Stewart v. Morgan State University et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 2/1/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/1/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
TROY STEWART
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-3605

:
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this breach of
contract and civil rights case are the motions to dismiss filed
by Defendants Morgan State University, Warren Hayman, Benjamin
Welsh, Martin Resnik, T. Joan Robinson, and Dallas Evans.
Nos. 10 & 19).

The issues have been briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
For

the

(ECF

following

reasons,

the

motions

Local Rule 105.6.
to

dismiss

will

be

granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

In the spring of 2010, Plaintiff was enrolled in the School
of Graduate Studies at Morgan State University to obtain an
Ed.D. degree in Urban Educational Leadership.

To this end, he

enrolled in core curricular classes and attempted to complete a
required internship during the spring semester with Defendant
Dr. Benjamin Welsh.

At the outset of the internship, Dr. Welsh

and

signed

Plaintiff

both

a

“Statement

of

Agreement”

that

outlined the objectives of the internship.
2).1

Email

correspondence

shows

that

(ECF No. 12-2, at 1some

weeks

into

semester, their relationship began to break down.
email

exchange

in

which

Plaintiff

proposed

the

After an

reworking

the

internship requirements, Dr. Welsh offered a series of steps for
Plaintiff to take to receive a passing grade.

In this email Dr.

Welsh wrote, “This is my final offer. No further negotiation is
possible.

Take it or leave it. . . It is in your best interest

to keep your mouth shut from now on and not try to change the
goals and objectives again.”

(ECF No. 12-4, at 10).

Ultimately

Plaintiff did not complete the work required and received a
grade of incomplete for the internship.
Plaintiff also wrote at least two papers for Dr. Welsh’s
courses.

Plaintiff

was

not

happy

feedback he received from Dr. Welsh.

with

his

grades

or

the

Specifically, in response

to a paper that Plaintiff wrote about his educational history,
Dr. Welsh commented that “it is founded on the premise that

1

In considering this motion to dismiss, the court relies on
email correspondence and other documents that Plaintiff attaches
to his opposition brief that are referenced in the complaint and
central to all claims.
Where appropriate, courts may allow
“consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral
to the claim,” including documents attached to a non-moving
party’s opposition to a motion to dismiss, without converting it
into a motion for summary judgment.
See El-Amin v. Blom, No.
11-3424, 2012 WL 2604213, at *1 n. 1 (D.Md. July 5, 2012)
(citations omitted) (considering documents attached by pro se
plaintiff to his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss
without converting to motion for summary judgment).
2

you[r] past was ‘normal’ and ‘average’ and therefore not worth
mentioning . . . the fact that ‘every family member before [you]
had attended and graduated college’ makes you unusual!”
No. 12-3, at 1).
classes.

(ECF

Plaintiff received grades of C in each of the

Dr. Welsh offered for Plaintiff to rewrite the papers

to improve his grades.

As part of this offer, he required

Plaintiff to review the papers with him and “generate questions
and theories as to why you got the grade that you got.”
No. 12-4, at 23).

(ECF

Plaintiff ultimately decided to appeal his

grades to the appropriate deans at the school.

These appeals

were denied, and Plaintiff was put on academic probation and
ultimately
after

he

removed

from

appealed

the

the

school.

grades

and

Plaintiff
asserted

alleges
to

that

school

administrators that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
had been violated, his grade for the internship was changed to
an F.

Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Welsh threatened him

verbally and physically.
Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.

The EEOC made no findings and issued

him a right to sue letter on October 12, 2011.
B.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 15, 2011 against
Morgan State University; Benjamin Welsh, associate professor in
the Urban Educational Leadership Doctoral Program; Dallas Evans
3

and Martin Resnik, members of Morgan State’s Board of Regents;
Warren

Hayman,

Leadership

interim

Doctoral

coordinator

Program;

Joan

of

the

Robinson,

Urban

Educational

Provost

and

Vice

President for Academic Affairs; and David Wilson, President.2
(ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff has not yet served Defendant Evans in

his individual capacity.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges counts

for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; violation of constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and breach of contract.

