Stewart v. Morgan State University et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 2/1/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/1/13. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
TROY STEWART
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 11-3605
:
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this breach of
contract and civil rights case are the motions to dismiss filed
by Defendants Morgan State University, Warren Hayman, Benjamin
Welsh, Martin Resnik, T. Joan Robinson, and Dallas Evans.
Nos. 10 & 19).
The issues have been briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
For
the
(ECF
following
reasons,
the
motions
Local Rule 105.6.
to
dismiss
will
be
granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
In the spring of 2010, Plaintiff was enrolled in the School
of Graduate Studies at Morgan State University to obtain an
Ed.D. degree in Urban Educational Leadership.
To this end, he
enrolled in core curricular classes and attempted to complete a
required internship during the spring semester with Defendant
Dr. Benjamin Welsh.
At the outset of the internship, Dr. Welsh
and
signed
Plaintiff
both
a
“Statement
of
Agreement”
that
outlined the objectives of the internship.
2).1
Email
correspondence
shows
that
(ECF No. 12-2, at 1some
weeks
into
semester, their relationship began to break down.
email
exchange
in
which
Plaintiff
proposed
the
After an
reworking
the
internship requirements, Dr. Welsh offered a series of steps for
Plaintiff to take to receive a passing grade.
In this email Dr.
Welsh wrote, “This is my final offer. No further negotiation is
possible.
Take it or leave it. . . It is in your best interest
to keep your mouth shut from now on and not try to change the
goals and objectives again.”
(ECF No. 12-4, at 10).
Ultimately
Plaintiff did not complete the work required and received a
grade of incomplete for the internship.
Plaintiff also wrote at least two papers for Dr. Welsh’s
courses.
Plaintiff
was
not
happy
feedback he received from Dr. Welsh.
with
his
grades
or
the
Specifically, in response
to a paper that Plaintiff wrote about his educational history,
Dr. Welsh commented that “it is founded on the premise that
1
In considering this motion to dismiss, the court relies on
email correspondence and other documents that Plaintiff attaches
to his opposition brief that are referenced in the complaint and
central to all claims.
Where appropriate, courts may allow
“consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral
to the claim,” including documents attached to a non-moving
party’s opposition to a motion to dismiss, without converting it
into a motion for summary judgment.
See El-Amin v. Blom, No.
11-3424, 2012 WL 2604213, at *1 n. 1 (D.Md. July 5, 2012)
(citations omitted) (considering documents attached by pro se
plaintiff to his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss
without converting to motion for summary judgment).
2
you[r] past was ‘normal’ and ‘average’ and therefore not worth
mentioning . . . the fact that ‘every family member before [you]
had attended and graduated college’ makes you unusual!”
No. 12-3, at 1).
classes.
(ECF
Plaintiff received grades of C in each of the
Dr. Welsh offered for Plaintiff to rewrite the papers
to improve his grades.
As part of this offer, he required
Plaintiff to review the papers with him and “generate questions
and theories as to why you got the grade that you got.”
No. 12-4, at 23).
(ECF
Plaintiff ultimately decided to appeal his
grades to the appropriate deans at the school.
These appeals
were denied, and Plaintiff was put on academic probation and
ultimately
after
he
removed
from
appealed
the
the
school.
grades
and
Plaintiff
asserted
alleges
to
that
school
administrators that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
had been violated, his grade for the internship was changed to
an F.
Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Welsh threatened him
verbally and physically.
Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
The EEOC made no findings and issued
him a right to sue letter on October 12, 2011.
B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 15, 2011 against
Morgan State University; Benjamin Welsh, associate professor in
the Urban Educational Leadership Doctoral Program; Dallas Evans
3
and Martin Resnik, members of Morgan State’s Board of Regents;
Warren
Hayman,
Leadership
interim
Doctoral
coordinator
Program;
Joan
of
the
Robinson,
Urban
Educational
Provost
and
Vice
President for Academic Affairs; and David Wilson, President.2
(ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff has not yet served Defendant Evans in
his individual capacity.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges counts
for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; violation of constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and breach of contract.
