Metro Media Entertainment, LLC v. Does 1 - 47

Filing 110

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/27/14. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
METRO MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT, LLC
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 12-0347

:
RICHARD STEINRUCK
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

copyright infringement case are a motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Richard Steinruck (ECF No. 100) and a motion
for

voluntary

dismissal

filed

Entertainment, LLC (ECF No. 102).

by

Plaintiff

Metro

Media

Also pending is a motion for

a hearing filed by Defendant Richard Steinruck (ECF No. 107).
The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
hearing being deemed necessary.
Plaintiff’s

Local Rule 105.6.
motion

to

dismiss

For the

following

reasons,

will

be

granted.

Defendant’s motions for summary judgment and for a

hearing will be denied as moot.
I.

Background
Some familiarity with the underlying facts of this case is

presumed.

(See ECF Nos. 67, 92, 99).

Plaintiff Metro Media

Entertainment, LLC owns the copyright to a pornographic film
titled My Baby Got Back! #44.

Plaintiff commenced this action

on February 6, 2012, by filing a complaint against forty-seven
Doe defendants alleged to have infringed Plaintiff’s copyright
in this pornographic film by downloading and/or uploading the
video over the Internet via a file-sharing protocol known as
(ECF No. 1).1

BitTorrent.

An order severed the forty-seven

defendants named in the complaint and dismissed all except Doe
1.

(ECF

No.

17).

The

order

further

directed

that

“all

documents filed in this action that contain Doe 1’s identifying
information shall be filed under seal.”

(Id. at 2).

Days

later, Plaintiff’s counsel transmitted a settlement offer to the
sole remaining defendant, stating, inter alia, that it will name
Doe

1

as

Plaintiff’s

a

defendant

copyright

(i.e.,
in

the

as

an

alleged

pornographic

infringer

film)

unless

of
a

proposed “settlement offer” of $3,5000.00 was promptly remitted.
(ECF No. 23-3, at 2).
Doe

1,

by

counsel,

counterclaim

in

which

he

responded
publicly

Defendant Richard Steinruck.

by

filing

revealed

(ECF No. 23).

an

his

answer

and

identity

as

The counterclaim

raised a single count of abuse of process under Maryland law.
Plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim (ECF No. 29), which

1

2012.

Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint on June 5,
(ECF No. 21).
2

was granted (ECF No. 67).2
July

30,

2012.

(ECF

A scheduling order was entered on

No.

28).

Shortly

after

discovery

commenced, the parties became embroiled in a number of discovery
disputes and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles
B. Day for resolution of all discovery and related scheduling
matters.

Among other things, the parties were unable to agree

on the terms of a protective order and as to the circumstances
in which Defendant’s computers would be inspected by Plaintiff’s
expert

witness.

After

many

months

of

delay,

the

issues

regarding the protective order were resolved (after an objection
to Judge Day’s ruling was overruled), but the parties apparently
never

submitted

signature.

a

final

Similarly,

protective
Judge

Day

order
ruled

to
that

Judge

Day

for

Plaintiff

was

entitled to have its expert perform an inspection at his or her
chosen location, and that Defendant was entitled to be present
during

the

inspection.

Despite

that

ruling

in

Plaintiff’s request, the inspection never occurred.

favor

of

(See ECF

No. 99, at 2-3).
On

March

15,

2013,

approximately

six

months

after

expiration of the deadline for amendment of pleadings or joinder
of additional parties, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend its
complaint in order to add Patrick Steinruck, Defendant’s son, as

2

Plaintiff also sought sanctions related to the filing of a
frivolous counterclaim, which was denied.
3

an additional defendant in this action.

(ECF No. 85).

That

motion was denied because Plaintiff failed to show good cause
for late-filing of the motion.3

(ECF No. 93).

On October 25, 2013, Defendant moved for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 100).

Plaintiff opposed the motion on November 12,

2013, and on the same date, filed its own motion to dismiss all
of

its

claims

voluntarily

(ECF Nos. 101 & 102).

pursuant

to

Fed.R.Civ.P.

