Tasciyan v. Medical Numerics et al
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 10/9/2012. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 10/9/12)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TALIN A. TASCIYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-1467 AW
MEDICAL NUMERICS et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Talin A. Tasciyan brings this action against the following Defendants: Medical
Numerics; Textron Systems; and Overwatch Geospatial Systems. Plaintiff asserts a retaliation
claim under Title VII. Pending before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. The Court has reviewed
the entire record and deems no hearing necessary. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Talin Tasciyan (Tasciyan) received a PhD in biomedical engineering from Duke
University in 1989. In 1999, a company named Sensor Systems hired Tasciyan to participate in
software development efforts. At some point, Sensor Systems became Medical Numerics.
Tasciyan worked at Medical Numerics in a similar capacity. Tasciyan remained with Medical
Numerics until her March 2009 termination.
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Tasciyan alleges that Defendants Medical Numerics and Overwatch Geospatial Systems
(Overwatch) were divisions of Sensor Systems. Tasciyan further alleges that Defendant Textron
System (Textron) bought out Medical Numerics and Overwatch in 2007. As explained more
fully below, Defendants dispute Tasciyan’s characterization of their relationship, contending that
they are separate entities.
In March 2008, Tasciyan was called to a meeting with the following officials: Jeff
Solomon, Bob Steagall, and Catherine Zako. Solomon and Steagall supervised Tasciyan at
Medical Numerics. Zako worked as Overwatch’s Human Resources Officer. Defendants assert
that this meeting stemmed from Tasciyan’s professional misconduct, including sending abusive
emails, creating conflicts with coworkers, and yelling at supervisors. Although Tasciyan states
that she has little recollection of what the parties discussed at the interview, she acknowledges
the existence of allegations that she was creating problems in the workplace. On January 5, 2009,
Tasciyan received a performance review stating that the issues discussed in the March 2008
meeting were “progressing reasonably well.” Doc. No. 39-7 at 2.
Tasciyan was the only female employee at Medical Numerics. Doc. No. 15-3. In January
2009, Tasciyan completed a self-evaluation form. See Doc. No. 39-4 at 30–31. In this form,
Tasciyan expressed concerns that Medical Numerics’ failure to promote her was due to her
gender. Specifically, Tasciyan stated that Medical Numerics failed to include her in certain
discussions possibly because of her sex. Consequentially, in Tasciyan’s view, her supervisors
were unable to assess her qualifications even though she had comparable credentials and
background experience to her coworkers. See Doc. No. 41-7.
On February 19, 2009, Tasciyan testifies that Solomon and Steagall met with her and
asked her to remove her statements from the evaluation form because they were inappropriate.
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See Doc. No. 39-4 at 30. Defendants do not dispute that they determined the comments to be
“inappropriate in the context of a self-evaluation.” Doc. No. 39-1 at 5.
In February 2009, Tasciyan was tasked with writing a computer script for a customer. On
February 17, 2009, Tasciyan wrote the script and emailed it to a customer, copying Solomon.
Doc. No. 39-6 at 2. In an email response to both Tasciyan and the customer, Solomon questioned
whether Tasciyan had written the script correctly. Tasciyan sent Solomon an email reply in
which she copied the customer. The reply states: “Why do you think it’s different from what was
proposed. I’m surprised you can decide so quickly without even consulting me.” Id.
On or about March 10, 2009, Tasciyan was called to a second disciplinary meeting. At
this meeting, Zako served Tasciyan with a disciplinary report. The report states that, although the
situation discussed in the March 2008 meeting had progressed reasonably well, two recent
developments displayed professional misconduct: (1) the email incident described above; and (2)
Tasciyan’s “ongoing volatile behavior” with her supervisor. Doc. No. 39-7 at 2.
Defendants allege that Tasciyan grew belligerent at the meeting and stormed out.
Although Tasciyan does not entirely dispute this description of her behavior, she suggests that
the lies Solomon, Steagall, and Zako levied at her induced her behavior.
