Kiraly v. Prince George's County Public Schools

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/30/12. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MARIA KIRALY
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-2845

:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

employment discrimination action is a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Board of Education of Prince George’s County (“the
Board”).

(ECF No. 7).1

The issues are fully briefed and the

court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being
deemed necessary.

For the reasons that follow, the motion will

be granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Maria Kiraly commenced this action on October 4,

2011,

by

filing

a

complaint

against

the

Board,

alleging

violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and
the

Americans

with

Disabilities

Act

(“ADA”).

Prior

to

any

response, she amended her complaint, adding as a defendant the

1

The
amended
complaint
incorrectly
identifies
defendant as “Prince George’s County Public Schools.”
docket will be corrected to reflect its proper name.

this
The

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Local

2250

hostile

(“Local

work

2250”),

and

environment,

to

the

asserting

retaliation,

infliction of emotional distress.
According

further

amended

and

claims

for

intentional

(ECF No. 3).2
complaint,

“Plaintiff

is

a

seventy[-]one year old, Caucasian female, born in Hungary[,] who
suffers [from] a disability,” namely, Irritable Bowel Syndrome
(“IBS”).

(Id. at ¶ 5).

She has been employed by the Board as a

bus driver for more than twenty-eight years and is a member of
Local

2250,

“the

collective

bargaining

agent

that

represents

approximately 5,500 support employees who work for [the Board].”
(Id. at ¶ 7).

The complaint recites, in conclusory fashion,

that one or both defendants are “trying to force older white
employees out of their jobs.”

(Id. at ¶ 21).3

As support for

2

It is unclear how any of the causes of action set forth in
the amended complaint apply to Local 2520. Moreover, it appears
that this defendant has not been served. The amended complaint
was filed on November 28, 2011.
At the court’s prompting,
Plaintiff requested the issuance of a summons as to Local 2250
on March 9, 2012, and a summons was issued by the clerk on March
12. To date, Local 2250 has not responded and Plaintiff has not
filed proof of service as to this defendant. Local Rule 103.8.1
provides, in part, that “[i]f a party demanding affirmative
relief has not effected service of process within 120 days of
filing the pleading seeking affirmative relief, the Court may
enter an order asking the party to show cause why the claim
should not be dismissed.”
Plaintiff will be directed to show
cause, within fourteen days, why Local 2250 should not be
dismissed.
3

The complaint often recites that a specific act was
performed by “Defendant.”
In most cases, however, not only is
2

this

conclusion,

she

asserts

that

unidentified

persons,

at

unspecified times, have made “comments . . . about her seniority
and the need for her to retire” and called into question “her
ability to drive the buses safely due to her age.”
9).

(Id. at ¶

On other occasions, Plaintiff has been “yelled at and given

misinformation,”

allegedly

for

the

purpose

of

“mak[ing]

it

appear that because of her age she [is] incompetent and not
capable

of

equipment,”

doing

her

despite

completed training.”

job

the

or

fact

learning
that

to

she

use

has

the

newer

“successfully

(Id. at ¶ 20).

Plaintiff cites the assignment and management of bus routes
as

evidence

of

race

and

age

discrimination.

Apparently,

a

collective bargaining agreement sets forth a process by which
the

routes.

Route

assignments are based, at least in part, on seniority.

Despite

her

Board’s

long

bus

tenure

drivers

with

the

bid

on

Board,

preferred

Plaintiff

was

“pulled

off

scheduled runs that she bid for and received and [] assigned to
work on [buses] that were older and not safe.”

(Id. at ¶ 10).

At some point, she was altogether “denied the ability to bid on
runs . . . while younger people of a different race were given
the more senior runs that Plaintiff was qualified to bid on and
should have received.”

(Id. at ¶ 23).

According to Plaintiff,

the individual actor not identified, but it is unclear which
defendant is alleged to be responsible.
3

“[t]his affected [her] ability to earn income and benefits that
she

is

entitled

agreement.”

to

receive

under

the

collective

bargaining

(Id. at ¶ 24).

On two occasions, Plaintiff was “threatened . . . with
termination.”

(Id. at ¶ 17).

