Ramos v. Bank of America, N.A. et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 06/04/2012. (nd, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
CARMEN RAMOS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-3022

:
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this diversity
action are two motions:

a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12), and a

motion to stay pretrial deadlines and discovery (ECF No. 21),
both filed by Defendants Bank of America, N.A., and BAC Home
Loan Servicing, LP.1

The issues have been fully briefed, and the

court now rules, no hearing deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For

dismiss

the

following

reasons,

the

motion

to

will

be

granted, and the motion to stay will be denied as moot.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

The

complaint

States

Treasury

alleges

the

Department’s

following
Home

facts.

Affordable

The

United

Modification

Program (“HAMP”) is a national program designed to stem the home
foreclosure
1

crisis

by

providing

affordable

mortgage

loan

According to Defendants’ motion, the proper name of
Defendant BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, is “BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP.” (ECF No. 12, at 1). The clerk will be directed
to correct the party name in this case.

modifications and other alternatives to eligible borrowers.

On

April 17, 2009, Defendants entered into a Servicer Participation
Agreement with the U.S. Treasury agreeing to comply with HAMP’s
requirements.

Under HAMP, prospective borrowers enter into a

standardized contract, called a Trial Period Plan (“TPP”), with
lenders/servicers

such

as

Defendants

for

a

three-month

trial

modification of the borrower’s existing note and mortgage.

The

TPP promises that if the borrower complies with the terms of the
agreement and the borrower’s representations continue to be true
in

all

material

respects,

then

the

borrower

will

receive

a

permanent modification on the same terms.
In

January

reduction

in

employment.
a

HAMP

2011,

her

Plaintiff

income

as

a

Carmen

result

of

Ramos
a

suffered

change

in

a
her

To remedy her economic situation, Ms. Ramos sought

loan

modification

Ramos’s home mortgage.

from

Defendants,

who

serviced

Ms.

On February 3, 2011, Ms. Ramos contacted

Defendants, who stated that they would send an “FHA-HAMP packet”
to her.

About a week later, Ms. Ramos received the FHA-HAMP

packet, which contained the documents for applying to the FHAHAMP program.

On February 17, 2011, Ms. Ramos submitted the

completed documents to Defendants.

According to the complaint,

between Ms. Ramos’s first attempt at submitting the documents in
February through April 29, 2011, there were numerous delays, and
Defendants lost Ms. Ramos’s paperwork multiple times.
2

Although

the complaint is unclear on what exactly happened on or about
April

29,

entered

2011,

into

does

allege

TPP

a

it

with

Ms.

that

Defendants

Ramos.

(ECF

No.

ultimately
2

¶

15).

Otherwise, the complaint alleges that Defendants “systematically
acted with carelessness, recklessness, negligence, bad faith,
breach of care, breach of duty, breach of good faith and fair
dealing, gross negligence and with deliberate indifference in
its

inaction

of

malfeasance,

misfeasance

and

nonfeasance

[their] efforts or attempt to modify” Ms. Ramos’s loan.

in

(Id. ¶

25).
B.

Procedural Background

On September 14, 2011, Ms. Ramos, proceeding pro se, filed
a

complaint

against

Defendants

Montgomery County, Maryland.
removed to this court.
eleven counts:

in

the

Circuit

Court

for

After service, Defendants timely

(ECF No. 1).

The complaint contains

(1) civil conspiracy to defraud; (2) unfair and

deceptive trade practices; (3) aiding and abetting fraud; (4)
fraudulent

intentional

misrepresentations

and

negligence;

(5)

unjust enrichment; (6) civil conspiracy; (7) violation of the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”); (8) commercial loan
servicer violations of suppression; (9) breach of duty, care,
and trust; (10) breach of good faith and fair dealing; and (11)

3

mental

anguish,

emotional

distress

and

psychological

trauma

resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder.2
On October 28, 2011, Ms. Ramos moved to remand the case
back to state court.

(ECF No. 11).

After Defendants responded

(ECF No. 15), the court, in a memorandum opinion and order,
denied the motion (ECF Nos. 19, 20).
Separately,

on

October

pending motion to dismiss.

