Dawson v. Wolf

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 10/18/2012. (ba, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TYLER DAWSON

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Plaintiff

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v

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JOHN S. WOLF, et al.

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Defendants

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Civil Action No. PJM-12-110

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MEMORANDUM
Pending is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 32.
Plaintiff’s correspondence docketed September 4, 2012, shall be construed as his opposition to
the motion. ECF No. 34. The Court finds a hearing in this matter unnecessary. See Local Rule
105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Background
The allegations raised by Plaintiff relate to his claim that in 2008, while he was
incarcerated at Western Correctional Institution (WCI) a group of officers1 put a rope around his
neck and beat him. He alleges this was done because one of the officers, Officer Elliot, was a
member of the Ku Klux Klan and is related to a girl whom Plaintiff is accused of raping.2
Plaintiff claims that as a result of the rope around his neck, his throat was injured. He describes

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None of the officers alleged to have beaten Plaintiff are named as Defendants in this case.

Plaintiff’s allegations are somewhat convoluted and hard to follow, but the gist of his assertions are that no one
believes he really raped the girl whom he was convicted of raping, who is African American, so a false story
alleging that he raped a white girl was promoted. He claims the purpose of the lie was to enrage correctional
officers who would then take their anger out on him. The story was started, according to Plaintiff, by the father of
the girl he was convicted of raping and his relatives. Plaintiff claims that he is innocent of the charges against him
and that the girl was actually raped by her father. He states that nobody in his hometown believes he is guilty.

the condition of his throat as being very red and appearing as if there is a bone in it. He asserts
there is a widespread conspiracy to keep him from obtaining appropriate medical care for the
injury to his throat which includes members of the psychology department. ECF No. 1 and 4.
Plaintiff explains that prior to his criminal trial he was confined to Clifton T. Perkins
Hospital to determine if he was competent to stand trial. ECF No. 10. He claims he was there
for only one day and, while there, certain staff members told him they were going to make
certain bad things happen to him when he was sent to the Division of Correction.3 Plaintiff
asserts that these same staff members have followed him to every institution and informed
correctional staff that he is crazy. The initial injury to his neck was blamed on a suicide attempt
which Plaintiff attributes, in part, to the efforts by both the correctional officers who assaulted
him and the staff at Perkins to portray him as mentally ill. ECF No. 4.
Plaintiff claims the condition of his throat has worsened and threatens his life. He states
his symptoms include spitting up blood, shaking attacks, chest discomfort, choking, and
sweating. Plaintiff was sent to Baltimore Washington Medical Center when he was found
unconscious in his cell and, upon regaining consciousness, claimed he could not speak. Hospital
staff ordered a CT Scan of his throat and, Plaintiff claims, medical staff lied and said it showed
no abnormality. As evidence that this diagnosis was incorrect, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of
a letter written by Commissioner of Correction Stouffer to Congressman Elijah Cummings
stating that Plaintiff was diagnosed with a “prominent epiglottis.”

ECF No. 10 at Att. 2.4 In

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Plaintiff also claims that while he was at Perkins he was railroaded into pleading guilty to a robbery charge, but
when he got to court he discovered the case also included a rape charge. He claims if he had known the charge was
included in the guilty plea he would have stood trial on the charge and been acquitted. He asserts his public
defender chose not to fight for him.
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The letter also explains that Plaintiff’s claims regarding his throat have been extensively investigated and states
there is no evidence that he is being denied needed medical care. Further, the letter states that Plaintiff was offered
psychotropic medication after a psychological evaluation determined he would benefit from same, but Plaintiff has
consistently refused to take the prescribed medication. ECF No. 10 at Att. 2.

