Stewart v. Morgan State University et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 9/3/14 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/3/14. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
TROY STEWART
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-3605

:
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

discrimination case is the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants Morgan State University (“Morgan State”), Dallas R.
Evans,

Warren

Hayman,

Martin

R.

Benjamin Welsh, and David Wilson.

Resnick,

T.

Joan

(ECF No. 34).

Robinson,

Also pending

is Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s opposition to the
summary judgment motion.

(ECF No. 37).

The issues have been

fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary.

Local

Rule

Defendants’

motion

for

105.6.

For

the

summary

judgment

following

reasons,

will

granted.

be

Defendants’ motion to strike will be denied.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Troy Stewart, proceeding pro se, claims that he
was

discriminated

dismissed

from

against
his

on

the

graduate

historically-black college.

basis

program

of

race

when

at

Morgan

he

State,

was
a

Plaintiff brings claims for race

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.,

breach of

contract, and constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
In the spring semester of 2010, Plaintiff Troy Stewart, an
African-American

male,

enrolled

at

Morgan

State

University,

where he began pursuing an Ed.D Degree in Urban Educational
Leadership.

(ECF No. 36, at 4-5).

The graduate program in

which Plaintiff enrolled required Ed.D candidates to complete a
minimum of sixty credit hours, with an overall 3.0 grade point
average, with the grade of “C” as the minimum acceptable grade.
(ECF No. 12-3, at 8)1.

The program requirements indicate that

“[a] student who receives two C’s will be dismissed from the
[Ed.D] program.”

(Id.).

Plaintiff was enrolled in three traditional lecture classes
and one internship course in the spring semester of 2010.
No. 36-1, at 2).

(ECF

Dr. Benjamin Welsh, a Caucasian male, served

as Plaintiff’s supervisor for his internship course, EDAD 603,
Administration and Social Policy, and taught two other courses
in

which

Practices

Plaintiff

was

of

Educational

Urban

enrolled:

1

EDAD

601,

Leadership,

Theories

and

ASLP

and
602,

ECF No. 12 is Plaintiff’s opposition to an earlier motion
to dismiss, and he attached documents upon which he relies in
pursuing his claims.
His opposition to the motion to summary
judgment generally refers to the complaint and court documents
and references the documents attached to ECF No. 12.
2

Philosophy of Education.

(ECF No. 12-3, at 4).

of

Welsh

the

internship,

“Statement

of

Dr.

Agreement”

on

and

Plaintiff

January

27,

2010,

objectives and requirements of the internship.

At the outset
both

signed

outlining

a

the

(ECF No. 12-2).

The Statement of Agreement states:
Internship
Experiences):

Objectives

(Learning

To identify, research, and get an idea on
how many grants are out here for at-risk
youths! I will dedicate at least 30 hours
per week for 7 weeks, which will be
equivalent to 210 hours of grant research
experience completing my first internship
experience in seven weeks. This research
could help in identifying a future grant.
I will perform and conduct independent
research from my home-based location and
research libraries. I will search federal
and state databases to get an idea of the
types of grants that are being offered. I
will
look
at
sites
such
as
http://www.grants.gov/.
This will give me
an idea of what is being offered in the
field of education for at-risk youths. I
will consult with Dr. Benjamin Welsh, my onsite supervisor. I will consult with him
during my internship about my findings.
This will give me experience in searching,
identifying, and researching grants. It will
also show me the current social policy
grants mainly in the field of education.
This
internship
will
give
me
further
understanding of federal and state grants.
(ECF No. 12-2, at 2).
Difficulties
Plaintiff’s

and

differences

relationship

and

of

opinion

interactions
3

with

developed
Dr.

in

Welsh.

Eventually, Plaintiff altered the focus of his internship and
appealed some of his grades.
which

included

two

“C”

After the grades were upheld,

grades

and

an

incomplete

for

the

internship, Plaintiff was dismissed from the program by November
2010.
B.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff

filed

a

complaint

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

with

the

Equal

Employment

The EEOC made no findings and

issued him a right to sue letter on October 12, 2011.
1-1).

(ECF No.

Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 15, 2011 against

Morgan State University; Benjamin Welsh, associate professor in
the Urban Educational Leadership Doctoral program; Dallas Evans
and Martin Resnik, members of Morgan State’s Board of Regents;
Warren

Hayman,

Leadership
President
(ECF

interim

Doctoral
for

No.

employment

Program;

Academic

1).

coordinator
Joan

Affairs;

Plaintiff’s

discrimination

of

Urban

Robinson,

and

David

complaint

and

the

Educational

Provost
Wilson,

alleged

retaliation

under

and

Vice

President.
counts
Title

for
VII;

violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
breach of contract.
On March 1, 2012, all of the Defendants, except Dallas
Evans, moved to dismiss (ECF No. 10); Mr. Evans moved to dismiss
on January 11, 2013 (ECF No. 17).
granted

in

part

by

memorandum
4

The motions to dismiss were

opinion

and

order

issued

on

February 1, 2013.
(1)

Title

contract

VII

The claims remaining in this case include:

claims

claims

for

against

Morgan

injunctive

State;

relief;

claims against the individual Defendants.

and

(2)

(3)

breach

Section

of

1983

Defendants answered

on February 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a corrected complaint on
March 29, 2013, and Defendants filed an amended answer on April
11, 2013.

(ECF Nos. 22, 24, & 25).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 11, 2013
and Plaintiff opposed the motion on October 30, 2013.
34 & 36).

(ECF Nos.

Defendants subsequently filed a motion to strike

Plaintiff’s opposition, suspecting that Mr. Stewart was using a
“ghost attorney.”

(ECF No. 37).

Plaintiff opposed this motion.

(ECF No. 38).2
II.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) which

provides that: “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
2

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s opposition will
be
denied.
Although
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiff’s
opposition
includes
significant
legal
arguments
and,
consequently, an attorney must have drafted it, many of the
cases cited in the opposition duplicate those cited in the
February 1, 2013 memorandum opinion adjudicating Defendants’
earlier-filed motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 37-1).
Moreover,
Plaintiff correctly points out that the cases he cited are
matters of public record and accessible to pro se litigants.
Plaintiff avers that he is self-represented. (ECF No. 38). The
motion to strike will be denied.
5

The Supreme Court of the United States has clarified that this
does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
“[b]y

its

very

terms,

this

standard

provides

that

the

mere

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will

not

defeat

an

otherwise

properly

supported

motion

for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

“The party

opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may
not

rest

upon

the

mere

allegations

or

denials

of

[his]

pleadings,’ but rather must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

See Bouchat v. Balt.

Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003)
(alteration in original) (quoting

former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable
to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in [his] favor
without

weighing

credibility.”

the

evidence

or

assessing

the

witness’

See Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc.,

290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002).

The court must, however,

also abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to
prevent

factually

unsupported

proceeding to trial.”

claims

and

defenses

from

See Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d

6

774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993) and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
III. Analysis
A.

Title VII Claims

Morgan

State

first

argues

that

Title

VII

only

governs

employment relationships, and Plaintiff was not an employee at
Morgan State within the meaning of Title VII.
7-8).

Alternatively,

Morgan

State

contends

dismissal was a purely academic decision.
1.

(ECF No. 34-1, at
that

Plaintiff’s

(ECF No. 34-1, at 7).

Employment Status

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an individual in his employment based on that person’s
race.3

The statute defines employer as “a person engaged in an

industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”
and “any agent of such person.”
VII

defines

employer.”
adopted

a

constitutes

an
42

employee
U.S.C.

two-part
an

§

test

employee

as

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
“an

individual

2000e(f).
to
for

determine

The

employed

Fourth

whether

purposes

of

an

Title

Title
by

Circuit

an
has

individual
VII.

See

Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211 (4th
Cir. 1999).

First, the putative employee must demonstrate the

existence of an employment relationship.
3

Bender v. Suburban

Although Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that he was
also discriminated against on the basis of sex, religion,
national origin, and age, (ECF No. 1, at 9), Plaintiff offers no
factual support for these claims.
7

Hosp.,

998

F.Supp.

631,

634

(D.Md.

1998)

(finding

it

to

be

“axiomatic that a plaintiff must allege the existence of an
employment relationship in order to state a Title VII claim.”).
Specifically, the employee must demonstrate that compensation
was

received

employer.

in

exchange

for

the

service

provided

to

the

Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d

71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Central to the meaning of [employee] is
the idea of compensation in exchange for services: an employer
is someone who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary
or other compensation to the person who provides services - that
person being the employee.”).