On March 1,
2012, some of the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.
(ECF No. 10).
II.
Plaintiff opposed this motion.
(ECF No. 12).
Standard of Review
The
purpose
of
a
motion
to
dismiss
pursuant
12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
to
Rule
Presley
v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly,
the
court
must
consider
all
well-pleaded
allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff,
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999).
The court need not take everything as true, however.
2
It is unclear whether David Wilson has been served, but
the rulings included in this memorandum opinion and order will
apply to him with equal force.
4
For
instance,
allegations.
the
court
need
not
accept
unsupported
legal
Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870,
873 (4th Cir. 1989).
Nor must it agree with legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679
(2009),
or
conclusory
factual
allegations
devoid
of
any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604
F.2d
844,
847
(4th
Cir.
1979).
And
if
the
properly
considered facts show nothing more than the “mere possibility of
misconduct,” the complaint should not survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s complaint must be construed liberally because
he is proceeding pro se.
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
Liberal construction means the court will read the pleadings to
state a valid claim to the extent it is possible to do so from
the facts available; it does not mean that the court should
rewrite
the
complaint
to
include
claims
never
presented.
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).
In
other words, even when pro se litigants are involved, the court
cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that support a
viable claim.
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391
(4th Cir. 1990).
At
this
stage,
the
court
focuses
on
the
facts
complaint and the documents attached to the complaint.
v. Lee, 117 F.Supp.2d 481, 485 (D.Md. 2000).
5
in
the
Abadian
In addition, the
court may consider documents referred to and relied upon in the
complaint
—
exhibits.”
“even
if
the
documents
are
not
attached
as
Fare Deals Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc.,
180 F.Supp.2d 678, 683 (D.Md. 2001); accord New Beckley Mining
Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 18 F.3d 1161,
1164 (4th Cir. 1994).
III. Analysis
A.
Title VII Claims
Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment entitles them
to
immunity
for
Plaintiff’s
discrimination
and
retaliation
claims, and that, in any event, the complaint fails to state a
claim under Title VII because Plaintiff was not an employee of
Morgan
State.
Plaintiff
argues
that
sovereign
immunity
is
abrogated by Title VII, that he was an employee of Morgan State,
and that Title VII applies because he was enrolled in a training
program.
1.
Sovereign Immunity
“The Supreme Court has held that, in enacting Title VII,
Congress
properly
abrogated
immunity for such suits.”
the
states’
Eleventh
Amendment
Stewart, Jr. v. Va. Com. Univ., 414
F.App’x 555, 556 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976) (holding that Title VII of the Civil
Rights
Act
immunity)).
of
1964
abrogates
the
states’
Eleventh
Amendment
Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to immunity.
6
2.
Failure to State a Claim
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be
dismissed because Plaintiff is a student of Morgan State, not an
employee.
A graduate student completing coursework can also be
an employee for purposes of Title VII.
See, e.g., Nigro v. Va.
Com. Univ./Med. Coll. of Virginia, No. 10-2425, 2012 WL 2354635,
at *10 (4th Cir. June 21, 2012) (reviewing Title VII claims of a
medical
resident);
see
also
Herron,
v.
Va.
Com.
Univ.,
366
F.Supp.2d 355, 364 (E.D.Va. 2004) (analyzing Title VII claims of
former nursing graduate student working in academic setting);
Mandsager v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, 269 F.Supp.2d 662,
672-74 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (analyzing graduate student’s Title VII
claims where student also served as research assistant); Bucklen
v.
Rensselaer
Polytechnic
Inst.,
166
F.Supp.2d
721,
725
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (acknowledging “the unique dual role of graduate
students,
as
MacArthur
v.
potentially
Ramsey
both
Havenwyck,
students
Inc.,
No.
and
employees”);
262600,
2005
WL
2758006, at *1 (Mich.App. Oct. 25, 2009) (finding a contract for
hire to be established “where there is an exchange of services
for
training
or
college
credits
toward
graduation
.