41(a)(2).

Defendant filed a reply brief in support

of his motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 104) and opposed
Plaintiff’s

motion

for

voluntary

dismissal

(ECF

No.

105).

Defendant later moved for a hearing on his motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 107).
II.

Analysis
A.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal

Plaintiff

moves

for

voluntary

dismissal

with

prejudice

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), which allows for dismissal by
court order after the opposing party has served either an answer
or motion for summary judgment and without the consent of all
parties who have appeared.

The decision to grant or deny a

3

Plaintiff commenced a separate action against Patrick
Steinruck.
See Civil Action No. DKC 13-1703.
Plaintiff later
moved to dismiss voluntarily pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2);
Patrick Steinruck did not oppose the motion.
The undersigned
issued an order on January 31, 2014, granting Plaintiff’s motion
for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party to bear
its own attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Civil Action No. DKC 131703, ECF No. 17).
4

voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is a matter of discretion
to

be

guided

by

certain

factors,

prejudice to the nonmoving party.

including

the

potential

Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d

1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987).
Where,

as

here,

a

plaintiff’s

Rule

41(a)(2)

motion

“specifically request[s] dismissal with prejudice, it has been
held that the district court must grant that request.”

9 Charles

A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller § 2367 (3d ed. 2008) (emphasis
added).

Indeed, that Plaintiff seeks “dismissal with prejudice

is of paramount importance,” F.D.I.C. v. Becker, 166 F.R.D. 14,
15 (D.Md. 1996), because a voluntary dismissal with prejudice
under Rule 41(a)(2) operates as “a complete adjudication on the
merits of the dismissed claim,” Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel
Stores Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991).

Absent a specific

order by the court, dismissal with prejudice “is subject to the
usual rules of res judicata.”

9 Wright & Miller § 2367; see also

In re Tomlin, 105 F.3d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1997) (“generally,
[d]ismissal

of

an

action

with

prejudice

is

a

complete

adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings and is a
bar to a further action between the parties.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 407 (4th
Cir. 2009) (same).

Moreover, “[n]ormally, a plaintiff may not

appeal the dismissal of his suit with prejudice, which is granted
on his own motion.”

Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting
5

Corp., 984 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958)).
In its motion for voluntary dismissal, Plaintiff represents
that

although

Defendant’s

it

“believes

copying

sufficient

and/or

allowing

evidence

someone

exists

(for

of

example,

Defendant’s son Patrick) to use Defendant’s Internet account to
make

an

willing

unauthorized
to

accept

copy

of

dismissal

Plaintiff’s
with

movie,

prejudice,

bearing its own costs and attorney fees.”

Plaintiff

with

each

is

party

(ECF No. 102, at 1).

According to Plaintiff, the evidence shows that a user located at
Richard Steinruck’s IP address downloaded a copy of the film in
question.

Despite Plaintiff’s belief “that a jury [would] find

that Defendant is liable for copyright infringement, [it] has
determined that the cost of going forward may not justify the
damages

that

might

recoverable.”

be

awarded,

(Id. at 4).

or

that

any

damage

would

be

Plaintiff also believes that evidence

may become spoliated, jeopardizing further proceedings.

(Id. at

4-5).
Defendant has opposed the motion for voluntary dismissal,
taking a much different view of the facts.
that

Plaintiff

evidence
voluntary
judgment

initiated

against

Defendant

dismissal
against

this

in

it.

an

action

himself”
effort

(ECF

No.
6

to
105,

Defendant believes

“without

a

and

now

has

avoid
at

the
1).

scintilla
moved

imposition

of
for
of

Specifically,

Defendant asserts that “[e]ven if the Court assumes that there
was a downloading of Plaintiff’s copyrighted pornographic film by
someone

using

Defendant’s

router,

there

has

never

been

the

slightest evidence that Defendant did such downloading, was aware
that anyone was downloading using his router, or has any idea who
did the downloading even now.”