Tasciyan returned to Medical Numerics after the meeting. There, on behalf of Textron’s
HR department, Steagall emailed Tasciyan and ordered her to take the rest of the day off. Doc.
No. 39-8. In a responsive email, Tasciyan stated that she was not going to take the rest of the day
off and that her volatile behavior owed to being “caught by surprise.” Id. Approximately one
week later, Tasciyan received a letter on Textron stationery stating that she was terminated.
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On June 18, 2009, Tasciyan filed an EEOC charge. Doc. No. 17-10. In the charge,
Tasciyan states that the discrimination she allegedly faced was based on sex and retaliation.
Tasciyan did not fill in the box for any other category of discrimination.
The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on March 22, 2011. Doc. No. 4-1. On May 31,
2011, Tasciyan filed her Complaint, asserting claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII.
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Defendants argued that Tasciyan
could not state cognizable claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. Doc. Nos. 13–15.
Defendants also argued that Medical Numerics was not an employer within the meaning of Title
VII.
On October 31, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order (October 2011
Opinion). Doc. Nos. 24–25. The Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in relation to the
argument that Medical Numerics was not a Title VII employer per se. However, the Court held
that it was plausible that Medical Numerics was integrated with Textron and Overwatch. The
Court also granted the Motion, without prejudice, as to Tasciyan’s sex discrimination claim and
denied it as to her retaliation claim.
In response, Tasciyan filed a document containing the dual-caption of “Plaintiff’s Reply
to Memorandum Opin[i]on” and (2) “Amendment to Complaint.” Doc. No. 26. The Court treated
this Document as both an Amended Complaint and Motion for Reconsideration. Around the
same time, Tasciyan filed a document she labeled as a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
Doc. No. 23.
On December 6, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order (December
2011 Opinion) in response to these documents. In this Opinion, the Court denied Tasciyan’s
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Motion for Reconsideration and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, although
refraining from dismissing Tasciyan’s amended claim for sex discrimination sua sponte, the
Court noted that it was deficient. The Court eventually issued a short Order dismissing
Tasciyan’s sex discrimination claim with prejudice. Doc. No. 38.
Following the Court’s December 2011 Opinion, Tasciyan filed a document titled
“Response to the Scheduling Order.” Doc. No. 34. In this document, Tasciyan cursorily requests
the Court to allow her to amend her Amended Complaint to add claims for age and national
origin discrimination. The Court will treat this document as a Motion to Amend despite the fact
that (1) it was not docketed as a motion and (2) Tasciyan suggests that it is not a motion. See
Doc. No. 41 at 7.
On March 6, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. No. 39.
Defendants press three primary arguments in this Motion. First, Defendants contend that no
reasonable juror could rule in favor of Tasciyan on her sex discrimination claim because she
cannot show that Defendants’ allegedly nonretaliatory reasons for firing her are pretextual.
Second, Defendants argue that no reasonable juror could conclude that Medical Numerics is
integrated with Overwatch and Textron. Third, Defendants maintain that Tasciyan’s Motion to
Amend fails as a matter of law because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies on her age
and national origin discrimination claims.
On May 29, 2012, Tasciyan filed documentation that she retrieved from an official U.S.
government website: http://www.usaspending.gov. See Doc. Nos. 44-1, -2. One such document
purports to indicate that Medical Numerics had 80 employees. See Doc. No. 44-1 at 3.
Defendants filed a short Motion to Strike this document on the ground that it is inadmissible
hearsay. Doc. No. 46.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). The Court must
“draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of
credibility and of the weight to be accorded to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come
forward with affidavits or similar evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A disputed fact
presents a genuine issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Material disputes are those that “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
Although the Court should believe the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all
justifiable inferences in his or her favor, the nonmoving party cannot create a genuine dispute of
material fact “through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” See Beal
v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, if a party “fails to properly support an
assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c), the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2). Finally, hearsay statements or conclusory statements with no evidentiary basis cannot
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support or defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Greensboro Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n,
Local 3157 v. City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1995).
B.