31,

2011,

Defendants

(ECF No. 12).

filed

the

In accordance with

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court
mailed a letter to Ms. Ramos notifying her that Defendants filed
a dispositive motion.

(ECF No. 13).

motion on December 5, 2011.
2011, Defendants replied.
II.

Ms. Ramos opposed the

(ECF No. 27).

On December 20,

(ECF No. 28).3

Standard of Review
The

purpose

of

a

motion

to

dismiss

pursuant

12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

to

Rule

Presley

v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule

2

Count Eleven is incorrectly styled as “Count X” in the
complaint.
3

On November 16, 2011, Defendants also filed the pending
motion to stay pretrial deadlines and discovery, which requests
a stay of all discovery until the resolution of the motion to
dismiss. (ECF No. 21). As a scheduling order has not yet been
entered in this case and the motion to dismiss will be resolved
by this memorandum opinion and order, the motion to stay will be
denied as moot.
4

8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, the court must consider all well-pleaded
allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in
the

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff,

see

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, the court need

not accept unsupported legal allegations.

Revene v. Charles

Cnty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

Nor must it

agree

allegations,

with

legal

conclusions

couched

as

factual

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or conclusory factual allegations devoid
of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v.
Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

“[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
5

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged,
but it has not ‘show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”

Iqbal,

8(a)(2)).

556

U.S.

at

679

(quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P.

Thus, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that

requires

the

reviewing

experience and common sense.”

court

to

draw

on

its

judicial

Id.

III. Analysis
Defendants’

initial

argument

proceeds

as

follows:

Ms.

Ramos seeks to enforce HAMP itself via the complaint; there is,
however,

no

private

right

of

action

under

complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
6-10).

HAMP;

thus,

the

(ECF No. 12-1, at

In response, Ms. Ramos contends that it is not HAMP

generally that she seeks to enforce; rather, it is enforcement
of

the

alleged

TPP

and

the

obtaining

of

a

permanent

loan

modification that gives rise to all of her causes of action.
(ECF No. 27, at 8-10).4
It is true that “Congress did not create a private right of
action

to

enforce

the

HAMP

guidelines.”

4

See

Allen

v.

It is obvious that Ms. Ramos copied her complaint and her
opposition in whole or in part from other sources. Contrary to
Defendants’ suggestion (see, e.g., ECF No. 12-1, at 6), however,
that fact does not preclude the court from considering Ms.
Ramos’s claims or arguments, particularly in light of her pro se
status, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding
pro se complaints to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
6

CitiMortgage,
(D.Md.

Aug.

Inc.,
4,

No.

CCB–10–2740,

2011).

Courts

in

2011
this

WL

3425665,

district

at

have

*8

held,

however, that separate and apart from HAMP, enforcement of the
TPP, if one exists, may give rise to a private right of action.
See Stovall v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. RDB–10–2836, 2011 WL
4402680, at *11 (D.Md. Sept. 20, 2011); Allen, 2011 WL 3425665,
at *4.
Neither party is completely correct in its assessment of
the

complaint.

This

confusion

stems

inconsistencies within the complaint itself:

from

factual

even though Ms.

Ramos clearly alleges that the parties have already entered into
a TPP (ECF No. 2 ¶ 15) and that its enforcement is the goal of
this suit, some of her claims appear to ignore that allegation
and instead seek a preliminary loan modification (i.e., a TPP).
Claims based on the latter scenario cannot stand, however.

By

disregarding the allegation that a TPP exists and seeking a
preliminary

loan

modification,

these

claims

attempting to enforce the HAMP guidelines.

are,

in

effect,

They must therefore

be dismissed because there is no private right of action to
enforce HAMP.
One,

Three,

See Allen, 2011 WL 3425665, at *8.
Four

(as

it

pertains

Here, Counts

to

fraudulent

misrepresentation), and Six fall within this category of claims.
On Count Four, Ms. Ramos alleges that as a result of Defendants’
fraud, her TPP application was improperly rejected.
7

(See ECF

No. 2 ¶ 45).

