Johns v. Astrue

Filing 22

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 1/28/14. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

January 28, 2014

LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:

Avis Johns v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-2996

Dear Counsel:
On October 20, 2011, the Plaintiff, Avis Johns, petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 19, 20). I find that no hearing is necessary.
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). I will deny Ms.
Johns’s motion and grant the Commissioner’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Johns filed her claims for benefits in the fall of 2007, alleging disability beginning on
April 2, 2006.1 (Tr. 136-40). Her claims were denied initially on December 14, 2007, and on
reconsideration on March 24, 2008. (Tr. 58-69). A hearing was held on September 23, 2009
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 25-49). Following the hearing, on December
4, 2009, the ALJ determined that Ms. Johns was not disabled during the relevant time frame.
(Tr. 11-24). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Johns’s request for review (Tr. 1-4), so the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Johns suffered from the severe impairments of depression,
bipolar disorder, lupus, and high cholesterol. (Tr. 17). Despite these impairments, the ALJ
determined that Ms. Johns retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a range of unskilled, light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b). Claimant requires a sit/stand option at will and should have limited
general public contact.
(Tr. 18). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Johns could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and that
she was not therefore disabled. (Tr. 22-24).

1

Ms. Johns’s SSI application asserted a later date of disability onset, May 1, 2007. (Tr. 136).

Avis Johns v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-2996
January 28, 2014
Page 2
Ms. Johns presents four primary arguments on appeal: (1) the ALJ did not provide an
adequate function-by-function analysis, (2) that the ALJ erred in considering the opinions from
the state agency physicians; (3) that the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinion of a
treating physician, Dr. Morris, and (4) that the ALJ needed to provide a more detailed mental
RFC assessment. Each argument lacks merit.
Ms. Johns first makes a continuously recycled argument that this court has rejected many
times, suggesting that the ALJ failed to provide a function-by-function narrative discussion of
her RFC. Pl. Mot. 3-6. In fact, however, the ALJ provided a three and one-half-page written
narrative on her RFC alone, in which he summarized Ms. Johns’s hearing testimony, made a
credibility determination, summarized Ms. Johns’s activities of daily living, reviewed both the
treatment records and the opinion evidence, noted observations from the hearing, and explained
the specific provisions included in the RFC assessment. (Tr. 18-22). Ms. Johns's boilerplate
argument is therefore completely inapplicable in this case.
Next, Ms. Johns contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate properly the opinions of the
state agency physicians, Drs. Moore and Edmunds.2 Ms. Johns is correct that Dr. Moore checked
multiple “moderate limitations” in Section I of his opinion, and that the ALJ did not include all
of those limitations in his RFC assessment or his hypothetical. (Tr. 260-63, 308). However, the
relevant portion of a physician’s opinion is not Section I, which sets forth a series of “check the
box” rankings, but Section III, which provides a narrative functional capacity assessment. See
Program Operations Manual System DI 24510.060B (Mental Residual Functional Capacity
Assessment), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510060 (“Section I is
merely a worksheet to aid in deciding the presence and degree of functional limitations and the
adequacy of documentation and does not constitute the RFC assessment.”). Because Section I
does not include the requisite level of detail to inform the ALJ’s opinion, an ALJ need not
address each of the Section I limitations. See, e.g., Andrews v. Astrue, Civil No. SKG–09–3061,
slip op. at *39 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2011) (noting that “even if the ALJ had not explicitly addressed
each of the mental function limitations appearing on Section I of the mental RFCA, he was not
required to do so.”). Moreover, the ALJ adequately addressed the limitations found in Dr.
Moore’s Section III functional capacity assessment. The ALJ limited Ms. Johns to unskilled
work with limited general public contact, (Tr. 18), which is consistent with Dr. Moore’s
suggestion that Ms. Johns “may exhibit difficulties on occasion with more complex tasks and
persistence” and “is likely to perform adequately in environments with limited social
interactions, ability to work at their own pace and minimal stressors.” (Tr. 262). The ALJ’s
assignment of significant weight to Dr. Moore’s opinion, therefore, is not in error.
Ms. Johns’s third argument is that the ALJ impermissibly substituted his own judgment
for that of her treating mental health provider, Dr. Morris, who opined that she would be unable
to endure the mental demands of competitive work. Pl. Mot. 8-9. The Fourth Circuit has stated
that treating source opinions are entitled to controlling weight if they are “well supported by
2

Dr. Edmunds issued a one-page opinion affirming the assessments of Dr. Moore, so an independent
analysis of Dr. Edmunds’s opinion is unnecessary. (Tr. 308).

Avis Johns v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-2996
January 28, 2014
Page 3
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (emphasis in original)
(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) & 416.927(d)(2)). “By negative implication, if a
physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other
substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.” Id. Ms. Johns contests the
ALJ’s findings that Dr. Morris’s opinion was “inconsistent with the evidence of record” and
“based primarily on the claimant’s” subjective complaints. Pl. Mot. 8. However, the ALJ
adequately supported those conclusions. The ALJ noted that the treatment records from
Threshold Services Mental Health Center, where Dr. Morris worked, indicated that Ms. Johns
experienced marked improvement with medication. (Tr. 20). In fact, the notes from the same
date as Dr. Morris’s opinion read, “Feels great on meds. Sleep is good. Mood is stable. . . Here
to fill out disability forms.” (Tr. 326). Dr. Morris’s opinion may be rejected, therefore, because
the physician's “own medical notes did not confirm his determination of ‘disability.’” Craig, 76
F.3d at 590.
The ALJ further noted that the November, 2007 assessment from the psychiatrist who
treated Ms. Johns for the longest time, Dr. Hardy, contradicted Dr. Morris’s opinion and
demonstrated that Ms. Johns had “average intelligence, good memory, thought process is intact,
depressed mood, and her affect was labile.” (Tr. 19, 243). The ALJ also noted that a
consultative examiner, Dr. Mittal, had not observed any mental impairment that would preclude
work. (Tr. 20, 267-69). I also note that Dr. Morris, at best, based her opinion on treatment of
Ms. Johns between her intake at Threshold Services Mental Health Center in January, 2009, and
the April 1, 2009 opinion.3
Ms. Johns also contends that the ALJ failed to provide a “more detailed” assessment of
her capacity to perform the mental demands of work while assessing her RFC. Pl. Mot. 9-11.
Ms. Johns's argument consists entirely of boilerplate, with the exception of the contention that
the ALJ provided only a “less-detailed conclusion that the plaintiff was limited [to] unskilled
work with limited general public contact.” Pl. Mot. 11. However, Ms. Johns disregards the
ALJ’s discussion of the mental health evidence from Drs. Hardy and Mittal, the summary of the
records from Threshold Services Mental Health Center, and the discussions of the opinion
evidence relating to Ms. Johns’s mental capacity. (Tr. 19-22). Ms. Johns provides no analysis of
how any “more detailed” assessment might have resulted in a different outcome.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Johns’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19)
will be DENIED. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) will be GRANTED.
The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

3

In fact, the records from Threshold Services Mental Health Center seem to reflect that Ms. Johns had a January
intake appointment with a counselor, but did not see a psychiatrist until March 2, 2009. (Tr. 335, 336). However, in
the best case scenario using the earlier date, Dr. Morris would have treated Ms. Johns for approximately twelve
weeks before issuing her opinion, in contrast to Dr. Hardy, who treated Ms. Johns for approximately four years
before opining that she had “no problem” in her ability to relate to others and that she “responds well to treatments
without any adverse effects.” (Tr. 241-44).

Avis Johns v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-11-2996
January 28, 2014
Page 4
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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