From November 2008 to February

2009, she was “placed on leave without pay and forced to use her
annual and sick leave,” apparently in relation to an incident in
which

she

was

“accused

of

attempting

to

run

over

another

employee who actually ran in front of [her] bus while [she] was
(Id. at ¶ 14).4

driving.”

On April 6, 2011, she was “accused of

threatening another driver and taken off her run and forced to
work in a different location and in another capacity to maintain
her employment.”
incident,

(Id. at ¶ 17).

Plaintiff

alleges

that

With regard to this second
“[t]he

Defendant

could

not

reasonably believe that the Plaintiff was capable of placing the
accuser

in

danger

or

fear

for

4

his

safety,”

and

that

the

The amended complaint later recites that Plaintiff was
“unfairly suspended because of false accusations made by her
supervisor.” (ECF No. 3 ¶ 46). Aside from a vague allegation
that Plaintiff, at some point and for unknown reasons, “was not
allowed to work for two and one half days” (id. at ¶ 12), the
leave of absence from November 2008 to February 2009 appears to
be the only event in the factual recitation of the complaint
that could potentially qualify as a suspension.
In setting
forth the facts, however, Plaintiff does not refer to this event
as a “suspension.” Because there is no time frame provided, it
is unclear what relationship this event has to others such that
an inference of discrimination might arise.
Moreover, it is
uncertain whether this allegation is directed toward the Board
or Local 2250, which allegedly refused to represent her in the
grievance process.
4

accusation

was

retaliation.”
According

merely

“pretext

for

continued

harassment

(Id. at ¶ 19).
to

Plaintiff,

the

cumulative

effect

“harassment” caused her to “have an attack” of IBS.
30).

and

of

this

(Id. at ¶

When she informed the Board of her condition, she was

“harassed and retaliated against . . . [and] subjected [] to
psychological testing to determine her eligibility for continued
employment.”

(Id.

at

¶

26).

After

a

subsequent

“attack,”

Plaintiff was accused of “pull[ing] a stunt,” “yelled at for
changing her soiled garments,” and “told that she was old and
that her health was in question.”

(Id. at ¶ 31).

Plaintiff was

required to obtain medical clearance before returning to work.
When she presented her employer with a doctor’s note declaring
her fit, however, she was “told that she could not return[.]”
(Id.

at

¶

33).

While

it

is

unclear

whether

Plaintiff

did

eventually return to her duties as a bus driver, there appears
to be no dispute that her employment has not been terminated.
On February 3, 2012, the Board filed the pending motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 7).

Plaintiff opposed that motion on March 16 (ECF No.

13) and the Board filed reply papers on April 2 (ECF No. 16).
II.

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
5

Presley v. City of

Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At this stage, the court must consider all well-pleaded
allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 268 (1994), and construe all factual allegations in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff,

see

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th
Cir. 1993)).

The court need not, however, accept unsupported

legal allegations.
870,

873

(4th

Cir.

Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d
1989).

Nor

must

it

agree

with

legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference
to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d
844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
6

193 (4th Cir. 2009).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not ‘show[n] .
. . that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
at

679

(quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2)).

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

Thus,

“[d]etermining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . .
. be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Id.

III. Analysis
The Board contends that Plaintiff’s amended complaint “is
merely

a

jumble

of

accusations

that

fails

to

provide

even

general allegations about who took certain actions and when they
supposedly took these actions.”
original)).

(ECF No. 7-1, at 4 (emphasis in

Absent such, it argues that it is “not on notice as

to who might be creating respondeat superior liability,” or when
the conduct in question occurred, and therefore “cannot defend
itself.”

(Id.).

Thus, according to the Board, “Plaintiff’s

[c]omplaint is deficient and does not set out the requisite
facts to show that her claims are plausible under the Iqbal and
Twombly standards.”

(Id.).

In opposing the motion, Plaintiff

merely asserts that “the [c]omplaint gives fair notice of the
nature

and

necessary,

basis

of

[she]

is

the

claim[s],”

prepared

to

7

and
give

suggests

that

“[i]f

details

about

each

supervisor named in the allegations in the complaint.”

