managers, (5) the companies
fail to observe basic formalities like keeping separate books and
holding separate shareholder and board meetings, (6) the
companies fail to maintain separate bank accounts, and (7) the
companies file joint tax returns.
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Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bet Sound–Stage Rest./BrettCo, Inc., 61 F. Supp.2d 448
(D. Md. 1999)). The integrated employer test necessitates a fact-intensive inquiry.
Compare Johnson v. Flowers Indus., 814 F.2d 978, 982 (noting that the integrated
employer test mirrors the piercing the corporate veil analysis in the corporate law
context), with Winner Acceptance Corp. v. Return on Capital Corp., Civil Action
No. 3088–VCP, 2008 WL 5352063, at *5 (Del. Ch. 2008) (characterizing the
piercing the corporate veil analysis as a “fact intensive inquiry”). Therefore, it is
ordinarily inappropriate for courts to apply the integrated employer test at the
motion to dismiss stage. Cf. Johnson v. Ross, 419 Fed. App’x. 357, 363 (4th Cir.
2011) (applying West Virginia law) (stating that the piercing the corporate veil
analysis is so fact-intensive that it is ordinarily inappropriate for resolution at the
summary judgment stage); Glunt, 123 F. Supp.2d at 874 (applying the integrated
employer test “[a]fter months of discovery”).
Tasciyan, 2011 WL 5119465, at *5. Given the fact-intensive nature of the integrated employer
test, a company’s apparent issuance of one paycheck to an employee and the presence of another
company’s address on an employee’s business card are insufficient as a matter of law to show
that these two employers are integrated with an employee’s immediate employer. Accordingly,
the Court denies Tasciyan’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 26).
As it has apparently yet to do so, the Court will issue a Scheduling Order.
____December 6, 2011____
Date
_________/s/__________
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
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