On March 1,

2012, some of the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.
(ECF No. 10).
II.

Plaintiff opposed this motion.

(ECF No. 12).

Standard of Review
The

purpose

of

a

motion

to

dismiss

pursuant

12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

to

Rule

Presley

v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly,

the

court

must

consider

all

well-pleaded

allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in
the

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff,

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999).

The court need not take everything as true, however.

2

It is unclear whether David Wilson has been served, but
the rulings included in this memorandum opinion and order will
apply to him with equal force.
4

For

instance,

allegations.

the

court

need

not

accept

unsupported

legal

Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870,

873 (4th Cir. 1989).

Nor must it agree with legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679

(2009),

or

conclusory

factual

allegations

devoid

of

any

reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

847

(4th

Cir.

1979).

And

if

the

properly

considered facts show nothing more than the “mere possibility of
misconduct,” the complaint should not survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint must be construed liberally because
he is proceeding pro se.

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).

Liberal construction means the court will read the pleadings to
state a valid claim to the extent it is possible to do so from
the facts available; it does not mean that the court should
rewrite

the

complaint

to

include

claims

never

presented.

Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).

In

other words, even when pro se litigants are involved, the court
cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that support a
viable claim.

Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391

(4th Cir. 1990).
At

this

stage,

the

court

focuses

on

the

facts

complaint and the documents attached to the complaint.
v. Lee, 117 F.Supp.2d 481, 485 (D.Md. 2000).
5

in

the

Abadian

In addition, the

court may consider documents referred to and relied upon in the
complaint

—

exhibits.”

“even

if

the

documents

are

not

attached

as

Fare Deals Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc.,

180 F.Supp.2d 678, 683 (D.Md. 2001); accord New Beckley Mining
Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 18 F.3d 1161,
1164 (4th Cir. 1994).
III. Analysis
A.

Title VII Claims

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment entitles them
to

immunity

for

Plaintiff’s

discrimination

and

retaliation

claims, and that, in any event, the complaint fails to state a
claim under Title VII because Plaintiff was not an employee of
Morgan

State.

Plaintiff

argues

that

sovereign

immunity

is

abrogated by Title VII, that he was an employee of Morgan State,
and that Title VII applies because he was enrolled in a training
program.
1.

Sovereign Immunity

“The Supreme Court has held that, in enacting Title VII,
Congress

properly

abrogated

immunity for such suits.”

the

states’

Eleventh

Amendment

Stewart, Jr. v. Va. Com. Univ., 414

F.App’x 555, 556 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976) (holding that Title VII of the Civil
Rights

Act

immunity)).

of

1964

abrogates

the

states’

Eleventh

Amendment

Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to immunity.
6

2.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be
dismissed because Plaintiff is a student of Morgan State, not an
employee.

A graduate student completing coursework can also be

an employee for purposes of Title VII.

See, e.g., Nigro v. Va.

Com. Univ./Med. Coll. of Virginia, No. 10-2425, 2012 WL 2354635,
at *10 (4th Cir. June 21, 2012) (reviewing Title VII claims of a
medical

resident);

see

also

Herron,

v.

Va.

Com.

Univ.,

366

F.Supp.2d 355, 364 (E.D.Va. 2004) (analyzing Title VII claims of
former nursing graduate student working in academic setting);
Mandsager v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, 269 F.Supp.2d 662,
672-74 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (analyzing graduate student’s Title VII
claims where student also served as research assistant); Bucklen
v.

Rensselaer

Polytechnic

Inst.,

166

F.Supp.2d

721,

725

(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (acknowledging “the unique dual role of graduate
students,

as

MacArthur

v.

potentially
Ramsey

both

Havenwyck,

students
Inc.,

No.

and

employees”);

262600,

2005

WL

2758006, at *1 (Mich.App. Oct. 25, 2009) (finding a contract for
hire to be established “where there is an exchange of services
for

training

or

college

credits

toward

graduation

.