Second, after compensation is

proven, employment status “is properly determined by analyzing
the facts of each employment relationship under a standard that
incorporates both the common law test derived from principles of
agency

and

the

so-called

‘economic

realities’

Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220 (citation omitted).

test.”

“[U]nder the

general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s
right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished.”
U.S.

730,

751

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
(1989).

After

determining

control

over

the

putative employee, courts turn to the “economic realities” test,
where “employees are those who as a matter of economic reality
are dependent upon the business to which they render service.”

8

Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220 (quoting Bartels v. Birmingham, 332
U.S. 126, 130 (1947)).
Morgan

State

contends

that

Plaintiff

did

not

receive

compensation because he was not paid for researching grants for
the internship course and “was not paid in any other capacity.”
(ECF No. 34-1, at 7).

As support, Morgan State cites to an

affidavit from Armada Grant, its Director of Human Resources:
“[t]here

is

no

record

that

MSU

hired

Troy

Stewart

for

any

purpose during the time period of August 2010 through June 2011,
and there is no record of payments being made to Troy Stewart,
as an employee or grant funded staff.”

(ECF No. 34-3 ¶ 6).

Morgan State also asserts that Plaintiff was not an employee
because “it is undisputed that any internship research conducted
by

Mr.

Stewart

Stewart’s

did

not

benefit

internship

and

coursework

credits.”

(ECF No. 34-1, at 6-7).

the

university
were

only

.
for

.

.

Mr.

academic

Plaintiff counters that he

“served a unique dual role, as both student and employee at
Morgan State.”

(ECF No. 36-1, at 11).

Plaintiff treats the

January 27, 2010 “Statement of Agreement” as a contract, stating
that “[f]or the internship Plaintiff entered into a separate and
distinct employment contract with Defendant whereby Plaintiff,
in exchange for college credit found federal and state grants
that

would

University.”

directly

benefit

MSU

(ECF No. 36-1, at 2).
9

and

the

programs

at

the

He points to college credit

and training as “compensation” for purposes of establishing an
employment relationship under Title VII.
The Fourth Circuit has held that receiving a paycheck is
not a condition precedent to being deemed an employee under
Title

VII.

Haavistola,

6

F.3d

at

221-22

(“[b]ecause

compensation is not defined by statute or case law, we hold that
it cannot be found as a matter of law.”).
Morgan

State

actually

benefited

from

Furthermore, whether
Plaintiff’s

research

efforts is irrelevant, as Plaintiff has alleged that his efforts
were

geared

toward

aiding

Morgan

State

in

finding

a

grant.

Accordingly, the fact that Plaintiff was not on Morgan State’s
payroll as an employee and did not receive monetary compensation
during his internship does not – in and of itself – disqualify
him as an “employee” for purposes of Title VII, and summary
judgment will not be granted on this basis.4
2.

Race Discrimination

Plaintiff was ultimately dismissed from his internship, the
only

potential

employment

aspect

of

the

academic

program,

because he failed to maintain the required academic standing.
He

contends

“incomplete”

that
in

he

the

received
internship

two
for

grades

of

“C”

discriminatory

and

an

reasons.

Although neither party discusses the legal standard for Title
4

Morgan State has not argued that Plaintiff fails to prove
employment under the common-law agency or economic realities
prongs.
10

VII claims, a plaintiff may prove discrimination by presenting
direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination,
or he may proceed under the burden-shifting method established
in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03
(1973); see also Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 506–08 (1993).

Ultimately, Plaintiff cannot support

his claim under either framework.
While

“[d]erogatory

remarks

may

in

some

instances

constitute direct evidence of discrimination,” Plaintiff must
demonstrate

that

the

“remarks

upon

which

[he]

relies

were

related to the employment decision in question.” Brinkley v.
Harbour

Recreation

(internal

citations

Club,

180

omitted)

F.3d

598,

(abrogated

608
on

(4th

other

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)).

Cir.1999)
grounds

by

Importantly,

there must be a nexus between the discriminatory conduct and the
employer’s adverse employment action in order for the conduct to
comprise direct evidence of discriminatory removal.

(Id.).