Motion to Dismiss—Rule 12(b)(1)
“There are two critically different ways in which to present a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). “First, it
may be contended that a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter
jurisdiction can be based.” Id. Where the defendant contends that the complaint fails to allege
facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, “all the facts alleged in the complaint are
assumed to be true and the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he
would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.” Id. “Second, it may be contended that the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.” Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. In such
cases, “the court is free to consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes
concerning jurisdiction.” Zander v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (D. Md. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 290 F.3d
201, 205 (2002)).
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Retaliation
“A plaintiff lacking direct evidence of retaliation may utilize the McDonnell Douglas . . .
framework to prove a claim of retaliation.” Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citing Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989)). “In the McDonnell
Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation, whereupon
the burden shifts to the employer to establish a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the action.”
Id. “If the employer sets forth a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the action, the plaintiff
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then must show that the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual or his claim will fail.” Id.
“More specifically, the plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the ‘explanation is “unworthy
of credence” or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of
[retaliation].’” Id. (quoting Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir. 2004)).
“To establish [her] prima facie case of retaliation, [Tasciyan] must show that [she]
engaged in protected activity, that [Defendants] took adverse action against [her], and that a
causal relationship existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment activity.”
Id. (citing King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 150–51 (4th Cir. 2003)).
“An employee may satisfy the first element by showing that she opposed a practice that
Title VII prohibits.” Tasciyan v. Med. Numerics, 820 F. Supp. 2d 664, 675 (2011) (citing Davis
v. Dimensions Health Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616–17 (D. Md. 2009)). “One court has
defined opposition as ‘utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal
protests and voicing one’s opinions in order to bring attention to an employer’s discriminatory
activities.’” Id. (quoting Davis, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 617). “For such activity to constitute
opposition, the plaintiff must have a reasonable and good faith belief that the conduct that she
opposes constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII.” Id. (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001)). “Opposition almost always arises when an employee
communicates to her employer her reasonable belief that the employer has engaged in
discrimination.” Id. (citing Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nash. and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555
U.S. 271, 276 (2009)).
Element three of the prima facie case for retaliation relates to causation. Generally,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged opposition caused the at-issue adverse action through
two evidentiary routes. First, plaintiffs may show that the adverse act bears sufficient temporal
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proximity to the protected activity. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273–74. Second, as this Court
has consistently held, “plaintiffs may state a prima facie case of causation by relying on evidence
other than, or in addition to, temporal proximity where such evidence is probative of causation.”
Jenkins v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 840 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (D. Md. 2012) (citing cases); see also,
e.g., Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that “other relevant
evidence may be used to establish causation” where temporal proximity is missing).
In this case, Tasciyan engaged in protected activity by communicating to Defendants her
reasonable belief that Medical Numerics’ failure to promote her was due to her gender. It is
undisputed that Tasciyan has a PhD from a prestigious university, worked for Medical Numerics
for several years, and was the sole female in the office. Based on these facts, a reasonable juror
could conclude that Tasciyan’s belief that Defendants discriminated against her by failing to
promote her was reasonable.
The second element of the prima facie case, material adversity, is easily satisfied because
Defendants terminated Tasciyan. Therefore, the question is whether Tasciyan has stated a prima
facie case of causation. A reasonable juror could so conclude. In terms of temporal proximity,
Defendants fired Tasciyan two to two-and-a-half months after she complained about perceived
discrimination. Although the question is unsettled, this temporal proximity may be sufficient for
a reasonable juror to conclude that Tasciyan’s firing was in reprisal for her protected activity. See
Cerberonics, 871 F.2d at 457.
However, the Court need not make this determination inasmuch as Tasciyan has
submitted other evidence that is probative of causation. It is undisputed that Solomon and
Steagall met with Tasciyan and asked her to remove her accusatory statements from the
evaluation form because they were supposedly inappropriate. Coupled with temporal proximity
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of two to two-and-a-half months, a reasonable juror could infer from this event that Tasciyan’s
complaint bothered Solomon and Steagall and, hence, induced them to fire her.