.

.

accordingly, [plaintiff’s] internship qualifies as a contract
for hire”); cf. Stilley v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of
Higher Educ., 968 F.Supp. 252, 261 (W.D.Pa. 1996) (refusing to
consider, for purposes of Title VII summary judgment analysis,
7

“issues pertaining to the completion of plaintiff’s dissertation
[that] relate to plaintiff’s role as a student and not as an
employee,” but analyzing Title VII claims related to work done
as an employee-researcher under professor’s supervision).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his work as an intern was to
research grants for Morgan State.

This work was on behalf of,

and to benefit Morgan State University.

Therefore, it cannot be

said at this stage that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not
Morgan State’s employee for purposes of Title VII.3
B.

Breach of Contract

Plaintiff argues that he signed a contract with Dr. Welsh
that

memorialized

identify

state

an

grants

agreement
for

for

Morgan

3

Plaintiff
State.

to

(ECF

search
No.

and

12-1).

Plaintiff alleges that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) also
protects him from discrimination. This section provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for any employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship
or
other
training
or
retraining, including on-the-job training
programs
to
discriminate
against
any
individual because of his race, color,
religion,
sex,
or
national
origin
in
admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or
other training.
Id. This section of Title VII simply provides that “[t]raining
is a benefit of employment that receives protection under Title
VII.”
LaGrande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co., Inc., 370 F.App’x
206, 211 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d)). It does
not eliminate the requirement that Morgan State be Plaintiff’s
employer for purposes of the statute.
8

Defendants contend that because Morgan State University is a
public institution, they are entitled to sovereign immunity on
Plaintiff’s

breach

of

contract

claims.

While

the

State

of

Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain breach of
contract cases brought in State courts, see Maryland Code Ann.,
State Gov’t § 12-201, the Legislature did not “waive the State’s
Eleventh

Amendment

court.”

immunity

in

[contract]

actions

in

Federal

State v. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. 129, 149 (2004).

“The Eleventh Amendment secures the states’ immunity from
private

suits

for

monetary

damages

filed

in

federal

Neinast v. Tx., 217 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2000).
Amendment

immunity,

however,

is

not

a

bar

to

court.”
Eleventh

non-monetary,

prospective injunctive relief or the fees and costs involved in
obtaining such relief.
Cir.

1995)

(1974)

(citing

for

injunctive

the
relief

Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 430 n. 1 (4th

Edelman

v.

proposition
may

Jordan,

that

proceed

even

dismissed based on immunity).

a

415

U.S.

claim
when

for

damages

651,

664-68

prospective
claims

are

To the extent that Plaintiff

seeks monetary relief for breach of contract, those claims will
be dismissed.
prospective

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims that seek

injunctive

relief,

in

the

form

of

injunctions

reviewing and expunging Plaintiff’s record in classes with Dr.
Welsh at Morgan State, will not be dismissed.

9

C.

Individual Defendants

Defendants aver that the entire suit must be dismissed with
regard to the individual defendants, because Title VII claims
against

individual

defendants

must be dismissed.

in

their

individual

capacities

Plaintiff argues that he alleged violations

of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
that individual defendants are not entitled to immunity on those
claims and cannot be dismissed.
Supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities
for violations of Title VII.

Luy v. Baltimore Police Dept., 326

F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (D.Md. 2004), aff'd, 120 F.App’x. 465 (4th
Cir. 2005).

In appropriate circumstances, however, individuals

are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See Cloaninger

ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th
Cir. 2009) (“Qualified immunity, when found to apply, bars §
1983

suits

against

government

capacity.”) (emphasis added).
against

the

individual

officers

in

their

individual

Therefore, while Title VII claims

defendants

will

be

dismissed,

the

remaining claims will not.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by

Defendants

Morgan

State

University,

Warren

Hayman,

Benjamin

Welsh, Martin Resnik, T. Joan Robinson, and Dallas Evans

10

(ECF

Nos. 10 and 17) will be granted in part and denied in part.
separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

11

A