Hunt v. Kaiser Permanente

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/29/2012. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 6/29/12)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
SHRONDA HUNT
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-2567

:
KAISER PERMANENTE
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shronda Hunt, proceeding pro se, commenced this
action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, Maryland.
drafted,

it

appears

to

While the complaint is inartfully
relate

to

an

altercation

between

Plaintiff and an employee of Defendant Kaiser Permanente, which
resulted

in

complaint

Plaintiff’s

purports

conspiracy,

to

assault

statement[s]

by

their

convictions,

personal

constitutional rights.”

arrest
raise
by

and

claims

felony
of

conviction.

“false

[Defendant’s]

employee
injury,

resulting
[and]

alleges

imprisonment,

employee,
in

violation

two
of

(2)

false
felony

civil

and

(ECF No. 2).

Defendant timely removed to this court.
complaint

The

“violation

of

civil

and

Noting that the
constitutional

rights,” Defendant asserted in its notice of removal that the
“case is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because this

[c]ourt has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331[.]”
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 4).
On June 1, 2012, the court, sua sponte, issued an order
directing Defendant to show cause why the case should not be
remanded to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.
No. 13).
of

(ECF

The court observed that “[t]he talismanic invocation

constitutional

language

in

a

complaint

.

.

.

is

not

sufficient to create jurisdiction unless there is at least a
colorable constitutional violation.”

(Id. at 3 (quoting Saloum

v. United States CIS, 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2nd Cir. 2006) (internal
marks

omitted)).

It

further

explained

that

because

the

complaint “appears to present common law tort claims, not a
‘colorable constitutional violation,’ . . . it appears that the
case was improperly removed.”

(Id.).

In response to the show cause order, Defendant argues that
the fact that Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional
claim does not defeat jurisdiction.

According to Defendant, the

complaint’s “allegations, liberally construed, are that an agent
of

Kaiser

verbally

and

physically

assaulted

[Plaintiff],

and

made statements to law enforcement authorities that led to her
arrest, imprisonment, and two felony convictions.”
at 4).

(ECF No. 14,

Construed in this manner, Defendant suggests that “the

complaint states colorable claims that Plaintiff’s substantive

2

due process rights were violated or that Kaiser violated one or
more federal civil rights statutes.”

(Id.).

Whether a complaint filed in state court presents a federal
question
rule.”

is

determined

based

on

the

“well

pleaded

complaint

Thus, unless the federal claim necessarily appears in

the plaintiff’s statement of her own case, there is no federal
question

jurisdiction.

Here,

the

complaint

merely

mentions

“civil and constitutional rights,” and alleges false statements
resulting in a felony conviction, but does not include the word
“federal” or refer to a federal statute.
private

persons

are

not

liable

violations as a general rule.

for

It is axiomatic that
federal

civil

rights

See, e.g., Goldstein v. Chestnut

Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000)
(citing

Lugar

v.

Edmondson

Oil

Co.,

457

U.S.

922

(1982)).

Rather, unless action is taken under color of state law, there
can

be

no

viable

federal

claim.

The

mere

provision

of

information to the police, even if false, does not give rise to
a federal claim, unless there is evidence that the private party
and

state

actor

shared

a

common

unlawful

goal.

See,

e.g.,

Anilao v. Spota, 774 F.Supp.2d 457, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Castro
v. County of Nassau, 739 F.Supp.2d 153, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
As

Defendant

observes,

there

is

a

doctrinal

difference

between merely failing to state a claim and the absence of a
federal claim for jurisdictional purposes.
3

Nevertheless, the

doctrine

of

substantiality

federal jurisdiction.

remains

a

significant

hurdle

to

As the Fourth Circuit explained in Davis

v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 1988):
The Hagans [v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 1974)]
court
made
clear
that
dismissal
for
insubstantiality is appropriate only where
the proffered claim is truly frivolous.
Cases which are doubtful on the merits, even
those which cannot survive a Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a
claim, still are substantial enough to
support federal jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90
L.Ed. 939 (1946).
Nevertheless, Hagans
stands for the proposition that federal
courts are without jurisdiction to hear
frivolous constitutional claims. . . .
The
doctrine
of
substantiality
is
especially
important
where
a
wholly
frivolous federal claim serves as a pretext
to allow a state law issue, the real focus
of the claim, to be litigated in the federal
system.
The
importance
of
the
substantiality
doctrine
lies
in
the
difference between dismissing a weak federal
claim
via
Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6)
or
in
dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction.
If
a court disposes of the claim on the merits,
it retains the power to decide any attendant
state law issues or pendent state law
claims.
If the federal claim is found
insubstantial, however, the court is also
without jurisdiction to decide any state
issues or claims and they must be resolved
in state court.
The Federal courts must,
therefore, guard against the litigant who
frames a pretextual federal issue solely for
the purpose of having a state law claim
adjudicated in the federal system.
An
informed sense of comity cautions against
the federal courts taking such cases and
Article III of the Constitution forbids it.

4

(Internal footnote omitted).
Here, as in Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 817
n. 5 (4th

Cir. 2004), the attempt by Defendant to interpret

Plaintiff’s

complaint

as

stating

some

amorphous

federal

due

process claim is too insubstantial to invoke federal question
jurisdiction:
To the extent that Dixon’s complaint can be
interpreted as stating a cause of action
based directly on the First Amendment, such
a claim would be too insubstantial to invoke
federal question jurisdiction because the
First Amendment does not apply to private
employers.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974)
(“[F]ederal courts are without power to
entertain claims otherwise within their
jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit,
wholly
insubstantial,
obviously
frivolous, plainly unsubstantial, or no
longer open to discussion.”)
(internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see
also Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 651 (4th
Cir. 1988) (same).
Because

the

face

of

Plaintiff’s

complaint

does

not

set

forth a colorable federal constitutional claim, and considering
that

all

doubt

is

to

be

resolved

against

exercising

jurisdiction, removal was improper and the case will be remanded
to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

A separate

order will follow.
________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

5