.
.
accordingly, [plaintiff’s] internship qualifies as a contract
for hire”); cf. Stilley v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of
Higher Educ., 968 F.Supp. 252, 261 (W.D.Pa. 1996) (refusing to
consider, for purposes of Title VII summary judgment analysis,
7
“issues pertaining to the completion of plaintiff’s dissertation
[that] relate to plaintiff’s role as a student and not as an
employee,” but analyzing Title VII claims related to work done
as an employee-researcher under professor’s supervision).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his work as an intern was to
research grants for Morgan State.
This work was on behalf of,
and to benefit Morgan State University.
Therefore, it cannot be
said at this stage that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not
Morgan State’s employee for purposes of Title VII.3
B.
Breach of Contract
Plaintiff argues that he signed a contract with Dr. Welsh
that
memorialized
identify
state
an
grants
agreement
for
for
Morgan
3
Plaintiff
State.
to
(ECF
search
No.
and
12-1).
Plaintiff alleges that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) also
protects him from discrimination. This section provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for any employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship
or
other
training
or
retraining, including on-the-job training
programs
to
discriminate
against
any
individual because of his race, color,
religion,
sex,
or
national
origin
in
admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or
other training.
Id. This section of Title VII simply provides that “[t]raining
is a benefit of employment that receives protection under Title
VII.”
LaGrande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co., Inc., 370 F.App’x
206, 211 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d)). It does
not eliminate the requirement that Morgan State be Plaintiff’s
employer for purposes of the statute.
8
Defendants contend that because Morgan State University is a
public institution, they are entitled to sovereign immunity on
Plaintiff’s
breach
of
contract
claims.
While
the
State
of
Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain breach of
contract cases brought in State courts, see Maryland Code Ann.,
State Gov’t § 12-201, the Legislature did not “waive the State’s
Eleventh
Amendment
court.”
immunity
in
[contract]
actions
in
Federal
State v. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. 129, 149 (2004).
“The Eleventh Amendment secures the states’ immunity from
private
suits
for
monetary
damages
filed
in
federal
Neinast v. Tx., 217 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2000).
Amendment
immunity,
however,
is
not
a
bar
to
court.”
Eleventh
non-monetary,
prospective injunctive relief or the fees and costs involved in
obtaining such relief.
Cir.
1995)
(1974)
(citing
for
injunctive
the
relief
Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 430 n. 1 (4th
Edelman
v.
proposition
may
Jordan,
that
proceed
even
dismissed based on immunity).
a
415
U.S.
claim
when
for
damages
651,
664-68
prospective
claims
are
To the extent that Plaintiff
seeks monetary relief for breach of contract, those claims will
be dismissed.
prospective
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims that seek
injunctive
relief,
in
the
form
of
injunctions
reviewing and expunging Plaintiff’s record in classes with Dr.
Welsh at Morgan State, will not be dismissed.
9
C.
Individual Defendants
Defendants aver that the entire suit must be dismissed with
regard to the individual defendants, because Title VII claims
against
individual
defendants
must be dismissed.
in
their
individual
capacities
Plaintiff argues that he alleged violations
of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
that individual defendants are not entitled to immunity on those
claims and cannot be dismissed.
Supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities
for violations of Title VII.
Luy v. Baltimore Police Dept., 326
F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (D.Md. 2004), aff'd, 120 F.App’x. 465 (4th
Cir. 2005).
In appropriate circumstances, however, individuals
are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Cloaninger
ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th
Cir. 2009) (“Qualified immunity, when found to apply, bars §
1983
suits
against
government
capacity.”) (emphasis added).
against
the
individual
officers
in
their
individual
Therefore, while Title VII claims
defendants
will
be
dismissed,
the
remaining claims will not.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants
Morgan
State
University,
Warren
Hayman,
Benjamin
Welsh, Martin Resnik, T. Joan Robinson, and Dallas Evans
10
(ECF
Nos. 10 and 17) will be granted in part and denied in part.
separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
11
A
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