Plaintiff’s argument that he received two “Cs” from Dr.
Welsh based on racial discrimination is unavailing considering
that the grades he received in those two classes concerned his
role

as

a

student,

not

as

an

employee

in

the

internship.

Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that he served a “dual role” as a
student and an employee, and the two “Cs” he received in Dr.
11

Welsh’s classes related to his role as a student and were not
connected to any adverse employment action.

See, e.g., Stilley

v. Univ. of Pitssburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 968 F.Supp.
252,

261

(W.D.Pa.

1996)

(“While

recognizing

that

plaintiff’s

work on her dissertation is closely related to her work on the
ADL

Project,

the

Title

VII

inquiry

must

focus

only

on

the

employee-employer relationship. . . . All issues pertaining to
the completion of plaintiff’s dissertation relate to plaintiff’s
role

as

a

student

and

not

as

an

employee.”).

Similarly

misplaced is Plaintiff’s reliance on the comment from Dr. Welsh
on his paper in the Philosophy of Education class to show that
the

grade

received

in

the

class

was

racially

charged.

Specifically, Plaintiff uses as evidence of discrimination the
following comment from Dr. Welsh on his paper:
it is founded on the premise that your past
was “normal” and “average” and therefore not
worth mentioning.
If you remember so much
share something.
The fact that “every
family member before [you] had attended
[and] graduated college” makes you unusual!
(ECF

No.

12-3,

at

1)

(emphasis

in

original).

perceives this comment to have a racial connotation.

Plaintiff
Plaintiff

cannot show that this comment on one paper in a class, written
by Dr. Welsh sometime in the spring of 2010, was in any way
linked to his dismissal from Morgan State by December 2010.
See, e.g., Sonpon v. Grafton School, Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 494,

12

499 (D.Md. 2002) (“there has to be a nexus between the offensive
remark and Grafton’s decision not to promote Plaintiff for that
remark

to

comprise

direct

evidence

of

discriminatory

discharge.”); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d
542, 549 (4th Cir. 1995) (statement made two days prior to the
plaintiff’s termination that the company needed to “get some
young blood” did “not evince an intent to discharge an older
employee”);

E.E.O.C.

v.

CTI

Global

Solutions,

Inc.,

815

F.Supp.2d 897, 907 (D.Md. 2011) (“Where the derogatory statement
bears little relation to the contested employment action and is
attenuated by time, a plaintiff will likely fail to satisfy the
nexus

requirement.”);

Brewer

v.

Board

of

Trustees

of

the

University of Illinois, 407 F.Supp.2d 946, 978 (C.D.Ill. 2005)
(“Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or argument that the
communications affected his assistantship.”); Sawyer v. Columbia
College,

864

F.Supp.2d

709,

717

(N.D.Ill.

2012)

(“Even

when

taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is no
connection

between

Meegan’s

alleged

actions

and

the

adverse

employment decision. . . . Meegan was a security guard and was
not

responsible

for

the

decision

to

terminate

and

suspend

[p]laintiff.”).
Plaintiff also argues in the opposition to the motion for
summary judgment that he:

13

provided email exhibits documenting that
defendant Benjamin Welsh, a white Caucasian
male who spoke of being “white” and his
“whiteness” in casual conversations, as part
of class discussions, and on many occasions
in the internship, in courses, in private
employee-employer
discussions
between
defendant and Plaintiff and in the class
defendant spoke racially charged hatred
against blacks, black institutions, and
those attending those institution.
(ECF No. 36-1, at 7).

Plaintiff has provided multiple email

exchanges between him and Dr. Welsh and other administrators at
Morgan State, but none of them reflect any comments made by Dr.
Welsh (or anyone else) on the basis of race.
generalized
instances

allegations,

when

conversations

Dr.

with

outside of class.

but

Welsh
him

does

used

during

not

delineate

racially
his

Plaintiff offers
any

charged

internship,

specific

language

in

class,

in
or

For instance, when Plaintiff opted to go

ahead with the grade appeal instead of revising his paper for
the

internship,

he

cited,

among

other

things,

an

allegedly

offensive email from Dr. Welsh to Plaintiff, stating that “[i]t
is in your best interest to keep your mouth shut from now on and
not try to change the goals and objectives again.”
4, at 11).