(ECF No.

13 ¶ 7).
Significantly
amended

complaint

more
is

detail

clearly

than

that

set

necessary.

forth

Absent

a

in

the

narrative

providing some description of the specific conduct at issue,
when

it

occurred,

and

the

identity

of

the

relevant

Plaintiff cannot allege plausible claims for relief.

actors,

See, e.g.,

United Black Firefighters, 604 F.2d at 847 (affirming dismissal
where the plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations of discrimination
were

not

supported

by

any

reference

to

particular

acts,

practices, or policies”); Casey v. Litton Loan Servicing LP,
Civ. No. RDB-11-0787, 2012 WL 502886, at *6 (D.Md. Feb. 14,
2012) (“The fundamental deficiency in the Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint

is

particularity

its

complete

actions

(or

failure

to

inactions)

describe

with

any

undertaken

by

the

defendant” (emphasis in original)); Cureton v. Cianbro Corp.,
Civ. No. JFM-06-2303, 2006 WL 3537407, at *2 (D.Md. Nov. 22,
2006) (dismissing complaint that omitted, inter alia, “the dates
of any alleged discrimination . . . and the individuals who
either participated in or benefitted from the discrimination”).
While

it

is

true,

as

the

Board

argues,

that

the

amended

complaint does not satisfy the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court in Iqbal and Twombly, a brief analysis of the specific
claims Plaintiff purports to raise is instructive.
8

A.

Disparate Treatment

The

first

and

second

counts

of

the

amended

complaint

purport to raise disparate treatment claims under Title VII and
the ADEA.5

To plead a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff

must allege with sufficient particularity that (1) she is a
member

of

a

protected

class,

(2)

her

job

performance

was

satisfactory, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and
(4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside
her protected class more favorably.

See Coleman v. Md. Court of

Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
Perhaps
treatment

the

claim

most
is

employment action.

fundamental

identification

element
of

a

of

a

cognizable

disparate
adverse

See James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.,

368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Regardless of the route a
plaintiff follows in proving a Title VII action, the existence
of

some

adverse

employment

action

citation and footnote omitted)).

is

required.”

(internal

An adverse employment action

is “a discriminatory act that ‘adversely affect[s] the terms,
conditions,

or

benefits

of

the

5

plaintiff’s

employment.’”

The first count, which is labeled “Discrimination under
Title VII,” recites, somewhat confusingly, that “Defendant
intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff because of her
Race, and Age (71) in violation of Title VII, ADA and ADEA[.]”
(ECF No. 3 ¶ 42).
There are separate counts, however,
purporting to allege violations of the ADA and ADEA, as well as
hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII. Thus,
essentially by process of elimination, the first count is
construed as alleging disparate treatment based on race.
9

Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting James, 368 F.3d at 375).

Where, as here, an

employee is not discharged, such actions typically take the form
of

a

decrease

in

compensation,

opportunity for promotion.

demotion,

or

loss

of

See James, 368 F.3d at 376.

an

It is

uncertain, based on Plaintiff’s amended complaint, whether any
such circumstance has come to bear.
While the complaint alludes, at certain points, to “unfair
suspensions” (ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 42, 46, 49), the factual allegations
do not address such discipline or the timing and circumstances
in which it may have arisen.
references

“attempt[s]”

Plaintiff’s employment.

by

At other points, the complaint

unspecified

persons

to

terminate

(Id. at ¶¶ 15, 17, 19, 42, 45, 49).

It

appears, however, that Plaintiff is still employed by the Board
and she has not identified the specific conduct that, in her
mind,

constituted

an

attempted

termination.

The

complaint

recites that, following the April 6, 2011, accusation that she
threatened another employee, Plaintiff was “forced to work in a
different

location

employment.”

and

in

(Id. at ¶ 17).

another

capacity

to

maintain

her

But the assignment of a “new role

and responsibilities . . . in and of itself does not constitute
adverse employment action” absent “a decrease in compensation,
job

title,

promotion.”

level

of

responsibility,

James, 368 F.3d at 376.
10

or

opportunity

for

Perhaps the best candidate

for

a

cognizable

adverse

employment

action

is

Plaintiff’s

assertion that she “was denied the ability to bid on runs . . .
while younger people of a different race were given the more
senior runs that Plaintiff was qualified to bid on and should
have received.”

