Ashby v. Shearin et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 6/7/2012. (c/m 6/8/12 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOHN ROBERT ASHBY,
Plaintiff,
v.

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BOBBY P. SHEARIN, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. PJM-11-2955

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is Defendants Gary D. Maynard, Bobby P. Shearin, and Michael Stouffer’s Motion
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 10. The Plaintiff has not filed a response.1 Upon
review of papers and exhibits filed, the Court finds an oral hearing in this matter unnecessary. See
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Background
Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process by the use of invalid and unlawful prison
disciplinary procedures. ECF No. 1. He states he was placed in solitary confinement in 2006 as a
result of disciplinary proceedings which he claims Defendants knew were unlawful. He also claims
he has been threatened with physical harm by unnamed correctional employees if he continues
seeking legal remedies. Id.
The uncontroverted records reveal that on January 5, 2006, several correctional employees at
the North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”) were attacked by a group of approximately
fifteen inmate, including Plaintiff. ECF No. 10, Exs. 1-4. Plaintiff was served notice of inmate rule
infractions and after a hearing found to have been involved in a “mass disturbance” involving
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Pursuant to the dictates of Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was notified that
Defendants had filed a dispositive motion, the granting of which could result in the dismissal of his action. ECF No.
11. Plaintiff was also informed that he was entitled to file materials in opposition to that motion within seventeen
(17) days from the date of that letter and that his failure to file a timely or responsive pleading or to illustrate, by
affidavit or the like, a genuine dispute of material fact, could result in the dismissal of his case or in the entry of
summary judgment without further notice of the Court. Id.

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“disturbance/mutinous act[s] by physically attacking staff persons with fists, officer’s own pepper
spray, floor fans, batteries, and telephone receiver.” Id., Ex. 1. Plaintiff was found guilty of eight
prison rule violations and sentenced to several periods of consecutive segregation. Id. During the
hearing concerning these rule violations, Plaintiff became upset and left the hearing room. The
Hearing Officer noted Plaintiff left the hearing under his own volition, waiving his right to be present
at the hearing. The Hearing Officer’s written decision was reviewed and affirmed by the Warden. Id.,
Ex. 6.
On October 26 and 30, 2006, Plaintiff was served with additional notice of inmate rule
infractions. Id., Ex. 7-8. The incidents were consolidated in the same hearing procedure. Id. Ex. 9.
Plaintiff pled guilty to the rule infractions and was sanctioned with additional segregation time to be
served consecutive to his previously imposed disciplinary segregation terms. Id., Ex. 10. The
decision of the hearing officer was approved by the Warden. Id., Ex. 11.
Standard of Review
A.

Motion to Dismiss
The purpose of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test the

sufficiency of the Plaintiff's Complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th
Cir. 1999). The dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted does not
require the Defendant to establish Abeyond doubt@ that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 555-56. Both Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), make clear that, in order to survive a Motion to Dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), a Complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’. . .” (citation omitted)); see also
Simmons v. United Mortgage and Loan Inv., 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011); Andrew v. Clark, 561
F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles
County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations,
see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, see United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
B.

Summary Judgment
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat

the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th
Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should Aview the
evidence in the light most favorable to....the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without
weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@ Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr.,
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Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to
trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999
F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Discussion
A.

Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff=s complaint against Warden Bobby P. Shearin, Gary Maynard, and J. Michael Stouffer

is based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, which does not apply in '1983 claims. See
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F. 3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under
'1983); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F. 3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (no respondeat superior liability
in a Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials must be “premised on >a recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates= misconduct may be a causative factor
in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.=@ Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.
3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001), citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F. 2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). Supervisory
liability under ' 1983 must be supported with evidence that (1) the supervisor had actual or
constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff, (2) the supervisor=s response to
the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the
alleged offensive practices, and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor=s
inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F. 3d
791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has pointed to no action or inaction on the part of the named
Defendants that resulted in a constitutional injury, and accordingly, his claims against them shall be
dismissed.

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B.

Due Process in Disciplinary Hearings
In prison disciplinary proceedings which bring the possible loss of good conduct credits, a

prisoner is entitled to certain due process protections. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564
(1974). These include advance written notice of the charges against him, a hearing, the right to call
witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and
correctional concerns, and a written decision. Wolff, 418 U. S. at 564-571. Substantive due process
is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was based upon "some evidence." Superintendent,
Mass. Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Plaintiff received all the process he
was due in each of the complained of disciplinary hearings. In each case, he was given timely
advance written notice of the infraction and was permitted to attend the disciplinary hearing and to
call witnesses on his own behalf. He also received written findings of the hearing officer. Moreover,
the hearing officer’s determination of guilt was based upon some evidence. In the first case, review
was based upon staff testimony, Plaintiff’s testimony and statements from his representative during
the preliminary stage of the proceedings,2 video evidence, and the written record, upon which the
hearing officer based determinations as to credibility and demeanor. ECF No. 10, Ex. 2. As to the
consolidated matter, Plaintiff pled guilty to the rule infractions. Id., Ex. 11.
To the extent Plaintiff contends that his placement on disciplinary segregation violates his
rights, his claim likewise fails.

In general, prisoners do not have a constitutional right to demand

to be housed in one prison setting verses another. A[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal
defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine
him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do
not otherwise violate the Constitution.@ Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). Under the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the focus on

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Plaintiff and his representative left the hearing when their requests to be handcuffed in front were not granted. ECF

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mandatory language in prison regulations was rejected. A liberty interest may be created when
state action imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life" without regard to mandatory language in prison regulations. Id. at 484.
Thus, the due process inquiry must focus on the nature of the deprivation alleged and not on the
language of particular prison regulations. Id. As a prisoner, Plaintiff is not entitled to the process
due to persons who remain at liberty. “Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty
curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited
than in cases where the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at all.” Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005). He is not entitled to an adversarial hearing, witnesses,
evidence introduction, or other trappings of a full trial. The undersigned finds that the process
afforded to Plaintiff in his adjustment proceeding, prior to placement on disciplinary segregation,
met with minimal constitutional standards.
Plaintiff’s claim that his disciplinary sanctions should be vacated in light of Massey v.
Secretary, Dep=t of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 389 Md. 496, 886 A.2d 585 (Md. 2005),
is unavailing. In Massey, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that the directives of the
Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services dealing with inmate
discipline and the procedures for charging offenses constituted regulations under the Administrative
Procedure Act (AAPA@) and thus, to be legally effective, were to be adopted in conformance with the
APA. See Massey, 389 Md. at 517-525, 886 A.2d at 597-602. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that
the regulations under which he was convicted of rule violations were of no force or effect, that
assertion must be made in the appropriate state forum.
Conclusion

No. 10, Ex. 2.

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For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants= Motion, construed as a motion for summary
judgment, shall be granted. A separate Order follows.

/s/
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

June 7, 2012

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