The next step of the McDonnell Douglas framework asks whether Defendants have
articulated one or more nonretaliatory reasons for terminating Tasciyan. Defendants argue that
Tasciyan displayed unprofessional conduct by copying a customer on the defensive email she
sent to Solomon. They also argue that turning belligerent and ultimately walking out of the
March 10, 2009 constituted an occasion for termination. Defendants further argue that Tasciyan
displayed a pattern of insubordination and volatile behavior tracing back until at least 2008. A
reasonable juror could conclude that any one of these reasons is nonretaliatory.
The third, and final, step in the McDonnell Douglas framework for retaliation asks
whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are
pretexts for discrimination. Defendants argue that Tasciyan’s allegedly chronic insubordination
and volatility preclude a reasonable juror from so concluding. To buttress this argument,
Defendants rely primarily on three instances of misbehavior: (1) the alleged misconduct that lead
to the March 2008 disciplinary meeting; (2) Tasciyan’s allegedly abusive email in which she
copied the customer; and (3) Tasciyan’s behavior during and after the March 10, 2009
disciplinary meeting, including the email in which Tasciyan stated that she refused to take the
rest of the day off.
Although Defendants’ arguments are not without force, construing the evidence
favorably to Tasciyan, a reasonable juror could find that these reasons are pretextual. Even
though Defendants allege that Tasciyan displayed improper behavior in the 2008 period,
Defendants’ performance review of January 5, 2009 states that the situation had progressed
reasonably well. Furthermore, while Tasciyan seems to concede that she grew belligerent and
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stormed out of the March 10, 2009 meeting, it is up to the trier of fact to determine whether her
behavior was a reasonable reaction to the perception that she had been treated unfairly.
Moreover, the disciplinary report that Zako gave Tasciyan at the meeting states that it was
Tasciyan’s second notice of misbehavior when the report includes a space for final notice. If
growing belligerent and storming out of the meeting truly motivated Defendants’ decision, a
reasonable juror could infer that Tasciyan should have been given final notice before being
terminated.
True, Tasciyan copied a customer on a somewhat unprofessional email she sent Solomon.
However, Solomon questioned whether Tasciyan had written the script correctly in an email in
which he as well copied the customer. Furthermore, on its face, the email does not seem overly
confrontational or abusive. In short, a reasonable juror could conclude that, under the
circumstances, Tasciyan’s email was not inappropriate or, alternatively, that it was no more
inappropriate than Solomon’s.
It is undisputed that Solomon and Steagall met with Tasciyan and asked her to remove
her accusatory statements from the evaluation form because they were inappropriate in that
context. It is also undisputed that the same supervisors were present at the March 10, 2009
meeting and participated in Tasciyan’s firing. Construing the evidence favorably, a reasonable
juror could conclude that the behavior of determining that Tasciyan’s discrimination complaint
was inappropriate and participating three weeks later in her termination displays a retaliatory
animus on the part of Solomon and Steagall. Therefore, a reasonable juror could conclude that
Defendants’ allegations of insubordination, volatility, and otherwise improper conduct are
pretexts for retaliation. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Tasciyan’s retaliation claim.
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B.
Whether Defendants Are Integrated Employers
The Court held in its October 2011 Opinion that Medical Numerics, per se, was not an
employer within the meaning of Title VII. However, the Court held that Tasciyan had stated a
facially plausible claim that Defendants were integrated employers. Therefore, the issue is
whether a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants are integrated employers within the
meaning of Title VII.
A plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim against an employer with fewer than fifteen
employees where that employer is “integrated” with another employer/s with a sufficient number
of employees. See, e.g., Glunt v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 847, 874 (D. Md.
2000). Courts apply the “integrated employer test” to make this determination. Id. (citing Hukill
v. Auto Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir.1999)). Under this test, “the court considers the
existence of four factors between the parent and its subsidiary: (1) common management; (2) the
interrelation between operations; (3) centralized control; and (4) the degree of common
ownership and financial control.” Id.