(ECF No. 3 ¶ 23).

According to Plaintiff, this

affected her “ability to earn income and benefits that she is
entitled to receive[.]”
of

the

(Id. at ¶ 24).

circumstances

in

which

Absent any description

this

denial

occurred,

identification of the actors, or timing in reference to other
events, however, an inference of discrimination does not arise.
See Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (“‘naked assertions’ of wrongdoing
necessitate some ‘factual enhancement’ within the complaint to
cross

‘the

line

between

possibility

and

plausibility

of

entitlement to relief.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557);
see also Hale v. Con-Way Transp. Services, Inc., 428 F.Supp.2d
471, 475 (E.D.Va. 2006) (“The touchstone of an ADEA action is
that the adverse employment decision would not have been made,
but for plaintiff’s age[;] [i]n other words, the plaintiff’s age
must

have

been

a

determining

factor

in

the

employer’s

decision.”) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000)).
Because it is unclear whether Plaintiff has suffered an
adverse employment action, let alone when such event occurred,
she

has

failed

to

state

a
11

plausible

claim

for

relief.

Accordingly, her disparate treatment claims under Title VII and
the ADEA will be dismissed.
B.

Hostile Work Environment

In the fourth count of her amended complaint, Plaintiff
raises a claim of hostile work environment under Title VII.

To

state a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must allege
facts showing: “(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the
plaintiff’s

[race];

(3)

which

is

sufficiently

severe

or

pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and
to

create

an

abusive

work

imputable to the employer.”

environment;

and

(4)

which

is

James v. Anne Arundel Cnty., Md.,

Civ. No. CCB-10-2267, 2011 WL 3666776, at *3 (D.Md. Aug. 19,
2011) (citing Okoli v. City of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th
Cir.

2011)).

“Courts

sufficiently

hostile

circumstances,

or

determine

including

whether

abusive
the

by

frequency

an

environment

looking
of

the

at

all

is
the

discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating,

or

a

mere

offensive

utterance;

and

whether

it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir.
2005) (internal quotations omitted).

“Pleading a hostile work

environment requires both an objective and a subjective showing,
specifically an environment that ‘a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive, and one that the victim did in fact perceive
12

to be so.’”

Reed v. Airtran Airways, 531 F.Supp.2d 660, 669

(D.Md. 2008) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 787 (1998)).
Plaintiff

asserts

in

her

complaint

that

“the

misconduct

detailed herein was unwelcome, but it persisted . . . [and] was
intended

to

humiliate

the

Plaintiff

and

was

pointed

Plaintiff because of her race and/or national origin.”
3 ¶ 51).6

at

the

(ECF No.

There are no facts, however, suggesting that any of

the alleged “unwelcome conduct” was based on Plaintiff’s race or
national

origin.

Aside

from

reciting

that

Plaintiff

is

a

“Caucasian female, born in Hungary” (id. at ¶ 5), and alleging,
in conclusory fashion, that “younger people of a different race”
were given preferential treatment (id. at ¶ 23), the complaint
is

devoid

national

of

any

origin.

objectionable

specific
Moreover,

conduct

that

reference
Plaintiff
was

to

Plaintiff’s

has

sufficient

race

failed

to

in

degree

or

allege
and

frequency to support liability under a hostile work environment
theory.

See

environment
offhand

is

Reed,

531

F.Supp.2d

at

by

‘extreme’

conduct;

marked

comments,

and

isolated

668

incidents

(“A

hostile

‘simple
(unless

work

teasing,
extremely

serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms
and conditions of employment.”) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at

6

This is the only mention in the complaint of national
origin discrimination.
13

788).

Accordingly, her hostile work environment claim cannot be

sustained.
C.

Retaliation

Title

VII

also

makes

it

unlawful

for

“an

employer

to

discriminate against any of [its] employees . . . because [s]he
has

opposed

any

subchapter,

or

practice
because

made

[s]he

an
has

unlawful
made

a

practice
charge,

by

this

testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
2000e-3(a).