(Id.).

Defendant asserts that

“[a]nyone within 400 feet of the Steinruck residence could have
been using the router without Mr. Steinruck’s knowledge.”

(Id.

at 4).
Although the strength of Plaintiff’s evidence to support
copyright infringement is debatable, there is no indication that
Plaintiff acted improperly or in bad faith by initiating and
pursuing this suit against Richard Steinruck.
and

served

a

complaint

against

Richard

Plaintiff filed

Steinruck

because

it

determined that a copy of one of its films had been downloaded by
a computer located at the IP address 108.18.217.126, and that
this IP address belonged to Richard Steinruck.
Appended

to

Plaintiff’s

the

amended

counsel

complaint

reciting

the

is

details

a
of

(ECF No. 21 ¶ 5).
certification
the

from

investigation

that was undertaken in connection with the alleged infringement.
(ECF No. 21-1).

Plaintiff did not have conclusive proof that

Richard Steinruck did the downloading or was aware that anyone
was downloading the pornographic film using his router, but as
Judge Paul W. Grimm recently stated in a copyright infringement
7

case

with

facts

virtually

identical

to

the

facts

here,

“the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not hold pleadings to such an
impossibly high standard; plausibility – not conclusiveness – is
the standard.”

Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Osburn, No. PWG-12-1294,

2014 WL 1682010, at *3-4 (D.Md. Apr. 28, 2014) (“it takes no
great imagination to see how evidence that a file was downloaded
by a certain IP address could support a plausible claim that the
file was downloaded by the subscriber at that IP address.”).4
Considering that dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s
amended

complaint

insulates

Defendant

from

further

litigation

arising out of the dismissed claims, any injustice that Defendant
might otherwise suffer “is significantly lessened.”
F.R.D. at 15.
plaintiff’s

Becker, 166

Because district courts ordinarily “must” grant a

request

for

voluntary

dismissal

with

Plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion will be granted.

prejudice,

See, e.g., C-

Tech Corp. v. Aversion Technologies, Civ. Action No. DKC 11-0983,
2012 WL 3962508, at *2-3 (D.Md. Sept. 7, 2012) (granting motion
for voluntary dismissal with prejudice).
The question remains, however, as to whether any conditions
should be attached to dismissal of the amended complaint.
crux

of

Defendant’s

opposition

is

his

view

that

The

allowing

Plaintiff to walk away without compensating him for attorney’s

4

The same attorneys represent the parties in both that case
and this litigation.
8

fees and costs “would be the height of unfair disposition by the
Court.”

(ECF No. 105, at 2-3).

When a dismissal is without

prejudice, the court may impose conditions, such as the movant’s
payment of the opposing party’s fees and costs.
41(a)(2).

See Fed.R.Civ.P.

In contrast, where a motion for voluntary dismissal is

granted with prejudice, such as here, an award of attorneys’ fees
is not appropriate because there is no risk that the defendant
can “be called upon again to defend” and thus no risk of “any
duplication of expense.”
(D.Md. 1963).
general

Courts have recognized two exceptions to this

principle:

circumstances”

Lawrence v. Fuld, 32 F.R.D. 329, 331

and

(1)

where

(2)

where

authority for such an award.”
quotation

marks

and

the

case

“there

is

involves

“exceptional

independent

statutory

9 Wright & Miller § 2366 (internal

citations

omitted).

For

instance,

circumstance would be exceptional if the “‘plaintiff’s suit was .
. . unnecessary, groundless, vexatious and oppressive.’”

Nat’l

Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Comcast Satellite Communications, Inc.,
No. CIV. H-00-261, 2000 WL 1717304, at *2 (D.Md. 2000) (quoting
Lawrence, 32 F.R.D. at 332-33).
Defendant

maintains

that

he

has

expended

large

sums

of

money for attorney fees, travel expenses for depositions, and for
preparing
with

pleadings,

Plaintiff’s

motions,

case.