This remark has no discernable racial connotation

and Plaintiff does not argue as much.
affidavits

(ECF No. 12-

or

any

other

documentation

Plaintiff’s allegations.

14

There are no supporting
to

give

credence

to

Moreover,

Plaintiff

has

not

shown

a

causal

connection

between any racial comments made by Dr. Welsh (which Plaintiff
does not even specify) and his dismissal.

Plaintiff’s grade

appeal, academic probation, and dismissal were handled by Glenda
Prime, the Chairperson of Advanced Studies Leadership & Policy
at

Morgan

State,

and

other

faculty

members;

there

is

no

indication that Dr. Welsh either served as the sole decisionmaker or played any role in this process.
recommended

the

two

“C”

grades

and

an

Although Dr. Welsh
“incomplete”

in

the

internship, the internship grade was downgraded to an “F” by an
independent
submitted

committee
and

that

assessed

reviewed

Plaintiff’s

the

paperwork

academic

eligibility to remain in the graduate program.5
2,

email

from

Glenda

Prime

(“Please

be

Plaintiff

performance

and

(See ECF No. 36-

advised

that

the

department has completed the grade appeal process . . . the
department has decided to uphold the grades assigned to you.”)
5

Dr. Welsh submitted an affidavit in support of the motion
for summary judgment stating that he was not the internship
course instructor, therefore he could only recommend a grade to
the instructor of record, Dr. Warren Hayman, the Interim
Coordinator, Urban Educational Leadership. (ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 5).
Dr. Welsh avers that “[w]hen a last minute change in goals and
objectives became necessary, [he] recommended to Dr. Hayman that
Mr. Stewart receive a grade of ‘Incomplete’ because he was not
able to complete the internship satisfactorily in the time
allowed.”
(Id.).
Dr. Hayman, an African-American male, then
awarded Mr. Stewart an “incomplete” in the internship.
(Id. ¶
6).
Plaintiff argues in the opposition to the motion for
summary judgment that he was not aware that Dr. Warren Hayman
was African American; Plaintiff’s awareness of Dr. Hayman’s race
is irrelevant, however.
15

(emphasis

added))).

Moreover,

Warren

Hayman,

an

African-

American male, was the instructor of record for the internship,
and

Dr.

Welsh

internship.

could

only

recommend

(ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 5).

the

“incomplete”

in

the

Plaintiff has provided no

supporting evidence that any of these other individuals engaged
in

discriminatory

conduct

in

connection

with

Plaintiff’s

academic probation and subsequent dismissal, assuming such acts
could even be regarded as adverse employment actions.
cannot

rely

on

generalized

allegations

of

Plaintiff

discrimination

to

defeat a properly-supported motion for summary judgment.
Absent

direct

circumstantially,

evidence,

using

McDonnell Douglas.

the

Plaintiff
pretext

must

prove

framework

his

case

established

in

Under this framework, Plaintiff must first

demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the
contours

of

circumstances.
position

is

which

will

vary

McDonnell,
unique

to

411

depending
U.S.

Plaintiff

at
such

802
as

on
n.

the
2.

factual
Where

here,

a

Plaintiff

asserting discriminatory discharge must show that: (1) he is a
member

of

a

protected

class;

(2)

he

suffered

an

adverse

employment action; (3) he was performing at a level that met his
employer’s expectations at the time of the adverse employment
action; and (4) he was terminated under circumstances that give
rise to an inference of discrimination.
253-54.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at

It is undisputed that Plaintiff, an African-American
16

male, meets the first element.
from

Morgan

State

Even assuming that his dismissal

constituted

an

adverse

employment

action,

Plaintiff has not satisfied the third and fourth elements of the
prima facie case.6
Plaintiff

has

provided

no

evidence

–

just

his

own

subjective beliefs - that his performance in the internship met
Morgan

State’s

legitimate

expectations,

nor

has

he

produced

evidence that those “expectations” were not legitimate.

See,

e.g., Dzaringa v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Civ. Action No. DKC 121609, 2013 WL 5634346, at *5 (D.Md. Oct. 15, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s
own view of his performance is irrelevant.”).

As Defendant

argues, at first, Mr. Stewart chose to research public grants
for the internship, but later changed topics to researching and
writing an article.
write

a

book

It appears that Plaintiff later agreed to

review,

but

Dr.