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addition to the condition of his throat, Plaintiff states that he has migraines which started after he
had eye surgery. He asserts that he should be sent for tests to determine if he has a brain tumor,
but members of the medical staff have refused to order such tests. ECF No. 1 at p. 8. Plaintiff
claims that he is losing eye sight in his good eye and the eye doctor will not help him because
Plaintiff is African-American. Plaintiff had surgery for chronic retinal detachment in 2006. ECF
No. 14 at Att. 1.
Plaintiff also alleges that his safety is threatened because correctional officers assigned to
his housing unit are allowing inmate workers to be out on the administrative segregation tier
when food is being delivered to the inmates who are assigned there. Plaintiff states that he is in
administrative segregation at Jessup Correctional Institution (JCI) because there is no protective
custody unit there and he has issues with prison gang members. He states the inmate workers are
allowed to “mess with” his food, placing cleaning products in his food. In addition, he claims
that correctional officers put things in his food. He states that for a while he simply refused to
eat his meals, but his refusal of food was interpreted as an effort to commit suicide. Plaintiff
claims that he now eats his food regardless of whether he sees someone “messing with it.” He
claims much of the time it tastes like there is soap in his food and on one occasion a black inky
substance was put into his food. ECF No. 1. He further alleges that on some occasions
medication is put into his food which makes him dizzy and puts him to sleep. Id.

He claims

Officers Boating-Sampong, Hall, Adejumo, Sanni, Osogbuy, Jaff, and Breathson have all
participated in tampering with his food. He also states the officers on the 7:00 to 3:00 shift
always let inmates out to work during feed-up which is a violation of regulations given Plaintiff
is housed in administrative segregation for purposes of protecting him from inmate gang
members with whom he claims he is “beefing.” ECF No. 4 at p. 8. Plaintiff urges this Court to

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review the recordings made from the cameras stationed in the housing unit because it would
reveal that people are in fact tampering with his food. He claims his tray is easy to target for
tampering because it is a medical tray. As a result of the alleged food tampering, Plaintiff claims
his mouth has broken out with bumps. ECF No. 1 at p. 9.
Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks a Restraining Order and alleges that Defendants are intercepting his
outgoing mail, opening his legal mail outside of his presence, and are withholding the envelopes
from his legal mail. ECF No. 25. In addition he claims he is being denied a transfer to another
institution in retaliation for filing the instant case.

Id. A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008). To obtain
a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate: 1) that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; 2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; 3) that
the balance of equities tips in his favor; and 4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008); The
Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.
2009), vacated on other grounds, _U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 (2010), reinstated in relevant part
on remand, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Plaintiff’s ability to have mail sent out from the institution does not appear to have been
adversely effected when the docket in this case is reviewed. He has filed twelve pleadings in this
case after the initial complaint and amended complaint were filed. See ECF Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14,
16, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 30, and 34. Although the Court has reservations about a prison policy to

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withhold legal envelopes as a general practice,5 there has been no showing in this case that
Plaintiff has been harmed by the practice. Additionally, the violation of prison regulations
regarding the handling of legal mail, i.e., that it must be opened in the inmate’s presence, is not
enough alone for this Court to intervene into the management of the prison mail room. See Smith
v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir.1990) (requiring a showing of improper motive or
interference with access to courts); Buie v. Jones 717 F. 2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (isolated
incident of mishandling does not show actionable pattern or practice). Accordingly, the motion
shall be denied.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,

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It is not difficult to imagine circumstances where the envelope in which legal mail is received would be important
evidence for a prisoner-litigant to access in order to establish the date of his actual receipt of any given item. See,
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Lewis v. Richmond City Police Department, 947 F.2d 733, 734-35 (4th Cir.
1991); United States v. Dorsey, 988 F. Supp. 917, 919-920 (D. Md. 1998).

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346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the non-movant, and draw all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Analysis
Medical Claims
The Eighth Amendment prohibits Aunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain@ by virtue
of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976). AScrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not limited to those punishments authorized
by statute and imposed by a criminal judgment.@ De=Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F. 3d 630, 633 (4th
Cir. 2003) citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.294, 297 (1991).

In order to state an Eighth

Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions of the
defendants or their failure to act amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical
need and that, subjectively, the prison staff were aware of the need for medical attention but
failed to either provide it or ensure the needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Objectively, the medical condition at issue must be serious. See Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (there is no expectation that prisoners will be provided with