The

and

other

record

filings

reflects

in

that

connection
aside

from

engaging in several discovery disputes seeking a protective order
9

and to inspect Defendant’s computers (which inspection Plaintiff
never actually undertook), Plaintiff was relatively inactive in
this

case.

Plaintiff
report,

By

and

to

contrast,

hired

rebut

his

Defendant

own

allegations

expert,
of

counterclaimed
who

prepared

copyright

an

against
expert

infringement.

In

Osburn, 2014 WL 1682010, at *5, plaintiff also asserted claims of
copyright infringement and then offered to dismiss voluntarily
the

action

expenses.

with

prejudice,

with

each

party

to

bear

its

own

Much like here, defendant in Osburn, 2014 WL 1682010,

at *5, vociferously objected to voluntary dismissal, arguing that
he

should

defend

a

be

awarded

baseless

attorney’s

lawsuit.

fees

Judge

and

Grimm

costs

in

rejected

having

defendant’s

arguments:
It is not apparent from the record that
[defendant] was required to respond to
[plaintiff’s]
relative
inactivity
by
conducting multiple depositions 2,500 miles
apart, retaining an expert and commissioning
a full expert report, and drafting “multiple
interrogatories and requests for production
of
documents,”
[]
and
more
economical
alternatives, such as telephone depositions,
were available.
Although it appears that
Osburn
was
responding
forcefully
to
allegations that he considered personally
offensive, [defendant’s] choice to pursue a
particularly
aggressive
defense
strategy
does
not
constitute
exceptional
circumstances
sufficient
to
warrant
an
attorney’s fees award. . . . And while the
Copyright
Act
grants
me
discretion
to
apportion costs or attorney’s fees under
certain circumstances, 17 U.S.C. § 505, I
decline to exercise that discretion here.
10

to

Dismissal
will
not
be
conditioned
on
[plaintiff’s] payment of attorney’s fees or
costs.
Osburn, 2014 WL 1682010, at *5 (emphasis added).
applies here.

The same logic

Moreover, Plaintiff offered to settle the matter

with a complete dismissal on August 29, 2013, months before
Defendant moved for summary judgment.
opposition
contends

to

the

that

unjustified

motion

the

for

terms

release

voluntary

of

of

(ECF No. 102-1).

the

dismissal,

settlement

Plaintiff

Defendant

included

“an

a

restrictive

(ECF No. 105, at 6).

confidentiality provision.”

and

In his

But as Judge

Grimm noted, a confidentiality provision, a mutual release, and
a provision for each party to bears its own fees and costs “are
not unusual [clauses] in settlement agreements.”

Osburn, 2014

WL 1682010, at *4.
Defendant further argues that “[i]t would be appropriate
for

the

record

to

show

that

the

case

was

disposed

of

by

[s]ummary [j]udgment, as that would inform other Courts of the
unsufficiency of the suit here more than a Rule 41 dismissal
would show.”

(Id. at 2).

But as explained in Weathers v.

Consolidated Stores Corp., No. Civ.A. DKC 2002-3274, 2004 WL
35769,

at

*2

n.2

(D.Md.

Jan.

7,

2004),

“[d]espite

filing

a

summary judgment motion, [d]efendant’s interests are well-served
by

a

dismissal

with

prejudice

because

‘[a]n

adjudication

in

favor of the defendants, by court or jury, can rise no higher
11

than this.’”

(citing Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores

Inc., 924 F.2d at 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991)).
Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

Rule

41(a)(2)

motion

will

be

granted, and this case will be dismissed with prejudice.
B.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff’s

Rule

41(a)(2)

motion

will

be

granted,

thus

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as moot.
III. Conclusion
For
dismissal

the

foregoing

filed

by

reasons,

Plaintiff

will

the
be

motion
granted.

for

voluntary
Defendant’s

motions for summary judgment and for a hearing will be denied as
moot.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

12