Welsh

found

weaknesses

in

Plaintiff’s work product and gave Plaintiff an opportunity to
6

Notably, Plaintiff was not terminated from his semesterlong internship.
His dissatisfaction stems from receiving an
“incomplete” – and ultimately an “F” – not from being unable to
finish the internship. He was given an opportunity to complete
the requirements of the internship – which Dr. Welsh warned him
may entail preparing several drafts of the book review – but
Plaintiff declined, opting to appeal the “incomplete” instead.
Consequently, it is doubtful that Plaintiff can even prove an
adverse employment action in connection with his internship,
which is what he regards as his “employment” relationship with
Morgan State.
Viewing the allegations in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff and assuming he has shown an adverse
employment action, as will be seen, Plaintiff’s discriminatory
discharge claim fails to satisfy the other two prongs of
McDonnell Douglas.
17

cure the deficiencies.
reflects
failing

that

Dr.

timely

to

Welsh

(ECF No. 12-4, at 19).
gave

complete

Plaintiff

the

an

internship

The record

“incomplete”

for

requirements;

the

“incomplete” simply allowed Plaintiff extra time to complete his
required work.

In an email dated June 17, 2010, Dr. Welsh

stated:
Do you want to work together to revise your
papers or not? If yes, then we need to put
these feelings behind us. . . . All I can
tell you about the internship grade is that
it is common practice for Dr. Hayman to give
internship students incompletes when the
work is not completed in time to submit a
grade. The book review needs work as well .
. . do you want to let that grade go along
with the other two?
(Id. at 22).

Plaintiff replied on June 18, 2010 that he would

revise the papers. (Id. at 23).

Dr. Welsh then responded on

June 19, 2010:
Very well, then.
I assume you understand
that I am not going to tell you what is
wrong with them.
I expect you to at least
generate questions and theories as to why
you got the grade that you got, and to share
those questions and theories with me when we
meet.
(Id.).

After this email from Dr. Welsh, on June 21, 2010,

Plaintiff wrote to Dr. Glenda Prime, the Chairperson of Advanced
Studies Leadership & Policy at Morgan State, stating that he
changed his mind about revising the papers and that he would be
appealing his two grades of “C” and an “I” in the internship.

18

The appeals committee - which did not include Dr. Welsh confirmed

that

Plaintiff

failed

to

meet

his

internship

requirements and changed his grade from an “incomplete” to an
“F.”

See,

undisputed
policies,

e.g.,
that

and

the

Dzaringa,

2013

[plaintiff]
only

WL

5634346,

failed

evidence

he

to

at

follow

provides

to

*5

(“It

is

Defendant’s
demonstrate

Defendant’s nefarious motive are some stray remarks by Pressley
and the general feeling that Pressley was not giving him the
autonomy and respect he thought his position deserved.

Such is

the ‘scintilla of evidence in support’ that is insufficient for
the nonmoving party on a motion for summary judgment.”); Nigro
v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ. Coll. of Virginia, 492 F.App’x
347, 360 (4th Cir. 2012) (Table opinion) (“Since we must view the
faculty’s
with

determination

considerable

that

Nigro

deference,[]

and

performed
the

record

unsatisfactorily
contains

ample

evidence that her performance in some rotations was deficient,
we cannot conclude that she has met her burden of showing that
she performed her job satisfactorily.”).

Moreover, Plaintiff

has

racial

not

produced

evidence

demonstrating

motivation,

failing to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie Title VII
claim.
Even assuming Plaintiff has made a prima facie Title VII
claim, Defendants have produced a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason

for

Plaintiff’s

dismissal
19

from

Morgan

State.

Specifically, Defendant argues that the decision to dismiss him
was

a

purely

academic

Plaintiff’s work.

decision

based

on

(ECF No. 34, at 7).

an

assessment

of

As discussed above,

Plaintiff was given an “incomplete” in the internship because he
changed topics with five weeks left and then failed timely to
complete

the

internship

requirements

outlined

by

Dr.

Welsh.

Moreover, he refused to make changes to the book review, even
after

being

attributes

offered

racial

several

motive

to

chances
Dr.

to

Welsh

do

so.

only.

