Harrison-Khatana v. Cannon et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 10/31/12 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/31/12. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DEBORAH HARRISON-KHATANA
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 11-3715
:
S. CANNON, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this employment
discrimination case is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Summon Cannon (ECF No. 10).
The issues have been briefed, and
the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule 105.6.
Local
For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss
will be granted.
I.
Background
Harrison-Khatana
complaint.
alleges
(ECF No. 1).
the
following
facts
in
her
Plaintiff is a disabled veteran who
was formerly employed as a fare box puller by the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”).
In addition to
her military disability, Harrison-Khatana suffered a disabling
injury during her time as a WMATA employee.
Harrison-Khatana
asserts that WMATA’s disability rules and regulations require
metro buses to be kneeled upon the request of any employee who
is
disabled.
Although
WMATA
accommodated
Harrison-Khatana’s
kneeling requests when she first returned to work after her
jobsite
injury,
Cannon
–
a
district
manager
with
WMATA
–
allegedly instructed his employees to stop kneeling the buses,
“which made [Plaintiff’s] job harder to do.”
also
purportedly
refused
a
request
(Id. at 3).1
from
WMATA
Harrison-Khatana’s
physician to place her on “light duty,” even though similarly
situated male employees were given lighter workloads during the
same time period.
(Id.).
Harrison-Khatana further alleges that
she applied for other positions within WMATA but that Cannon
selected less senior employees instead of her.
Plaintiff also
contends that, after she complained to the union about WMATA’s
failure
to
make
reasonable
accommodations,
Cannon
against her by “making [work] harder for [her].”
retaliated
(Id.).
At
some point in time, WMATA terminated Plaintiff.
After filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Harrison-Kathana received a right to sue letter on
September 28, 2011.
se
complaint
defendants.
the
Civil
in
On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed a pro
this
court
naming
WMATA
and
Cannon
as
Harrison-Khatana asserts claims under Title VII of
Rights
Act
of
1964,
42
U.S.C.
§§ 2000e,
et
seq.
(“Title VII”), and the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”).
1
Plaintiff seeks back pay,
The page numbers listed represent those assigned by the
CM/ECF system.
2
reinstatement,
costs
and
compensatory
attorneys’
damages,
fees.
On
pain
January
Khatana’s motion for leave to proceed
and
6,
suffering,
2012,
and
Harrison-
in forma pauperis
was
granted.
(ECF No. 3).
On March 5, 2012, WMATA answered the
complaint
(ECF
and
No.
9),
Cannon
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 10).
moved
to
dismiss
under
Harrison-Khatana filed an
opposition on March 8, 2012 (ECF No. 12), and Cannon did not
file a reply.
II.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,
464
F.3d
480,
483
(4th
Presley v. City of
Cir.
2006).
A
plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).
Fed.R.Civ.P.
“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp.
That showing must
consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
3
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff,
see
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal
allegations
not
need
be
accepted.
Revene
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
v.
Charles
Cnty.
Legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604
F.2d
844,
847
(4th
Cir.
1979);
see
also
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Francis
v.
“[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged,
but it has not ‘show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”
8(a)(2)).
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
at
679
(quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P.
Thus, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that
requires
the
reviewing
experience and common sense.”
court
to
draw
on
its
judicial
Id.
III. Analysis
Cannon correctly argues that he must be dismissed from this
lawsuit because, as an individual, he is not a proper defendant
to a Title VII or ADA lawsuit.
4
It
is
well-settled
that
“supervisors
are
not
liable
in
their individual capacities for Title VII violations” because
they are not “employers” within the meaning of the statute.
Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998).
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has held that the ADA “do[es] not
provide
for
causes
of
individual capacities.”
action
against
defendants
in
their
Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F.App’x 366,
368 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Baird ex rel. Baird Rose, 192 F.3d
462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Accordingly, Harrison-Khatana’s ADA
and Title VII claims cannot be maintained against Cannon in his
individual capacity.
Assuming, arguendo, that Harrison-Khatana is attempting to
sue
Cannon
in
his
official
capacity,
claims against him would still fail.
her
Title
VII
and
ADA
The Fourth Circuit has
held that suing a public employee in his official capacity is
the
practical
itself.
equivalent
of
suing
the
governmental
entity
Love–Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004).
Because Harrison-Kathana is also pursuing relief against WMATA
under Title VII and the ADA, any claims against Cannon in his
official capacity would be subject to dismissal as redundant.
See Bradley v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, Civ. No. JKB–11–1799,
2012 WL 4321738, at *2 (D.Md. Sept. 19, 2012) (dismissing claims
against individual defendants because “it would be pointless to
[sue them in their official capacities] since a suit brought in
5
that
manner
Baltimore
would
still
Police
be,
in
effect,
Department,
which
a
suit
against
the
is
already
a
defendant . . . ”).
Hence, the Title VII and ADA claims against Cannon must be
dismissed,
regardless
of
whether
he
is
being
sued
in
his
individual or official capacity.2
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Summon Cannon will be granted.
A separate order will
follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
2
In light of this conclusion, Cannon’s second argument
(i.e., that he cannot be held liable under Title VII or the ADA
because he was not named as a respondent in Harrison-Khatana’s
EEOC charge) will not be reached.
6
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