There is no bright-line test for determining whether two or more employers are
integrated; the integrated employer test necessitates a fact-intensive inquiry. In the Title VII
context, courts have identified factors that tend to prove “‘that one company employs the other’s
employees.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bet Sound–Stage Rest./BrettCo, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448,
456 (D. Md. 1999)). Some of these factors are that
(1) one company’s employees hired and fired the other’s employees and/or
authorized [layoffs], recalls, and promotions of such employees; (2) one company
routinely transferred employees between it and the other company, used the same
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work force, and/or handled the other’s payroll, (3) one company exercises more
than general oversight of the other’s operations . . . .
Id. (quoting Thomas, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 456).
In this case, a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants are integrated employers
for Title VII purposes. Although Defendants contend that Medical Numerics was separately
managed, a reasonable juror could infer that Textron and Overwatch exercised considerable
control over Tasciyan’s discipline and ultimate termination. The record contains an email from
Steagall to Tasciyan in which Steagall tells her that “Textron Systems HR has advised me to
direct you to take the rest of the day off.” Doc. No. 39-8 at 2. A reasonable juror could infer from
this email that Steagall (i.e., Medical Numerics) was acting at the behest of Textron during the
firing incident.
The record similarly reflects that officials for both Textron and Overwatch were actively
involved in the disciplinary and termination processes. Zako, HR Manager for Overwatch,
attended both the March 2008 and 2009 meetings. In the March 2009 meeting, Zako served
Tasciyan with a disciplinary report bearing the heading “Textron Systems.” Likewise, Tasciyan’s
termination letter is on Textron letterhead and bears the signature of Robert Cuddyer, who
identifies as HR Manager of Textron Systems. Doc. No. 41-8.
Along those lines, a few months after her termination, Zako sent Tasciyan a letter bearing
the heading Overwatch/Textron Systems in which she relays Overwatch’s demand that Tasciyan
return NIH office keys. Doc. No. 17-15. In sum, the record contains evidence from which a
reasonable juror could conclude that Textron and Overwatch exercised management authority
over pertinent aspects of Medical Numerics’ operations and that Defendants’ operations were
meaningfully interrelated.
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The record contains other evidence that is probative of integration. Tasciyan has adduced
an earnings statement bearing the heading Textron, stating that it originated from the Textron
Service Center. Furthermore, Tasciyan recently filed a document from the website
http://www.usaspending.gov indicating that Medical Numerics has 80 employees. Because
Medical Numerics has only 13–14 employees, this document supports the inference that
Defendants were integrated. See Doc. No. 44-1 at 3.
Defendants move to strike this document on the basis that it is inadmissible hearsay. It is
too early in the litigation for the Court to conclusively make this determination. As Tasciyan
obtained the document from an official U.S. Government website, the document may qualify as
an exception to hearsay under the public records exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).1 What is
more, even if the document is inadmissible, Tasciyan’s other evidence is sufficient for a
reasonable juror to conclude that Defendants are integrated employers. Accordingly, the Court
denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the argument that they are not
integrated employers under Title VII. The Court also denies, without prejudice, Defendants’
Motion to Strike.
C.
Motion to Amend
Assuming Tasciyan properly presented it, the Court denies Tasciyan’s Motion to Amend
her Amended Complaint to add claims for age and national origin discrimination. Tasciyan failed
to file an EEOC charge for these claims and nothing in the record indicates that the EEOC
undertook an investigation of such claims. This is unsurprising considering that the allegations in
Tasciyan’s EEOC charge make no mention of age or national origin discrimination. Doc. No. 1710. Hence, the Court denies Tasciyan’s Motion to Amend.
1
To be sure, this assumes that a proper foundation for the document can be laid.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and DENIES Tasciyan’s Motion to Amend.
A separate Order will follow. The Court will set the case in for trial.2
_____October 9, 2012____
Date
_________/s/__________
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
2
Tasciyan should understand that, while the Court must construe her evidence in the most favorable light
at this juncture, the Court will require both Parties to adhere to the rules of evidence, burden of proof, and
procedural rules for the conduct of trials. The Court strongly advises Tasciyan to obtain the assistance of
legal counsel. The failure to do so may prove fatal to her claim.
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