Kiraly v. Prince George's County Public Schools
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/20/13. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MARIA KIRALY
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 11-2845
:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
this
employment discrimination action are motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Local 2250 (“the Union”), and Board of Education of
Prince George’s County (“the Board”).
relevant
issues
have
been
briefed
(ECF Nos. 29, 30).
and
the
court
now
The
rules
pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary.
For the reasons that follow, both motions will be granted.1
I.
Background
Plaintiff Maria Kiraly – a Caucasian, seventy-one-year-old
school
bus
driver
who
suffers
from
Irritable
Bowel
Syndrome
(“IBS”) – commenced this action on October 4, 2011, against the
Board, her employer, alleging disparate treatment based on race
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
1
Also pending is Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for extension
of time to file her opposition papers.
(ECF No. 31).
That
motion will also be granted.
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (“Title VII”); disparate
treatment based on age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”); and
failure
to
accommodate
her
disability
in
violation
of
the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et
seq. (“ADA”).
complaint,
Prior to any response, Plaintiff amended the
adding
the
Union
as
a
defendant
and
asserting
additional claims for hostile work environment and retaliation
under
Title
VII
and
intentional
infliction
of
dismiss,
characterizing
emotional
distress.
The
Board
complaint
as
moved
“merely
to
a
jumble
of
accusations
the
that
amended
fails
to
provide even general allegations about who took certain actions
and when they supposedly took these actions.”
4
(emphasis
in
original)).
The
court
(ECF No. 7-1, at
essentially
agreed,
finding that
[s]ignificantly more detail than that set
forth in the amended complaint is clearly
necessary.
Absent a narrative providing
some description of the specific conduct at
issue, when it occurred, and the identity of
the relevant actors, Plaintiff cannot allege
plausible claims for relief.
(ECF No. 17, at 8).
action
applied
to
Further noting that none of the causes of
the
Union
–
which,
in
any
event,
had
apparently not been served – the court dismissed the amended
complaint,
without
prejudice
to
2
Plaintiff’s
right
to
file
a
second amended complaint within twenty-one days, and directed
Plaintiff to show cause why the Union should not be dismissed.
Approximately three weeks later, Plaintiff filed a waiver
of service signed by counsel for the Union (ECF No. 20) and a
second amended complaint purporting to raise the same claims she
attempted to raise in the prior pleading (ECF No. 22).
In
response, the Board and the Union filed the pending motions to
dismiss.
(ECF
Nos.
29,
30).2
Plaintiff
filed
papers
in
opposition (ECF Nos. 32, 33) and Defendants filed replies (ECF
Nos. 34, 35).
II.
Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
of
Charlottesville,
464
F.3d
480,
483
See Presley v. City
(4th
Cir.
2006).
A
2
The Union moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Much of its motion is based on the
premise that Plaintiff’s claims against it may only be construed
as alleging breach of a duty of fair representation, rather than
discrimination based on race, age, and disability.
Thus, the
Union contends, the complaint does not present a federal
question and, because the parties are not diverse, the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected a similar
premise, advanced by the same counsel, in Murphy v. Adams, Civ.
No. DKC 12-1975, 2013 WL 398753, at *3 (D.Md. Jan. 31, 2013),
and will do the same here.
While the Rule 12(b)(6) aspect of
the Union’s motion focuses primarily on an erroneous limitations
argument, it generally alleges that the complaint does not pass
muster under Iqbal and Twombly.
The Board’s motion is labeled as a motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment.
In substance, however,
it seeks only dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
3
plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).
Fed.R.Civ.P.
“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp.
That showing must
consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff,
see
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal
allegations need not be accepted.
See Revene v. Charles County
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
Legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604
F.2d
844,
847
(4th
Cir.
1979);
see
also
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
4
Francis
v.
“[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged,
but it has not ‘show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”
8(a)(2)).
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
at
679
(quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P.
Thus, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that
requires
the
reviewing
court
experience and common sense.”
to
draw
on
its
judicial
Id.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, unfortunately, is not
an
improvement
on
the
prior
versions,
as
it
is
laden
with
conflicting allegations that undermine any attempt to discern a
coherent factual narrative.
