Deabreu et al v. Novastar Home Morgage, Incorporated et al

Filing 110

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 92 Motion for Reconsideration (c/m to Plaintiffs 2/5/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/5/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LOUIS PIERRE DEABREU, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 11-3692

:
NOVASTAR HOME MORTGAGE, INC,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Louis Pierre Deabreu and Renee Lavinia Deabreu,
proceeding pro se, commenced this action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia on November 28,
2011.

The complaint, which largely relates to the foreclosure

of Plaintiffs’ home in Charles County, Maryland, names twentytwo defendants, but contains substantive allegations as to only
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The District of Columbia court

transferred the case to this district, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
proceed

This court granted Plaintiffs’ motions for leave to
in

forma

pauperis,

and

the

United

States

Marshal

effected service of process.
Seventeen
dismiss.

defendants

responded

by

filing

motions

to

Among these was a motion filed by Defendants Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A.; Timothy J. Sloan; John G. Stumpf; Buonassisi,
Henning & Lash; U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for
Credit

Suisse

First

Boston;

Alex

Cooper

Auctioneers,

Incorporated;

MERS;

and

Prudential

Ridgeway

Realty,

Inc.,

to

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 39).
By a memorandum opinion and order issued June 4, 2012, the
court granted Wells Fargo’s motion.
court

noted

jurisdiction

that,
as

although

the

(ECF Nos. 90, 91).

Plaintiffs

jurisdictional

cited

basis,

federal
the

The

question

well-pleaded

allegations of the complaint did not present a federal question:
In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert
that the “court has jurisdiction, because
the Complainants are without relief save in
a Court of Special Equity and on the grounds
of injury sustained due to a breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of contract[.]”
(ECF No. 1 ¶ II).
This statement clearly
does not provide a basis for federal
question jurisdiction; rather, it suggests
that Plaintiffs’ claim arise under Maryland
common law.
Although the civil cover sheet
accompanying the complaint cites a federal
statute – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – the complaint
itself makes no mention of this provision,
nor does any named defendant appear to be a
state actor.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation
of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state
law.”).
Plaintiffs have named the United
States
Department
of
Education
as
a
defendant,
and
district
courts
have
jurisdiction over certain actions against
the federal government.
See 28 U.S.C. §
1346; 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.
But where,
as here, the complaint contains no factual
allegations relating to the government, it
does not support the exercise of subject
2

matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scarborough
v. Carotex Const., Inc., 420 Fed.Appx. 870,
874 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding no subject
matter jurisdiction where the complaint
“contains no allegations that the federal
government . . . had any involvement
whatsoever” in the case).
(ECF No. 90, at 3-4).

Upon further noting that the requirements

for diversity jurisdiction were not met, the court found no
basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed
the complaint as to all defendants.
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the pending motion for
reconsideration.

(ECF No. 92).

Multiple groups of defendants

separately filed opposition papers (ECF Nos. 93, 101-03), and
Plaintiffs filed a near-identical reply to each opposition (ECF
Nos. 96, 104-07).
A motion for reconsideration filed within twenty-eight days
of the underlying order is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e).1

Courts have recognized three limited grounds

for granting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e): (1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law, (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial, or (3) to correct clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice.

See United States ex rel. Becker v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir.

1

Plaintiff’s motion was filed approximately fifteen days
after the underlying order was entered.
3

2002) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th
(2003).

Cir. 1998)),

cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1012

A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old

matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Co.,

148

Practice

F.3d
and

at

403

Procedure

(quoting
§

11

2810.1,

at

Wright,

Pacific Ins.

et

127–28

al.,

Federal

ed.

1995)).

(2d

Where a party presents newly discovered evidence in support of
its

Rule

59(e)

motion,

it

“must

produce

a

legitimate

justification for not presenting the evidence during the earlier
proceeding.”

Id. (quoting Small v. Hunt, 98 F.3d 789, 798 (4th

Cir. 1996)) (internal marks omitted).
Plaintiff has not sufficiently addressed any of the grounds
for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), nor does any appear to be
applicable.

Plaintiffs’ motion recites that it is “based upon

the fact that the court may have overlooked the fundamental
foundational [p]recedent and judicial notice established by the
Consent

Judgment

filed

in

the

U.S.

District

Court

for

the

District of Columbia (here filed as Exhibit A and previously
filed

as

exhibits

in

this

case)

which

undeniable subject matter jurisdiction[.]”

gives

this

Court

(ECF No. 92, at 1).

The attached exhibit is a press release, dated February 9, 2012
–

over

two

months

after

Plaintiffs

commenced

this

action

–

announcing that “the federal government and 49 state attorneys
4

general have reached a landmark $25 billion agreement with the
nation’s

five

largest

mortgage

servicers

loan servicing and foreclosure abuses.”

to

address

mortgage

(ECF No. 92-1, at 1).

The press release further reflects that “[t]he agreement will be
filed as a consent judgment in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.”

(Id. at 2).

Despite Plaintiffs’ apparent argument to the contrary, a
consent judgment filed in another district court over two months
after Plaintiffs filed their complaint does not provide a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction.

As noted in the prior opinion

in this case, “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, ‘district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under

the

States.’”
any

Constitution,

laws,

(ECF No. 90, at 3).

claim

in

their

or

treaties

of

the

United

Plaintiffs have not pointed to

complaint

alleging

violation

of

the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Accordingly, it is this 5th day of February, 2013, by the
United

States

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Maryland,

ORDERED that:
1.

The

motion

for

reconsideration

filed

by

Plaintiffs

Louis Pierre Deabreu and Renee Lavinia Deabreu (ECF No. 92) BE,
and the same hereby IS, DENIED; and

5

2.
Memorandum

The

clerk

Opinion

is
and

directed
Order

to

to

transmit

counsel

for

copies

of

Defendants

this
and

directly to Plaintiffs.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

6