42 U.S.C. §

Protected activity of an employee, therefore, can

take the form of either opposing a practice prohibited under
Title

VII

charge,

(pursuant
testifying,

to

the

opposition

assisting,

or

clause)

or

participating

making

a

in

an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (pursuant
to the participation clause).
plaintiff

must

state

the

To allege a retaliation claim, a

following

elements:

(1)

that

she

engaged in a protected activity, (2) that her employer acted
adversely against her, and (3) that the protected activity was
causally connected to the adverse action.

See Holland, 487 F.3d

at 218.
In the fifth count of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
“Defendant

retaliated

against

[her]

for

her

discrimination

complaints and EEOC filing in violation of [Title VII].”
No. 3 ¶ 56).

(ECF

While the filing of complaints of discrimination
14

certainly would constitute protected activity under Title VII,
Plaintiff provides no indication as to the substance of these
complaints, when they occurred, or how they were related to an
adverse employment action.

Accordingly, she has failed to state

a plausible claim for retaliation.
D.
In

ADA
the

third

count

of

her

amended

complaint,

Plaintiff

alleges that the Board “violated the ADA by . . . making false
accusations about [her] health and mental state[;] [r]efusing to
accommodate

[her]

documentation

to

disability
verify

even

the

when

she

condition[;]

provided
[p]lacing

medical
her

on

suspension and threatening to terminate her for insubordination
when she was deliberately subjected to stressful situations that
triggered

her

disability.”

(ECF

No.

3

¶

49).

Insofar

as

Plaintiff’s employment has not been terminated and no facts are
asserted that would support a disparate treatment claim under
the

ADA,

it

appears

that

she

intends

to

raise

a

claim

for

disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate.

To

plead a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff
must set forth facts supporting that (1) she was an individual
who had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) the
employer

had

notice

of

her

disability,

(3)

with

reasonable

accommodations she should perform the essential functions of the
position,

and

(4)

the

employer
15

refused

to

make

such

accommodations.

See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11

(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. School
Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2nd Cir. 1999)).
Assuming

that

Plaintiff’s

IBS

constitutes

a

disability

within the meaning of the ADA and that she provided the Board
with notice of her disability, her claim still must fail because
she has done nothing more than assert that she requested and was
denied a reasonable accommodation.

Like much of the amended

complaint, this is a conclusory statement unsupported by any
facts, such as, for example, how her ability to work was limited
by IBS, what accommodations were necessary and requested, and
the circumstances in which a request was made and denied.

See

Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 Fed.Appx. 49, 59 (4th Cir. 2002) (The
“burden

of

qualified

identifying
individual

plaintiff,
respect

as

to

reasonable”).

does

an
to

the

accommodation
perform

ultimate

demonstrating

that

the

that
job

burden
such

rests

of

an

would

allow
with

persuasion

a

the
with

accommodation

is

Absent such detail, her disability discrimination

claim cannot be sustained.
E.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”)

was

first

recognized

by

the

Court

Maryland in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560 (1977).

of

Appeals

of

To recover for

such a claim under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
16

the defendant’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the
conduct

was

connection

extreme
between

or

outrageous;

the

wrongful

(3)

there

conduct

and

is
the

distress; and (4) the emotional distress is severe.
“Each

of

these

specificity.

elements

must

be

pled

a

and

causal

emotional

Id. at 566.
proved

with

It is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege

that they exist; [s]he must set forth facts that, if true, would
suffice

to

demonstrate

that

they

exist.”

Servs. Admin., 78 Md.App. 151, 175 (1989).

Foor

v.

Juvenile

This tort is “rarely

viable” and “is to be used sparingly and only for opprobrious
behavior that includes truly outrageous conduct.”

Respess v.

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America, 770 F.Supp.2d 751, 757
(D.Md. 2011) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 231 (4th
Cir. 2009)).
The Board argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second
and

fourth

elements

of

an

IIED

claim.