Plaintiff

Several

other

faculty members, however – including Dr. Glenda Prime and Dr.
Warren Hayman – sat on the committee that reviewed whether the
“incomplete” (and his two other “C” grades) were justified, and
concluded

that

Commonwealth

were.7

they

Univ.,

366

See,

F.Supp.2d

e.g.,

Herron

355,

368

v.

Virginia

(E.D.Va.

2004)

(“Simply stated, the Plaintiff was failing her clinical rotation
and

the

apprised

evidence
of

her

is

clear

that

shortcomings

although

by

she

clinical

was

supervisors,

refused to listen to or integrate their feedback.”).
has

not

reasons

come

forward

justifying

his

with

any

academic

7

evidence
probation

repeatedly

that
and

she

Plaintiff

Morgan

State’s

dismissal

were

Moreover, the program requirements for the Ed.D program
indicate that “[a] student who receives two C’s will be
dismissed from the [Ed.D] program.”
(ECF No. 12-3, at 8).
Plaintiff’s receipt of two grades of “C” in the spring of 2010,
already
justified
dismissal
according
to
the
program
requirements.
20

pretextual.

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to

Morgan State on the race discrimination claim.
3.

Retaliation

Plaintiff’s

retaliation

claim

fares

no

better.

To

establish a prima facie retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer
acted adversely against him; and (3) the protected activity was
causally connected to the adverse action.

See Holland v. Wash.

Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff does

not explicitly identify the basis for his retaliation claim, but
it appears that Plaintiff believes that the “incomplete” in his
internship

was

changed

to

complaints and grade appeal.”
There

are

several

an

“F”

“when

Plaintiff

filed

(ECF No. 36-1, at 5).

problems

with

Plaintiff’s

argument.

First, filing a grade appeal is not protected activity.

The

record reflects that Plaintiff indicated to Dr. Glenda Prime
that he wanted to appeal the grades because he thought Dr. Welsh
belittled him and he also found offensive a remark from Dr.
Welsh to keep his mouth shut.

(ECF No. 12-4, at 24-25).

There

is no indication that Plaintiff asserted race discrimination and
that his “incomplete” was downgraded to an “F” as a result of
his

discrimination

complaint.

Moreover,

in

his

complaint,

Plaintiff indicates that his “grade was changed to an ‘F’ in the
externship/internship . . . after he filed a complaint with the
21

U.S. Department of Education.”

(ECF No. 24, at 13).

Even

assuming Plaintiff could prove an adverse employment action, his
complaint

avers

that

he

filed

a

complaint

with

multiple

agencies, including the Department of Education, in January 21,
2011, by which point the decision to dismiss had already been
made.

(ECF No. 24, at 12).

Accordingly, summary judgment will

be granted for Morgan State as to the retaliation claim as well.
B.

Breach of Contract

Plaintiff

also

brings

a

breach

of

contract

claim.8

Plaintiff argues that Defendants created a contract when Dr.
Welsh signed the Statement of Agreement at the commencement of
the internship and that Morgan State breached this contract by
giving him an “incomplete” and then an “F” in the internship
after

Plaintiff

allegedly

completed

all

of

the

internship

requirements.
“To

prevail

in

an

action

for

breach

of

contract,

a

plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
contractual
obligation.”

obligation

and

that

the

defendant

breached

that

Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC v. Manhattan

Imported Cars, Inc., 738 F.Supp.2d 640, 649 (D.Md. 2010) (citing
Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 175 (2001)).
determining

whether

a

contract

8

exists,

“the

hallmarks

When
of

a

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for monetary damages
(as opposed to injunctive relief) was dismissed by prior
memorandum opinion. (See ECF No. 20).
22

binding contract are ‘an offer by one party and an unconditional
acceptance

of

that

precise

offer

by

the

other.’”

Estrin

v.

Natural Answers, Inc., 103 Fed.Appx. 702, 704 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Lemlich v. Board of Trs., 282 Md. 495, 385 A.2d 1185,
1189

(1978)).

In

forming

a

contract,

there

must

be

consideration, where a performance or promise is bargained for
in

exchange

for

a

return

performance

or

return

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 (1981).

promise.