She intimates that no TPP was ever entered into,

though one should have been.

(See id.).

Counts One, Three, and

Six are all predicated on the fraud alleged under Count Four.
(See id. ¶¶ 27-29, 34-40, 56-59).

As the claims under these

counts attempt to enforce HAMP by demanding a TPP, they may not
proceed.5
The

remaining

claims

will

be

construed

as

seeking

to

enforce the TPP itself or some other right independent of HAMP.
To

facilitate

this

analysis,

certain

related

claims

will

be

discussed together rather than in the order they appear in the
complaint.6
A.
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices (Count Two) and
Violation of the MCPA (Count Seven)
Defendants

contend

that

Counts

Two

and

Seven

should

be

dismissed, among other reasons, because they are not alleged
with particularity, as is required for claims sounding in fraud.

5

Even if these claims could stand, Ms. Ramos has likely
abandoned them. As Defendants note in their reply (ECF No. 28,
at 4-5), Ms. Ramos failed to respond to Defendants’ motion on
Counts One, Three, Four, and Six.
(Nor, in fact, did she
address Defendants’ arguments as to Counts Five, Eight, Nine,
and Eleven.) By her failure to address Defendants’ arguments in
her opposition, Ms. Ramos has abandoned these claims.
See
Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children’s Guild, 742 F.Supp.2d 772, 783
(D.Md. 2010) (citing Mentch v. E. Sav. Bank, FSB, 949 F.Supp.
1236, 1247 (D.Md. 1997)); Schalk v. Associated Anesthesiology
Practice, 316 F.Supp.2d 244, 250 n.8 (D.Md. 2004).
6

No party suggests that
Maryland’s applies to all claims.
8

any

state’s

law

other

than

(See ECF No. 12-1, at 11-14).

As a threshold matter, Defendants

assume that Counts Two and Seven are duplicative of each other
as setting forth a claim under the MCPA.7
dispute this characterization.

Ms. Ramos does not

Ms. Ramos merely responds, in

relevant part, by citing a litany of deceptive actions and nonactions that Defendants allegedly performed.
10-11).

(ECF No. 27, at

Defendants correctly reply that Ms. Ramos does not

actually rebut any of their arguments.

(ECF No. 28, at 5).

As

Ms. Ramos does not disagree with Defendants’ construction of her
claims under Counts Two and Seven, they will be analyzed as
asserting

the

single

MCPA

cause

of

action

that

Defendants

describe.
Although

Count

Seven

contains

no

independent

factual

allegations of its own, Count Two alleges that “a faction and
scheme existed” and that Defendants used a “faction and scheme
to

defraud”

Ms.

Ramos.

(ECF

No.

2

¶¶

31,

33).

These

allegations suggest that Ms. Ramos’s MCPA claim sounds in fraud.
Thus, it is subject to the heightened pleading standards of
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

9(b).

See

Allen,

2011

WL

3425665, at *9 (subjecting the plaintiff’s MCPA claim to Rule
9(b) where the complaint alleged that the defendant violated the

7

Despite the lack of a reference to the MCPA in Count Two,
this
interpretation
is
reasonable
given
that
the
MCPA
specifically defines the term “unfair or deceptive trade
practices.” E.g., Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301.
9

statute

by

“making

deceptive

representations,

failing

to

disclose relevant information, and making false or misleading
representations

to

borrowers

with

respect

to

the

TPP

Agreement”).
Rule 9(b) states that “in alleging a fraud or mistake, a
party

must

state

with

particularity

constituting the fraud or mistake.
and

other

generally.”

conditions
Such

of

a

circumstances

Malice, intent, knowledge,

person’s

allegations

the

mind

typically

may

“include

be

alleged

the

‘time,

place and contents of the false representation, as well as the
identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what
[was] obtained thereby.’”

Superior Bank, F.S.B. v. Tandem Nat’l

Mortg., Inc., 197 F.Supp.2d 298, 313–14 (D.Md. 2000) (quoting
Windsor Assocs., Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F.Supp. 273, 280 (D.Md.
1983)).