Moreover, the complaint fails to
identify what alleged acts correspond to specific claims, opting
instead to present a series of facts with the hope that one or
more causes of action might be pieced together therefrom.
to
the
conflicting
nature
of
the
allegations,
however,
Due
this
simply is not possible.
Plaintiff
alleges,
for
example,
that,
after
she
was
diagnosed with IBS, she took extended medical leave from work
beginning on or about October 15, 2007.
that she returned on February 6, 2008.
She initially asserts
(ECF No. 22 ¶ 10).
Two
paragraphs later, the complaint recites that she “returned to
work as instructed” on November 5, 2008 – i.e., approximately
5
nine months after February 6 – at which point she was told “to
go home” by the forewoman of her bus lot, Ms. Swann.
12).
(Id. at ¶
According to Plaintiff, she “was not given a reason why
she was being sent home” and “she lost sick time, retirement
[benefits,] and her pay was reduced” as a result.
(Id.).
She
further alleges, however, that she “was suspended in November
2008” after she was “accused [by Ms. Swann] of attempting to run
over another employee” with a bus.
(Id. at ¶ 57).
In yet
another incident occurring in November 2008, Plaintiff complains
that she was sent home for medical reasons following an incident
in which she “soiled [her] undergarments” while at work.
at ¶¶ 13-15).
(Id.
At another point in the complaint, she states
that she was “placed on leave without pay . . . from November
2008 to February 2009” (id. at ¶ 26), but then cites several
incidents that allegedly occurred at work during the same time
period
(id.
incidents,
in
at
¶¶
19,
January
33,
2009,
40).
Following
Plaintiff
allegedly
one
of
those
“became
very
ill” and “was forced to take a year of leave with pay and to use
her medical benefits” (id. at ¶ 69), but she cites numerous
incidents occurring at work during the time she was on leave
(id. at ¶¶ 25, 32, 34, 38, 40, 55, 56, 67, 76, 87, 88).
She
alleges that she was again placed on leave in March 2009, and
“was informed that she would be terminated because there was no
record
of
[her]
requesting
leave
6
or
that
she
provided
any
medical documentation.”
however,
she
asserts
(Id. at ¶ 32).
that
she
was
During the same month,
“transferred
to
another
location” where she “made less money . . . because she could not
drive overtime.”
was
threatened
another
(Id. at ¶ 56).
with
employee.”
On January 4, 2011, Plaintiff
termination
for
“attempting
(Id.
23,
24).
at
¶¶
to
run
Although
over
she
was
“informed by letter dated March 14, 2011,” that the decision to
terminate her employment had been “upheld” after further review,
she was apparently still working on April 6, 2011, when she was
“threatened
again
with
termination”
following
an
incident
in
which she was “accused of threatening another driver and taken
off her run and forced to work in a different location and in
another capacity to maintain her employment.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 24,
27).
Due
to
inconsistencies
such
as
these,
it
is
virtually
impossible to piece together a clear account of the relevant
facts.
As noted, in analyzing a motion to dismiss, the court
must accept as true the “well-pleaded allegations” contained in
the complaint.
majority
of
the
See Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134.
allegations
contained
in
The vast
Plaintiff’s
second
amended complaint are decidedly not “well-pleaded” and cannot be
credited for purposes of the instant motions.
What remains,
moreover, are essentially conclusory allegations that isolated
incidents, neutral on their face, were in fact motivated by
7
discriminatory
animus.
Such
allegations
state plausible claims for relief.
are
insufficient
to
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Accordingly, the complaint is subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff requests, in the event that the dismissal motions
are
granted,
amend.”
that
(ECF
she
No.
33,
be
at
permitted
17).
“a
last
Pursuant
opportunity
to
to
Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires.”
The Supreme Court has held that:
In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason – such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments
previously
allowed,
undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc. – the leave sought should,
as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The court declines to grant leave for Plaintiff to file a
third amended complaint.
As the Board observes, in permitting
Plaintiff leave to file her second amended complaint, the court
provided a detailed account of the pleading requirements for the
claims she attempted to raise.
Plaintiff’s counsel failed to
take advantage of that opportunity, however, and there is no
reason to believe that a different result would obtain upon the
filing of a third amended complaint.
8
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by
the Board and the Union will be granted.
A separate order will
follow.
________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
9
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