Feller v. Didone et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 4/5/12 nd). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 04/05/2012. (nd, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WILLIAM F. FELLER
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Plaintiff
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v
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THOMAS C. DIDONE and
ACS STATE & LOCAL SOLUTIONS, INC.
Defendants
Civil Action No. DKC-12-1002
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The above-captioned case was filed on April 2, 2012, together with a Motion to Proceed
in Forma Pauperis. ECF No. 2. Because he appears indigent, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No.
3. He states on March 25, 2011, he was issued a traffic ticket for exceeding the speed limit via
speed monitoring camera. ECF No. 3 at p. 1. He claims the first he became aware of the citation
was on May 3, 2011, when he received an overdue notice stating he had failed to respond to the
citation by the April 24, 2011 deadline. Plaintiff claims he never received the initial citation
notice.
In response to the overdue notice, Plaintiff sent in a letter and a check for the amount of
the initial citation, but not for the late fees. Id. at p. 2. In his letter Plaintiff explained that he did
not admit liability; that the enclosed payment was payment in full; and if Defendants did not
agree to the conditions, a trial date should be set. Plaintiff states the check was cashed. In July,
2011, Plaintiff’s MVA account was “flagged” stating he still owed the late fees and charging
additional fees for imposition of the MVA flag. Id.
Plaintiff requested an investigation from the Internal Affairs Division of the Montgomery
County Police, and one was initiated. As of March 28, 2012, Plaintiff states the investigation is
ongoing. Plaintiff claimed in his complaint with Internal Affairs that the ticket was issued
illegally, that ACS and Montgomery County Police violated Md. Code Ann., Transp. §21-809(j)
because ACS was paid fees on a per ticket basis. Id. Plaintiff further claimed that ACS is not
licensed in the State of Maryland as a Private Detective Agency or a Special Police Agency.
Additionally, Plaintiff states he raised several points regarding the constitutionality of the Safe
Speed Program. Id.
The instant Complaint appears to be an attempt to sue state officials to enjoin them from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908) “permits citizens to sue state officials to enjoin the enforcement of unconstitutional
laws,” creating “an exception to the general constitutional command that federal courts do not
have jurisdiction over suits by citizens against the states.” Lyle v. Griffith, 240 F. 3d 404, 412
(4th Cir. 2001). “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.’” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002), quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997).
The Complaint seeks to enjoin enforcement of fees associated with an overdue traffic
fine. ECF No. 3 at p. 2. Plaintiff claims he will be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief is not
granted because he will be unable to register his car and, thus, lose his right to drive it. Id. at p.
18. His basis for challenging the actions of Montgomery County officials is not a challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute permitting speed cameras; rather he states the contractual
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relationship between ACS and Montgomery County violates state law. 1 In addition he claims
there is no basis in state law for preventing the registration of his vehicle for non-payment of late
fees only; that ACS is not properly licensed under Maryland law; and the citation issued to him
did not contain the legally required information. ECF No. 3 at pp. 16 – 17. It is important to
note that Plaintiff is not seeking an injunction to prevent the future enforcement of the Safe
Speed Program, but to enjoin the prohibition against the registration of his vehicle. Thus the
Complaint is not the challenge contemplated by Ex Parte Young and is more accurately an action
seeking mandamus relief against a state agency.2
This Court does not have jurisdiction over State employees in an action for writ of
mandamus. Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir.
1969); see also 28 U.S.C. ' 1361. Additionally, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ that
is only available in cases where no other means by which the relief sought could be granted. In
re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir.1987). Plaintiff makes clear that although he had an
opportunity to challenge the validity of the citation as well as the legality of the contract between
Montgomery County Police and ACS in state district court, he did not do so because it “would be
extremely difficult when some judges will limit defenses.” ECF No. 3 at p. 19. As a matter of
comity, this court will not intervene in a matter that the state courts have not had an opportunity
to address. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987).
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Plaintiff lists constitutional arguments against the validity of the Safe Speed Program, but does not seek to enjoin
the use of the speed cameras in general. He states his “only goal” is “to allow him to re-register his vehicle.” ECF
No. 3 at p. 19.
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The sole relief sought is injunctive relief.
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In light of the lack of jurisdiction over the matter asserted, the Complaint shall be
dismissed and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order denied.
Date:
April 5, 2012
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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