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unqualified access to health care). Proof of an objectively serious medical condition, however,
does not end the inquiry.
The subjective component requires Asubjective recklessness@ in the face of the serious
medical condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839B 40. ATrue subjective recklessness requires
knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that
risk.@ Rich v. Bruce, 129 F. 3d 336, 340 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1997). AActual knowledge or awareness
on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference
>because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted
punishment.=@ Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F. 3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)
quoting Farmer 511 U.S. at 844. If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an official
may avoid liability Aif [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately
averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged in
light of the risk the defendant actually knew at the time. Brown v. Harris, 240 F. 3d 383, 390
(4th Cir. 2000); citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F. 3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) (focus must be on
precautions actually taken in light of suicide risk, not those that could have been taken).
Defendants in the instant case are correctional staff, charged with maintaining the
security of the prison, and the Warden. There are no members of the medical staff named as
Defendants. Thus, it appears Plaintiff’s theory of liability is that Defendants have prevented him
from receiving medical care to address a serious medical condition of which they were aware.
The record evidence establishes that Plaintiff has received constitutionally adequate medical
care.
With respect to Plaintiff’s complaints about his throat, he has been examined repeatedly.
On September 15, 2011, Plaintiff was seen for neck pain, claiming he had an old injury to his

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neck and had recently fallen, re-injuring it. ECF No. 32 at Ex. 21, pp. 55 – 56. Plaintiff was
examined by Physician’s Assistant Moss who noted that the more questions he asked Plaintiff
about his neck, the more his story changed regarding the injury. Id. at p. 55. Additionally,
Plaintiff refused to allow Moss to fully examine his neck and he refused to move his neck.
When Moss asked Plaintiff if he could move his neck, Plaintiff shook his head “no.” Id.

On

September 26, 2011, Plaintiff was sent to an outside hospital after he was found in his cell
unconscious.6

Id. at p. 38.

After regaining consciousness Plaintiff refused to speak, but

indicated his throat was injured. A CT Scan was performed and yielded normal results. A
toxicology screen was also performed and came back with negative results. Id. Because Plaintiff
continued to refuse to speak, he was referred for a psychiatric consultation, but Plaintiff refused
to be seen.
Plaintiff asserts that the diagnosis regarding his throat has changed from normal to
“prominent epiglottis,” proving Defendants have lied about the condition of his throat. ECF No.
1. Plaintiff’s interpretation of the evidence is mistaken. A “prominent epiglottis” is not a change
in the diagnosis of “normal.” Rather, it simply more fully describes the anatomy of Plaintiff’s
throat. Even if this represented a change in the diagnosis, the named Defendants had no
participation in the diagnosis and made no effort to prevent Plaintiff from receiving medical care
for his complaint.
Following his evaluation at the hospital, Plaintiff was seen again for complaints regarding
his throat and chest tightness on November 11, 2011.

ECF No. 32 at Ex. 21, p. 34. On

November 13, 2011, he reported that he suffered from heart disease when he was 10 years old.
Id. at pp. 30 – 31. Because he was not exhibiting any symptoms of a cardiac issue, Plaintiff was

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On October 4, 2011, Plaintiff reported to medical staff that he had a seizure disorder. No history of seizures were
noted in his medical file. ECF No. 32 at Ex. 21, pp. 46 – 54.

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offered Maalox which he refused. When he became difficult, he requested to return to his cell.
On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff was put on a cardiovascular diet for a period of three months.
Id. at pp. 29 and 88. He reported again on November 16, 2011, that he was having chest pains.
Id. at pp. 26 – 28. When Plaintiff again complained of chest pain in December, x-rays of his
chest were performed and no abnormalities were noted. Id. at pp. 12 – 23. Plaintiff was
instructed not to eat and lay down, but to sit upright or stand for two to three hours after eating.
Id. at p. 12. On January 5, 2012, Plaintiff refused the cardiovascular diet and signed a release of
responsibility. Id. at p. 72. There is no evidence that Plaintiff’s complaints regarding chest pains
were ignored or that Defendants prevented him from seeking or receiving care.
Plaintiff’s complaints of headaches were also adequately addressed. On October 19,
2010, Plaintiff was seen by P.A. Moss for headaches and was provided Ibuprofen. ECF No. 32
at Ex. 21, pp. 67 – 68. On December 8, 2010, Plaintiff was again seen for a complaint of
migraines and nosebleeds. Id. at pp. 65 – 66. Nurse Practitioner Maximuangu examined Plaintiff
and noted that the nasal septum was red and inflamed, but was not bleeding. Id. He was
prescribed Excedrin Migraine7 for his headaches as well as Afrin nasal spray for his nasal
passages. He was told to return in 14 days if the headaches worsened or did not improve. Id.
When Plaintiff reported that he was suffering headaches on January 5, 2011, he did not appear to
be in distress and his request for a “brain exam” was denied. ECF No. 32 at Ex. 21, pp. 10 – 11.
He was told, however, to follow up within 10 days if his condition did not improve or worsened.
Id.