“[L]ack

of

compliance

with

Rule

9(b)’s

pleading

requirements is treated as a failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).”

Harrison, 176 F.3d at 783 n.5.

Here, Ms. Ramos has failed to plead her MCPA claim with
sufficient particularity.

At best, the complaint reads:

At all times present hereto a faction
and scheme existed and participated in by
all defendants for promise of financial
gains and or goods and services.
. . . .
As a direct and proximate result of all
Defendants actions, Plaintiff have suffered
great economic and financial loses including
monies paid to lawyers and time from work
10

and continue to suffer losses as a result of
the
defendants
malfeasances
by
way
of
felonious faction and scheme to defraud the
Plaintiff out of their credit, money and
property as stated above.
(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 31, 33) (errors in original).
are insufficient under Rule 9(b).
bare

minimum

of

facts;

there

These allegations

Ms. Ramos fails to allege the

is

no

indication

place, or content of the alleged fraud.

of

the

time,

It is also not clear

which of the two Defendants is implicated by these allegations.
As noted above, in her opposition, Ms. Ramos attempts to
rectify the inadequacy of her pleadings under Counts Two and
Seven by listing a variety of fraudulent actions and non-actions
that

Defendants

allegedly

undertook,

which

she

alleges

constitute unfair or deceptive trade practices under the MCPA.
(ECF No. 27, at 10-11).
not

be

considered

here.

These newly alleged facts, however, may
See

Zachair,

Ltd.

v.

Driggs,

965

F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D.Md. 1997) (holding that facts contained
in an opposition to a motion to dismiss but not within the
complaint itself cannot be considered).

Even if they could be

considered, they are still far too generalized in nature to come
close to meeting the requirements of Rule 9(b).
In sum, Ms. Ramos has not met the requirements of Rule
9(b), and Counts Two and Seven will therefore be dismissed,

11

albeit without prejudice.8

Any future amendments to these counts

must at least state the time, place, and contents of alleged
misrepresentations and other actions that were made specifically
to Ms. Ramos, as well as who made the representations or acted
deceptively and what that person obtained thereby.

It is not

enough to aver the general nature of Defendants’ compliance, or
lack thereof, with HAMP; every factual allegation in support of
a potential MCPA claim must be grounded in Defendants’ actual
conduct pursuant to the TPP.
B.

Negligence (Count Four)

As to the negligence claim under Count Four, Defendants
move to dismiss on the basis that, as a matter of law, there is
no duty they could have breached.

(ECF No. 12-1, at 18-19).

Indeed, “[i]n order to maintain a tort cause of action based on
negligence,
defendant

the

was

plaintiff

under

a

must

duty

to

8

first
protect

establish
the

that

‘the

plaintiff

from

Ms. Ramos’s exposition of the recent trend of courts
permitting HAMP-related claims to proceed under state consumer
protection laws has no bearing on this analysis.
(ECF No. 27,
at 13-17).
First, as is plainly evident, the court has not
barred her MCPA claim merely because it is related to HAMP.
Second, almost all of the cited authority implicates the law of
other states.
The only cited case that addresses the MCPA is
distinguishable because the plaintiffs in that case, unlike
here, had pleaded the MCPA claim with sufficient particularity.
See In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP) Contract Litig., No. 10–md–02193–RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at
*5 (D.Mass. July 6, 2011) (addressing several states’ laws,
including Maryland’s, as an MDL court).
12

injury.’”

Jones v. Hyatt Ins. Agency, Inc., 356 Md. 639, 653

(1999).

Assuming Ms. Ramos attempts to pursue a negligence

claim

alleging

by

that

Defendants

owed

her

a

duty

of

care

arising out of the TPP, she must identify a duty separate from
that imposed by the putative TPP contract itself.

In Maryland,

a “contractual obligation, by itself, does not create a tort
duty.

Instead, the duty giving rise to a tort action must have

some independent basis.

This principle is applicable even when

the failure to perform the contract results from the defendant’s
negligence.”