Specifically,

it

contends, Plaintiff has “failed to allege any extreme case of
uncivilized
emotional
opposition

behavior”

distress.”
papers

do

or

that

she

is

“suffering

7-1,

at

5,

(ECF

No.

not

specifically

6).

address

disabling
Plaintiff’s

the

Board’s

argument in this regard.
To satisfy the second element, the conduct in question must
“completely violate human dignity,” and “strike to the very core
of one’s being, threatening to shatter the frame upon which
17

one’s emotional fabric is hung.”

Interphase Garment Solutions,

LLC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 566 F.Supp.2d 460, 466
(D.Md. 2008) (quoting

Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66

Md.App. 46, 59-60 (1986));

see also Kohler v. Shenasky, 914

F.Supp. 1206, 1212 (D.Md. 1995) (“For conduct to be ‘extreme and
outrageous,’ it must go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and . . . be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.”

(internal marks omitted)).

“[T]he mere

fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct
as insulting, or will have [her] feelings hurt, is not enough.”
Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md.
663, 672 (1992).
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff has failed to identify
the conduct she alleges was “extreme and outrageous”; rather,
she merely asserts that “Defendant’s conduct in harassing the
Plaintiff

and

reckless,

extreme

connection

deceit
and

between

emotional distress.”

and

dishonesty

outrageous,

Defendant’s

and

was

there

misconduct

(ECF No. 3 ¶ 57).

intentional
was

and

a

and

causal

Plaintiff’s

Setting aside that it

is unknown which “Defendant” this cause of action refers to and
that

no

individual

actors

are

identified

–

which

itself

constitutes sufficient grounds for dismissal, see Asafo-Adjei v.
First Sav. Mortg. Corp., No. RWT 09cv2184, 2010 WL 730365, at *5
(D.Md.

Feb.

25,

2010)

(dismissing
18

where

“Plaintiff

fails

to

identify

which

Defendants

caused

describe

with

particularity

the

his

emotional

emotional

distress

distress

that

or
he

allegedly suffered”) – this is precisely the kind of “unadorned
conclusory allegation[]” that courts have found insufficient to
state a claim for relief.
At

base,

criticized,

Francis, 588 F.3d at 193.

Plaintiff

asserts

intentionally

that

misled,

she

and

has

been

falsely

unfairly

accused

of

wrongdoing in attempt either to create a pretextual cause for
her termination or to force her resignation.

Insofar as this

conduct was motivated by discriminatory animus, other causes of
action may provide relief.

The facts do not, however, come

close to alleging “extreme and outrageous” conduct supporting a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Figueiredo-Torres

v.

Nickel,

321

Md.

642,

655

(1991)

See
(“mere

insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other

trivialities

are

insufficient

to

support

a

claim

for

intentional infliction of emotional distress” (internal marks
omitted)); Rollins v. Verizon Md., Inc., Civ. No. RDB 09-2379,
2010 WL 4449361, at *8 (D.Md. Nov. 5, 2010) (although yelling at
the plaintiff in front of co-workers “may have embarrassed or
upset [her], it does not constitute conduct that goes ‘beyond
all possible bounds of decency’”); Arbabi v. Fred Meyers, Inc.,
205 F.Supp.2d 462, 466 (D.Md. 2002) (“workplace harassment . . .
almost never rises to the level of outrageousness, and almost
19

never results in such severely debilitating emotional trauma, as
to reach the high threshold invariably applicable to a claim of
intentional
law.”).
IV.

infliction

of

emotional

distress

under

Maryland

Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed.7

Leave to Amend
In

the

concluding

paragraph

of

her

opposition

papers,

Plaintiff asks that she be permitted to amend her complaint
“[i]f for some reason the [c]ourt should determine that [she]
fails to state a claim[.]”

(ECF No. 13, at 3).

As the Board

has not opposed this request, Plaintiff will be permitted to
file a second amended complaint within twenty-one days.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s motion to dismiss

will be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a
second

amended

complaint

within

twenty-one

days.

Within

fourteen days, Plaintiff must show cause why Local 2250 should
not be dismissed.

A separate order will follow.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
7

Because the amended complaint does not adequately plead
the second element of the tort, the sufficiency of the
allegations with respect to the fourth element need not be
examined.
20