If a contract

is found to exist, Maryland applies the objective theory of
contracts, where
[A] court is to determine from the language
of the agreement, what a reasonable person
in the position of the parties would have
understood the contract to mean at the time
the contract was entered into; when the
language of the contract is plain and
unambiguous,
there
is
no
room
for
construction as the courts will presume that
the parties meant what they expressed.
Id. (citing Mathis v. Hargrove, 166 Md.App. 286, 319 (2005)).
Defendants contend that the Statement of Agreement is an
outline of the goals and objectives of Plaintiff’s internship,
which

is

properly

not

a

contract

authorized

because

state

it

official.

was

never

(ECF

No.

signed
34,

at

by

a

8-9).

Defendants also argue that even if the Statement of Agreement is
deemed

a

Plaintiff

binding
changed

contract,
his

it

was

research

remaining in the semester.

no

topic

(Id. at 9).
23

longer
with

in
just

effect

when

five

weeks

Plaintiff counters that

the Statement of Agreement was an employment contract, signed by
Dr.

Welsh,

an

University.”

“authorized

representative

(ECF No. 36-1, at 14).

of

Morgan

State

Plaintiff further argues

that it was Dr. Welsh who initiated changes to the Statement of
Agreement, making Defendants liable for breaching the contract.
The Statement of Agreement, which outlines the internship
objectives, is not a contract.

The Statement of Agreement does

not

or

address

State.

any

consideration

obligations

(See ECF No. 12-2, at 2).

owed

by

Morgan

The language of the Statement

of Agreement only mentions benefits that Plaintiff would receive
from

his

own

research

efforts

and

is

more

akin

independently-created syllabus approved by a teacher.

to

an

Even if

the Statement of Agreement constituted a contract between Morgan
State and Plaintiff, however, its plain terms do not require
Morgan

State

exchange

or

for

assessment

Dr.

Welsh

Plaintiff’s

of

to

award

work,

Plaintiff’s

a

satisfactory

irrespective

work.

of

Plaintiff’s

Dr.

grade

in

Welsh’s

generalized

allegation that the contract was breached when he received an
“incomplete”
judgment.

and

an

“F”

Accordingly,

is

insufficient

summary

judgment

to
will

defeat
be

summary

granted

to

Defendants on the breach of contract claim.9

9

Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that “Benjamin Welsh
wrote emails to Troy Stewart showing extreme hostility towards
Troy Stewart before final grades were to be submitted and after
final grades were submitted.”
(ECF No. 24, at 9).
Plaintiff
24

C.

Section 1983 Claims

Defendants argue that the Section 1983 claims should be
dismissed

because

there

was

no

constitutional

violation.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person, who
acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal
rights.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section

1983

claims

is

Although the basis of Plaintiff’s
also

not

entirely

clear,

in

his

complaint, Plaintiff asserts that “Morgan State University’s act
of dismissing Troy Stewart’s complaint violated [his] . . .
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”

(ECF No. 24, at 8).

In

the opposition, Plaintiff argues that “being unfairly graded and
denied

his

right

to

appeal

discriminatory

grades,

caus[ed]

irreparable harm to his right to a public education under the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.”
silent

on

(ECF No. 36-1, at 5).
the

right

to

The Constitution, however, is

education

and

the

Supreme

Court

has

declined to recognize education as a fundamental federal right
guaranteed by the Constitution.

See San Antonio Ind. School

Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

Instead, the Supreme

asserts
that
“Benjamin
Welsh
sent
these
emails
and
correspondence simultaneously to Chairperson Glenda Prime and
Interim Coordinator Warren Hayman. . . . When Benjamin Welsh
sent these simultaneous emails he breached a contract with Troy
Stewart.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff includes legal conclusions, but
again fails to include any facts indicating how sending these
emails constituted a contract breach, assuming a contract
between Plaintiff and Morgan State existed.
25

Court

has

function

of

explained
state

that

and

education

local

that

Defendants

the

governments.”

Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
proof

is

committed

“most
Brown

important
v.

Bd.

of

Plaintiff has not provided any
a

constitutional

violation.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that he was denied the right to
appeal discriminatory grades is disingenuous considering that he
did appeal his grades to Glenda Prime.

His dissatisfaction with

the outcome of that appeal does not give rise to a Section 1983
violation.

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted as to

the 1983 claims.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed by Defendants will be granted.
strike will be denied.

Defendants’ motion to

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

26