Jones, 356 Md. at 654 (internal quotations and

citations omitted); see also Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591,
595 (1961) (“The mere negligent breach of a contract, absent a
duty or obligation imposed by law independent of that arising
out of the contract itself, is not enough to sustain an action
sounding in tort.”).
The bare fact that Ms. Ramos and Defendants may have been
in a borrower/lender relationship does not impose any special
tort duty.

See Gephardt v. Mortg. Consultants, Inc., No. JFM–

10–1537, 2011 WL 531976, at *5 (D.Md. Feb. 8, 2011) (“It is well
established

under

Maryland

law

that,

absent

special

circumstances, ‘the relationship of a bank to its customer in a
loan

transaction

is

ordinarily

a

contractual

relationship

between debtor and creditor, and is not fiduciary in nature.’”
(quoting Yousef v. Trustbank Sav., F.S.B., 81 Md.App. 527, 536
13

(1990))).
to

find

ordinary

In general, “[c]ourts have been exceedingly reluctant
special

circumstances

contractual

sufficient

relationship

between

to
a

transform
bank

and

an
its

customer into a fiduciary relationship or to impose any duties
on

the

bank

not

found

in

the

loan

agreement.”

Parker

v.

Columbia Bank, 91 Md.App. 346, 369 (1992).
Here, the complaint does not allege any facts describing
special circumstances to suggest that Defendants owed Ms. Ramos
a duty above and beyond what was allegedly agreed upon in the
TPP.
TPP

If Ms. Ramos believes that a duty of care related to the
was

breached,

contract claim.9
claim.
C.

she

may

have

a

straightforward

breach

of

But, as alleged, she does not have a negligence

Accordingly, this claim cannot go forward.
Unjust Enrichment (Count Five)

Defendants argue that Ms. Ramos’s unjust enrichment claim
cannot be maintained because the Promissory Note is an express
contract that governs their rights, and the existence of such an
express contract bars a claim for unjust enrichment.
12-1, at 20).
It

is

(ECF No.

Ms. Ramos does not respond.

generally

true

that,

“[i]n

Maryland,

a

claim

of

unjust enrichment, which is a quasi-contract claim, may not be

9

If Ms. Ramos intends to come back with an amended
complaint that includes a breach of contract claim, she would be
well-advised to attach at least a copy of the alleged TPP that
she and Defendants are party to.
14

brought where the subject matter of the claim is covered by an
express contract between the parties.”

Janusz v. Gilliam, 404

Md. 524, 537 (2008) (internal quotations omitted); see also FLF,
Inc. v. World Publ’ns, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 640, 642 (D.Md. 1998)
(“It is settled law in Maryland, and elsewhere, that a claim for
unjust enrichment may not be brought where the subject matter of
the

claim

is

parties.”).
that

Ms.

covered

by

an

express

contract

between

the

In this case, the allegations in Count Five suggest

Ramos’s

unjust

enrichment

claim

is

based

upon

her

belief that the initial loan that she took out on her home was
unfair — not the TPP.

(See ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 49-55).

Because the

Promissory Note expressly defines the parties’ obligations under
the initial loan, an unjust enrichment claim will not lie on
that basis.
If Ms. Ramos instead intended to base her unjust enrichment
claim upon Defendants’ alleged breach of the TPP, the existence
of the TPP would not necessarily bar her claim.

See Cnty.

Comm’rs v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83, 100
(2000)

(listing

contracts

bar

exceptions

unjust

to

the

enrichment

contract has been breached).

general

claims,

rule

that

including

express

where

the

The complaint, however, would fail

to state a claim in that case per Iqbal and Twombly; nowhere in
the complaint are any non-conclusory facts set forth suggesting
that Defendants obtained an unfair benefit by entering into the
15

TPP with Ms. Ramos.

Because Ms. Ramos may be able to rectify

this deficient pleading in Count Five, it will be dismissed
without prejudice.
D.
Commercial Loan Servicer Violations of Suppression
(Count Eight), Breach of Duty, Care, and Trust (Count
Nine), and Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count
Ten)
Counts Eight, Nine, and Ten must be dismissed because, as
Defendants

observe

(ECF

No.

