Streeter v. Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 21 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and DISMISSING the Amended Complaint with prejudice; DENYING AS MOOT 24 Plaintiff's Motion to Continue and judgment for costs is ENTERED in favor of Defendants. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 3/31/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 3/31/15)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
FONDA A. STREETER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARYLAND-NATIONAL
CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. RWT 12-cv-0976
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Self-represented Plaintiff Fonda A. Streeter filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County, Maryland alleging that she was sexually harassed and then terminated
from her employment with the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the
“Commission”) in retaliation for complaining about the harassment. ECF No. 2. Defendants,
the Commission, Emily Rose, and Rodney Scott, removed the action to this Court on
April 3, 2012. ECF No. 1.
On April 10, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 9. On January 7, 2013, the
Court granted Defendants’ dispositive motion, dismissing the Complaint as to Emily Rose and
Rodney Scott and granting Streeter leave to file an amended complaint against the Commission
within twenty-one days. ECF No. 18. The Court cautioned Streeter that any amended complaint
filed must satisfy the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires
clear and specific facts sufficient to allege liability, or risk dismissal with prejudice. Id. On
January 28, 2013, Streeter filed a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to
Defendants Memorandum Opinion and Order,” but which is in substance an objection to this
Court’s January 7, 2013 Order dismissing the case without prejudice. ECF No. 19. Defendants
now move to dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. 1, ECF No. 21. No response has been filed.
In Streeter’s original Complaint, she alleged that Defendants discriminated against her
during the course of her employment with the Commission until her termination on
July 31, 2009. ECF No. 2, ¶ 1. Streeter alleged that she had been subjected to sexual harassment
from her supervisor, Rodney Scott, and that the Commission both failed to take corrective action
and retaliated against her for filing a complaint. Id. ¶ 2. According to Streeter, this retaliation
included another supervisor, Emily Rose, placing unspecified requirements on her
employment—which were not required of other, similarly situated employees and which
ultimately led to her termination on July 31, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Streeter noted that she also
registered a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
that “culminated in [her] authorization to file this action.” Id. ¶ 3.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint.
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Simmons & United Mortg. & Loan Invest, 634 F.3d 754, 768
(4th Cir. 2011) (“On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”) (internal quotations and
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emphasis omitted).
“Thus, ‘[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in
the complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Monroe v. City
of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261,
266 (4th Cir. 2009)).
Title VII provides that it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
[her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff
need not establish a prima facie case of a Title VII violation to survive a motion to dismiss.
Templeton v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 424 F. App’x 249, 250 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-15 (2002)). Yet, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Templeton, 424 F. App’x at 250
(citation omitted). “‘[N]aked assertions of wrongdoing necessitate some factual enhancement
within the complaint to cross the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
Streeter’s original Complaint was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, having been
comprised of only a bare assertion that she was “subjected to sexual harassment” by Rodney
Scott, a note that she filed a complaint with the EEOC without making clear that she has
exhausted her administrative requirements, and naked allegations of generalized retaliatory
conduct by Emily Rose and the Commission. See ECF No. 18, at 4. Streeter’s filings with the
Court since then have neither cured these deficiencies nor illuminated any facts which allege, in
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more than a conclusory fashion, that Defendants have acted unlawfully. Even when the Court
liberally construes Streeter’s pro se Complaint, the Court is unable to conclude that it contains
sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. The facts
pleaded in the document entitled “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to Defendants Memorandum
Opinion and Order,” therefore, do not fairly apprise Defendants of what is being claimed and are
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, it is this 31st day of March, 2015, by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland,
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice
(ECF No. 21) is hereby GRANTED and the Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with
prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue (ECF No. 24) is hereby DENIED AS
MOOT; and it is further
ORDERED, that judgment for costs is hereby ENTERED in favor of Defendants; and it
is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk is hereby DIRECTED to close this case; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and
Counsel of Record.
/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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