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Plaintiff reported that he did not like the way Excedrin Migraine made him feel and that he had difficulty sleeping
when taking it. It was therefore discontinued and new pain relief, Ibuprofen, was prescribed. ECF No. 32 at Ex. 21,
pp. 63 – 64.

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Plaintiff’s claim that he should be evaluated for a possible brain tumor because he has
headaches, without some evidence that he is suffering other neurological symptoms warranting
an objective concern regarding that possibility, is not an adequate basis for a constitutional claim.
His assertion is simply his disagreement with the medical care provided. He has offered no
evidence that the named Defendants knew or should know that he requires evaluation for a brain
tumor, nor has he demonstrated that they have interfered with medically prescribed treatment.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.8
Conditions Claim
Conditions which "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"
may amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 347 (1981).
However, conditions which are merely restrictive or even harsh, "are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Id.
In order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment, a prisoner must prove two elements - that 'the
deprivation of [a] basic human need was objectively sufficiently
serious,' and that 'subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.'
Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
“These requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a
condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called “punishment,” and absent severity,
such punishment cannot be called “cruel and unusual.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir.
2008) citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991).
To establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be evidence that a known
excessive risk of harm to the inmate’s health or safety was disregarded. See Wilson, 501 U. S. at
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Plaintiff has also been offered psychiatric care on numerous occasions, but he has rejected all opportunities to
participate in such care. Indeed, he does not allege in his Complaint or any subsequently filed documents that he
requires psychiatric care and is not receiving same.

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298. In other words, “the test is whether the guards know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious
danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown v. North
Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010), quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301
F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.2002). Conduct is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment unless it
transgresses bright lines of clearly-established pre-existing law. See Maciariello v. Sumner, 973
F. 2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
The objective prong of a conditions claim requires proof of an injury. "[T]o withstand
summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions a plaintiff must
produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions." Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir.1993). “Only extreme
deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim
regarding conditions of confinement.” De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.2003).
Demonstration of an extreme deprivation proscribed by the Eighth Amendment requires proof of
a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.
See Odom v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 349 F. 3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff’s claims regarding the conditions of his confinement concern the allegation that
both correctional officers and other inmates are poisoning his food. Defendants unequivocally
deny any knowledge of the claims asserted. ECF No. 32 at Ex. 2 – 7. Plaintiff alleges that
cameras on the housing unit tier should have recorded acts of food tampering and urges this
Court to require Defendants to produce the recordings for this Court to review. Before that
occurs, however, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that he has been subjected to
conditions violating the Eighth Amendment. This, he has not done. There is no evidence that
Plaintiff has suffered “serious or significant physical or emotional injury” as a result of the

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alleged tampering with his food. He has declined all efforts to cooperate with psychiatric care,
insisting he does not need same, and does not attribute any of his claimed medical issues to the
claimed food tampering. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
Failure to Protect Claim
In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect from violence,
Plaintiff must establish that Defendants exhibited deliberate or callous indifference to a specific
known risk of harm. Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F. 2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). APrison conditions may
be restrictive and even harsh, but gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by
another serves no legitimate penological objective, any more than it squares with evolving
standards of decency. Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.@ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
833B 34 (1994) (citations omitted). A[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.@ Id at 837. See also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F. 3d 336, 339B 40 (4th
Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff claims that he is assigned to administrative segregation because it is used in
place of protective custody at JCI. He asserts that allowing essentially any other inmate to be out
of their cell during times when food is served presents an unreasonable risk of harm to him.
Defendants state that Plaintiff has two documented enemies, neither of whom is housed at JCI
with him. ECF No. 32 at Ex. 22. There is no evidence that any of the inmate workers Plaintiff

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references are known to be a threat to him or that Defendants have ignored a substantial risk of
serious harm to him. The claims must fail.
A separate Order granting summary judgment in Defendants’ favor follows.
/s/
PETER J. MESSITTE
October 18, 2012

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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