12-1,

at

21-22),

none

of

them

describe a recognized cause of action in Maryland.
First, as to Count Eight, Ms. Ramos cites no authority —
nor is the court aware of any — holding that “Commercial Loan
Servicer Violations of Suppression” is a cognizable cause of
action.

Even if it were, Ms. Ramos provides no facts to support

her claim.

Thus, Count Eight will be dismissed.

Second, as to Count Nine, Defendants are unable to decipher
what cause of action Ms. Ramos intended to advance.

Ms. Ramos

failed to address this count in her opposition and thus has not
provided

any

clarification.

It

appears

that

she

may

have

intended to assert a claim akin to a breach of fiduciary duty.
Assuming that is the case, her claim would fail.

In Maryland,

“[i]n a claim for monetary damages at law . . . an alleged
breach of fiduciary duty may give rise to a cause of action, but
it does not, standing alone, constitute a cause of action.”
George Wasserman & Janice Wasserman Goldsten Family LLC v. Kay,

16

197 Md.App. 586, 630 (2011).

Accordingly, as Ms. Ramos’s only

relief sought is monetary, a breach of fiduciary duty claim is
not viable.
And third, as to Count Ten, “no independent cause of action
at law exists in Maryland for breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing.”

Mount Vernon Props., LLC v. Branch

Banking & Trust Co., 170 Md.App. 457, 472 (2006).

Such a breach

“is better viewed as an element of another cause of action at
law.”

Id.

Where, as here, it is alleged as an independent

claim, it cannot be maintained.10
E.
Mental Anguish, Emotional Distress and Psychological
Trauma Resulting in Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (Count
Eleven)
Defendants
intentional

construe

infliction

of

Count

Eleven

emotional

as

setting

distress

cause

forth
of

an

action

(ECF No. 12-1, at 23-24), which Ms. Ramos does not dispute.
Defendants

contend

that,

assuming

that

is

the

case,

the

complaint fails to state a claim.

10

Ms. Ramos futilely attempts to salvage Count Ten by
citing to inapposite case law. For example, in Gaudin v. Saxon
Mortgage Services, Inc., No. C 11–1663 RS, 2011 WL 5825144
(N.D.Cal. Nov. 17, 2011), the court did not need to address
whether a breach of good faith and fair dealing constituted an
independent cause of action because the defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on other grounds.
Id. at *5. Her other
cited cases involve the law of other states, not Maryland’s.
See, e.g., Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Woodlake Imaging, LLC, No.
Civ.A. 04-CV-3334, 2005 WL 331695, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 9, 2005)
(applying Pennsylvania law).
17

To

recover

for

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress, Ms. Ramos must allege facts showing that Defendants’
conduct

was:

(1)

intentional

or

reckless,

(2)

extreme

and

outrageous, (3) causally connected to her emotional distress,
and (4) the distress caused was severe.

Baltimore–Clark v.

Kinko’s Inc., 270 F.Supp.2d 695, 701 (D.Md. 2003) (citing Harris
v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977)).

“Each of these elements

must be pled and proved with specificity.

It is not enough for

a plaintiff merely to allege that they exist; [s]he must set
forth facts that, if true, would suffice to demonstrate that
they exist.”
175 (1989).

Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md.App. 151,
The tort is rarely viable in Maryland. See Respess

v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 770 F.Supp.2d 751, 757 (D.Md.
2011).
“cannot

In fact, a court in this district recently held that it
imagine

transaction

that

any

set

would

outrageous conduct.”

of

facts

support

an

surrounding
inference

of

a

mortgage

extreme

and

Asafo-Adjei v. First Savs. Mortg. Corp.,

No. RWT 09cv2184, 2010 WL 730365, at *5 (D.Md. Feb. 25, 2010).
Here, Ms. Ramos has come nowhere close to alleging facts
sufficient to establish that Defendants’ conduct was “extreme or
outrageous.”

In fact, the complaint is wholly devoid of any

facts, apart from the basic timeline of events leading to this
suit, to support this count.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion

will be granted as to this claim.
18

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants

will

denied as moot.

be

granted,

and

the

motion

to

stay

will

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

19

be